1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
202 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
203 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
204 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
205 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
206 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
208 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
209 err: msgs::LightningError,
210 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
212 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
214 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 err: LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
219 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 shutdown_finish: None,
229 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
231 err: LightningError {
233 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
235 shutdown_finish: None,
239 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
240 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
243 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
245 err: LightningError {
247 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
248 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
254 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
258 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
261 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
263 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
265 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
267 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
268 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
274 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
277 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
284 shutdown_finish: None,
289 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
290 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
291 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
292 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
293 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
295 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
296 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
297 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
298 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
299 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
300 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
301 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
303 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
307 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
308 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
309 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
310 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
311 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
312 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
313 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
314 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
315 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
316 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
317 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
318 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
320 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
321 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
322 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
323 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
326 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
327 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
328 /// quite some time lag.
329 enum BackgroundEvent {
330 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
331 /// commitment transaction.
332 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
335 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
336 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
338 latest_features: InitFeatures,
341 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
342 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
344 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
346 struct PendingInboundPayment {
347 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
348 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
349 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
350 /// this payment being removed.
352 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
353 user_payment_id: u64,
354 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
355 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
356 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
359 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
360 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
361 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
362 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
363 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
364 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
365 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
366 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
368 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
369 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
370 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
371 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
372 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
373 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
374 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
375 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
376 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
378 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
379 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
381 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
382 /// to individual Channels.
384 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
385 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
386 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
387 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
389 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
390 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
391 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
392 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
393 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
394 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
395 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
397 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
398 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
399 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
400 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
403 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
404 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
405 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
406 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
407 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
409 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
410 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
411 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
412 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
413 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
414 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
415 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
416 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
417 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
418 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
421 default_configuration: UserConfig,
422 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
428 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
430 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
431 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
433 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
434 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
435 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
436 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
438 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
439 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
440 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
441 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
442 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
443 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
445 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
446 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
447 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
448 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
449 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
450 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
451 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
452 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
454 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
455 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
457 our_network_key: SecretKey,
458 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
460 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
461 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
462 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
464 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
465 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
466 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
467 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
469 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
470 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
471 /// are currently open with that peer.
472 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
473 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
475 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
477 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
478 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
479 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
480 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
481 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
482 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
483 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
484 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
485 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
487 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
494 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
496 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
497 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
498 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
499 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
500 pub struct ChainParameters {
501 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
502 pub network: Network,
504 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
506 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
507 pub best_block: BestBlock,
510 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
516 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
517 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
518 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
519 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
520 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
521 /// updates are ready for persistence).
523 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
524 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
525 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
526 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
527 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
529 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
530 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
533 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
534 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
535 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
538 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
539 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
541 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
542 persistence_notifier: notifier,
543 should_persist: persist_check,
544 _read_guard: read_guard,
549 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
551 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
552 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
557 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
558 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
560 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
562 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
563 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
564 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
565 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
566 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
568 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
569 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
571 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
573 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
574 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
575 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
576 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
577 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
578 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
579 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
581 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
582 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
584 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
585 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
586 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
587 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
589 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
590 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
591 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
592 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
593 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
594 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
597 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
599 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
600 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
603 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
605 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
606 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
607 pub struct ChannelDetails {
608 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
609 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
610 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
611 /// lifetime of the channel.
612 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
613 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
614 /// our counterparty already.
616 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
617 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
618 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
619 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
620 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
621 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
622 /// The node_id of our counterparty
623 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
624 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
625 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
626 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
627 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
628 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
629 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
630 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
631 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
632 /// this value on chain.
634 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
636 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
638 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
639 pub to_self_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
640 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
641 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
642 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
644 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
646 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
647 pub to_remote_reserve_satoshis: u64,
648 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
650 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
651 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
652 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
653 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
655 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
656 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
657 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
658 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
659 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
660 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
661 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
662 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
663 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
665 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
666 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
667 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
668 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
669 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
670 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
671 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
672 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
673 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
675 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
677 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
678 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
679 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
680 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
681 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
682 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
683 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
684 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
685 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
687 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
688 pub spend_csv_on_our_commitment_funds: Option<u16>,
689 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
690 pub is_outbound: bool,
691 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
692 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
693 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
694 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
695 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
697 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
698 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
699 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
700 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
702 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
704 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
706 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
707 /// payments to us through this channel.
708 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
711 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
712 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
714 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
715 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
716 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
717 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
718 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
719 ParameterError(APIError),
720 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
721 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
722 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
725 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
727 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
728 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
729 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
730 /// paths than the ones selected).
731 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
732 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
733 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
734 /// in over-/re-payment.
736 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
737 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
738 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
740 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
741 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
742 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
743 /// with the latest update_id.
