1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1113 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1115 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1116 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1118 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1119 /// closing channels
1120 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1121 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1122 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1123 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1125 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1126 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1128 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1129 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1130 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1131 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1132 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1133 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1135 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1136 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1138 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1140 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1141 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1142 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1143 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1144 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1146 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1147 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1148 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1150 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1151 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1152 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1154 /// # Initialization
1156 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1157 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1158 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1159 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1160 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1163 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1164 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1165 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1166 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1167 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1168 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1169 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1170 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1172 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1175 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1176 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1177 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1178 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1180 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1182 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1183 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1184 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1185 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1187 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1188 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1189 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1190 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1191 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1192 /// # mut reader: R,
1193 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1194 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1195 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1196 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1199 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1200 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1201 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1202 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1205 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1206 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1207 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1208 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1209 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1211 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1212 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1214 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1217 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1218 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1219 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1227 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1228 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1229 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1230 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1231 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1232 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1233 /// as documented by those traits
1234 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1236 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1237 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1238 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1240 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1241 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1243 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1244 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1245 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1246 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1250 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1251 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1252 /// currently open channels.
1255 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1257 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1258 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1259 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1260 /// for details in channels {
1261 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1266 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1267 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1268 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1269 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1271 /// ## Opening Channels
1273 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1274 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1275 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1278 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1279 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1280 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1281 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1283 /// # trait Wallet {
1284 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1285 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1286 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1289 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1290 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1291 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1292 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1293 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1294 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1295 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1298 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1299 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1300 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1301 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1302 /// user_channel_id, ..
1304 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1305 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1306 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1308 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1309 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1311 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1312 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1315 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1316 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1318 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1319 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1322 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1323 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1324 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1332 /// ## Accepting Channels
1334 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1335 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1336 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1339 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1340 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1341 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1343 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1345 /// # unimplemented!()
1348 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1349 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1350 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1351 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1352 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1353 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1354 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1356 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1357 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1362 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1363 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1364 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1366 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1367 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1376 /// ## Closing Channels
1378 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1379 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1380 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1381 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1382 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1385 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1386 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1387 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1388 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1390 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1391 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1393 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1394 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1395 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1396 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1399 /// // On the event processing thread
1400 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1401 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1402 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1403 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1413 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1414 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1415 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1416 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1418 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1419 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1420 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1421 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1422 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1423 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1424 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1425 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1426 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1428 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1429 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1430 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1432 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1434 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1435 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1436 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1437 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1438 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1440 /// # DoS Mitigation
1442 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1443 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1444 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1445 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1447 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1448 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1449 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1453 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1454 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1455 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1456 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1457 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1459 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1460 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1461 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1462 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1463 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1464 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1465 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1466 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1467 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1468 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1469 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1470 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1471 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1472 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1473 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1474 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1475 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1476 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1477 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1478 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1479 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1480 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1481 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1482 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1483 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1486 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1487 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1488 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1489 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1490 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1494 // `pending_offers_messages`
1496 // `total_consistency_lock`
1498 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1500 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1502 // |__`per_peer_state`
1504 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1506 // |__`claimable_payments`
1508 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1512 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1514 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1516 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1520 // |__`pending_events`
1522 // |__`pending_background_events`
1524 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1526 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1527 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1528 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1529 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1530 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1531 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1535 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1536 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1537 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1543 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1545 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1547 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1548 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1550 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1551 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1552 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1553 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1555 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1556 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1558 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1559 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1560 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1561 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1562 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1563 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1564 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1565 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1567 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1569 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1570 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1572 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1574 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1575 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1576 /// and via the classic SCID.
1578 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1579 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1581 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1583 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1585 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1586 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1587 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1589 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1590 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1592 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1593 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1595 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1596 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1598 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1599 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1600 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1601 /// active channel list on load.
1603 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1604 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1606 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1608 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1609 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1610 /// the handling of the events.
1612 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1613 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1616 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1617 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1618 /// would break backwards compatability.
1619 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1620 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1621 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1623 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1625 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1627 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1629 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1631 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1632 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1633 /// confirmation depth.
1635 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1636 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1637 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1639 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1641 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1643 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1645 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1647 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1649 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1650 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1651 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1653 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1654 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1656 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1657 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1658 /// keeping additional state.
1659 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1661 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1662 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1663 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1664 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1666 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1667 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1669 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1670 /// are currently open with that peer.
1672 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1673 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1676 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1678 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1679 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1680 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1681 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1682 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1684 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1685 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1686 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1687 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1688 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1690 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1691 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1693 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1694 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1695 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1696 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1697 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1699 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1700 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1702 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1703 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1704 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1705 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1706 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1708 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1710 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1712 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1713 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1714 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1715 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1716 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1717 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1718 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1719 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1720 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1721 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1722 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1724 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1725 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1726 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1728 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1730 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1731 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1733 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1737 signer_provider: SP,
1742 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1744 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1745 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1746 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1747 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1748 pub struct ChainParameters {
1749 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1750 pub network: Network,
1752 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1754 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1755 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1758 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1762 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1763 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1766 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1767 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1768 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1769 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1770 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1771 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1773 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1774 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1775 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1776 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1777 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1778 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1780 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1781 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1784 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1785 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1786 /// events to handle.
1788 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1789 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1791 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1792 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1795 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1796 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1797 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1798 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1800 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1801 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1802 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1803 should_persist: move || {
1804 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1805 // processing and return that.
1806 let notify = persist_check();
1807 match (notify, force_notify) {
1808 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1809 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1810 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1811 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1812 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1815 _read_guard: read_guard,
1819 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1820 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1821 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1822 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1823 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1824 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1826 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1827 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1828 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1829 should_persist: persist_check,
1830 _read_guard: read_guard,
1835 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1836 fn drop(&mut self) {
1837 match (self.should_persist)() {
1838 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1839 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1840 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1842 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1843 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1844 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1849 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1850 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1852 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1854 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1855 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1856 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1857 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1858 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1860 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1861 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1863 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1865 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1866 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1867 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1868 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1869 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1870 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1871 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1872 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1873 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1874 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1875 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1876 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1877 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1879 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1880 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1882 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1883 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1884 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1885 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1887 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1888 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1889 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1890 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1891 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1892 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1894 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1896 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1897 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1899 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1901 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1902 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1904 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1905 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1906 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1908 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1909 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1910 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1912 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1913 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1914 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1915 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1917 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1918 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1919 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1921 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1922 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1923 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1925 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1926 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1927 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1928 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1929 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1930 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1931 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1932 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1933 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1934 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1935 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1938 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1939 /// to better separate parameters.
1940 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1941 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1942 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1943 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1944 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1945 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1946 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1947 pub features: InitFeatures,
1948 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1949 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1950 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1952 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1954 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1955 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1956 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1957 /// payments to us through this channel.
1958 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1959 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1960 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1961 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1962 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1963 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1964 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1967 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1968 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1969 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1970 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1971 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1972 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1973 /// lifetime of the channel.
1974 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1975 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1976 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1977 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1978 /// our counterparty already.
1979 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1980 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1982 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1983 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1984 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1985 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1987 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1988 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1990 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1991 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1993 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1994 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1995 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1996 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1997 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1998 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1999 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2000 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2001 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2004 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2006 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2007 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2008 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2009 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2010 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2011 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2012 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2014 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2015 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2017 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2018 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2019 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2020 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2021 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2022 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2023 /// this value on chain.
2025 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2027 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2029 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2030 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2031 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2032 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2033 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2034 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
2035 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2037 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2038 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2039 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2040 pub user_channel_id: u128,
2041 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2042 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2044 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2045 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2046 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2047 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2048 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2050 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2051 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2052 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2053 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2055 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2056 pub balance_msat: u64,
2057 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2058 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2059 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2060 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2062 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2064 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2065 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2066 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2067 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2068 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2069 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2070 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2071 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2073 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2074 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2075 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2076 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2077 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2078 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2079 /// route which is valid.
2080 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2081 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2082 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2083 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2084 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2085 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2087 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2088 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2089 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2090 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2091 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2092 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2093 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2094 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2095 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2097 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2099 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2100 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2101 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2102 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2103 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2105 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2106 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2107 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2108 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2109 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2110 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2111 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2113 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2114 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2115 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2116 pub is_outbound: bool,
2117 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2118 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2119 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2120 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2121 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2123 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2124 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2125 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2126 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2127 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2128 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2129 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2131 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2132 pub is_usable: bool,
2133 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2134 pub is_public: bool,
2135 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2136 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2137 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2138 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2139 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2140 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2142 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2143 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2144 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2146 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2147 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2148 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2150 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2151 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2154 impl ChannelDetails {
2155 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2156 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2157 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2159 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2160 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2161 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2162 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2165 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2166 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2167 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2169 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2170 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2171 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2172 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2175 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2176 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2177 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2180 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2181 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2183 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2184 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2185 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2187 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2188 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2189 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2190 features: latest_features,
2191 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2192 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2193 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2194 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2195 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2196 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2197 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2198 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2199 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2200 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2202 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2203 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2204 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2205 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2206 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2207 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2208 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2209 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2210 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2211 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2212 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2213 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2214 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2215 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2216 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2217 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2218 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2219 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2220 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2221 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2222 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2223 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2224 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2225 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2226 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2227 config: Some(context.config()),
2228 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2229 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2230 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2235 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2236 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2237 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2238 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2239 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2240 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2241 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2242 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2243 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2245 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2247 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2248 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2250 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2251 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2252 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2253 /// to drop the channel.
2257 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2258 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2259 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2260 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2261 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2263 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2264 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2265 payment_id: PaymentId,
2267 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2269 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2270 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2271 payment_id: PaymentId,
2272 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2274 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2275 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2276 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2279 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2280 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2281 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2283 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2284 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2285 payment_id: PaymentId,
2286 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2287 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2288 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2290 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2291 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2292 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2294 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2295 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2296 payment_id: PaymentId,
2297 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2298 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2302 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2304 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2306 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2307 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2308 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2309 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2311 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2312 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2313 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2316 macro_rules! handle_error {
2317 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2318 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2319 // entering the macro.
2320 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2321 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2325 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2326 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2328 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2329 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2330 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2331 let logger = WithContext::from(
2332 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2334 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2336 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2337 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2338 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2343 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2346 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2348 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2349 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2350 action: err.action.clone()
2354 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2355 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2356 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2357 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2358 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2362 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2369 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2370 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2371 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2372 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2374 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2375 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2376 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2378 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2379 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2380 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2381 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2382 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2384 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2385 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2387 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2391 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2392 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2393 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2395 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2396 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2398 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2399 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2401 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2402 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2403 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2404 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2405 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2406 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2408 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2413 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2414 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2416 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2417 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2419 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2420 match $channel_phase {
2421 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2422 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2424 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2425 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2427 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2428 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2430 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2431 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2432 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2434 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2435 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2436 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2442 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2443 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2447 let key = *$entry.key();
2448 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2450 $entry.remove_entry();
2458 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2459 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2463 let key = *$entry.key();
2464 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2466 $entry.remove_entry();
2474 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2475 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2477 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2478 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2484 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2485 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2486 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2487 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2488 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2490 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2491 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2492 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2493 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2494 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2495 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2496 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2497 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2498 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2499 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2504 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2505 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2506 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2507 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2508 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2509 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2510 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2511 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2512 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2513 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2515 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2520 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2521 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2522 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2523 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2524 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2525 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2526 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2527 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2528 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2530 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2535 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2536 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2537 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2538 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2539 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2540 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2541 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2542 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2543 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2544 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2545 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2546 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2548 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2549 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2550 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2556 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2557 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2559 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2560 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2561 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2562 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2563 updates.announcement_sigs);
2564 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2565 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2568 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2569 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2570 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2571 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2573 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2574 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2575 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2576 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2577 let mut batch_completed = false;
2578 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2579 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2580 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2581 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2583 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2584 channel_state.2 = true;
2586 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2588 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2590 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2593 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2594 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2595 if batch_completed {
2596 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2597 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2598 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2599 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2600 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2601 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2602 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2603 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2604 chan.set_batch_ready();
2605 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2606 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2610 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2611 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2612 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2617 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2619 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2620 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2622 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2623 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2624 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2625 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2630 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2631 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2632 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2633 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2635 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2636 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2637 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2638 panic!("{}", err_str);
2640 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2641 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2642 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2645 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2651 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2652 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2653 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2655 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2656 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2657 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2658 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2659 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2660 // filter for uniqueness here.
