1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1113 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1115 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1116 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1118 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1119 /// closing channels
1120 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1121 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1122 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1123 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1125 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1126 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1128 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1129 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1130 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1131 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1132 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1133 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1135 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1136 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1138 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1140 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1141 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1142 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1143 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1144 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1146 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1147 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1148 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1150 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1151 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1152 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1154 /// # Initialization
1156 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1157 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1158 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1159 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1160 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1163 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1164 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1165 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1166 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1167 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1168 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1169 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1170 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1172 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1175 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1176 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1177 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1178 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1180 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1182 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1183 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1184 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1185 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1187 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1188 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1189 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1190 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1191 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1192 /// # mut reader: R,
1193 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1194 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1195 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1196 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1199 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1200 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1201 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1202 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1205 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1206 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1207 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1208 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1209 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1211 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1212 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1214 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1217 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1218 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1219 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1227 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1228 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1229 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1230 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1231 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1232 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1233 /// as documented by those traits
1234 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1236 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1237 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1238 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1240 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1241 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1243 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1244 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1245 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1246 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1250 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1251 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1252 /// currently open channels.
1255 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1257 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1258 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1259 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1260 /// for details in channels {
1261 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1266 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1267 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1268 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1269 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1271 /// ## Opening Channels
1273 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1274 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1275 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1278 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1279 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1280 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1281 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1283 /// # trait Wallet {
1284 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1285 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1286 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1289 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1290 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1291 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1292 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1293 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1294 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1295 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1298 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1299 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1300 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1301 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1302 /// user_channel_id, ..
1304 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1305 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1306 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1308 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1309 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1311 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1312 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1315 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1316 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1318 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1319 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1322 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1323 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1324 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1332 /// ## Accepting Channels
1334 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1335 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1336 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1339 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1340 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1341 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1343 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1345 /// # unimplemented!()
1348 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1349 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1350 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1351 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1352 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1353 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1354 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1356 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1357 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1362 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1363 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1364 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1366 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1367 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1376 /// ## Closing Channels
1378 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1379 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1380 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1381 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1382 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1385 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1386 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1387 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1388 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1390 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1391 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1393 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1394 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1395 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1396 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1399 /// // On the event processing thread
1400 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1401 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1402 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1403 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1413 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1414 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1415 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1416 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1417 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1420 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1421 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1422 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1423 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1425 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1427 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1428 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1429 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1430 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1431 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1432 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1434 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1435 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1436 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1439 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1440 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1442 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1443 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1444 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1445 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1446 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1448 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1449 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1452 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1455 /// // On the event processing thread
1456 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1457 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1458 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1459 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1460 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1461 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1463 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1464 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1466 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1467 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1468 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1469 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1472 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1473 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1474 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1482 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1483 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1486 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1487 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1488 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1489 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1491 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1492 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1493 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1495 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1496 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1497 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1498 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1499 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1500 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1502 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1503 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1506 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1507 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1509 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1511 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1512 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1513 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1519 /// // On the event processing thread
1520 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1521 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1522 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1529 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1531 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1532 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1533 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1534 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1535 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1536 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1539 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1540 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1541 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1543 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1544 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1545 /// let offer = channel_manager
1546 /// .create_offer_builder("coffee".to_string())?
1548 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1549 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1550 /// # let offer = builder
1551 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1553 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1555 /// // On the event processing thread
1556 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1557 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1558 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1559 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1560 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1562 /// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1563 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1568 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1569 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1578 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1579 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1580 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1583 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1584 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1585 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1587 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1588 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1589 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1591 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1592 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1593 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1594 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1596 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1597 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1600 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1601 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1603 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1605 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1609 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1611 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1613 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1617 /// // On the event processing thread
1618 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1619 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1620 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1621 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1630 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1631 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1632 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1633 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1635 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1636 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1637 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1638 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1639 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1640 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1641 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1642 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1643 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1645 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1646 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1647 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1649 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1651 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1652 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1653 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1654 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1655 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1657 /// # DoS Mitigation
1659 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1660 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1661 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1662 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1664 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1665 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1666 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1670 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1671 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1672 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1673 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1674 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1676 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1677 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1678 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1679 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1680 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1681 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1682 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1683 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1684 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1685 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1686 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1687 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1688 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1689 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1690 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1691 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1692 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1693 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1694 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1695 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1696 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1697 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1698 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1699 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1700 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1701 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1702 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1703 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1704 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1705 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1706 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1707 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1708 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1709 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1710 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1711 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1712 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1713 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1716 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1717 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1718 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1719 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1720 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1724 // `pending_offers_messages`
1726 // `total_consistency_lock`
1728 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1730 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1732 // |__`per_peer_state`
1734 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1736 // |__`claimable_payments`
1738 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1742 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1744 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1746 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1750 // |__`pending_events`
1752 // |__`pending_background_events`
1754 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1756 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1757 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1758 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1759 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1760 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1761 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1765 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1766 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1767 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1773 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1775 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1777 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1778 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1780 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1781 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1782 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1783 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1785 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1786 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1788 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1789 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1790 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1791 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1792 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1793 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1794 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1795 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1797 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1799 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1800 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1802 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1804 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1805 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1806 /// and via the classic SCID.
1808 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1809 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1811 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1813 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1815 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1816 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1817 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1820 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1822 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1823 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1825 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1826 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1828 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1829 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1830 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1831 /// active channel list on load.
1833 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1834 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1836 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1838 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1839 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1840 /// the handling of the events.
1842 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1843 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1846 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1847 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1848 /// would break backwards compatability.
1849 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1850 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1851 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1853 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1855 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1857 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1859 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1861 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1862 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1863 /// confirmation depth.
1865 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1866 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1867 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1869 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1871 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1873 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1875 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1877 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1879 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1880 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1881 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1883 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1884 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1886 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1887 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1888 /// keeping additional state.
1889 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1891 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1892 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1893 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1894 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1896 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1897 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1899 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1900 /// are currently open with that peer.
1902 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1903 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1906 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1908 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1909 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1910 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1911 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1912 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1914 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1915 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1916 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1917 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1918 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1920 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1921 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1923 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1924 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1925 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1926 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1927 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1929 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1930 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1932 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1933 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1934 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1935 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1936 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1938 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1940 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1942 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1943 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1944 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1945 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1946 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1947 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1948 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1949 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1950 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1951 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1952 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1954 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1955 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1956 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1958 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1960 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1961 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1963 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1967 signer_provider: SP,
1972 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1974 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1975 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1976 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1977 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1978 pub struct ChainParameters {
1979 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1980 pub network: Network,
1982 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1984 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1985 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1988 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1992 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1993 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1996 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1997 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1998 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1999 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2000 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2001 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2003 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2004 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2005 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2006 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2007 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2008 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2010 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2011 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2014 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2015 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2016 /// events to handle.
2018 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2019 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2021 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2022 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2025 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2026 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2027 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2028 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2030 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2031 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2032 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2033 should_persist: move || {
2034 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2035 // processing and return that.