744 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
747 macro_rules! handle_error {
748 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
751 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
752 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
754 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
755 // entering the macro.
756 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
759 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
761 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
762 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
763 if let Some(update) = update_option {
764 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
770 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
771 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
773 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
774 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
775 action: err.action.clone()
779 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
780 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
783 // Return error in case higher-API need one
790 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
791 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
792 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
794 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
795 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
797 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
798 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
799 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
800 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
802 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
803 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
805 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
806 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
807 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
808 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
810 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
811 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
817 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
818 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
822 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
824 $entry.remove_entry();
832 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
833 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
837 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
839 $entry.remove_entry();
847 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
848 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
849 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
851 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
853 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
854 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
855 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
856 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
858 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
859 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
860 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
861 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
862 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
863 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
864 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
865 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
866 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
867 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
868 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
871 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
872 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
873 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
874 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
876 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
877 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
879 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
880 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
882 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
883 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
884 if !$resend_commitment {
885 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
888 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
890 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
891 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
895 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
896 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
898 $entry.remove_entry();
904 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
905 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
906 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
908 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
909 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
913 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
914 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
915 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
916 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
917 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
920 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
925 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
926 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
927 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
928 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
929 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
930 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
932 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
933 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
935 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
936 if !forwards.is_empty() {
937 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
938 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
941 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
942 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
943 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
944 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
945 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
946 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
947 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
948 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
949 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
950 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
951 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
952 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
955 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
956 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
957 // before it should be allowed to.
958 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
959 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
960 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
963 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
964 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
965 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
966 msg: announcement_sigs,
969 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
972 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
973 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
974 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
975 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
976 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
977 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
978 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
979 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
980 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
981 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
982 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
983 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
984 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
985 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
986 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
987 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
988 let mut order = $order;
990 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
992 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
996 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
997 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
998 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
999 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1004 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1005 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1006 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1007 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1008 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1013 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1017 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1022 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1023 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1024 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1029 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1030 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1031 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1032 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1033 assert!(res.is_ok());
1036 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1040 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1041 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1042 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1044 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1046 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1047 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1052 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1053 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1054 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1055 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1056 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1059 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1061 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1062 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1064 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1066 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1068 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1069 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1070 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1071 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1072 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1073 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1076 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1077 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1078 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1082 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1084 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1085 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1086 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1087 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1088 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1089 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1091 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1092 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1094 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1095 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1098 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1099 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1101 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1103 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1104 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1105 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1106 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1114 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1115 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1116 &self.default_configuration
1119 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1121 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1122 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1123 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1124 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1125 /// otherwise ignored.
1127 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1128 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1130 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1131 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1132 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1133 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1134 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1137 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1138 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1139 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1141 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1142 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1143 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1145 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1146 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1147 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1148 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1149 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1151 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1156 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1157 node_id: their_network_key,
1163 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1164 let mut res = Vec::new();
1166 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1167 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1168 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1169 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1170 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1171 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1172 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1173 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1174 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1175 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1176 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1177 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1178 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1179 to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1180 to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1181 inbound_capacity_msat,
1182 outbound_capacity_msat,
1183 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1184 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1185 spend_csv_on_our_commitment_funds: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1186 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1187 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1188 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1189 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1190 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1194 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1195 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1196 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1197 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1203 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1204 /// more information.
1205 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1206 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1209 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1210 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1212 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1213 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1215 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1216 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1217 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1218 // really wanted anyway.
1219 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1222 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1223 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1224 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1226 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1227 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1228 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1230 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1231 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1232 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1233 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1234 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1235 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1237 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1240 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1241 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1242 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1244 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1245 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1247 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1250 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1251 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1253 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1254 self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
1257 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1258 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1259 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1268 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1269 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1270 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1271 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1272 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1274 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1275 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1276 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1277 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1278 // ignore the result here.