2661 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2662 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2663 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2664 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2666 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2667 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2669 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2670 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2671 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2677 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2678 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2679 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2680 while !processed_all_events {
2681 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2688 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2689 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2690 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2692 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2693 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2694 result = $self.process_background_events();
2696 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2697 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2698 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2699 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2703 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2704 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2705 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2706 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2709 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2711 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2712 $event_to_handle = event;
2714 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2715 post_event_actions.push(action);
2720 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2721 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2722 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2723 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2724 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2725 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2728 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2729 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2730 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2731 processed_all_events = false;
2735 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2736 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2737 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2739 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2740 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2741 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2747 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2749 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2750 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2751 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2752 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2753 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2754 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2758 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2760 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2762 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2763 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2765 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2767 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2768 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2769 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2772 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2773 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2774 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2776 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2777 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2778 current_timestamp: u32,
2780 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2781 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2782 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2783 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2785 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2786 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2787 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2792 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2794 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2795 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2796 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2797 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2798 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2799 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2800 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2801 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2803 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2806 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2807 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2809 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2811 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2813 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2815 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2816 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2817 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2818 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2819 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2820 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2821 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2822 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2824 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2834 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2835 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2836 &self.default_configuration
2839 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2840 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2841 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2844 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2845 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2847 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2849 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2853 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2858 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2860 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2861 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2862 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2863 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2864 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2866 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2867 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2869 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2870 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2871 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2873 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2874 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2875 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2877 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2878 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2880 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2881 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2882 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2883 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2884 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2885 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2887 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2888 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2889 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2890 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2891 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2892 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2895 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2896 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2897 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2899 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2901 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2902 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2904 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2906 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2907 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2908 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2913 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2914 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2915 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2916 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2917 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2918 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2922 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2927 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2929 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2930 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2935 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2941 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2942 node_id: their_network_key,
2945 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2948 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2949 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2950 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2951 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2952 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2953 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2954 // the same channel.
2955 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2957 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2958 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2959 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2960 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2961 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2962 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2963 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2964 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2965 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2969 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2970 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2971 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2979 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2980 /// more information.
2981 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2982 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2983 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2984 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2985 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2986 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2987 // the same channel.
2988 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2990 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2991 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2992 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2993 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2994 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2995 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2996 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2997 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3005 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3006 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3008 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3009 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3011 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3012 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3013 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3014 // really wanted anyway.
3015 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3018 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3019 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3020 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3023 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3024 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3025 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3026 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3027 let context_to_details = |context| {
3028 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3030 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3032 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3033 .map(context_to_details)
3039 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3040 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3042 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3043 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3044 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3046 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3047 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3048 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3049 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3050 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3051 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3053 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3054 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3055 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3057 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3058 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3059 payment_id: *payment_id,
3060 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3061 total_msat: *total_msat,
3064 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3065 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3067 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3068 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3070 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3075 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3076 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3078 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3079 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3082 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3084 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3085 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3087 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3088 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3090 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3091 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3092 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3093 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3094 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3095 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3096 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3097 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3099 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3100 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3101 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3102 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3103 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3107 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3108 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3110 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3111 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3112 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3113 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3116 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3117 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3120 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3121 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3123 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3124 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3131 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3132 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3133 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3134 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3137 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3138 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3144 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3145 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3146 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3148 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3149 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3151 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3152 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3153 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3154 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3156 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3158 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3159 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3160 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3163 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3164 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3165 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3166 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3167 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3168 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3171 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3172 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3173 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3175 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3176 /// the channel being closed or not:
3177 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3178 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3179 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3180 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3181 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3182 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3183 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3185 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3186 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3187 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3188 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3190 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3192 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3193 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3194 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3197 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3198 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3199 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3200 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3201 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3204 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3205 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3206 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3207 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3208 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3211 let logger = WithContext::from(
3212 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3215 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3216 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3217 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3218 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3219 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3220 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3221 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3223 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3224 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3225 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3226 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3227 // ignore the result here.
3228 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3230 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3231 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3232 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3233 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3234 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3235 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3236 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3237 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3238 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3239 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3240 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3241 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3244 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3247 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3248 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3253 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3254 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3255 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3256 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3257 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3258 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3259 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3260 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3263 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3264 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3265 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3269 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3270 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3274 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3275 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3276 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3277 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3278 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3279 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3280 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3281 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3282 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3283 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3284 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3286 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3288 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3289 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3290 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3291 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3292 mem::drop(peer_state);
3293 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3295 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3296 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3297 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3299 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3300 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3301 // Unfunded channel has no update
3302 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3304 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3305 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3306 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3307 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3308 // Unfunded channel has no update
3309 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3312 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3313 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3314 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3315 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3317 (None, *peer_node_id)
3319 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3322 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3323 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3324 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3326 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3327 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3328 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3329 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3330 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3336 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3339 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3340 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3341 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3342 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3343 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3344 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3345 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3346 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3347 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3348 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3349 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3350 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3361 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3362 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3363 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3365 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3366 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3367 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3370 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3371 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3372 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3374 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3375 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3376 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3377 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3378 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3381 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3382 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3383 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3384 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3385 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3389 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3390 /// local transaction(s).
3391 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3392 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3393 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3397 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3398 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3400 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3402 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3403 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3406 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3407 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3408 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3409 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3415 macro_rules! return_err {
3416 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3419 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3420 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3422 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3423 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3424 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3425 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3426 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3427 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3428 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3432 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3433 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3434 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3435 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3436 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3437 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3438 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3439 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3445 let NextPacketDetails {
3446 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3447 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3448 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3449 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3450 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3453 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3454 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3455 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3456 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3457 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3458 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3459 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3460 // phantom or an intercept.
3461 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3462 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3463 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3467 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3470 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3472 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3473 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3474 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3475 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3476 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3480 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3481 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3484 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3485 // have no consistency guarantees.
3486 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3490 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3491 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3492 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3493 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3494 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3496 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3497 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3498 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3499 // we don't have the channel here.
3500 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3502 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3504 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3505 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3506 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3507 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3508 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3509 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3510 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3511 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3512 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3513 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3514 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3516 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3519 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3520 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3522 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3523 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3530 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3532 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3533 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3535 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3536 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3537 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3538 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3539 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3541 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3542 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3548 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3549 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3550 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3551 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3553 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3554 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3556 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3557 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3558 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3560 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3561 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3562 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3563 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3564 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3565 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3566 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3570 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3572 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3575 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3576 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3577 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3578 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3579 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3580 macro_rules! return_err {
3581 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3583 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3584 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3585 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3586 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3587 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3588 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3589 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3590 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3591 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3595 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3596 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3597 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3598 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3599 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3605 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3607 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3608 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3609 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3610 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3613 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3614 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3615 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3616 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3617 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3619 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3622 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3623 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3624 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3625 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3626 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3632 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3633 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3634 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3636 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3637 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3638 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3640 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3641 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3642 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3643 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3644 return Err(LightningError {
3645 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3646 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3649 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3650 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3652 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3653 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3654 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3657 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3658 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3659 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3660 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3662 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3663 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3664 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3666 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3667 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3668 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3669 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3670 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3671 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3672 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3676 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3679 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3680 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3681 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3682 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3684 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3685 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3686 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3687 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3688 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3691 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3692 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3694 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3695 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3696 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3697 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3698 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3699 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3700 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3701 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3703 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3704 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3705 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3707 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3709 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3716 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3717 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3718 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3719 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3724 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3725 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3726 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3729 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3730 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3731 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3732 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3734 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3735 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3736 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3738 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3739 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3743 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3744 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3746 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3747 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3748 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3750 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3753 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3755 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3756 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3760 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3761 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3762 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3763 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3764 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3765 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3766 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3767 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3769 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3770 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3771 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3772 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3774 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3775 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3777 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3778 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3779 Some(monitor_update) => {
3780 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3782 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3783 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3784 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3785 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3786 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3787 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3788 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3796 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3799 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3800 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3801 // `channel_by_id` map.
3802 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3803 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3807 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3808 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3810 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3815 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3817 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3818 /// fields for more info.
3820 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3821 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3823 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3825 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3826 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3827 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3828 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3829 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3831 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3832 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3833 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3834 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3835 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3837 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3838 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3839 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3840 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3842 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3844 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3845 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3846 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3848 /// In general, a path may raise:
3849 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3850 /// node public key) is specified.
3851 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3852 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3853 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3854 /// relevant updates.
3856 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3857 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3858 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3860 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3861 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3862 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3863 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3864 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3865 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3866 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3867 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3869 self.pending_outbound_payments
3870 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3871 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3872 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3875 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3876 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3877 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3878 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3880 self.pending_outbound_payments
3881 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3882 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3883 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3884 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3888 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3889 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3891 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3892 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3893 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3897 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3898 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3899 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3903 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3904 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3907 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3908 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3909 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3910 self.pending_outbound_payments
3911 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3912 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3913 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3914 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3915 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3919 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3920 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3921 /// retries are exhausted.
3923 /// # Event Generation
3925 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3926 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3928 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3929 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3930 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3932 /// # Requested Invoices
3934 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3935 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3936 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3937 /// once the invoice has been received.
3939 /// # Restart Behavior
3941 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3942 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3943 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3945 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3946 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3947 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3948 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3951 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3952 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3953 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3954 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3955 /// never reach the recipient.
3957 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3958 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3960 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3961 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3963 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3964 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3965 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3966 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3967 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3968 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3969 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3972 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3973 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3975 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3978 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3979 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3980 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3981 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3982 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3983 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3984 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3985 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3988 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3989 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3990 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3991 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3992 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3993 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3994 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3995 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3996 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3999 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4002 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4003 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4006 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4007 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4009 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4010 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4011 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4012 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4013 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4014 let payment_params =
4015 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4017 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4019 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4022 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4023 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4025 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4026 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4027 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4028 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4030 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4031 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4032 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4033 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4034 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4035 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4036 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4037 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4038 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4039 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4041 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4042 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4043 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4044 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4048 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4050 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4051 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4054 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4056 let mut res = Vec::new();
4058 for mut path in route.paths {
4059 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4060 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4061 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4062 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4063 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4066 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4069 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4070 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4072 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4074 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4075 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4080 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4083 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4088 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4089 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4090 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4092 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4093 let used_liquidity =
4094 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4096 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4097 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4099 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4102 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4107 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4108 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4109 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4116 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4117 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4118 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4119 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4120 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4121 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4122 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4123 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4124 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4126 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4127 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4129 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4130 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4131 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4133 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4134 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4135 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4136 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4137 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4138 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4139 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4140 } else { unreachable!(); });
4142 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4143 Err((chan, err)) => {
4144 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4145 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4146 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4147 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4148 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4154 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4155 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4157 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4158 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4161 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4162 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4163 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4167 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4168 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4169 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4173 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4175 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4178 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4179 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4181 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4183 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4184 funding_txo, o.get()
4186 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4187 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4188 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4189 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4190 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4191 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4194 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4201 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4202 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4203 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4207 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4209 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4210 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4212 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4213 /// across the p2p network.