2036 let notify = persist_check();
2037 match (notify, force_notify) {
2038 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2039 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2040 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2041 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2042 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2045 _read_guard: read_guard,
2049 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2050 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2051 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2052 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2053 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2054 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2056 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2057 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2058 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2059 should_persist: persist_check,
2060 _read_guard: read_guard,
2065 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2066 fn drop(&mut self) {
2067 match (self.should_persist)() {
2068 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2069 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2070 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2072 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2073 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2074 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2079 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2080 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2082 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2084 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2085 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2086 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2087 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2088 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2090 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2091 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2093 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2095 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2096 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2097 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2098 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2099 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2100 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2101 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2102 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2103 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2104 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2105 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2106 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2107 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2109 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2110 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2112 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2113 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2114 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2115 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2117 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2118 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2119 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2120 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2121 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2122 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2124 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2126 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2127 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2129 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2131 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2132 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2134 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2135 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2136 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2138 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2139 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2140 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2142 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2143 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2144 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2145 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2147 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2148 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2149 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2151 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2152 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2153 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2155 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2156 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2157 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2158 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2159 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2160 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2161 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2162 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2163 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2164 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2165 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2168 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2169 /// to better separate parameters.
2170 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2171 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2172 /// The node_id of our counterparty
2173 pub node_id: PublicKey,
2174 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2175 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2176 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2177 pub features: InitFeatures,
2178 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2179 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2180 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2182 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2184 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2185 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2186 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2187 /// payments to us through this channel.
2188 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2189 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2190 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2191 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2192 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2193 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2194 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2197 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2198 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2199 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2200 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2201 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2202 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2203 /// lifetime of the channel.
2204 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2205 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2206 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2207 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2208 /// our counterparty already.
2209 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2210 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2212 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2213 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2214 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2215 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2217 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2218 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2220 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2221 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2223 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2224 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2225 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2226 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2227 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2228 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2229 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2230 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2231 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2234 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2236 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2237 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2238 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2239 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2240 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2241 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2242 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2244 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2245 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2247 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2248 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2249 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2250 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2251 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2252 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2253 /// this value on chain.
2255 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2257 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2259 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2260 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2261 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2262 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2263 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2264 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
2265 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2267 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2268 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2269 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2270 pub user_channel_id: u128,
2271 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2272 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2274 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2275 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2276 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2277 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2278 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2280 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2281 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2282 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2283 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2285 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2286 pub balance_msat: u64,
2287 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2288 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2289 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2290 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2292 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2294 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2295 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2296 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2297 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2298 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2299 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2300 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2301 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2303 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2304 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2305 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2306 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2307 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2308 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2309 /// route which is valid.
2310 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2311 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2312 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2313 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2314 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2315 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2317 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2318 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2319 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2320 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2321 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2322 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2323 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2324 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2325 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2327 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2329 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2330 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2331 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2332 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2333 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2335 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2336 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2337 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2338 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2339 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2340 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2341 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2343 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2344 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2345 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2346 pub is_outbound: bool,
2347 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2348 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2349 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2350 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2351 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2353 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2354 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2355 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2356 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2357 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2358 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2359 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2361 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2362 pub is_usable: bool,
2363 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2364 pub is_public: bool,
2365 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2366 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2367 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2368 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2369 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2370 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2372 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2373 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2374 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2376 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2377 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2378 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2380 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2381 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2384 impl ChannelDetails {
2385 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2386 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2387 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2389 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2390 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2391 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2392 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2395 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2396 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2397 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2399 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2400 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2401 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2402 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2405 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2406 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2407 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2410 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2411 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2413 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2414 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2415 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2417 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2418 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2419 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2420 features: latest_features,
2421 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2422 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2423 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2424 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2425 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2426 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2427 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2428 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2429 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2430 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2432 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2433 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2434 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2435 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2436 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2437 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2438 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2439 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2440 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2441 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2442 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2443 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2444 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2445 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2446 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2447 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2448 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2449 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2450 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2451 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2452 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2453 is_usable: context.is_live(),
2454 is_public: context.should_announce(),
2455 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2456 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2457 config: Some(context.config()),
2458 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2459 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2460 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2465 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2466 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2467 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2468 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2469 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2470 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2471 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2472 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2473 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2475 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2477 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2478 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2480 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2481 NegotiatingClosingFee,
2482 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2483 /// to drop the channel.
2487 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2488 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2489 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2490 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2491 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2493 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2494 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2495 payment_id: PaymentId,
2497 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2499 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2500 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2501 payment_id: PaymentId,
2502 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2504 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2505 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2506 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2509 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2510 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2511 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2513 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2514 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2515 payment_id: PaymentId,
2516 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2517 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2518 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2520 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2521 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2522 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2524 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2525 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2526 payment_id: PaymentId,
2527 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2528 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2532 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2534 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2536 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2537 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2538 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2539 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2541 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2542 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2543 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2546 macro_rules! handle_error {
2547 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2548 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2549 // entering the macro.
2550 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2551 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2555 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2556 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2558 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2559 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2560 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2561 let logger = WithContext::from(
2562 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2564 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2566 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2567 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2568 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2573 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2576 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2578 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2579 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2580 action: err.action.clone()
2584 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2585 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2586 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2587 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2588 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2592 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2599 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2600 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2601 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2602 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2604 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2605 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2606 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2608 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2609 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2610 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2611 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2612 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2614 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2615 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2617 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2621 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2622 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2623 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2625 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2626 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2629 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2631 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2632 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2633 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2634 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2635 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2636 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2638 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2643 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2644 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2646 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2647 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2649 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2650 match $channel_phase {
2651 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2652 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2654 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2655 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2657 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2658 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2660 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2662 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2664 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2665 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2666 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2672 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2673 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2677 let key = *$entry.key();
2678 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2680 $entry.remove_entry();
2688 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2689 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2693 let key = *$entry.key();
2694 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2696 $entry.remove_entry();
2704 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2705 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2707 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2708 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2714 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2715 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2716 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2717 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2718 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2720 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2721 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2722 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2723 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2724 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2725 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2726 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2727 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2728 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2729 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2734 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2735 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2736 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2737 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2738 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2739 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2740 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2741 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2742 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2743 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2745 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2750 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2751 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2752 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2753 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2754 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2755 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2756 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2757 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2758 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2760 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2765 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2766 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2767 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2768 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2769 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2770 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2771 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2772 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2773 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2774 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2775 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2776 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2778 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2779 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2780 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2786 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2787 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2789 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2790 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2791 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2792 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2793 updates.announcement_sigs);
2794 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2795 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2798 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2799 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2800 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2801 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2803 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2804 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2805 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2806 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2807 let mut batch_completed = false;
2808 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2809 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2810 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2811 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2813 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2814 channel_state.2 = true;
2816 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2818 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2820 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2823 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2824 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2825 if batch_completed {
2826 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2827 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2828 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2829 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2830 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2831 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2832 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2833 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2834 chan.set_batch_ready();
2835 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2836 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2840 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2841 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2842 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2847 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2849 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2850 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2852 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2853 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2854 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2855 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2860 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2861 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2862 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2863 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2865 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2866 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2867 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2868 panic!("{}", err_str);
2870 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2871 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2872 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2875 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2881 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2882 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2883 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2885 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2886 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2887 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2888 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2889 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2890 // filter for uniqueness here.