1279 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1283 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1285 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1286 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1287 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1288 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1289 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1290 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1293 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1294 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1296 chan.remove_entry().1
1298 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1301 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1302 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1303 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1304 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1305 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1310 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1313 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1314 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1315 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1316 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1317 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1318 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1319 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1320 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1321 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1322 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1323 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1333 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1334 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1335 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1336 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1337 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1341 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1342 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1343 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1345 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1346 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1347 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1348 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1349 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1350 failure_code: $err_code,
1351 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1356 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1357 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1360 let shared_secret = {
1361 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1362 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1365 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1367 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1368 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1369 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1370 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1371 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1372 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1373 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1374 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1377 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1378 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1379 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1380 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1381 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1384 let mut channel_state = None;
1385 macro_rules! return_err {
1386 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1388 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1389 if channel_state.is_none() {
1390 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1392 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1393 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1394 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1395 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1396 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1401 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1402 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1403 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1404 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1406 let error_code = match err {
1407 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1408 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1409 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1410 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1411 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1413 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1416 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1417 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1418 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1425 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1428 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1429 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1430 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1431 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1432 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1433 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1434 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1435 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1436 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1437 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1438 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1439 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1443 // final_expiry_too_soon
1444 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1445 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1446 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1447 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1448 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1449 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1451 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1452 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1453 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1455 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1456 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1457 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1460 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1461 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1462 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1463 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1466 if payment_data.is_none() {
1467 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1470 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1471 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1472 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1473 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1475 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1476 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1477 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1478 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1480 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1481 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1482 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1483 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1486 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1487 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1488 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1490 // Check two things:
1491 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1492 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1493 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1495 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1497 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1498 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1499 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1501 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1503 let blinding_factor = {
1504 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1505 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1506 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1507 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1510 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1512 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1514 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1517 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1518 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1521 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1522 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1523 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1524 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1525 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1529 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1530 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1531 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1534 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1535 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1536 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1537 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1541 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1542 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1543 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1544 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1545 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1546 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1547 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1548 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1549 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1550 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1552 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1554 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1555 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1557 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1558 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1559 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1560 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1561 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1562 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1563 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1565 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1566 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1568 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1569 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1570 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1572 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1573 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1575 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1576 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1577 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1578 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1579 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1581 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1582 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1584 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1585 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1586 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1587 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1593 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1594 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1595 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1596 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1598 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1599 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1601 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1602 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1603 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1605 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1607 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1612 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1615 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1616 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1617 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1619 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1620 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1621 if !chan.should_announce() {
1622 return Err(LightningError {
1623 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1624 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1628 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1631 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1632 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1633 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1634 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1635 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1636 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1637 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1638 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1639 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1643 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1645 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1646 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1648 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1649 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1650 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1651 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1652 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1653 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1654 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1655 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1658 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1659 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1661 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1667 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1668 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1670 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1671 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1672 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1674 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1675 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1676 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1677 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1678 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1680 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1682 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1683 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1685 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1686 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1687 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1688 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1689 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1692 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1693 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1695 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1696 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1698 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1699 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1701 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1703 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1704 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1705 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1707 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1708 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1709 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1710 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1711 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1712 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1713 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1714 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1715 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1718 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1719 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1720 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1721 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1722 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1723 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1724 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1725 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1733 } else { unreachable!(); }
1737 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1738 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1740 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1745 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1747 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1748 /// fields for more info.
1750 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1751 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1752 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1753 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1754 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1755 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1757 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1759 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1760 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1761 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1763 /// In general, a path may raise:
1764 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1765 /// node public key) is specified.
1766 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1767 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1769 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1770 /// relevant updates.
1772 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1773 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1774 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1776 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1777 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1778 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1779 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1781 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1782 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1783 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1784 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1785 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1786 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1788 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1789 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1790 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1791 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1792 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1794 let mut total_value = 0;
1795 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1796 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1797 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1798 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1799 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1800 continue 'path_check;
1802 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1803 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1804 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1805 continue 'path_check;
1808 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1809 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1811 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1812 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1815 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1816 let mut results = Vec::new();
1817 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1818 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1820 let mut has_ok = false;
1821 let mut has_err = false;
1822 for res in results.iter() {
1823 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1824 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1825 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1826 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1833 if has_err && has_ok {
1834 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1836 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1842 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1843 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1844 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1845 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1847 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1849 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1851 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1852 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1853 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1854 } else { unreachable!(); })
1857 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1859 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1860 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1863 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1864 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1869 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1870 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1871 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1874 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1876 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1878 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1886 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1887 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1888 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1892 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1894 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1895 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1897 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1899 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1900 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1901 /// keys per-channel).
1903 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1904 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1905 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1907 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1908 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1909 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1911 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1912 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1913 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1915 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1916 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1918 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1922 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1923 let mut output_index = None;
1924 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1925 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1926 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1927 if output_index.is_some() {
1928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1929 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1932 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1934 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1937 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1940 if output_index.is_none() {
1941 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1942 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1945 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1949 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1950 if !chan.should_announce() {
1951 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1955 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1957 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1959 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1960 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1962 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1963 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1964 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1965 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1966 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1971 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1972 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1973 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1975 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1978 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1979 // smaller than 500:
1980 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1982 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
1983 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
1984 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
1985 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
1986 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
1987 /// our network addresses.