4215 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4216 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4218 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4219 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4220 /// keys per-channel).
4222 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4223 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4224 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4226 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4227 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4228 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4230 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4231 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4232 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4233 /// for more details.
4235 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4236 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4237 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4238 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4241 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4243 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4244 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4246 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4247 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4248 /// signature for each channel.
4250 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4251 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4252 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4253 let mut result = Ok(());
4255 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4256 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4257 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4258 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4259 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4264 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4265 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4266 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4270 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4271 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4272 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4273 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4274 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4275 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4276 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4277 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4279 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4280 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4285 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4286 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4287 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4288 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4292 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4293 match states.entry(txid) {
4294 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4295 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4296 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4300 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4303 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4304 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4305 temporary_channel_id,
4306 counterparty_node_id,
4307 funding_transaction.clone(),
4310 let mut output_index = None;
4311 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4312 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4313 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4314 if output_index.is_some() {
4315 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4316 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4319 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4322 if output_index.is_none() {
4323 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4324 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4327 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4328 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4329 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4330 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4331 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4332 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4338 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4339 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4340 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4341 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4342 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4343 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4344 .into_iter().flatten()
4345 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4347 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4348 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4350 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4353 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4354 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4355 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4356 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4358 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4359 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4360 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4364 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4365 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4366 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4372 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4374 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4375 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4376 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4377 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4379 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4380 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4382 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4383 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4385 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4387 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4388 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4389 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4390 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4391 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4392 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4393 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4394 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4395 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4396 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4397 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4398 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4399 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4404 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4405 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4406 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4409 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4410 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4411 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4412 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4416 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4417 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4418 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4419 config.apply(config_update);
4420 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4423 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4424 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4425 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4426 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4427 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4428 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4435 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4436 debug_assert!(false);
4437 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4439 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4440 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4447 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4449 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4450 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4451 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4452 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4454 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4455 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4457 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4458 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4460 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4462 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4463 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4464 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4465 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4466 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4467 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4468 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4469 pub fn update_channel_config(
4470 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4471 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4472 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4475 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4476 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4478 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4479 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4481 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4482 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4483 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4484 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4485 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4487 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4488 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4489 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4492 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4495 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4496 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4497 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4498 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4499 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4500 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4503 let next_hop_scid = {
4504 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4505 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4506 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4507 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4508 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4509 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4510 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4511 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4512 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4513 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4516 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4518 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4519 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4520 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4523 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4524 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4525 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4526 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4527 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4534 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4535 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4536 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4539 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4540 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4541 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4542 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4545 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4547 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4548 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4549 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4550 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4551 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4554 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4555 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4556 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4557 payment.prev_channel_id,
4558 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4559 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4561 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4565 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4566 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4568 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4571 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4572 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4575 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4576 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4577 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4580 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4581 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4582 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4583 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4584 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4585 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4586 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4587 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4588 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4589 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4592 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4593 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4594 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4595 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4600 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4602 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4603 /// Will likely generate further events.
4604 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4607 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4608 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4609 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4611 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4612 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4614 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4615 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4616 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4617 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4619 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4620 match forward_info {
4621 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4622 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4623 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4624 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4625 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4628 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4629 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4630 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4631 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4633 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4634 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4635 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4636 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4637 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4638 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4639 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4640 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4641 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4644 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4645 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4647 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4650 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4651 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4657 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4658 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4660 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4664 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4665 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4667 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4671 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4672 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4673 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4674 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4675 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4676 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4677 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4680 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4681 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4682 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4683 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4684 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4686 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4688 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4689 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4693 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4694 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4695 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4696 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4697 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4698 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4700 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4701 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4707 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4710 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4713 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4714 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4715 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4716 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4717 // problem, not ours.
4723 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4724 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4725 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4727 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4731 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4732 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4733 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4734 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4735 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4738 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4739 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4740 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4741 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4742 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4743 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4744 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4745 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4746 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4747 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4748 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4749 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4750 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4753 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4754 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4755 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4756 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4757 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4758 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4759 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4761 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4762 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4763 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4765 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4766 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4767 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4768 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4769 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4770 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4773 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4774 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4775 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4778 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4779 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4781 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4783 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4784 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4785 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4786 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4792 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4793 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4795 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4796 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4797 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4799 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4800 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4801 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4802 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4804 Some((res, htlc_id))
4807 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4808 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4809 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4810 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4812 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4814 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4815 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4816 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4822 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4826 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4827 match forward_info {
4828 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4829 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4830 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4831 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4832 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4835 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4836 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4837 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4838 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4839 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4841 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4842 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4843 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4844 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4845 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4847 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4848 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4849 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4851 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4852 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4856 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4857 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4860 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4863 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4864 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4865 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4866 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4867 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4868 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4869 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4870 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4871 phantom_shared_secret,
4874 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4875 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4876 // if routing nodes overpay
4877 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4878 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4880 total_value_received: None,
4881 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4884 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4887 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4889 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4890 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4891 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4892 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4893 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4894 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4896 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4897 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4898 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4899 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4900 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4901 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4902 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4903 phantom_shared_secret,
4906 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4907 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4909 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4912 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4913 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4914 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4915 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4916 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4919 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4920 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4921 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4922 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4923 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4924 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4926 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4927 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4928 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4930 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4931 .entry(payment_hash)
4932 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4933 .or_insert_with(|| {
4934 committed_to_claimable = true;
4936 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4939 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4940 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4941 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4942 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4944 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4945 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4946 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4948 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4949 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4950 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4953 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4955 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4956 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4957 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4958 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4959 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4960 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4961 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4962 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4963 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4964 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4966 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4968 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4969 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4970 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4971 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4972 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4973 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4975 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4976 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4977 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4978 committed_to_claimable = true;
4980 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4981 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4982 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4983 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4984 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4985 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4986 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4987 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4988 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4992 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4993 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4994 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4995 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4996 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4998 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5000 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5001 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5003 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5004 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5005 committed_to_claimable = true;
5008 payment_claimable_generated
5012 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5013 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5014 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5015 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5016 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5017 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5018 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5019 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5021 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5022 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5023 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5024 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5025 Ok(result) => result,
5027 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5028 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5031 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5032 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5033 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5034 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5035 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5036 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5039 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5040 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5041 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5043 check_total_value!(purpose);
5045 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5046 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5047 check_total_value!(purpose);
5051 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5052 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5053 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5054 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5056 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5057 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5058 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5059 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5060 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5061 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5062 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5063 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5065 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5066 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5067 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5069 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5070 if payment_claimable_generated {
5071 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5077 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5078 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5086 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5087 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5088 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5089 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5091 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5092 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5094 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5096 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5097 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5098 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5100 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5102 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5103 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5104 events.append(&mut new_events);
5107 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5109 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5110 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5111 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5113 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5115 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5116 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5117 if background_events.is_empty() {
5118 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5121 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5123 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5124 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5125 // monitor updating completing.
5126 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5128 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5129 let mut updated_chan = false;
5131 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5132 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5133 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5134 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5135 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5136 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5137 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5138 updated_chan = true;
5139 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5140 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5142 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5150 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5151 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5154 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5155 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5156 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5157 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5159 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5160 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5162 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5163 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5164 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5165 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5166 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5172 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5175 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5176 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5177 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5178 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5179 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5182 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5183 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5185 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5187 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5188 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5189 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5191 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5192 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5193 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5194 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5196 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5197 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5199 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5200 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5204 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5205 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5206 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5207 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5208 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5209 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5210 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5212 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5213 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5216 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5219 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5220 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5222 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5227 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5228 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5236 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5238 /// This currently includes:
5239 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5240 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5241 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5243 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5244 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5245 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5246 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5247 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5248 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5249 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5250 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5252 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5253 /// estimate fetches.
5255 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5256 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5257 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5258 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5259 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5261 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5262 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5264 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5265 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5266 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5267 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5269 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5270 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5271 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5272 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5273 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5274 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5276 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5277 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5278 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5280 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5281 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5282 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5283 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5284 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5287 channel_id: *chan_id,
5288 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5300 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5301 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5302 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5303 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5304 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5305 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5307 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5308 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5313 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5314 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5316 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5317 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5318 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5319 if needs_close { return false; }
5322 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5323 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5324 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5325 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5326 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5327 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5328 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5329 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5331 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5332 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5333 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5334 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5338 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5340 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5343 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5345 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5346 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5347 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5348 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5352 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5354 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5360 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5362 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5363 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5364 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5365 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5366 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5367 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5368 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5369 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5370 channel_id: *chan_id,
5371 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5379 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5380 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5381 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5383 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5384 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5385 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5387 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5388 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5389 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5390 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5392 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5393 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5394 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5395 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5400 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5401 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5402 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5403 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5404 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5405 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5406 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5407 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5408 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5414 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5416 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5417 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5422 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5423 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5424 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5425 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5426 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5427 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5428 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5429 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5430 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5431 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5432 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5434 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5435 // have no channels to the peer.
5436 let remove_entry = {
5437 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5438 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5441 entry.remove_entry();
5444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5449 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5450 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5451 // This should be unreachable
5452 debug_assert!(false);
5455 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5456 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5457 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5458 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5459 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5460 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5461 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5464 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5465 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5466 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5468 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5469 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5476 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5477 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5478 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5479 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5480 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5483 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5484 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5487 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5488 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5491 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5492 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5493 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5494 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5495 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5496 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5497 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5500 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5501 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5504 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5505 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5506 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5507 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5508 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5515 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5516 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5517 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5519 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5520 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5521 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5522 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5524 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5525 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5526 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5527 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5528 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5529 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5532 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5533 /// reason for the failure.
5535 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5536 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5539 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5540 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5541 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5542 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5543 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5544 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5545 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5550 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5551 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5552 match failure_code {
5553 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5554 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5555 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5556 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5557 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5558 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5561 let fail_data = match data {
5562 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5565 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5570 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5571 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5573 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5575 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5576 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5577 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5578 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5579 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5580 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5581 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5583 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5585 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5586 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5588 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5593 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5594 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5595 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5596 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5597 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5598 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5599 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5600 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5601 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5602 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5604 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5605 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5606 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5607 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5609 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5610 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5611 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5612 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5613 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5617 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5618 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5619 // be surfaced to the user.