2891 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2892 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2893 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2894 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2896 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2897 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2899 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2900 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2901 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2907 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2908 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2909 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2910 while !processed_all_events {
2911 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2918 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2919 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2920 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2922 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2923 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2924 result = $self.process_background_events();
2926 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2927 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2928 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2929 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2933 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2934 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2935 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2936 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2939 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2941 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2942 $event_to_handle = event;
2944 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2945 post_event_actions.push(action);
2950 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2951 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2952 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2953 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2954 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2955 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2958 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2959 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2960 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2961 processed_all_events = false;
2965 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2966 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2967 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2969 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2970 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2971 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2977 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2979 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2980 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2981 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2982 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2983 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2984 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2988 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2990 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2992 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2993 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2995 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2997 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2998 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2999 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3002 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3003 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3004 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3006 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3007 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3008 current_timestamp: u32,
3010 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3011 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3012 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3013 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3015 default_configuration: config.clone(),
3016 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3017 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3022 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3024 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3025 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3026 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3027 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3028 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3029 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3030 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3031 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3033 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3036 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3037 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3039 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3041 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3043 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3045 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3046 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3047 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3048 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3049 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3050 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3051 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3052 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3054 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3064 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3065 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3066 &self.default_configuration
3069 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3070 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3071 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3074 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3075 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3077 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3079 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3083 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3088 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3090 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3091 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3092 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3093 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3094 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3096 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3097 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3099 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3100 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3101 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3103 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3104 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3105 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3107 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3108 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3110 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3111 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3112 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3113 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3114 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3115 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3117 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3118 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3119 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3120 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3121 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3122 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3126 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3127 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3131 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3132 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3134 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3136 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3137 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3138 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3143 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3144 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3145 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3146 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3147 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3148 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3152 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3157 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3159 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3160 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3163 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3165 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3171 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3172 node_id: their_network_key,
3175 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3178 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3179 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3180 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3181 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3182 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3183 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3184 // the same channel.
3185 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3187 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3189 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3190 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3191 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3192 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3193 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3194 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3195 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3199 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3200 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3201 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3209 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3210 /// more information.
3211 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3212 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3213 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3214 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3215 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3216 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3217 // the same channel.
3218 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3220 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3221 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3222 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3223 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3224 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3225 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3226 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3227 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3235 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3236 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3238 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3239 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3241 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3242 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3243 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3244 // really wanted anyway.
3245 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3248 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3249 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3250 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3253 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3254 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3255 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3256 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3257 let context_to_details = |context| {
3258 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3260 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3262 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3263 .map(context_to_details)
3269 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3270 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3272 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3273 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3274 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3276 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3277 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3278 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3279 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3280 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3281 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3283 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3284 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3285 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3287 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3288 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3289 payment_id: *payment_id,
3290 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3291 total_msat: *total_msat,
3294 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3295 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3297 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3298 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3300 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3305 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3306 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3308 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3309 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3314 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3315 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3317 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3318 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3320 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3322 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3323 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3324 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3325 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3326 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3327 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3329 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3330 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3331 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3332 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3333 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3337 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3338 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3340 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3341 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3342 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3343 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3346 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3347 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3350 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3351 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3353 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3354 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3361 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3362 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3363 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3364 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3367 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3368 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3374 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3375 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3376 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3378 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3379 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3381 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3382 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3383 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3384 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3386 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3388 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3389 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3390 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3393 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3394 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3395 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3396 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3397 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3398 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3401 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3402 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3403 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3405 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3406 /// the channel being closed or not:
3407 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3408 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3409 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3410 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3411 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3412 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3413 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3415 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3416 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3417 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3418 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3420 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3422 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3423 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3424 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3427 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3428 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3429 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3430 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3431 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3434 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3435 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3436 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3437 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3438 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3441 let logger = WithContext::from(
3442 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3445 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3446 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3447 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3448 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3449 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3450 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3451 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3453 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3454 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3455 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3456 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3457 // ignore the result here.
3458 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3460 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3461 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3462 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3463 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3465 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3466 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3467 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3468 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3469 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3470 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3471 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3474 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3477 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3478 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3483 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3484 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3485 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3486 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3487 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3488 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3489 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3490 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3493 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3494 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3495 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3499 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3500 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3504 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3505 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3506 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3507 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3508 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3509 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3510 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3511 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3512 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3513 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3514 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3516 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3518 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3519 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3520 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3521 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3522 mem::drop(peer_state);
3523 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3525 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3526 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3527 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3529 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3530 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3531 // Unfunded channel has no update
3532 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3534 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3535 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3536 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3537 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3538 // Unfunded channel has no update
3539 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3542 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3543 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3544 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3545 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3547 (None, *peer_node_id)
3549 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3552 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3553 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3554 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3555 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3556 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3557 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3558 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3559 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3560 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3566 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3569 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3571 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3572 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3573 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3574 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3575 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3576 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3577 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3578 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3579 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3580 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3591 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3592 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3593 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3595 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3596 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3597 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3600 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3601 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3602 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3604 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3605 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3606 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3607 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3608 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3611 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3612 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3613 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3614 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3615 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3619 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3620 /// local transaction(s).
3621 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3622 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3623 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3627 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3628 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3630 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3632 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3633 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3636 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3637 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3638 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3639 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3645 macro_rules! return_err {
3646 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3649 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3650 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3652 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3653 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3654 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3655 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3656 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3657 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3658 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3662 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3663 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3664 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3665 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3666 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3667 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3668 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3669 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3675 let NextPacketDetails {
3676 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3677 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3678 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3679 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3680 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3683 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3684 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3685 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3686 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3687 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3688 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3689 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3690 // phantom or an intercept.
3691 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3692 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3693 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3697 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3700 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3702 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3703 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3704 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3705 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3706 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3708 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3709 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3710 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3711 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3714 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3715 // have no consistency guarantees.
3716 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3720 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3721 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3722 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3723 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3724 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3726 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3727 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3728 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3729 // we don't have the channel here.
3730 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3732 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3734 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3735 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3736 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3737 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3738 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3739 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3740 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3741 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3742 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3743 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3744 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3746 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3749 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3750 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3752 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3753 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3760 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3762 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3763 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3765 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3766 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3767 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3768 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3769 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3771 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3772 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3778 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3779 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3780 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3781 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3783 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3784 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3786 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3787 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3788 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3790 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3791 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3792 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3793 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3794 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3795 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3796 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3800 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3802 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3805 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3806 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3807 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3808 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3809 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3810 macro_rules! return_err {
3811 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3813 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3814 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3815 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3816 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3817 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3818 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3819 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3820 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3821 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3825 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3826 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3827 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3828 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3829 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3835 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3837 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3838 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3839 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3840 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3843 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3844 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3845 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3846 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3847 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3849 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3852 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3853 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3854 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3855 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3856 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3862 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3863 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3864 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3866 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3867 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3868 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3870 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3871 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3872 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3873 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3874 return Err(LightningError {
3875 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3876 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3879 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3880 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3882 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3883 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3884 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3887 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3888 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3889 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3890 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3892 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3893 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3894 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3896 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3897 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3898 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3899 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3900 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3901 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3902 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3906 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3909 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3910 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3911 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3912 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3914 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3915 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3916 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3917 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3918 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3921 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3922 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3924 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3925 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3926 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3927 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3928 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3929 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3930 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3931 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3933 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3934 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3935 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3937 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3939 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3946 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3947 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3948 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3949 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3954 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3955 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3956 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3959 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3960 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3961 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3962 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3964 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3965 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3966 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3968 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3969 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3973 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3974 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3976 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3977 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3978 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3980 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3983 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3985 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3986 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3988 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3989 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3990 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3991 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3992 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3993 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3994 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3995 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3996 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3997 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3999 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4000 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4001 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4002 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4004 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4005 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4007 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4008 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4009 Some(monitor_update) => {
4010 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4012 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4013 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4014 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4015 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4016 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4017 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4018 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4026 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4029 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4030 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4031 // `channel_by_id` map.