1989 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
1990 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1992 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
1993 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
1994 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
1995 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
1997 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
1999 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2000 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2003 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2004 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2007 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2008 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2009 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2011 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2012 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2013 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2014 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2015 rgb, alias, addresses,
2016 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2017 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2019 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2020 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2022 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2023 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2025 let mut announced_chans = false;
2026 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2027 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2028 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2030 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2035 announced_chans = true;
2037 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2038 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2039 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2043 if announced_chans {
2044 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2045 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2046 signature: node_announce_sig,
2047 contents: announcement
2053 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2055 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2056 /// Will likely generate further events.
2057 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2060 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2061 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2062 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2064 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2065 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2067 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2068 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2069 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2070 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2072 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2073 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2074 match forward_info {
2075 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2076 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2077 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2078 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2079 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2080 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2081 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2083 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2084 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2087 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2088 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2089 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2090 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2091 // problem, not ours.
2098 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2099 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2100 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2101 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2102 match forward_info {
2103 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2104 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2106 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2107 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2109 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2110 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2111 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2112 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2113 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2115 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2117 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2118 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2120 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2122 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2123 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2124 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2130 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2132 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2133 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2134 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2135 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2136 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2137 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2138 // this channel currently :/.
2144 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2145 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2147 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2148 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2149 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2151 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2152 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2154 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2156 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2157 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2158 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2161 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2163 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2164 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2165 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2166 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2167 // messages when we can.
2168 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2169 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2170 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2177 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2178 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2181 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2182 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2183 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2184 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2185 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2186 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2188 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2190 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2191 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2192 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2194 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2196 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2198 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2202 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2203 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2206 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2207 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2208 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2209 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2210 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2211 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2212 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2213 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2214 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2216 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2224 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2225 match forward_info {
2226 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2227 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2228 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2229 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2230 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2231 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2232 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2233 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2234 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2235 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2237 value: amt_to_forward,
2238 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2239 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2242 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2244 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2245 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2246 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2248 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2249 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2250 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2251 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2252 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2254 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2259 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2260 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2261 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2262 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2263 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2264 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2265 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2266 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2268 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2269 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2271 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2272 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2273 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2274 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2275 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2276 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2277 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2278 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2280 let mut total_value = 0;
2281 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2282 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2283 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2284 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2285 total_value += htlc.value;
2286 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2287 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2288 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2289 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2291 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2293 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2294 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2295 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2296 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2299 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2300 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2302 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2303 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2305 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2307 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2308 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2310 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2312 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2313 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2320 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2321 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2323 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2324 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2332 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2333 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2336 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2337 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2340 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2341 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2342 events.append(&mut new_events);
2345 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2347 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2348 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2350 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2351 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2352 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2353 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2354 if background_events.is_empty() {
2358 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2360 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2361 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2362 // monitor updating completing.
2363 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2370 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2371 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2372 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2373 self.process_background_events();
2376 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2377 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2378 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2380 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2382 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2383 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2384 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2385 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2386 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2388 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2389 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2390 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2391 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2392 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2393 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2394 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2395 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2396 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2397 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2398 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2402 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2403 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2405 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2406 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2407 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2411 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2412 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2422 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2423 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2424 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2425 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2426 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2427 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2428 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2430 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2431 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2432 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2433 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2434 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2435 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2436 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2437 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2438 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2439 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2440 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2446 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2447 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2448 // be surfaced to the user.
2449 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2450 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2453 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2454 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2455 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2456 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2457 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2459 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2464 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2465 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2466 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2468 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2470 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2471 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2472 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2474 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2475 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2477 rejected_by_dest: false,
2485 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2492 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2493 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2494 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2495 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2496 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2497 /// still-available channels.
2498 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2499 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2500 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2501 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2504 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2505 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2506 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2510 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2511 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2512 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2514 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2517 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2518 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2519 match &onion_error {
2520 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2522 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2524 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2525 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2526 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2527 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2528 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2529 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2530 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2535 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2536 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2537 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2538 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2540 error_code: onion_error_code,
2542 error_data: onion_error_data
2546 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2552 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2553 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2554 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2555 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2557 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2558 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2559 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2560 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2561 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2562 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2564 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2566 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2572 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2573 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2574 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2575 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2576 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2577 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2579 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2580 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2581 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2585 let mut forward_event = None;
2586 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2587 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2589 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2591 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2594 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2597 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2598 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2599 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2600 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2601 time_forwardable: time
2608 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2609 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2610 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2612 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2613 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2614 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2615 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2617 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2619 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2620 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2621 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2622 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2626 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2627 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2628 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2629 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2631 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2632 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2633 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2634 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2636 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2637 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2638 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2639 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2640 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2642 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2643 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2644 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2650 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2651 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2652 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2654 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2655 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2656 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2657 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2658 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2659 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2660 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2662 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2664 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2665 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2666 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2667 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2668 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2669 } else { errs.push(e); }
2671 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2672 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2677 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2678 // which were generated.