5620 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5621 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5622 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5624 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5626 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5627 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5628 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5629 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5630 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5631 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5632 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5634 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5635 debug_assert!(false);
5636 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5641 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5644 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5645 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5646 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5647 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5651 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5652 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5653 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5654 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5655 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5656 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5657 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5658 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5659 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5660 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5663 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5664 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5665 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5668 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5669 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5670 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5672 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5673 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5674 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5675 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5676 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5678 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5679 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5680 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5683 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5684 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5685 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5687 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5688 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5689 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5690 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5691 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5693 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5695 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5696 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5698 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5699 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5703 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5704 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5706 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5710 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5711 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5712 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5713 push_forward_ev = true;
5715 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5716 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5717 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5720 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5723 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5724 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5725 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5726 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5727 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5728 failed_next_destination: destination,
5734 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5735 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5737 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5738 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5739 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5740 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5742 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5743 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5744 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5745 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5747 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5748 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5749 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5751 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5752 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5753 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5754 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5755 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5756 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5757 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5758 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5759 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5762 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5763 /// even type numbers.
5767 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5768 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5770 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5771 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5772 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5775 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5776 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5778 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5781 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5782 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5783 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5784 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5785 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5786 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5787 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5788 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5793 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5794 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5795 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5796 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5797 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5799 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5800 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5801 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5805 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5806 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5807 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5808 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5809 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5810 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5811 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5812 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5813 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5814 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5815 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5824 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5826 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5827 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5828 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5829 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5830 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5831 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5832 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5833 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5834 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5835 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5836 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5837 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5838 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5839 debug_assert!(false);
5843 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5845 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5846 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5847 debug_assert!(false);
5851 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5852 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5854 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5855 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5856 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5857 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5860 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5861 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5862 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5863 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5867 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5868 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5869 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5870 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5871 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5872 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5873 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5876 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5877 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5878 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5879 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5880 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5881 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5886 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5887 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5888 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5889 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5890 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5891 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5892 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5894 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5897 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5898 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5899 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5900 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5904 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5905 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5906 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5907 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5909 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5910 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5911 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5912 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5914 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5915 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5916 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5917 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5920 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5921 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5922 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5923 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5927 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5928 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5929 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5932 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5933 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5934 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5935 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5936 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5937 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5938 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5939 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5942 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5943 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5944 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5946 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5949 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5950 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5952 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5953 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5954 // monitor update as a background event.
5955 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5956 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5957 counterparty_node_id,
5958 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5959 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5960 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5964 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5965 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5970 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5972 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5974 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5975 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5976 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5977 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5978 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5980 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5982 debug_assert!(false,
5983 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5986 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5987 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5988 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5989 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5990 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5992 let mut found_blocker = false;
5993 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5994 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5995 // which case we need to only remove the one
5996 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5997 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5998 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5999 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6001 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6004 debug_assert!(false);
6013 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6014 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6015 counterparty_node_id: None,
6016 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6019 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6023 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6024 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6025 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6026 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6027 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6028 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6029 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6030 // again on restart.
6031 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6032 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6033 payment_preimage, update_res);
6036 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6037 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6039 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6040 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6041 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6042 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6043 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6044 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6045 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6046 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6047 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6048 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6051 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6052 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6053 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6054 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6055 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6056 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6060 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6061 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6064 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6065 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6066 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6067 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6070 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6071 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6072 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6073 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6074 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6076 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6077 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6078 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6080 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6081 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6084 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6085 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6086 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6087 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6088 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6089 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6090 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6091 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6092 let chan_to_release =
6093 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6094 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6096 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6097 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6098 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6099 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6104 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6105 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6106 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6107 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6108 // in the background.
6109 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6110 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6111 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6112 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6114 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6115 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6116 funding_txo, update, ..
6118 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6119 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6120 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6121 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6123 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6129 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6130 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6131 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6133 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6134 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6136 monitor_update.updates[0],
6137 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6142 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6143 // immediately once we get going.
6144 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6147 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6149 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6152 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6153 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6154 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6155 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6156 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6157 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6158 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6162 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6163 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6164 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6167 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6168 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6169 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6170 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6171 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6172 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6173 prev_user_channel_id,
6174 next_user_channel_id,
6175 total_fee_earned_msat,
6177 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6178 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6180 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6184 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6185 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6186 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6192 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6193 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6194 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6197 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6198 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6199 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6200 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6202 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6204 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6205 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6206 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6208 payment_purpose: purpose,
6211 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6213 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6217 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6219 sender_intended_total_msat,
6223 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6224 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6226 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6227 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6228 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6231 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6232 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6234 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6235 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6236 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6237 downstream_channel_id,
6238 Some(blocking_action),
6245 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6246 /// update completion.
6247 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6248 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6249 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6250 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6251 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6252 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
6253 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6254 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6255 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6256 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6257 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
6258 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6259 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6260 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6262 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6264 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6265 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6266 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
6267 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6270 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6271 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6273 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6274 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6275 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6280 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6281 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6282 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6283 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6288 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6289 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6290 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6291 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6292 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6297 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6301 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6307 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6308 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6309 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6313 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6314 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6315 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6321 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6322 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6324 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6325 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6327 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6328 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6329 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6330 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6331 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6336 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6337 let mut peer_state_lock;
6338 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6339 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6340 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6341 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6343 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6346 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6347 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6348 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6349 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6350 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6353 let remaining_in_flight =
6354 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6355 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6358 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6359 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6360 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6361 remaining_in_flight);
6362 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6365 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6368 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6370 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6371 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6374 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6375 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6376 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6378 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6379 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6380 /// used to accept such channels.
6382 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6383 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6384 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6385 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6388 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6389 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6391 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6392 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6393 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6395 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6396 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6398 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6399 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6401 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6402 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6404 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6405 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6406 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6407 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6410 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6412 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6413 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6415 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6416 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6417 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6418 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6420 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6421 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6423 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6425 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6426 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6427 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6429 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6430 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6431 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6433 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6434 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6435 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6436 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6437 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6438 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6439 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6442 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6443 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6445 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6451 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6452 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6453 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6454 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6456 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6460 Ok(mut channel) => {
6462 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6463 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6464 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6465 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6466 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6467 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6468 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6471 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6472 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6473 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6475 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6477 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6478 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6479 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6480 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6481 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6482 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6483 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6484 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6487 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6488 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6489 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6491 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6495 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6496 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6497 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6499 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6500 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6501 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6504 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6511 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6512 /// or 0-conf channels.
6514 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6515 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6516 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6517 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6518 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6519 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6521 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6522 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6523 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6524 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6525 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6526 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6527 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6531 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6534 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6535 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6537 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6538 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6540 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6541 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6542 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6543 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6544 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6546 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6549 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6550 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6551 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6554 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6555 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6556 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6557 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6558 // included in the unfunded count.
6559 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6560 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6561 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6564 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6565 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6568 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6569 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6570 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6571 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6576 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6579 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6580 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6581 // likely to be lost on restart!
6582 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6583 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6584 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6587 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6589 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6592 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6593 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6594 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6595 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6596 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6598 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6599 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6601 debug_assert!(false);
6602 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6603 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6604 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6609 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6610 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6611 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6612 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6613 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6614 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6616 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6617 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6618 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6621 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6622 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6623 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6624 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6625 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6628 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6629 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6631 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6632 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6633 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6636 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6637 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6638 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6639 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6641 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6643 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6644 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6645 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6646 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6647 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6648 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6651 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6652 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6653 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6658 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6659 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6660 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6661 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6662 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6663 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6664 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6667 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6672 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6673 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6674 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6675 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6676 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6678 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6679 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6680 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6681 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6684 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6685 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6687 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6688 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6689 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6691 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6695 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6696 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6697 // likely to be lost on restart!
6698 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6699 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6700 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6702 debug_assert!(false);
6703 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6705 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6706 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6707 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6709 match phase.get_mut() {
6710 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6711 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6712 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6715 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6719 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6722 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6723 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6724 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6725 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6726 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6728 user_channel_id: user_id,
6733 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6734 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6736 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6737 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6739 debug_assert!(false);
6740 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6743 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6744 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6745 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6746 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6747 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6748 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6749 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6751 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6752 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6753 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6754 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6755 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6756 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6757 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6758 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6759 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6763 Some(mut phase) => {
6764 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6765 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6766 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6768 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6771 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6773 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6774 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6775 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6776 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6777 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6778 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6780 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6781 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6782 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6785 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6786 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6787 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6789 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6790 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6791 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6792 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6793 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6796 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6797 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6798 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6799 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6801 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6802 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6803 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6804 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6805 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6806 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6807 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6812 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6813 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6814 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6816 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6820 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6821 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6822 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6830 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6831 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6832 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6833 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6835 debug_assert!(false);
6836 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6841 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6843 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6844 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6845 let logger = WithContext::from(
6847 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6848 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6851 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6853 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6854 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6855 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6856 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6857 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6858 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6859 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6860 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6861 } else { unreachable!(); }
6864 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6865 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6866 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6867 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6868 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6869 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6870 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6874 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6875 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6876 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6877 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6878 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6879 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6886 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6890 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6891 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6892 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6893 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6894 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6896 debug_assert!(false);
6897 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6899 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6900 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6901 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6902 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6903 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6904 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6905 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6906 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6907 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6908 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6909 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6910 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6911 msg: announcement_sigs,
6913 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6914 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6915 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6916 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6917 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6918 // announcement_signatures.
6919 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6920 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6921 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6922 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6929 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6930 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6935 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6936 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6939 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6940 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6945 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6946 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6947 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6949 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6950 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6952 debug_assert!(false);
6953 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6955 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6956 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6957 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6958 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6960 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6961 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6962 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6963 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6965 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6968 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6969 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6970 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6971 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6973 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6974 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6975 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6976 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6977 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6978 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6982 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6983 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6984 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6985 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6988 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6989 let context = phase.context_mut();
6990 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6991 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6992 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6993 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6995 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6996 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6997 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6998 let context = phase.context_mut();
6999 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7000 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7001 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7005 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7008 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7009 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7010 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7011 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7013 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7014 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7020 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7021 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7022 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7024 debug_assert!(false);
7025 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7027 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7028 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7029 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7030 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7032 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7033 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7034 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7035 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7037 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7042 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7043 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7044 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7045 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7046 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7047 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7048 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7050 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7051 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7057 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7058 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7059 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7060 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7062 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7063 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7066 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7071 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7072 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7073 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7078 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7079 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7080 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7081 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7083 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7084 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7085 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7086 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7088 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7089 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7091 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7093 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7095 debug_assert!(false);
7096 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7100 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7101 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7102 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7103 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7104 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7105 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7106 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7107 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7109 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7111 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
7112 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7113 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7114 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7115 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7116 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7117 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7118 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7122 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7123 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7124 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7125 match pending_forward_info {
7126 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7127 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7129 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7130 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7131 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7132 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7133 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7135 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7136 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7137 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7138 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7139 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7142 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
7144 _ => pending_forward_info
7147 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7148 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7150 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7151 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7154 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7159 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7161 let next_user_channel_id;
7162 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7164 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7166 debug_assert!(false);
7167 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7171 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7173 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7174 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7175 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7176 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7178 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7180 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7181 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7182 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7184 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7185 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7186 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7187 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7188 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7189 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7190 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7191 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7194 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7195 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7201 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7202 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7203 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7209 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7210 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7211 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7212 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7213 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7215 debug_assert!(false);
7216 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7220 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7221 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7222 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7223 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7225 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7226 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7229 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7234 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7235 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7236 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7237 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7238 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7240 debug_assert!(false);
7241 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7243 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7244 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7245 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7246 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7247 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7248 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7249 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7251 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7252 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7254 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7255 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7259 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7263 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7264 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7265 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7267 debug_assert!(false);
7268 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7270 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7271 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7272 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7273 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7274 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7275 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7276 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7277 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7278 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7279 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7280 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7284 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7285 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7288 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7293 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7294 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7295 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7296 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7297 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7298 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7299 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7300 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7301 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7302 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7303 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7305 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7306 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7308 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7309 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7310 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7311 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7312 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7313 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7316 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7317 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7319 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7320 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7321 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7322 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7323 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7324 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7325 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7326 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7327 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7330 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7331 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7333 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7334 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7335 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7336 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7337 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7338 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7339 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7340 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7341 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7342 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7343 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7344 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7347 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7348 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7349 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7354 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7355 // payments are being processed.