4032 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4033 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4037 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4038 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4040 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4045 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4047 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4048 /// fields for more info.
4050 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4051 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4053 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4055 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4056 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4057 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4058 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4059 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4061 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4062 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4063 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4064 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4065 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4067 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4068 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4069 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4070 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4072 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4074 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4075 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4076 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4078 /// In general, a path may raise:
4079 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4080 /// node public key) is specified.
4081 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4082 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4083 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4084 /// relevant updates.
4086 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4087 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4088 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4090 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4091 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4092 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4093 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4094 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4095 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4096 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4097 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4099 self.pending_outbound_payments
4100 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4101 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4102 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4105 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4106 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4107 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4108 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4110 self.pending_outbound_payments
4111 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4112 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4113 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4114 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4118 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4119 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4121 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4122 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4123 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4127 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4128 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4129 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4133 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4134 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4137 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4138 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4139 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4140 self.pending_outbound_payments
4141 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4142 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4143 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4144 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4145 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4149 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4150 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4151 /// retries are exhausted.
4153 /// # Event Generation
4155 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4156 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4158 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4159 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4160 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4162 /// # Requested Invoices
4164 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4165 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4166 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4167 /// once the invoice has been received.
4169 /// # Restart Behavior
4171 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4172 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4173 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4175 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4176 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4178 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4181 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4182 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4183 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4184 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4185 /// never reach the recipient.
4187 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4188 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4190 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4191 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4193 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4194 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4195 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4197 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4198 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4199 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4202 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4203 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4205 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4208 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4209 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4210 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4211 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4212 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4213 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4214 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4215 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4218 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4219 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4220 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4221 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4222 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4224 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4225 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4226 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4229 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4232 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4233 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4236 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4237 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4239 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4240 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4241 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4242 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4243 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4244 let payment_params =
4245 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4247 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4249 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4252 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4253 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4255 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4256 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4257 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4258 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4260 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4261 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4262 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4263 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4264 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4265 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4266 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4267 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4268 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4269 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4271 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4272 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4273 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4274 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4278 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4280 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4281 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4284 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4286 let mut res = Vec::new();
4288 for mut path in route.paths {
4289 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4290 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4291 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4292 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4293 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4296 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4299 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4300 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4302 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4304 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4305 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4310 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4313 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4318 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4319 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4320 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4322 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4323 let used_liquidity =
4324 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4326 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4327 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4329 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4332 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4337 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4338 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4339 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4346 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4347 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4348 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4349 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4350 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4351 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4353 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4354 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4356 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4357 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4359 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4360 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4361 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4363 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4364 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4365 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4366 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4367 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4368 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4369 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4370 } else { unreachable!(); });
4372 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4373 Err((chan, err)) => {
4374 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4375 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4376 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4377 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4378 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4384 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4385 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4387 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4388 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4391 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4392 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4393 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4397 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4398 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4399 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4403 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4404 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4405 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4407 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4408 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4409 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4413 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4414 funding_txo, o.get()
4416 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4417 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4418 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4419 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4420 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4421 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4424 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4431 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4432 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4433 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4437 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4439 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4440 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4442 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4443 /// across the p2p network.
4445 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4446 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4448 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4449 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4450 /// keys per-channel).
4452 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4453 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4454 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4456 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4457 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4458 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4460 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4461 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4462 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4463 /// for more details.
4465 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4466 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4467 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4468 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4471 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4473 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4474 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4476 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4477 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4478 /// signature for each channel.
4480 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4481 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4482 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4483 let mut result = Ok(());
4485 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4486 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4487 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4488 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4489 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4494 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4495 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4496 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4500 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4501 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4502 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4503 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4504 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4505 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4506 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4507 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4509 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4510 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4515 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4516 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4517 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4518 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4522 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4523 match states.entry(txid) {
4524 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4525 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4526 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4530 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4533 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4534 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4535 temporary_channel_id,
4536 counterparty_node_id,
4537 funding_transaction.clone(),
4540 let mut output_index = None;
4541 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4542 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4543 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4544 if output_index.is_some() {
4545 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4546 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4549 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4552 if output_index.is_none() {
4553 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4554 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4557 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4558 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4559 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4560 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4561 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4562 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4568 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4569 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4570 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4571 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4572 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4573 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4574 .into_iter().flatten()
4575 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4577 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4578 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4580 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4582 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4583 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4584 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4585 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4586 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4588 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4589 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4590 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4594 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4595 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4596 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4602 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4604 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4605 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4606 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4607 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4609 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4610 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4612 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4613 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4615 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4617 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4618 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4619 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4620 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4621 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4622 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4623 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4624 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4625 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4626 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4627 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4628 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4629 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4634 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4635 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4636 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4637 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4638 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4639 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4640 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4641 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4642 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4646 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4647 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4648 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4649 config.apply(config_update);
4650 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4653 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4654 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4655 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4656 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4657 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4658 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4665 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4666 debug_assert!(false);
4667 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4669 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4670 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4677 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4679 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4680 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4681 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4682 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4684 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4685 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4687 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4688 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4690 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4692 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4693 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4694 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4695 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4696 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4697 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4698 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4699 pub fn update_channel_config(
4700 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4701 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4702 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4705 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4706 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4708 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4709 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4711 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4712 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4713 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4714 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4715 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4717 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4718 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4719 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4722 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4725 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4726 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4727 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4728 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4729 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4730 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4731 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4733 let next_hop_scid = {
4734 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4735 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4736 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4737 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4738 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4739 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4740 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4741 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4742 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4743 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4746 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4748 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4749 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4750 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4753 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4754 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4755 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4756 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4757 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4764 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4765 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4766 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4769 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4770 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4771 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4772 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4775 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4777 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4778 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4779 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4780 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4781 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4784 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4785 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4786 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4787 payment.prev_channel_id,
4788 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4789 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4791 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4795 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4796 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4798 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4801 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4802 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4803 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4805 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4806 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4807 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4810 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4811 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4812 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4813 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4814 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4815 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4816 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4817 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4818 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4819 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4822 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4823 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4824 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4825 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4830 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4832 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4833 /// Will likely generate further events.
4834 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4835 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4837 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4838 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4839 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4841 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4842 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4844 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4845 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4846 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4847 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4849 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4850 match forward_info {
4851 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4852 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4853 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4854 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4855 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4858 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4859 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4860 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4861 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4863 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4864 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4865 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4866 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4867 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4868 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4869 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4870 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4871 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4874 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4875 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4877 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4880 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4881 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4887 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4888 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4890 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4894 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4895 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4897 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4901 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4902 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4903 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4904 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4905 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4906 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4907 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4910 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4911 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4912 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4913 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4914 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4916 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4918 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4919 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4923 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4924 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4925 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4926 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4927 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4928 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4930 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4931 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4937 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4940 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4943 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4944 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4945 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4946 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4947 // problem, not ours.