2679 channel_state.take();
2681 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2682 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2683 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2690 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2691 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2692 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2693 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2694 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2700 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2701 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2702 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2703 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2704 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2705 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2706 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2707 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2709 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2713 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2714 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2715 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2716 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2717 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2718 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2719 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2720 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2721 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2722 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2731 // TODO: Do something with e?
2732 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2733 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2734 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2735 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2736 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2737 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2738 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2742 } else { unreachable!(); }
2745 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2747 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2748 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2750 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2751 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2752 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2754 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2755 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2759 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2762 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2763 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2764 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2767 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2768 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2769 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2770 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2773 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2774 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2775 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2776 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2777 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2778 payment_preimage, e);
2782 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2784 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2785 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2786 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2792 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2793 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2794 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2797 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2798 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2801 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2802 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2804 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2805 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2806 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2807 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2809 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2810 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2811 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2812 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2813 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2814 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2815 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2816 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2817 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2818 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2820 let chan_restoration_res;
2821 let mut pending_failures = {
2822 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2823 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2824 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2825 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2828 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2832 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2833 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
2834 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2835 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
2836 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
2837 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
2838 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2839 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2840 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
2843 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2844 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2845 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2849 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2850 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2851 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2855 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2856 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2860 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2861 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2862 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2863 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2864 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2865 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2867 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2868 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2869 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2871 entry.insert(channel);
2877 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2878 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2879 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2880 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2881 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2882 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2883 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2884 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2886 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2887 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2892 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2893 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2894 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2895 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2897 user_channel_id: user_id,
2902 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2903 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2904 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2905 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2906 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2907 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2908 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2909 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2910 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2912 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2914 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2917 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2918 // lock before watch_channel
2919 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2921 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2922 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2923 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2924 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2925 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2926 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2927 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2928 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2929 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2930 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2931 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2933 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2934 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2935 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2936 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2937 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2938 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2942 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2943 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2944 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2946 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2949 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2950 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2959 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2961 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2962 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2963 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2964 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2965 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2966 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2967 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2969 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2970 Ok(update) => update,
2971 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2973 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2974 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2981 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2982 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2986 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2987 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2988 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2989 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2990 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2991 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2992 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2994 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2995 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2997 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2998 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2999 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3000 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3001 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3002 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3003 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3004 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3005 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3006 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3007 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3008 msg: announcement_sigs,
3010 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3011 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3012 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3013 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3018 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3022 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3023 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
3024 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3025 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3027 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3028 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3029 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3030 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3032 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3033 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3034 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3035 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3039 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3040 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3041 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3045 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
3046 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3047 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3049 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3050 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
3052 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3055 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3056 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3058 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3059 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3060 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3061 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3069 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3070 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3071 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3072 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3073 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3075 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3076 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3078 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3079 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3080 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3081 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3086 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3087 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3088 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3089 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3090 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3091 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3092 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3094 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3095 } else { (tx, None) }
3097 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3100 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3101 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3102 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3104 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3105 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3106 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3107 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3115 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3116 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3117 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3118 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3120 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3121 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3122 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3123 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3125 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3126 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3128 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3130 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3134 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3135 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3136 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3137 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3138 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3139 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3140 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3141 match pending_forward_info {
3142 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3143 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3144 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3145 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3146 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3147 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3148 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3152 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3153 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3154 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3155 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3156 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3157 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3158 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3159 // no problem just calling this
3160 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3161 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3163 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3164 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3165 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3168 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3170 _ => pending_forward_info
3173 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3175 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3180 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3181 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3183 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3184 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3185 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3186 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3187 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3189 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3191 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3194 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3198 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3199 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3200 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3201 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3202 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3203 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3206 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3213 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3214 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3215 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3216 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3217 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3218 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3219 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3221 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3222 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3223 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3225 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3232 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3233 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3234 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3235 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3237 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3240 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3241 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3242 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3243 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3244 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3245 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3246 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3251 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3252 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3253 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3255 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3256 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3257 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3259 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3261 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3262 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3263 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3264 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3265 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3266 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3268 commitment_signed: msg,
3272 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3273 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3274 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3285 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3286 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3287 let mut forward_event = None;
3288 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3289 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3290 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3291 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3293 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3294 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3295 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3296 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3298 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3299 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3300 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3303 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3304 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3309 match forward_event {
3311 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3312 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3313 time_forwardable: time