7356 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7357 push_forward_event = true;
7359 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7360 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7367 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7368 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7371 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7372 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7373 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7375 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7379 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7380 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7381 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7382 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7383 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7385 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7386 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7387 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7388 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7389 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7390 // real by taking more time.
7391 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7392 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7393 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7398 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7399 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7400 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7401 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7402 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7403 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7404 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7406 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7407 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7408 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7409 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7410 channel_funding_outpoint,
7412 counterparty_node_id,
7417 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7418 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7419 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7421 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7422 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7423 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7424 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7426 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7427 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7428 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7434 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7435 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7436 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7437 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7439 debug_assert!(false);
7440 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7441 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7443 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7445 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7446 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7447 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7448 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7449 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7450 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7451 *counterparty_node_id)
7453 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7454 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7455 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7456 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7457 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7458 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7459 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7463 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7464 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7470 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7474 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7475 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7476 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7478 debug_assert!(false);
7479 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7481 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7482 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7483 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7484 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7485 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7486 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7487 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7489 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7490 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7498 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7499 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7500 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7502 debug_assert!(false);
7503 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7505 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7506 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7507 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7508 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7509 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7510 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7514 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7515 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7516 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7517 msg, &self.default_configuration
7518 ), chan_phase_entry),
7519 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7520 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7521 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7524 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7525 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7528 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7533 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7534 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7535 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7536 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7538 // It's not a local channel
7539 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7542 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7543 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7544 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7545 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7547 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7548 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7551 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7552 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7553 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7554 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7555 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7556 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7557 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7559 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7561 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7562 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7563 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7564 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7566 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7567 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7568 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7569 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7572 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7576 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7577 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7580 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7582 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7585 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7587 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7588 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7590 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7592 debug_assert!(false);
7593 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7594 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7598 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7599 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7600 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7601 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7603 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7604 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7605 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7606 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7607 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7608 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7609 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7610 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7611 let mut channel_update = None;
7612 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7613 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7614 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7617 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7618 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7619 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7620 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7621 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7622 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7623 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7628 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7629 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7630 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7631 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7632 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7633 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7637 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7638 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7642 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7644 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7645 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7646 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7647 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7648 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7649 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7651 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7652 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7653 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7654 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7655 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7656 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7657 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7658 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7659 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7660 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7661 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7662 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7663 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7664 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7665 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7666 next_funding_txid: None,
7669 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7670 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7671 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7677 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7678 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7679 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7680 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7683 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7684 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7689 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7690 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7691 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7693 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7694 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7695 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7696 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7697 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7698 match monitor_event {
7699 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7700 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7701 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7702 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7703 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7704 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7705 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7707 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7708 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7709 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7710 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7713 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7714 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7715 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7717 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7718 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7719 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7720 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7723 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7725 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7726 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7727 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7728 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7729 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7730 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7731 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7734 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7736 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7737 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7738 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7742 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7743 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7744 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7745 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7753 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7754 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7760 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7761 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7764 has_pending_monitor_events
7767 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7768 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7769 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7771 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7772 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7773 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7776 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7777 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7778 /// update was applied.
7779 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7780 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7781 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7783 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7784 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7785 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7786 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7788 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7789 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7791 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7792 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7793 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7794 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7796 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7797 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7798 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7799 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7800 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7801 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7803 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7804 has_monitor_update = true;
7806 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7807 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7808 continue 'peer_loop;
7817 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7818 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7819 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7825 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7826 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7828 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7829 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7831 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7832 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7833 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7836 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7837 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7839 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7840 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7841 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7842 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7847 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7848 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7853 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7854 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7857 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7858 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7859 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7865 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7869 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7870 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7871 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7874 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7875 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7879 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7882 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7883 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7889 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7890 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7891 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7892 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7893 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7894 let mut has_update = false;
7895 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7897 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7899 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7900 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7901 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7902 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7903 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7905 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7906 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7907 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7908 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7909 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7911 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7912 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7915 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7916 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7917 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7919 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7920 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7921 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7922 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7923 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7928 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7929 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7930 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7936 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7937 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7942 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7948 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7949 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7952 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7953 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7959 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7960 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7962 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7963 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7964 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7965 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7966 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7967 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7968 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7969 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7970 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7971 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7972 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7973 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7974 assert!(should_broadcast);
7975 } else { unreachable!(); }
7976 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7977 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7978 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7981 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7986 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7987 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7988 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7989 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7993 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7994 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7995 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7996 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7997 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7999 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8003 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8008 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8010 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8012 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8013 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8014 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8015 &$self, description: String
8016 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8017 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8018 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8019 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8020 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8022 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8023 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8024 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8026 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8033 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8034 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8035 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8039 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8040 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8042 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8043 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8044 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8047 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8048 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8049 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8051 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8052 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8056 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8057 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8058 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8059 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8060 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8062 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8066 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8067 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8072 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8073 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8074 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8076 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8078 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8079 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8080 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8081 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8082 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8083 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8084 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8085 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8086 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8087 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8088 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8089 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8091 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8092 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8093 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8095 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8096 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8101 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8102 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8103 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8104 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8106 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8112 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8114 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8115 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8116 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8117 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8118 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8119 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8123 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8124 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8125 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8126 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8129 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8131 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8133 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8134 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8135 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8137 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8138 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8139 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8140 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8141 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8142 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8143 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8145 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8146 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8150 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8151 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8154 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8155 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8156 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8160 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8161 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8162 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8163 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8167 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8168 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8169 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8174 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8175 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8176 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8177 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8180 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8181 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8182 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8183 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8184 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8185 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8186 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8187 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8188 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8189 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8190 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8191 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8192 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8193 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8194 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8196 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8197 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8199 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8201 let builder = match quantity {
8203 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8205 let builder = match amount_msats {
8207 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8209 let builder = match payer_note {
8211 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8213 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8214 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8216 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8218 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8219 self.pending_outbound_payments
8220 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8221 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8223 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8225 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8226 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8227 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8228 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8229 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8232 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8234 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8235 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8236 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8237 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8238 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8239 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8240 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8241 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8242 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8244 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8251 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8254 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8255 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8256 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8260 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8261 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8262 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8263 /// received and no retries will be made.
8268 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8269 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8272 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8273 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8274 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8275 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8276 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8278 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8279 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8281 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8282 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8285 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8287 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8288 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8289 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8290 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8292 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8293 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8294 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8296 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8297 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8298 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8300 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8301 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8302 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8304 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8305 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8306 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8307 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8309 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8310 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8311 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8312 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8313 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8316 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8318 for path in refund.paths() {
8319 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8320 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8321 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8322 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8324 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8330 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8334 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8337 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8338 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8340 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8341 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8342 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8343 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8345 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8347 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8348 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8352 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8353 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8355 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8357 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8358 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8360 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8361 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8362 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8363 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8364 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8365 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8366 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8367 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8368 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8369 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8370 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8373 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8374 /// stored external to LDK.
8376 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8377 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8378 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8380 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8381 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8384 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8385 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8386 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8387 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8389 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8390 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8391 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8392 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8393 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8395 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8396 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8397 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8398 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8399 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8401 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8402 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8404 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8405 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8409 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8410 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8412 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8414 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8415 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8417 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8418 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8419 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8420 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8421 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8422 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8423 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8426 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8427 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8429 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8430 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8431 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8434 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8436 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8437 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8438 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8439 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8441 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8443 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8444 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8445 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8448 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8449 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8452 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8453 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8454 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8455 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8456 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8457 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8459 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8460 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8461 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8462 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8463 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8465 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8467 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8470 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8471 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8475 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8476 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8478 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8479 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8480 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8481 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8483 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8484 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8485 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8486 Some(_) => continue,
8487 None => return scid_candidate
8492 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8494 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8495 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8497 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8498 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8499 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8503 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8504 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8505 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8507 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8508 /// times to get a unique scid.
8509 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8510 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8511 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8513 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8514 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8515 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8516 return scid_candidate
8520 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8521 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8522 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8523 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8525 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8526 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8527 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8528 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8529 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8530 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8532 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8533 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8534 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8543 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8544 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8545 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8546 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8547 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8551 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8552 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8553 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8554 events.push_back((event, None));
8558 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8559 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8560 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8564 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8565 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8569 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8570 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8573 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8574 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8575 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8576 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8577 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8578 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8579 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8581 let logger = WithContext::from(
8582 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8585 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8586 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8587 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8588 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8589 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8590 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8591 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8592 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8594 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8598 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8599 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8600 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8601 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8602 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8603 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8608 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8610 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8611 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8612 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8613 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8615 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8616 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8617 if further_update_exists {
8618 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8623 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8630 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8631 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8637 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8638 for action in actions {
8640 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8641 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8643 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8649 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8650 /// using the given event handler.
8652 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8653 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8657 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8661 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8663 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8664 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8665 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8666 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8667 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8668 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8672 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8673 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8674 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8675 /// is always placed next to each other.
8677 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8678 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8679 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8680 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8682 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8683 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8684 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8685 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8686 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8687 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8688 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8690 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8691 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8692 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8693 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8696 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8697 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8699 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8700 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8703 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8704 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8705 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8706 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8707 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8708 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8709 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8713 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8714 events.replace(pending_events);
8723 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8725 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8726 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8727 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8728 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8729 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8730 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8734 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8736 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8737 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8738 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8740 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8744 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8746 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8747 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8748 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8749 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8750 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8751 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8755 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8757 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8758 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8759 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8760 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8761 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8764 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8765 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8768 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8769 let _persistence_guard =
8770 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8771 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8772 let new_height = height - 1;
8774 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8775 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8776 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8777 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8778 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8779 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8782 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8786 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8788 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8789 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8790 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8791 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8792 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8793 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8797 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8798 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8799 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8800 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8802 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8803 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8805 let _persistence_guard =
8806 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8807 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8808 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8809 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8811 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8812 if height < last_best_block_height {
8813 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8814 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8818 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8819 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8820 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8821 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8823 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8824 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8826 let _persistence_guard =
8827 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8828 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8829 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8831 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8833 macro_rules! max_time {
8834 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8836 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8837 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8838 // having an explicit local time source.
8839 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8840 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8841 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8842 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8843 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8849 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8850 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8851 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8852 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8856 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8857 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8858 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8859 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8860 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8861 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8862 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8863 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8864 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8865 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8866 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8873 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8874 let _persistence_guard =
8875 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8876 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8877 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8878 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8879 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8880 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8881 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8882 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8887 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8889 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8890 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8891 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8892 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8893 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8894 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8898 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8899 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8901 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8902 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8903 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8904 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8905 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8907 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8908 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8910 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8911 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8912 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8913 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8914 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8915 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8917 // Retain unfunded channels.