4953 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4954 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4955 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4957 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4961 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4963 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4964 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4965 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4968 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4969 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4970 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4971 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4972 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4973 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4974 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4975 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4976 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4977 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4978 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4979 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4980 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4983 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4984 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4985 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4986 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4987 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4988 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4989 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4990 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4991 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4992 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4993 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4995 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4996 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4997 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4998 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4999 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5000 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5003 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5004 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5005 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5008 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5009 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5011 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5013 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5014 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5015 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5016 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5022 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5023 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5025 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5026 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5027 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5029 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5030 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5031 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5032 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5034 Some((res, htlc_id))
5037 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5038 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5039 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5040 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5042 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5044 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5045 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5046 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5052 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5056 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5057 match forward_info {
5058 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5059 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5060 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5061 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5062 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5065 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5066 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5067 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5068 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
5069 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5071 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5072 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5073 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5074 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5075 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5077 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5078 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5079 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5081 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5082 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5086 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5087 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
5090 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5093 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5094 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5095 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5096 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5097 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5098 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5099 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5100 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5101 phantom_shared_secret,
5104 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5105 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5106 // if routing nodes overpay
5107 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5108 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5110 total_value_received: None,
5111 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5114 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5117 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5119 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5120 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5121 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5122 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5123 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5124 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5126 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5127 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5128 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5129 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5130 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5131 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5132 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5133 phantom_shared_secret,
5136 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5137 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5139 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5142 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5143 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5144 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5145 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5146 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5149 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5150 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5151 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5152 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
5153 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
5154 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
5156 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5157 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5158 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5160 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5161 .entry(payment_hash)
5162 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5163 .or_insert_with(|| {
5164 committed_to_claimable = true;
5166 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5169 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5170 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5171 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5172 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5174 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5175 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5176 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5178 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5179 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5180 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5183 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5185 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5186 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5187 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5188 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5189 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5190 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5191 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5192 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5193 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5194 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5196 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5198 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5199 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5200 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5201 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5202 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5203 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5205 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5206 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5207 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5208 committed_to_claimable = true;
5210 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5211 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5212 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5213 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5214 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5215 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5216 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5217 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5218 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5223 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5224 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5225 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5226 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5228 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5230 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5231 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5233 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5234 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5235 committed_to_claimable = true;
5238 payment_claimable_generated
5242 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5243 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5244 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5245 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5246 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5247 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5248 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5249 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5250 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5251 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5252 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5253 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5254 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5255 Ok(result) => result,
5257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5258 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5261 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5262 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5263 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5264 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5265 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5266 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5269 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5270 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5271 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5273 check_total_value!(purpose);
5275 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5276 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5277 check_total_value!(purpose);
5281 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5282 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5283 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5284 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5286 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5287 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5288 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5289 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5290 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5291 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5292 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5293 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5295 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5296 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5297 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5299 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5300 if payment_claimable_generated {
5301 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5307 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5308 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5316 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5317 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5318 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5319 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5321 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5322 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5324 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5326 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5327 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5328 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5330 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5332 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5333 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5334 events.append(&mut new_events);
5337 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5339 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5340 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5341 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5343 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5345 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5346 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5347 if background_events.is_empty() {
5348 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5351 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5353 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5354 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5355 // monitor updating completing.
5356 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5358 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5359 let mut updated_chan = false;
5361 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5362 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5363 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5364 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5365 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5367 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5368 updated_chan = true;
5369 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5370 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5372 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5380 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5381 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5384 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5385 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5386 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5387 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5388 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5389 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5390 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5392 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5393 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5394 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5395 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5396 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5402 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5405 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5406 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5407 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5408 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5409 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5412 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5413 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5415 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5417 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5418 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5419 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5421 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5422 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5423 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5424 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5426 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5427 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5429 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5430 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5434 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5435 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5436 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5437 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5438 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5439 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5440 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5442 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5443 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5445 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5446 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5447 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5448 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5449 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5450 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5452 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5457 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5458 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5466 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5468 /// This currently includes:
5469 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5470 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5471 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5473 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5474 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5475 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5476 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5477 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5478 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5479 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5480 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5482 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5483 /// estimate fetches.
5485 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5486 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5487 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5488 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5489 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5491 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5492 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5494 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5495 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5496 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5497 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5499 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5500 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5501 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5502 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5503 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5504 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5506 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5507 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5508 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5510 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5511 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5512 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5513 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5514 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5515 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5516 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5517 channel_id: *chan_id,
5518 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5529 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5530 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5533 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5534 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5535 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5537 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5538 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5543 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5544 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5546 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5547 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5548 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5549 if needs_close { return false; }
5552 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5553 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5554 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5555 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5556 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5557 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5558 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5559 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5561 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5562 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5563 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5564 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5568 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5570 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5573 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5575 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5576 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5577 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5578 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5582 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5584 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5590 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5592 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5593 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5594 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5595 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5596 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5597 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5598 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5599 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5600 channel_id: *chan_id,
5601 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5609 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5610 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5611 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5613 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5614 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5615 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5617 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5618 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5619 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5620 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5622 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5623 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5624 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5625 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5630 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5631 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5632 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5633 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5634 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5635 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5636 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5637 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5638 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5644 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5646 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5647 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5652 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5653 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5654 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5655 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5656 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5657 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5658 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5659 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5660 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5661 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5662 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5664 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5665 // have no channels to the peer.
5666 let remove_entry = {
5667 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5668 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5671 entry.remove_entry();
5674 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5679 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5680 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5681 // This should be unreachable
5682 debug_assert!(false);
5685 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5686 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5687 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5688 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5689 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5690 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5691 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5694 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5695 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5696 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5698 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5699 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5706 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5707 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5708 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5709 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5710 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5713 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5714 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5717 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5718 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5721 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5722 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5723 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5724 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5725 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5726 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5727 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5730 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5731 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5734 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5735 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5736 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5737 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5738 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5745 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5746 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5747 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5749 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5750 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5751 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5752 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5754 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5755 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5756 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5757 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5758 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5759 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5762 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5763 /// reason for the failure.
5765 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5766 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5767 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5769 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5770 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5771 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5772 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5773 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5774 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5775 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5780 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5781 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5782 match failure_code {
5783 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5784 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5785 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5786 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5787 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5788 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5790 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5791 let fail_data = match data {
5792 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5795 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5800 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5801 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5803 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5805 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5806 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5807 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5808 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5809 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5810 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5811 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5813 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5815 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5816 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5818 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5823 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5824 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5825 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5826 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5827 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5828 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5829 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5830 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5831 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5832 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5834 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5835 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5836 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5837 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5839 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5840 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5841 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5842 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5843 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5847 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5848 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5849 // be surfaced to the user.