3321 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3322 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3324 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3325 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3326 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3327 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3328 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3329 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3331 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3332 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3333 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3334 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3335 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3336 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3337 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3338 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3340 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3342 } else { unreachable!(); }
3345 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3346 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3347 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3351 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3352 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3353 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3357 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3359 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3362 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3364 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3365 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3366 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3368 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3375 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3376 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3377 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3378 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3379 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3380 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3383 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3385 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3390 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3391 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3392 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3394 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3395 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3396 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3397 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3399 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3400 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3403 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3404 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3405 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3406 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3407 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3415 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3416 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3417 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3418 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3419 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3420 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3422 // It's not a local channel
3423 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3426 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3427 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3428 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3429 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3430 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3431 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3432 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3433 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3435 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3437 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3438 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3439 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3440 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3442 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3445 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3447 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3450 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3451 let chan_restoration_res;
3452 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3453 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3454 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3456 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3457 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3458 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3459 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3461 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3462 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3463 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3464 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3465 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3466 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3467 let mut channel_update = None;
3468 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3469 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3470 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3473 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3474 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3475 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3476 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3477 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3478 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3479 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3482 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3483 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3484 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3485 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3487 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3492 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3493 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3495 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3496 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3501 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3502 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3503 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3504 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3505 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3507 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3509 let counterparty_node_id;
3510 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3511 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3512 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3514 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3515 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3516 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3517 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3518 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3520 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3521 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3523 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3524 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3526 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3527 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3528 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3530 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3533 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3534 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3535 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3536 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3537 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3538 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3539 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3540 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3541 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3551 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3552 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3553 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3557 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3558 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3559 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3560 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3561 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3562 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3563 match monitor_event {
3564 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3565 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3566 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3567 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3569 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3570 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3573 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3574 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3575 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3576 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3577 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3578 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3579 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3580 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3581 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3583 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3584 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3585 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3589 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3590 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3591 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3592 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3600 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3601 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3604 has_pending_monitor_events
3607 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3608 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3609 /// update was applied.
3611 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3612 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3613 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3614 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3615 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3616 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3617 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3618 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3620 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3621 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3622 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3623 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3624 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3626 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3627 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3628 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3629 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3630 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3632 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3633 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3634 has_monitor_update = true;
3635 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3636 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3637 if close_channel { return false; }
3639 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3640 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3641 updates: commitment_update,
3648 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3649 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3656 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3657 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3658 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3661 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3662 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3668 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3669 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3671 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3672 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3673 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3674 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3675 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3676 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3677 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3678 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3679 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3680 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3681 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3682 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3683 assert!(should_broadcast);
3684 } else { unreachable!(); }
3685 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3687 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3691 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3692 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3694 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3696 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3697 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3698 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3699 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3700 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3701 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3702 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3703 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3704 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3705 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3706 // never fail a payment too early.
3707 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3709 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3712 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3717 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3720 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3721 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3723 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3724 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3725 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3727 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3729 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3730 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3731 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3732 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3733 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3734 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3735 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3738 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3739 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3742 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3743 /// stored external to LDK.
3745 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3746 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3747 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3749 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3750 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3752 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3753 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3754 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3755 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3756 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3758 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3759 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3760 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3761 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3763 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3764 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3765 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3766 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3767 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3769 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3770 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3771 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3772 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3773 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3775 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3776 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3777 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3779 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3781 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3782 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3784 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3785 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3786 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3787 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3788 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3791 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3792 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3793 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3794 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3795 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3800 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3801 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3802 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3803 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3804 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3807 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3808 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3809 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3810 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3812 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3813 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3814 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3815 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3818 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3819 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3822 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3823 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3824 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3826 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3827 events.replace(pending_events);
3836 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3838 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3839 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3840 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3841 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3844 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3846 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3847 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3849 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3850 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3851 /// restarting from an old state.
3852 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3853 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3854 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3856 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3857 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3858 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3859 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3862 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3863 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3864 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3867 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3868 handler.handle_event(event);
3876 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3878 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3879 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3880 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3881 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3884 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3886 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3887 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3888 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3889 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3890 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3893 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3894 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3895 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3898 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3899 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3900 let new_height = height - 1;
3902 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3903 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3904 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3905 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3906 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3907 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3910 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
3914 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3916 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3917 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3918 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3919 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3922 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3923 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3924 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3925 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3927 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3928 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3930 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3931 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3934 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3935 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3936 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3937 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3939 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3940 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3942 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3944 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3946 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
3948 macro_rules! max_time {
3949 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3951 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3952 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3953 // having an explicit local time source.