8918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8919 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8920 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8922 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8923 let res = f(channel);
8924 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8925 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8926 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8927 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8928 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8930 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8931 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8932 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8933 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8934 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8935 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8936 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8937 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8942 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8947 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8948 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8951 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8952 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8953 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8954 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8955 msg: announcement_sigs,
8957 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8958 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8961 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8962 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8963 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8968 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8969 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8970 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8971 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8972 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8973 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8974 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8975 // is always consistent.
8976 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8977 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8978 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8979 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8980 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8983 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8984 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8985 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8986 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8987 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8988 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8989 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8990 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8994 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8995 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8996 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8997 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8998 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8999 data: reason_message,
9012 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9013 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9014 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9015 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9016 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9017 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9018 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9019 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9020 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9021 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9023 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9024 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9025 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9029 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9032 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9033 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9034 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9035 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9036 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9037 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9038 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9039 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9040 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9041 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9042 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9043 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9046 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9047 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9048 _ => unreachable!(),
9050 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9051 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9052 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9053 let logger = WithContext::from(
9054 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9056 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9062 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9064 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9065 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9069 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9070 /// may have events that need processing.
9072 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9073 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9075 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9076 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9077 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9078 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9081 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9083 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9084 /// indicates this should be checked.
9085 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9086 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9089 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9090 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9091 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9094 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9095 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9096 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9097 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9100 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9101 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9102 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9103 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9106 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9107 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9109 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9110 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9111 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9112 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9113 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9116 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9117 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9118 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9119 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9122 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9123 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9124 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9125 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9128 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9129 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9130 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9131 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9134 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9135 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9136 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9137 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9141 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9142 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9144 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9145 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9146 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9147 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9148 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9149 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9153 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9154 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9155 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9156 // change to the contents.
9157 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9158 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9159 let persist = match &res {
9160 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9161 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9162 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9164 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9166 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9171 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9172 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9173 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9174 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9177 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9178 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9179 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9180 // change to the contents.
9181 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9182 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9183 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9187 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9188 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9189 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9190 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9193 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9194 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9195 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9198 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9200 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9203 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9204 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9205 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9206 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9207 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9209 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9210 let persist = match &res {
9211 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9212 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9214 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9219 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9220 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9221 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9222 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9225 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9226 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9227 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9228 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9231 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9232 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9233 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9234 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9237 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9238 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9239 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9240 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9243 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9244 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9245 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9248 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9249 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9250 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9253 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9254 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9255 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9256 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9257 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9258 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9259 let persist = match &res {
9260 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9261 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9262 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9264 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9269 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9270 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9271 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9274 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9275 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9276 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9277 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9278 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9279 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9280 let persist = match &res {
9281 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9282 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9283 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9285 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9290 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9291 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9292 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9293 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9294 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9295 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9296 let persist = match &res {
9297 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9298 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9299 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9301 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9306 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9307 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9308 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9311 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9312 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9313 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9316 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9317 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9318 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9319 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9320 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9321 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9322 let persist = match &res {
9323 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9324 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9325 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9327 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9332 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9333 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9334 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9337 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9338 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9339 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9342 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9347 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9349 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9350 let persist = match &res {
9351 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9352 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9353 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9355 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9360 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9361 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9362 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9363 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9364 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9367 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9368 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9369 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9371 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9372 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9373 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9374 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9375 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9376 let context = match phase {
9377 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9378 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9379 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9380 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9385 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9386 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9387 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9390 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9391 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9394 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9395 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9398 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9399 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9403 // Clean up for removal.
9404 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9405 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9408 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9409 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9410 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9411 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9413 // V1 Channel Establishment
9414 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9415 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9416 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9417 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9418 // V2 Channel Establishment
9419 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9420 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9421 // Common Channel Establishment
9422 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9423 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9425 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9427 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9428 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9429 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9430 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9431 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9432 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9433 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9434 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9435 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9436 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9437 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9438 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9439 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9440 // Channel Operations
9441 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9442 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9443 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9444 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9445 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9446 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9448 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9449 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9450 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9451 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9452 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9453 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9454 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9455 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9456 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9459 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9460 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9461 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9462 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9465 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9467 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9469 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9470 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9474 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9475 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9476 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9477 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9481 let mut res = Ok(());
9483 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9484 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9485 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9486 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9487 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9488 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9489 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9492 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9493 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9495 if inbound_peer_limited {
9497 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9499 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9500 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9501 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9502 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9503 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9504 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9505 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9506 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9511 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9512 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9514 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9515 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9516 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9517 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9520 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9523 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9524 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9529 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9532 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9533 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9534 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9535 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9537 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9539 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9540 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9541 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9542 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9543 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9547 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9549 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9550 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9554 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9555 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9556 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9557 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9558 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9559 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9563 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9564 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9565 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9566 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9567 debug_assert!(false);
9570 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9571 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9572 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9573 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9574 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9575 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9576 debug_assert!(false);
9582 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9583 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9588 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9589 match &msg.data as &str {
9590 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9591 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9593 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9594 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9595 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9596 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9597 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9598 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9599 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9600 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9601 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9603 || -> NotifyOption {
9604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9605 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9606 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9607 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9608 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9609 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9610 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9611 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9615 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9616 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9617 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9618 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9619 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9620 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9622 log_level: Level::Trace,
9625 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9626 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9627 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9629 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9640 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9641 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9643 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9644 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9645 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9646 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9647 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9648 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9649 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9650 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9652 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9653 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9654 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9658 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9659 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9660 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9661 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9662 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9663 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9664 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9665 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9666 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9667 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9668 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9674 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9675 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9676 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9677 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9678 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9684 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9685 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9686 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9690 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9691 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9695 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9696 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9699 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9700 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9703 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9704 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9707 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9708 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9709 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9710 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9713 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9714 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9715 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9716 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9719 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9720 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9721 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9722 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9725 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9726 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9727 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9728 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9731 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9732 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9733 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9734 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9737 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9738 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9739 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9740 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9743 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9744 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9745 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9746 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9749 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9750 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9751 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9752 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9755 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9756 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9757 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9758 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9762 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9763 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9765 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9766 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9767 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9768 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9769 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9770 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9774 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9775 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9776 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9779 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9780 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9783 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9784 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9786 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9787 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9789 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9790 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9794 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9795 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9796 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9798 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9800 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9801 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9805 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9806 amount_msats, payment_secret
9808 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9810 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9811 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9815 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9816 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9817 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9820 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9821 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9822 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9823 payment_paths, payment_hash
9825 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9826 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9827 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9829 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9830 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9831 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9832 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9833 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9836 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9837 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9838 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9839 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9840 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9842 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9843 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9844 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9845 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9846 .and_then(|invoice| {
9848 let mut invoice = invoice;
9849 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9850 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9852 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9853 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9854 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9856 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9857 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9862 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9863 Err(error) => Some(error),
9867 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9868 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9870 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9872 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9873 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9876 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9877 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9878 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9885 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9886 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9892 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9893 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9897 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9898 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9899 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9900 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9901 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9905 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9906 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9908 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9909 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9910 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9911 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9912 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9915 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9916 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9917 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9918 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9921 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9922 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9923 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9924 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9927 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9928 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9929 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9930 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9933 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9934 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9935 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9936 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9937 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9938 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9939 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9940 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9941 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9942 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9943 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9944 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9945 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9946 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9947 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9948 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9949 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9950 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9951 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9952 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9953 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9958 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9959 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9961 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9962 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9963 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9964 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9967 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9968 (2, node_id, required),
9969 (4, features, required),
9970 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9971 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9972 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9973 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9976 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9977 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9978 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9979 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9980 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9981 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9982 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9983 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9984 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9985 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9986 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9987 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9988 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9989 (7, self.config, option),
9990 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9991 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9992 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9993 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9994 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9995 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9996 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9997 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9998 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9999 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10000 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10001 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10002 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10003 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10004 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10005 (32, self.is_public, required),
10006 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10007 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10008 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10009 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10010 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10011 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10012 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10018 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10019 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10020 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10021 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10022 (2, channel_id, required),
10023 (3, channel_type, option),
10024 (4, counterparty, required),
10025 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10026 (6, funding_txo, option),
10027 (7, config, option),
10028 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10029 (9, confirmations, option),
10030 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10031 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10032 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10033 (16, balance_msat, required),
10034 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10035 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10036 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10037 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10038 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10039 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10040 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10041 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10042 (26, is_outbound, required),
10043 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10044 (30, is_usable, required),
10045 (32, is_public, required),
10046 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10047 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10048 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10049 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10050 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10051 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10052 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10055 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10056 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10057 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10058 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10059 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10062 inbound_scid_alias,
10063 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10065 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10066 outbound_scid_alias,
10070 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10071 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10073 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10074 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10075 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10076 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10077 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10078 confirmations_required,
10080 force_close_spend_delay,
10081 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10082 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10083 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10084 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10085 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10086 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10087 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10088 channel_shutdown_state,
10089 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10090 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10095 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10096 (2, channels, required_vec),
10097 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10098 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10101 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10102 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10103 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10106 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10108 (0, onion_packet, required),
10109 (1, blinded, option),
10110 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10113 (0, payment_data, required),
10114 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10115 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10116 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10117 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10118 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10120 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10121 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10122 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10123 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10124 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10125 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10126 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10130 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10131 (0, routing, required),
10132 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10133 (4, payment_hash, required),
10134 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10135 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10136 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10137 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10141 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10142 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10144 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10145 0u8.write(writer)?;
10146 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10147 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10148 reason.write(writer)?;
10150 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10151 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10153 1u8.write(writer)?;
10154 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10155 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10156 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10157 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10164 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10165 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10166 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10169 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10170 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10171 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10172 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10176 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10177 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10178 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10179 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10180 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10183 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10184 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10185 // messages contained in the variants.
10186 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10187 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10188 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10190 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10191 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10192 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10193 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10194 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10197 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10198 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10199 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10200 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10201 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10203 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10208 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10213 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10214 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10215 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10218 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10219 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10220 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10221 (2, outpoint, required),
10222 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10223 (4, htlc_id, required),
10224 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10225 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10226 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10227 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10228 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10231 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10232 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10233 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10234 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10235 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10237 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10238 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10239 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10240 (2, self.value, required),
10241 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10242 (4, payment_data, option),
10243 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10244 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10245 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10246 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10252 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10253 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10254 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10255 (0, prev_hop, required),
10256 (1, total_msat, option),
10257 (2, value_ser, required),
10258 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10259 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10260 (5, total_value_received, option),
10261 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10262 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10263 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10265 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10266 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10267 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10269 if payment_data.is_some() {
10270 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10272 if total_msat.is_none() {
10273 total_msat = Some(value);
10275 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10278 if total_msat.is_none() {
10279 if payment_data.is_none() {
10280 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10282 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10284 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10288 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10291 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10292 total_value_received,
10293 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10295 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10296 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10301 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10302 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10303 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10306 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10307 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10308 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10309 let mut payment_id = None;
10310 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10311 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10312 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10313 (0, session_priv, required),
10314 (1, payment_id, option),
10315 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10316 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10317 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10318 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10320 if payment_id.is_none() {
10321 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10323 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10325 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10326 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10327 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10329 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10330 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10331 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10332 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10336 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10337 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10338 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10340 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10343 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10344 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10349 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10350 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10352 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10353 0u8.write(writer)?;
10354 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10355 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10356 (0, session_priv, required),
10357 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10358 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10359 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10360 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10361 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10362 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10365 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10366 1u8.write(writer)?;
10367 field.write(writer)?;
10374 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10375 (0, forward_info, required),
10376 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10377 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10378 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10379 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10380 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10381 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10382 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10385 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10386 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10387 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10389 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10393 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10394 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10395 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10396 (0, htlc_id, required),
10397 (2, err_packet, required),
10400 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10401 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10402 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10403 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10404 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10405 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10406 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10407 (0, htlc_id, required),
10408 (1, failure_code, required),
10409 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10410 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10418 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10419 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10420 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10422 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10424 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10425 (0, htlc_id, required),
10426 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10427 (2, err_packet, required),
10428 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10430 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10431 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10432 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10434 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10438 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10439 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10443 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10448 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10449 (0, payment_secret, required),
10450 (2, expiry_time, required),
10451 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10452 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10453 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10456 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10458 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10459 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10460 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10461 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10462 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10463 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10467 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10468 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10470 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10472 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10474 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10475 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10476 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10479 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10481 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10482 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10483 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10484 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10485 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10486 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10487 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10490 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10491 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10495 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10497 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10498 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10499 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10500 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10501 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10502 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10505 channel.write(writer)?;
10511 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10512 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10513 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10514 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10515 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10516 for forward in pending_forwards {
10517 forward.write(writer)?;
10522 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10524 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10525 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10526 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10528 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10529 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10530 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10531 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10532 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10533 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10534 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10535 htlc.write(writer)?;
10537 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10538 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10541 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10542 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10543 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10544 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10545 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10546 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10547 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10550 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10551 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10552 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10553 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10554 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10556 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10557 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10558 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10559 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10560 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10561 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10562 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10567 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10568 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10569 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10570 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10571 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10572 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10573 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10574 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10575 0u64.write(writer)?;
10577 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10578 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10579 event.write(writer)?;
10583 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10584 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10585 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10586 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10587 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10588 0u64.write(writer)?;
10590 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10591 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10592 // likely to be identical.