5850 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5851 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5852 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5854 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5856 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5857 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5859 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5861 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5862 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5864 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5865 debug_assert!(false);
5866 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5869 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5871 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5874 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5875 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5876 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5877 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5881 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5882 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5883 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5884 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5885 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5886 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5887 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5888 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5889 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5890 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5893 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5894 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5895 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5898 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5899 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5900 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5902 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5903 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5904 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5905 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5906 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5908 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5909 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5910 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5913 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5914 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5915 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5917 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5918 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5919 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5920 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5921 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5923 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5925 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5926 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5928 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5929 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5933 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5934 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5936 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5940 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5941 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5942 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5943 push_forward_ev = true;
5945 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5947 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5950 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5953 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5954 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5955 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5956 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5957 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5958 failed_next_destination: destination,
5964 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5965 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5967 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5968 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5969 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5970 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5972 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5973 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5974 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5975 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5977 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5978 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5979 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5981 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5982 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5983 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5984 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5985 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5986 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5987 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5988 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5989 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5992 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5993 /// even type numbers.
5997 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5998 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6000 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6001 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6002 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6005 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6006 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6011 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6012 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6013 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6014 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6015 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6016 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6017 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6018 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6023 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6024 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6025 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6026 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6027 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6029 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6030 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6031 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6035 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6036 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6037 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6038 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6039 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6040 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6041 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6042 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6043 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6044 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6045 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6054 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6056 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6057 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6058 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6059 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6060 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6061 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6062 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6063 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6064 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6066 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6067 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6068 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6069 debug_assert!(false);
6073 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6075 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6076 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6077 debug_assert!(false);
6081 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6082 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6084 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6085 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6086 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6087 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6090 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6091 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6092 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6093 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6097 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6098 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6099 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6100 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6101 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6102 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6103 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6106 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6107 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6108 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6109 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6110 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6111 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6116 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6117 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6118 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6119 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6120 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6121 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6122 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6124 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6127 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6128 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6129 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6130 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6134 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6135 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6136 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6137 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6139 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6140 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6141 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6142 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6144 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6145 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6146 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6147 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6150 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6151 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6152 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6153 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6157 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6158 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6159 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6162 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6165 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6166 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6167 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6168 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6169 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6172 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6173 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6174 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6176 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6179 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6180 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6182 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6183 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6184 // monitor update as a background event.
6185 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6186 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6187 counterparty_node_id,
6188 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6189 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6190 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6194 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6195 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6200 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6202 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6204 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6205 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6206 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6207 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6208 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6210 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6212 debug_assert!(false,
6213 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6216 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6217 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6218 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6219 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6220 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6222 let mut found_blocker = false;
6223 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6224 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6225 // which case we need to only remove the one
6226 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6227 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6228 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6229 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6231 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6234 debug_assert!(false);
6243 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6244 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6245 counterparty_node_id: None,
6246 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6249 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6253 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6254 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6255 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6256 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6257 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6258 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6259 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6260 // again on restart.
6261 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6262 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6263 payment_preimage, update_res);
6266 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6267 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6269 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6270 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6271 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6272 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6273 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6274 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6275 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6276 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6277 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6278 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6281 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6282 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6283 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6284 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6285 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6286 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6290 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6291 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6294 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6295 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6296 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6297 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6300 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6301 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6302 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6303 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6304 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6306 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6307 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6308 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6310 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6311 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6314 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6315 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6316 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6317 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6318 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6319 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6320 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6321 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6322 let chan_to_release =
6323 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6324 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6326 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6327 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6328 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6329 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6334 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6335 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6336 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6337 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6338 // in the background.
6339 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6340 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6341 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6342 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6344 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6345 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6346 funding_txo, update, ..
6348 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6349 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6350 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6351 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6353 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6359 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6360 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6361 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6363 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6364 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6366 monitor_update.updates[0],
6367 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6372 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6373 // immediately once we get going.
6374 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6377 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6379 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6382 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6383 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6384 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6385 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6386 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6387 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6388 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6392 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6393 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6394 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6397 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6398 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6399 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6400 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6401 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6402 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6403 prev_user_channel_id,
6404 next_user_channel_id,
6405 total_fee_earned_msat,
6407 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6408 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6410 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6414 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6415 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6416 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6422 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6423 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6424 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6427 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6428 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6429 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6430 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6432 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6434 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6435 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6436 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6438 payment_purpose: purpose,
6441 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6443 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6447 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6449 sender_intended_total_msat,
6453 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6454 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6456 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6457 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6458 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6461 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6462 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6464 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6465 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6466 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6467 downstream_channel_id,
6468 Some(blocking_action),
6475 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6476 /// update completion.
6477 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6478 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6479 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6480 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6481 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6482 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
6483 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6484 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6485 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6486 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6487 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
6488 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6489 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6490 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6492 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6494 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6495 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6496 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
6497 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6500 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6501 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6503 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6504 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6505 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6510 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6511 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6512 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6513 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6518 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6519 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6520 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6521 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6522 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6527 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6531 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6537 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6538 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6539 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6543 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6544 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6545 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6551 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6552 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6554 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6555 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6557 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6558 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6559 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6560 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6561 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6566 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6567 let mut peer_state_lock;
6568 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6569 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6570 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6573 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6576 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6577 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6578 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6579 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6580 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6583 let remaining_in_flight =
6584 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6585 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6588 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6589 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6590 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6591 remaining_in_flight);
6592 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6595 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6598 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6600 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6601 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6604 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6605 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6606 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6608 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6609 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6610 /// used to accept such channels.
6612 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6613 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6614 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6615 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6618 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6619 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6621 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6622 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6623 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6625 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6626 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6628 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6629 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6631 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6632 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6634 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6635 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6636 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6637 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6640 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6642 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6645 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6646 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6647 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6648 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6650 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6651 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6653 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6655 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6656 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6657 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6659 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6660 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6661 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6663 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6664 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6665 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6666 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6667 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6668 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6669 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6672 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6673 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6675 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6681 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6682 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6683 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6684 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6686 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6690 Ok(mut channel) => {
6692 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6693 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6694 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6695 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6696 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6697 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6698 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6701 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6702 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6703 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6705 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6707 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6708 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6709 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6710 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6711 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6712 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6713 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6714 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6717 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6718 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6719 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6721 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6725 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6726 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6727 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6729 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6730 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6731 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6734 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6741 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6742 /// or 0-conf channels.
6744 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6745 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6746 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6747 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6748 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6749 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6751 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6752 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6753 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6754 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6755 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6756 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6757 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6761 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6764 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6765 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6767 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6768 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6770 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6771 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6772 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6773 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6774 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6776 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6779 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6780 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6781 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6784 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6785 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6786 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6787 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6788 // included in the unfunded count.
6789 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6790 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6791 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6794 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6795 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6798 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6799 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6800 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6801 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6806 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6809 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6810 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6811 // likely to be lost on restart!
6812 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6813 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6814 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6817 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6818 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6819 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6822 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6823 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6824 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6825 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6826 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6828 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6829 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6831 debug_assert!(false);
6832 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6833 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6834 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6836 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6837 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6839 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6840 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6841 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6842 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6843 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6844 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6846 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6847 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6848 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6851 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6852 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6853 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6854 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6855 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6858 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6859 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6861 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6862 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6863 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6866 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6867 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6868 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6869 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6871 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6873 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6874 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6875 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6876 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6877 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6878 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6881 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6882 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6883 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6888 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6889 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6890 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6891 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6892 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6893 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6894 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6902 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6903 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6905 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6906 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6908 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6909 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6910 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6911 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6914 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6915 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6917 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6918 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6919 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6921 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6925 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6926 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6927 // likely to be lost on restart!