3954 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3955 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3956 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3957 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3958 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3964 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3965 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3966 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3967 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3968 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3972 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3973 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3974 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3975 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3976 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3977 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3983 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3985 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3986 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3987 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3988 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3989 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3990 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3995 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3997 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3998 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3999 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4000 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4003 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4004 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4006 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4007 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4008 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4009 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4010 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4012 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4013 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4015 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4016 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4017 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4018 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4019 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4020 let res = f(channel);
4021 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4022 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4023 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4024 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4025 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4029 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4031 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4032 msg: funding_locked,
4034 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4035 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4036 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4037 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4038 msg: announcement_sigs,
4040 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4041 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4042 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4043 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4044 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4047 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4049 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4051 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4052 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4053 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4055 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4056 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4057 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4058 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4059 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4063 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4064 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4065 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4072 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4073 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4074 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4075 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4076 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4077 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4078 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4079 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4080 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4081 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4082 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4083 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4084 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4089 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4094 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4096 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4097 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4101 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4102 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4103 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4105 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4106 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4107 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4108 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4111 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4112 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4114 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4115 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4118 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4119 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4120 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4121 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4122 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4126 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4127 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4128 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4129 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4133 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4134 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4135 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4136 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4137 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4138 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4141 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4142 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4143 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4146 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4148 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4151 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4152 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4153 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4156 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4158 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4161 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4163 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4166 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4171 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4172 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4173 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4176 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4178 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4181 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4182 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4183 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4186 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4187 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4188 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4191 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4192 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4193 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4196 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4198 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4201 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4203 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4206 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4207 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4208 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4211 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4212 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4213 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4216 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4217 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4218 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4221 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4226 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4227 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4228 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4231 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4232 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4233 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4234 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4236 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4237 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4238 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4239 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4240 if no_connection_possible {
4241 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4242 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4243 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4244 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4245 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4247 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4248 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4259 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4260 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4261 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4262 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4263 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4264 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4265 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4269 no_channels_remain = false;
4275 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4277 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4278 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4279 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4280 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4281 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4282 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4283 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4284 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4285 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4286 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4287 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4288 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4289 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4290 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4291 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4292 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4293 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4294 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4295 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4296 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4300 if no_channels_remain {
4301 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4304 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4305 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4309 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4310 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4312 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4315 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4316 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4317 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4318 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4319 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4322 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4323 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4328 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4329 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4330 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4331 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4332 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4333 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4334 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4335 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4336 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4340 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4341 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4342 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4348 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4351 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4352 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4354 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4355 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4356 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4357 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4358 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4362 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4363 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4368 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4369 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4370 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4371 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4372 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4373 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4376 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4379 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4385 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4386 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4391 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4392 let result = *guard;
4400 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4401 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4402 let current_time = Instant::now();
4404 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4405 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4410 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4411 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4412 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4413 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4414 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4416 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4417 let result = *guard;
4418 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4422 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4423 None => return result,
4429 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4431 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4432 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4433 *persistence_lock = true;
4434 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4439 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4440 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4442 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4444 (0, onion_packet, required),
4445 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4448 (0, payment_data, required),
4449 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4453 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4454 (0, routing, required),
4455 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4456 (4, payment_hash, required),
4457 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4458 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4465 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4471 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4472 (2, outpoint, required),
4473 (4, htlc_id, required),
4474 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4477 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimableHTLC, {
4478 (0, prev_hop, required),
4479 (2, value, required),
4480 (4, payment_data, required),
4481 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4484 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4485 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4486 (0, session_priv, required),
4487 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4488 (4, path, vec_type),
4490 (1, PreviousHopData)
4493 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4494 (0, LightningError) => {
4498 (0, failure_code, required),
4499 (2, data, vec_type),
4503 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4505 (0, forward_info, required),
4506 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4507 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4508 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4511 (0, htlc_id, required),
4512 (2, err_packet, required),
4516 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4517 (0, payment_secret, required),
4518 (2, expiry_time, required),
4519 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4520 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4521 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4524 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4525 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4526 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4527 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4528 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4531 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4532 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4534 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4536 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4538 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4539 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4540 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4543 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4544 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4545 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4546 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4547 unfunded_channels += 1;
4550 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4551 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4552 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4553 channel.write(writer)?;
4557 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4558 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4559 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4560 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4561 for forward in pending_forwards {
4562 forward.write(writer)?;
4566 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4567 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4568 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4569 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4570 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4571 htlc.write(writer)?;
4575 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4576 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4577 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4578 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4579 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4580 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4583 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4584 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4585 for event in events.iter() {
4586 event.write(writer)?;
4589 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4590 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4591 for event in background_events.iter() {
4593 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4595 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4596 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4601 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4602 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4604 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4605 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4606 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4607 hash.write(writer)?;
4608 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4611 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4612 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4613 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4614 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4617 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4623 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4625 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4627 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4628 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4629 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4630 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4631 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4632 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4633 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4634 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4635 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4636 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4637 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4639 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4640 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4642 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4643 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4644 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4645 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4646 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4647 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4648 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4649 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4650 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4651 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4652 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4655 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4656 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4658 pub keys_manager: K,
4660 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4662 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4663 pub fee_estimator: F,
4664 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4666 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4667 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4668 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4669 pub chain_monitor: M,
4671 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4672 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4673 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4674 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4675 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4676 /// deserialization.