10593 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10594 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10596 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10597 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10598 hash.write(writer)?;
10599 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10602 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10603 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10604 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10605 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10606 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10609 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10610 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10612 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10613 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10614 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10615 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10618 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10619 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10620 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10621 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10625 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10626 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10627 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10629 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10630 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10631 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10637 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10638 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10639 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10640 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10643 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10644 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10645 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10646 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10647 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10650 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10651 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10652 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10653 if !updates.is_empty() {
10654 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10655 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10660 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10661 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10662 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10663 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10664 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10665 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10666 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10667 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10668 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10669 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10670 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10671 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10672 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10679 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10680 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10681 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10682 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10685 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10686 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10687 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10688 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10689 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10690 // check that the event is sane here.
10691 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10692 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10693 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10694 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10700 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10701 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10702 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10703 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10704 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10705 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10708 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10709 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10710 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10711 events.push_back((ev, action));
10712 } else if action.is_some() {
10713 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10720 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10721 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10722 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10723 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10724 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10725 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10728 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10730 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10732 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10733 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10734 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10735 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10736 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10737 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10738 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10739 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10740 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10741 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10742 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10743 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10744 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10746 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10747 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10749 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10750 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10752 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10753 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10754 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10755 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10756 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10757 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10759 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10760 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10762 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10763 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10764 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10765 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10766 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10767 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10771 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10772 pub entropy_source: ES,
10774 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10775 pub node_signer: NS,
10777 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10778 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10780 pub signer_provider: SP,
10782 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10784 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10785 pub fee_estimator: F,
10786 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10788 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10789 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10790 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10791 pub chain_monitor: M,
10793 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10794 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10795 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10796 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10797 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10798 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10800 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10802 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10803 /// deserialization.
10805 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10806 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10807 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10809 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10810 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10812 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10813 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10814 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10815 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10817 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10820 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10821 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10824 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10825 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10827 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10828 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10829 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10830 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10831 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10832 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10836 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10837 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10838 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10839 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10840 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10842 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10843 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10844 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10850 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10851 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10852 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10853 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10855 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10856 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10857 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10858 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10859 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10860 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10864 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10865 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10866 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10870 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10871 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10873 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10874 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10875 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10876 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10877 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10878 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10882 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10883 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10885 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10886 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10887 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10889 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10891 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10892 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10893 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10894 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10895 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10896 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10897 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10898 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10899 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10900 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10901 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10903 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10904 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10905 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10906 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10907 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10908 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10909 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10910 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10911 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10912 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10913 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10914 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10915 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10916 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10917 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10919 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10920 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10921 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10923 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10924 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10925 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10927 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10928 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10929 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10931 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10932 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10933 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10935 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10936 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10937 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10940 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10941 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10942 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10943 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10944 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10945 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10946 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10947 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10949 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10950 let mut found_htlc = false;
10951 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10952 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10955 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10956 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10957 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10958 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10959 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10960 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10961 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10963 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10964 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10965 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10969 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10970 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10971 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10972 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10973 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10975 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10976 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10978 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10979 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10980 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10981 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10983 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10984 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10985 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10986 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10990 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10991 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10992 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10993 // safely discard the channel.
10994 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10995 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10996 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10997 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10998 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10999 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11000 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11001 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11004 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11005 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11006 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11007 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11008 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11009 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11013 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11014 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11015 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11016 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11017 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11019 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11020 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11021 counterparty_node_id: None,
11022 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11023 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11025 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11029 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11030 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11031 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11032 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11033 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11034 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11035 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11036 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11037 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11039 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11042 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11043 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11044 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11045 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11046 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11047 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11048 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11049 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11051 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11054 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11057 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11058 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11059 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11060 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11061 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11062 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11063 is_connected: false,
11067 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11068 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11069 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11070 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11071 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11072 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11073 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11074 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11077 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11078 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11079 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11080 for _ in 0..event_count {
11081 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11082 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11087 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11088 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11089 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11091 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11092 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11093 // on-startup monitor updates.
11094 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11095 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11097 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11101 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11102 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11104 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11105 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11106 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11107 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11108 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11112 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11113 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11114 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11115 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11116 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11117 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11118 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11120 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11121 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11125 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11126 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11127 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11128 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11129 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11130 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11131 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11132 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11133 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11134 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11135 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11136 let mut events_override = None;
11137 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11138 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11139 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11140 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11141 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11142 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11143 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11144 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11145 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11146 (8, events_override, option),
11147 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11148 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11149 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11150 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11152 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11153 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11156 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11157 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11160 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11161 pending_events_read = events;
11164 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11165 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11168 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11169 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11170 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11171 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11172 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11173 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11175 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11177 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11178 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11179 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11182 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11183 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11184 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11185 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11186 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11188 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11189 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11190 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11192 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11193 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11194 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11195 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11196 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11198 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11199 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11200 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11201 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11202 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11203 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11204 pending_background_events.push(
11205 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11206 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11207 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11208 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11209 update: update.clone(),
11212 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11213 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11214 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11215 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11216 pending_background_events.push(
11217 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11218 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11219 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11222 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11223 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11224 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11226 max_in_flight_update_id
11230 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11231 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11232 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11233 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11234 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11235 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11237 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11239 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11240 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11241 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11242 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11243 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11244 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11245 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11246 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11247 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11250 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11251 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
11252 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11253 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11254 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11255 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11256 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11257 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11258 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11259 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11260 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11263 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11264 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11265 debug_assert!(false);
11266 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11271 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11272 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11273 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11274 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11275 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11276 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11277 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11278 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11279 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11280 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11282 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11283 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11284 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11286 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11287 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11288 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11289 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11290 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11291 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11292 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11293 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11298 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11299 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11301 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11302 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11303 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11304 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11307 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11308 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11309 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11310 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11311 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11312 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11313 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11315 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11316 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11317 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11318 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11319 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11320 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11321 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11322 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11323 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11326 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11327 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11328 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11329 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11331 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11332 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11333 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11336 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11337 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11338 retry_strategy: None,
11339 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11340 payment_params: None,
11341 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11342 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11343 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11344 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11345 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11346 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11347 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11348 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11349 total_msat: path_amt,
11350 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11351 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11353 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11354 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11359 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11360 match htlc_source {
11361 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11362 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11363 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11364 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11366 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11367 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11368 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11369 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11370 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11371 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11372 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11373 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11374 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11375 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11376 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11381 !forwards.is_empty()
11383 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11384 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11385 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11386 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11387 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11388 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11389 intercepted_id != ev_id
11396 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11397 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11398 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11399 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11400 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11401 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11402 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11403 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11404 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11405 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11406 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11408 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11409 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11410 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11411 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11413 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11414 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11415 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11422 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11423 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11425 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11427 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11428 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11429 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11430 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11431 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11432 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11433 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11434 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11435 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11436 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11439 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11440 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11441 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11442 // channel still live case here.
11446 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11447 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11452 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11453 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11454 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11455 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11456 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11457 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11458 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11459 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11463 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11464 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11466 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11467 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11468 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11469 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11471 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11472 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11473 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11475 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11476 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11478 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11479 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11481 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11484 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11485 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11486 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11488 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11492 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11493 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11494 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11495 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11496 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11498 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11499 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11500 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11501 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11502 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11503 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11504 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11505 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11507 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11508 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11512 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11514 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11516 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11517 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11519 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11520 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11525 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11526 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11528 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11530 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11532 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11533 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11534 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11535 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11539 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11540 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11541 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11542 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11543 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11544 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11545 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11546 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11547 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11549 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11550 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11551 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11553 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11554 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11555 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11556 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11557 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11558 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11560 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11561 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11562 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11563 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11564 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11565 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11569 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11570 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11571 debug_assert!(false);
11572 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11577 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11579 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11580 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11581 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11582 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11583 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11584 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11585 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11586 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11587 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11588 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11589 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11591 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11592 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11594 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11595 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11596 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11597 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11599 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11600 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11601 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11602 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11604 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11605 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11606 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11607 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11609 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11610 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11611 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11614 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11615 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11616 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11619 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11620 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11623 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11626 purpose: payment.purpose,
11627 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11628 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11629 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11635 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11636 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11637 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11638 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11639 for action in actions.iter() {
11640 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11641 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11642 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11644 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11646 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11647 blocked_channel_id);
11648 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11649 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11650 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11652 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11653 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11654 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11655 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11659 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11660 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11664 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11666 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11667 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11671 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11673 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11674 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11675 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11676 router: args.router,
11678 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11680 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11681 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11682 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11683 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11685 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11686 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11687 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11688 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11689 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11690 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11692 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11694 our_network_pubkey,
11697 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11699 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11701 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11702 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11703 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11704 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11705 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11707 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11708 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11710 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11712 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11714 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11715 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11716 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11718 logger: args.logger,
11719 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11722 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11723 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11724 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11725 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11726 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11729 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11730 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11731 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11732 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11733 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11734 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11735 downstream_channel_id, None
11739 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11740 //connection or two.
11742 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11748 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11749 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11750 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11751 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11752 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11753 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11754 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11755 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11756 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11757 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11758 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11759 use crate::prelude::*;
11760 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11761 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11762 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11763 use crate::util::test_utils;
11764 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11765 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11768 fn test_notify_limits() {
11769 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11770 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11774 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11776 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11777 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11778 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11779 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11780 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11782 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11784 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11785 // to connect messages with new values
11786 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11787 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11788 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11789 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11790 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11791 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11793 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11794 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11795 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11796 // ... but the last node should not.
11797 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11798 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11799 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11800 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11802 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11803 // about the channel.