6928 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6930 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6932 debug_assert!(false);
6933 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6935 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6936 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6937 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6939 match phase.get_mut() {
6940 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6941 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6942 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6952 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6953 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6954 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6955 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6956 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6958 user_channel_id: user_id,
6963 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6964 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6966 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6967 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6969 debug_assert!(false);
6970 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6973 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6975 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6976 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6977 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6978 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6979 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6981 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6982 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6983 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6984 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6985 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6986 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6987 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6988 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6989 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6993 Some(mut phase) => {
6994 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6995 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6996 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6998 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7001 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7003 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7004 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7005 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7006 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7007 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7008 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7010 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7011 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7012 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7015 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7017 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7020 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7021 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7022 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7023 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7025 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7026 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7027 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7028 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7029 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7031 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7032 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7033 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7034 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7035 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7036 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7037 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7042 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7043 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7044 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7046 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7050 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7051 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7052 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7060 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7061 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7063 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7065 debug_assert!(false);
7066 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7069 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7070 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7071 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7072 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7073 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7074 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7075 let logger = WithContext::from(
7077 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7078 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7081 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7083 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7084 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7085 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7086 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7087 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7088 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7089 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7090 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7091 } else { unreachable!(); }
7094 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7095 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7096 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7097 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7098 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7099 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7100 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7104 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7105 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7106 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7107 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7108 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7109 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7113 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7120 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7121 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7122 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7123 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7124 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7126 debug_assert!(false);
7127 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7129 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7130 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7131 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7133 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7134 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7135 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7136 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7137 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7138 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7139 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7140 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7141 msg: announcement_sigs,
7143 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7144 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7145 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7146 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7147 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7148 // announcement_signatures.
7149 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7150 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7151 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7152 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7159 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7160 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7165 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7166 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7169 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7170 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7175 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7176 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7177 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7179 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7180 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7182 debug_assert!(false);
7183 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7185 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7186 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7187 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7188 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7190 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7191 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7192 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7193 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7195 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7198 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7199 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7200 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7201 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7203 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7204 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7205 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7206 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7207 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7208 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7212 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7213 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7214 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7215 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7218 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7219 let context = phase.context_mut();
7220 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7221 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7222 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7223 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7225 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7226 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7227 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7228 let context = phase.context_mut();
7229 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7230 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7231 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7235 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7238 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7239 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7240 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7241 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7243 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7244 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7250 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7251 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7252 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7254 debug_assert!(false);
7255 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7257 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7258 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7259 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7260 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7262 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7263 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7264 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7265 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7266 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7267 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7272 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7273 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7274 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7275 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7276 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7277 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7278 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7280 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7281 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7284 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7287 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7288 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7289 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7290 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7292 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7293 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7294 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7296 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7301 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7302 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7303 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7308 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7309 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7310 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7311 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7313 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7314 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7315 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7316 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7318 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7319 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7321 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7322 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7323 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7325 debug_assert!(false);
7326 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7330 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7332 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7333 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7334 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7335 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7336 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7337 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7339 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7341 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
7342 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7343 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7344 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7345 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7346 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7347 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7348 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7352 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7353 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7354 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7355 match pending_forward_info {
7356 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7357 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7359 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7360 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7361 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7362 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7363 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7365 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7366 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7367 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7368 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7369 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7372 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
7374 _ => pending_forward_info
7377 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7378 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7380 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7381 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7384 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7389 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7391 let next_user_channel_id;
7392 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7393 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7394 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7396 debug_assert!(false);
7397 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7399 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7400 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7401 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7402 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7403 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7404 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7405 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7406 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7408 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7410 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7411 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7412 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7414 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7415 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7416 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7417 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7418 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7419 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7420 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7421 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7424 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7425 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7428 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7431 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7432 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7433 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7439 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7440 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7441 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7442 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7443 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7445 debug_assert!(false);
7446 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7450 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7451 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7452 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7453 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7455 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7456 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7464 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7465 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7466 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7467 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7468 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7470 debug_assert!(false);
7471 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7473 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7474 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7475 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7477 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7478 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7479 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7481 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7482 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7484 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7485 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7493 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7494 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7495 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7497 debug_assert!(false);
7498 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7502 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7503 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7504 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7505 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7506 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7507 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7508 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7509 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7510 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7514 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7515 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7523 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7524 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7525 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7526 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7527 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7528 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7529 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7530 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7531 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7532 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7533 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7535 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7536 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7538 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7539 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7540 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7541 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7542 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7543 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7546 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7547 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7549 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7550 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7551 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7553 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7554 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7555 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7556 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7557 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7560 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7561 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7564 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7565 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7566 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7567 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7568 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7569 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7570 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7571 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7572 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7573 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7574 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7577 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7578 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7579 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7584 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7585 // payments are being processed.
7586 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7587 push_forward_event = true;
7589 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7590 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7597 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7598 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7601 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7602 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7603 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7605 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7609 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7610 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7611 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7612 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7613 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7615 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7616 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7617 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7618 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7619 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7620 // real by taking more time.
7621 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7622 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7623 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7628 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7629 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7630 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7631 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7632 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7633 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7634 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7636 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7637 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7638 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7639 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7640 channel_funding_outpoint,
7642 counterparty_node_id,
7647 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7648 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7649 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7651 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7652 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7653 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7654 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7656 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7657 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7658 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7664 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7665 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7666 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7667 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7669 debug_assert!(false);
7670 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7671 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7672 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7673 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7674 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7675 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7676 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7677 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7678 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7679 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7680 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7681 *counterparty_node_id)
7683 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7684 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7685 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7686 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7687 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7688 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7689 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7693 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7694 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7700 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7704 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7705 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7706 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7708 debug_assert!(false);
7709 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7711 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7712 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7713 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7715 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7716 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7717 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7719 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7720 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7728 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7729 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7730 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7732 debug_assert!(false);
7733 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7737 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7739 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7740 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7741 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7744 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7745 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7746 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7747 msg, &self.default_configuration
7748 ), chan_phase_entry),
7749 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7750 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7751 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7754 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7755 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7763 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7764 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7765 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7766 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7768 // It's not a local channel
7769 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7772 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7773 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7774 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7775 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7777 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7778 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7779 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7781 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7782 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7783 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7784 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7785 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7786 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7787 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7789 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7791 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7792 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7793 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7794 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7796 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7797 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7798 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7799 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7802 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7806 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7807 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7810 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7812 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7815 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7817 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7820 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7822 debug_assert!(false);
7823 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7824 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7828 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7829 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7830 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7831 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7833 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7834 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7835 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7836 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7837 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7838 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7839 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7840 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7841 let mut channel_update = None;
7842 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7843 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7844 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7847 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7848 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7849 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7850 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7851 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7852 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7853 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7858 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7859 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7860 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7861 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7862 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7863 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7867 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7868 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7872 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7874 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7875 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7876 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7877 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7878 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7879 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7881 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7882 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7883 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7884 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7885 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7886 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7887 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7888 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7889 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7890 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7891 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7892 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7893 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7894 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7895 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7896 next_funding_txid: None,
7899 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7900 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7901 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7907 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7908 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7909 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7910 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7913 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7914 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7919 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7920 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7921 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7923 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7924 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7925 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7926 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7927 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7928 match monitor_event {
7929 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7930 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7931 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7932 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7933 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7934 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7935 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7937 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7938 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7939 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7940 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7943 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7944 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7945 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7947 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7948 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7949 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7950 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7953 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7954 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7955 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7956 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7957 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7958 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7959 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7960 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7961 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7964 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7966 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7967 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7968 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7972 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7973 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7974 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7975 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7983 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7984 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7990 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7991 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7994 has_pending_monitor_events
7997 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7998 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7999 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8001 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8003 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8006 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8007 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8008 /// update was applied.