4678 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4679 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4680 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4682 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4683 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4685 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4686 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4687 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4688 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4690 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4693 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4694 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4697 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4698 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4699 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4700 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4701 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4702 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4705 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4706 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4707 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4708 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4709 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4711 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4712 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4717 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4718 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4719 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4720 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4721 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4723 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4724 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4727 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4728 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4729 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4733 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4734 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4735 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4736 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4737 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4738 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4741 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4742 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4744 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4745 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4746 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4748 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4750 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4751 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4752 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4753 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4754 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4755 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4756 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4757 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4758 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4759 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4760 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4761 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4762 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4763 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4764 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4765 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4766 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4767 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4768 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4769 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4770 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4771 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4772 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4773 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4774 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4775 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4776 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4777 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4778 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4779 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4781 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4782 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4784 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4787 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4788 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4789 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4790 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
4791 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
4792 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4796 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4797 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4798 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4802 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4803 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4804 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4805 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4806 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4807 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4808 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4809 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4810 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4812 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4815 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4816 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4817 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4818 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4819 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4820 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4821 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4822 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4824 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4827 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4828 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4829 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4830 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4831 let peer_state = PeerState {
4832 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4834 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4837 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4838 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4839 for _ in 0..event_count {
4840 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4841 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4846 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4847 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4848 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4849 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4850 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4851 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4855 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4856 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4858 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4859 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4860 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4861 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4862 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4866 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4867 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4868 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4869 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4870 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4874 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
4876 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4877 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4879 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4881 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4882 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4883 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4885 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4887 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4892 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4894 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4895 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4897 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4898 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4901 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4902 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4904 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4906 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4907 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4908 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4909 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4911 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4912 logger: args.logger,
4913 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4916 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4917 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4920 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4921 //connection or two.
4923 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4929 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4931 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4933 use core::time::Duration;
4934 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4935 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4936 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4939 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4940 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4941 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4943 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4944 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4945 thread::spawn(move || {
4947 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4948 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4949 *persistence_lock = true;
4952 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4958 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4959 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4961 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4964 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4969 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4971 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4974 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4981 fn test_notify_limits() {
4982 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
4983 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
4984 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4985 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4986 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4987 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4989 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4991 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
4992 // to connect messages with new values
4993 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
4994 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
4995 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
4996 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
4998 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
4999 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5000 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5001 // ... but the last node should not.
5002 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5003 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5004 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5005 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5007 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5008 // about the channel.
5009 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5010 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5011 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5013 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5015 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5016 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5017 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5018 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5019 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5020 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5022 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5023 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5024 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5026 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5027 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5028 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5029 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5030 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5031 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5033 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5034 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5035 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5036 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5037 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5038 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5039 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5040 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5042 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5043 // the channel info has updated.
5044 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5045 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5046 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5047 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5048 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5049 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5053 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5056 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5057 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5058 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5059 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5060 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5061 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5062 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5063 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5064 use routing::router::get_route;
5065 use util::test_utils;
5066 use util::config::UserConfig;
5067 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5069 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5070 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5071 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5073 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5077 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5078 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5079 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5080 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5081 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5082 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5083 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5088 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5089 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5092 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5093 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5094 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5096 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5097 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5099 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5100 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
5102 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5103 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5105 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5106 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5107 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5108 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5109 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5111 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5113 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5115 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5116 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5117 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5118 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
5119 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5121 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5123 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
5125 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
5126 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5127 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5130 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
5131 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5132 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
5134 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
5135 } else { panic!(); }
5137 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5138 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5140 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
5143 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5146 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
5147 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
5149 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5150 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5151 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
5152 match msg_events[0] {
5153 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
5154 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
5155 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
5159 match msg_events[1] {
5160 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5164 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
5166 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
5167 macro_rules! send_payment {
5168 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
5169 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
5170 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
5171 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
5173 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
5174 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
5176 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
5177 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5179 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5180 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
5181 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5182 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
5183 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5184 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5185 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5186 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
5188 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
5189 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
5190 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5192 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
5193 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
5194 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5195 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5196 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5198 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5201 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5202 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5203 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5204 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5206 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5211 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5212 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);