11804 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11805 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11806 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11808 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11810 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11811 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11812 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11813 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11814 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11815 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11817 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11818 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11819 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11821 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11822 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11823 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11824 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11825 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11826 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11828 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11829 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11830 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11831 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11832 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11833 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11834 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11835 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11837 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11838 // the channel info has updated.
11839 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11840 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11841 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11842 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11843 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11844 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11848 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11849 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11854 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11855 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11857 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11858 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11859 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11860 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11862 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11863 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11864 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11865 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11866 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11867 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11868 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11869 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11871 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11872 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11873 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11875 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11876 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11877 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11879 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11880 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11881 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11882 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11883 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11885 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11886 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11887 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11889 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11890 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11891 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11892 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11893 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11894 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11895 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11896 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11897 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11899 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11900 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11901 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11903 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11904 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11905 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11907 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11908 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11909 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11910 // lightning messages manually.
11911 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11912 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11915 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11916 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11917 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11918 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11920 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11921 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11923 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11924 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11926 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11927 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11928 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11930 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11931 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11932 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11934 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11936 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11938 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11939 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11942 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11943 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11944 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11945 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11947 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11948 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11949 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11950 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11955 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11956 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11957 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11958 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11960 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11965 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11966 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11967 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11970 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11971 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11972 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11973 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11974 // fails as expected.
11975 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11976 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11977 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11978 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11979 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11980 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11981 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11982 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11983 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11984 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11985 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11986 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11987 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11988 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11989 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11991 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11992 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11993 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11995 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11996 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11997 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11998 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11999 let route = find_route(
12000 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12001 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12003 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12004 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12006 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12008 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12009 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12010 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12012 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12013 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12014 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12016 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12018 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12019 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12020 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12021 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12022 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12023 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12024 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12025 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12026 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12028 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12029 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12031 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12032 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12033 let route = find_route(
12034 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12035 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12037 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12038 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12040 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12041 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12042 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12043 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12044 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12046 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12047 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12048 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12049 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12051 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12052 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12053 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12054 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12055 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12058 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12059 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12061 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12062 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12063 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12064 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12065 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12066 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12067 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12068 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12069 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12071 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12072 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12074 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12075 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12076 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12077 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12079 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12080 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12081 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12082 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12083 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12085 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12086 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12087 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12090 let route = find_route(
12091 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12092 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12094 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12095 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12096 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12098 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12099 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12100 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12101 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12102 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12104 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12108 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12109 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12110 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12111 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12112 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12113 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12114 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12115 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12116 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12118 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12119 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12123 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12124 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12125 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12131 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12132 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12134 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12135 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12136 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12137 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12138 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12139 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12140 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12141 let route = find_route(
12142 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12143 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12146 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12147 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12148 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12149 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12150 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12151 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12154 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12155 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12156 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12157 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12158 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12159 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12160 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12162 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12166 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12167 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12168 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12169 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12170 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12171 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12172 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12173 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12174 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12176 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12177 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12179 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12180 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12181 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12182 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12183 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12184 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12185 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12186 let route = find_route(
12187 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12188 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12191 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12192 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12193 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12194 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12195 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12196 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12197 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12198 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12201 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12202 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12203 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12204 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12205 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12206 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12207 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12209 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12213 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12217 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12219 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12220 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12221 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12222 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12224 // Marshall an MPP route.
12225 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12226 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12227 route.paths.push(path);
12228 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12229 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12230 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12231 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12232 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12233 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12235 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12236 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12238 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12239 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12241 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12246 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12247 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12248 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12249 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12250 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12252 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12254 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12255 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12257 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12258 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12260 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12263 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12264 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12265 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12266 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12267 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12268 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12271 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12274 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12275 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12280 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12281 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12282 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12283 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12284 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12285 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12287 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12288 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12290 total_msat: 100_000,
12293 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12294 // payment verification fails as expected.
12295 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12296 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12297 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12298 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12300 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12304 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12305 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12309 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12310 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12311 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12312 // the channel is successfully closed.
12313 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12314 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12315 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12316 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12318 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12319 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12320 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12321 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12322 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12324 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12325 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12327 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12328 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12329 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12330 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12333 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12335 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12336 // as it has the funding transaction.
12337 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12338 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12339 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12342 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12344 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12346 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12348 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12349 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12350 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12352 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12355 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12356 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12357 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12358 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12359 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12362 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12363 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12365 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12366 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12367 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12368 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12370 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12371 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12372 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12373 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12375 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12376 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12378 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12379 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12380 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12381 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12382 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12383 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12384 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12388 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12389 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12390 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12391 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12392 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12393 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12394 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12397 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12399 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12400 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12401 // closing transaction).
12402 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12403 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12404 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12406 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12407 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12408 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12409 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12410 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12413 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12415 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12417 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12418 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12419 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12421 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12423 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12424 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12427 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12428 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12429 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12432 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12433 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12434 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12437 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12438 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12439 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12442 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12443 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12444 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12447 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12449 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12450 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12452 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12453 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12455 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12456 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12461 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12462 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12463 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12464 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12465 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12466 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12467 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12468 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12471 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12472 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12473 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12475 // Test the API functions.
12476 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12478 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12480 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12482 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12484 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12486 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12488 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12492 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12493 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12494 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12495 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12496 // the given `channel_id`.
12497 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12498 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12499 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12502 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12505 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12507 // Test the API functions.
12508 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12510 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12512 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12514 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12516 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12518 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12522 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12523 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12524 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12525 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12526 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12527 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12529 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12531 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12532 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12534 let mut funding_tx = None;
12535 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12536 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12537 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12540 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12541 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12542 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12543 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12544 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12546 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12548 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12550 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12552 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12554 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12556 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12559 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12560 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12561 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12562 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12563 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12564 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12566 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12567 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12569 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12570 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12571 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12572 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12573 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12574 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12575 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12578 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12579 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12580 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12581 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12582 }, true).unwrap_err();
12584 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12585 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12586 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12587 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12588 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12589 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12590 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12592 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12593 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12595 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12596 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12597 }, true).unwrap_err();
12599 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12600 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12601 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12602 }, false).unwrap();
12603 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12605 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12606 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12608 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12609 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12610 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12611 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12612 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12614 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12615 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12616 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12618 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12619 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12620 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12622 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12623 // "protected" and can connect again.
12624 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12625 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12626 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12628 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12630 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12632 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12633 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12637 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12638 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12642 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12644 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12646 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12647 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12649 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12650 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12651 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12652 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12655 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12657 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12658 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12659 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12661 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12662 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12663 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12665 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12666 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12667 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12668 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12672 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12673 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12674 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12677 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12678 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12680 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12682 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12684 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12685 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12687 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12688 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12689 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12690 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12691 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12692 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12695 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12696 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12698 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12699 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12701 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12703 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12704 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12707 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12708 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12709 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12710 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12711 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12713 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12714 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12716 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12717 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12718 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12719 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12723 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12725 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12726 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12728 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12729 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12730 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12732 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12733 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12737 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12741 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12742 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12743 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12744 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12745 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12746 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12747 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12748 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12749 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12750 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12751 payment_metadata: None,
12752 keysend_preimage: None,
12753 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12754 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12756 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12758 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12759 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12760 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12761 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12762 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12763 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12764 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12766 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12767 } else { panic!(); }
12769 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12770 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12771 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12772 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12773 payment_metadata: None,
12774 keysend_preimage: None,
12775 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12776 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12778 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12780 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12781 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12782 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12783 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12787 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12788 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12789 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12790 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12791 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12793 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12794 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12795 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12796 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12797 payment_metadata: None,
12798 keysend_preimage: None,
12799 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12800 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12802 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12803 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12804 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12806 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12807 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12808 // is not satisfied.
12809 assert!(result.is_ok());
12813 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12814 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12815 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12816 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12817 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12819 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12820 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12825 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12826 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12828 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12829 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12831 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12832 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12833 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12834 match &msg_events[0] {
12835 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12836 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12838 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12839 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12840 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12846 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12847 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12849 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12850 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12853 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12857 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12858 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12859 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12860 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12863 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12864 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12865 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12866 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12867 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12869 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12870 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12871 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12873 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12874 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12876 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12877 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12882 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12883 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12885 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12886 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12888 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12889 // not have generated any events.
12890 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12894 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12895 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12896 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12897 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12898 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12899 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12900 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12901 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12903 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12904 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12905 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12907 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12908 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12909 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12910 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12913 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12914 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12917 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12918 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12919 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12921 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12922 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12923 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12924 ..Default::default()
12926 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12927 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12928 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12930 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12931 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12934 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12935 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12936 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12937 ..Default::default()
12939 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12940 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12941 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12942 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12944 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12945 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12948 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12949 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12950 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12951 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12952 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12955 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12956 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12957 ..Default::default()
12959 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12962 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12963 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12964 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12969 fn test_payment_display() {
12970 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12971 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12972 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12973 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12974 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12975 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12979 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12980 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12981 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12982 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12983 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12984 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12986 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12987 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12988 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12989 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12990 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12991 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12992 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12993 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12995 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12996 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12997 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13000 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13001 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13003 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13004 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13006 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13007 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13008 }, false).unwrap();
13009 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13010 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13011 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13013 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13015 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13016 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13017 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13018 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13019 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13020 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13021 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13022 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13023 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13024 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13025 } else { panic!() };
13026 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13027 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13028 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13029 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13031 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13033 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13034 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13035 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13040 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13041 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13042 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13043 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13046 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13047 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13048 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13050 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13051 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13053 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13054 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13057 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13058 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13059 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13061 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13065 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13066 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13067 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13069 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13074 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13075 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13076 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13077 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13079 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13080 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13081 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13083 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13085 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13086 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13087 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13088 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13090 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13091 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13093 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13099 use crate::chain::Listen;
13100 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13101 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13102 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13103 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13104 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13105 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13106 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13107 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13108 use crate::util::test_utils;
13109 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13111 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13112 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13113 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13114 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13116 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13118 use criterion::Criterion;
13120 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13121 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13122 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13123 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13124 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13125 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13126 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13128 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13129 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13131 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13132 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13134 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13136 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13139 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13140 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13143 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13144 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13145 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13147 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13148 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13150 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13151 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13152 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13153 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13154 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13156 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13157 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13158 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13160 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13161 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13162 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13163 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13165 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13166 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13167 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13169 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13170 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13171 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13172 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13173 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13175 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13176 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13177 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13179 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13180 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13182 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13183 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13184 }, false).unwrap();
13185 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13186 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13187 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13190 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13191 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13192 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13194 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13195 } else { panic!(); }
13197 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13198 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13199 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13200 match events_b[0] {
13201 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13202 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13204 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13207 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13208 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13209 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13210 match events_a[0] {
13211 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13212 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13217 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13219 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13220 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13221 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13223 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13224 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13225 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13226 match msg_events[0] {
13227 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13228 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13229 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13233 match msg_events[1] {
13234 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13238 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13239 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13240 match events_a[0] {
13241 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13242 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13247 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13248 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13249 match events_b[0] {
13250 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13251 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13256 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13257 macro_rules! send_payment {
13258 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13259 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13260 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13261 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13262 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13263 payment_count += 1;
13264 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13265 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13267 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13268 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13269 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13270 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13271 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13272 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13273 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13274 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13275 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13276 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13277 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13279 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13280 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13281 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13282 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13284 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13286 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13287 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13288 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13290 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13293 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13294 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13295 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13296 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13298 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13302 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13303 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13304 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);