8009 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8010 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8011 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8013 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8014 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8015 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8016 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8018 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8019 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8021 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8022 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8023 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8024 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8026 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8027 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8028 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8029 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8030 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8031 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8033 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8034 has_monitor_update = true;
8036 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8037 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8038 continue 'peer_loop;
8047 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8048 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8049 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8055 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8056 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8058 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8059 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8061 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8062 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8063 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8066 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8067 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8069 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8070 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8071 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8072 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8077 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8078 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8083 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8084 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8087 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8088 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8089 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8095 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8099 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8100 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8101 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8104 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8105 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8109 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8110 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8111 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8112 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8113 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8119 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8120 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8121 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8122 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8123 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8124 let mut has_update = false;
8125 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8127 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8129 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8130 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8131 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8132 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8133 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8135 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8136 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8137 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8138 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8139 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8141 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8142 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8145 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8146 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8147 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8149 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8150 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8151 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8152 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8153 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8158 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8159 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8160 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8166 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8167 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8172 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8178 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8179 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8182 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8183 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8189 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8190 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8192 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8193 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8194 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8195 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8196 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8197 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8198 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8199 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8200 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8201 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8202 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8203 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8204 assert!(should_broadcast);
8205 } else { unreachable!(); }
8206 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8207 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8208 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8211 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8216 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8217 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8218 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8219 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8223 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8224 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8225 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8226 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8227 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8229 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8233 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8238 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8240 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8242 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8243 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8244 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8245 &$self, description: String
8246 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8247 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8248 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8249 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8250 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8252 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8253 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8254 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8256 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8263 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8264 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8265 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8269 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8270 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8272 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8273 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8274 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8277 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8278 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8279 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8281 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8282 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8286 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8287 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8288 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8289 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8290 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8292 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8296 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8297 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8302 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8303 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8304 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8306 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8308 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8309 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8310 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8311 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8312 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8313 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8314 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8315 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8316 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8317 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8318 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8319 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8321 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8322 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8323 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8325 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8326 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8329 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8331 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8332 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8333 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8334 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8336 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8342 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8344 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8345 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8346 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8347 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8348 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8349 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8353 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8354 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8355 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8356 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8359 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8361 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8363 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8364 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8365 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8367 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8368 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8369 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8370 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8371 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8372 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8373 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8375 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8376 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8380 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8381 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8384 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8385 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8386 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8390 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8391 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8392 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8393 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8397 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8398 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8399 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8404 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8405 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8406 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8407 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8410 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8411 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8412 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8413 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8414 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8415 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8416 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8417 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8418 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8419 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8420 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8421 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8422 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8423 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8424 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8426 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8427 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8429 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8431 let builder = match quantity {
8433 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8435 let builder = match amount_msats {
8437 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8439 let builder = match payer_note {
8441 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8443 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8444 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8448 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8449 self.pending_outbound_payments
8450 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8451 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8453 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8455 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8456 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8457 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8458 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8459 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8462 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8464 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8465 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8466 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8467 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8468 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8469 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8470 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8471 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8472 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8474 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8481 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8484 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8485 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8486 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
8490 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8491 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8492 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8493 /// received and no retries will be made.
8498 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8499 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8502 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8503 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8504 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8505 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8506 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8508 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8509 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8511 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8512 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8517 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8518 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8519 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8520 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8522 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8523 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8524 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8526 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8527 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8528 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8530 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8531 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8532 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8534 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8535 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8536 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8537 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8539 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8540 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8541 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8542 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8543 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8546 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8548 for path in refund.paths() {
8549 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8550 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8551 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8552 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8554 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8560 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8564 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8567 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8568 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8570 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8571 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8572 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8573 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8575 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8577 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8578 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8582 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8583 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8585 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8587 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8588 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8590 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8591 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8592 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8593 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8594 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8595 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8596 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8597 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8598 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8599 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8600 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8603 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8604 /// stored external to LDK.
8606 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8607 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8608 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8610 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8611 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8614 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8615 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8616 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8617 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8619 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8620 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8621 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8622 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8623 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8625 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8626 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8627 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8628 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8629 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8631 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8632 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8634 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8635 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8639 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8640 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8642 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8644 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8645 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8647 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8648 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8649 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8650 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8651 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8652 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8653 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8656 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8657 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8659 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8660 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8661 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8664 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8666 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8667 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8668 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8669 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8671 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8673 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8674 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8675 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8678 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8679 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8682 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8683 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8684 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8685 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8686 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8687 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8689 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8690 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8691 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8692 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8693 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8695 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8697 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8700 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8701 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8705 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8706 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8708 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8709 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8710 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8711 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8713 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8714 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8715 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8716 Some(_) => continue,
8717 None => return scid_candidate
8722 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8724 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8725 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8727 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8728 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8729 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8733 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8734 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8735 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8737 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8738 /// times to get a unique scid.
8739 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8740 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8741 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8743 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8744 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8745 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8746 return scid_candidate
8750 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8751 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8752 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8753 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8755 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8756 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8759 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8760 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8762 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8763 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8764 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8773 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8774 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8775 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8776 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8777 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8781 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8782 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8783 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8784 events.push_back((event, None));
8788 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8789 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8790 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8794 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8795 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8799 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8800 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8803 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8804 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8805 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8806 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8807 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8808 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8809 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8811 let logger = WithContext::from(
8812 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8815 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8816 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8817 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8818 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8819 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8820 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8821 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8822 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8824 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8828 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8829 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8830 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8831 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8832 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8833 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8838 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8840 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8841 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8842 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8843 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8845 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8846 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8847 if further_update_exists {
8848 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8853 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8860 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8861 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8867 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8868 for action in actions {
8870 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8871 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8873 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8879 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8880 /// using the given event handler.
8882 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8883 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8887 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8891 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8893 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8894 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8895 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8896 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8897 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8898 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8902 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8903 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8904 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8905 /// is always placed next to each other.
8907 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8908 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8909 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8910 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8912 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8913 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8914 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8915 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8916 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8917 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8918 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8920 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8921 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8922 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8923 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8926 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8927 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8929 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8930 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8933 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8935 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8936 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8937 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8938 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8939 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8943 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8944 events.replace(pending_events);
8953 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8955 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8956 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8957 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8958 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8959 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8960 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8964 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8966 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8967 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8968 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8970 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8974 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8976 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8977 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8978 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8979 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8980 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8981 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8985 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8987 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8988 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8989 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8990 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8991 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8994 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8995 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8998 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8999 let _persistence_guard =
9000 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9001 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9002 let new_height = height - 1;
9004 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9005 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9006 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9007 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9008 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9009 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9012 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9016 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9018 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9019 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9020 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9021 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9022 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9023 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9027 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9028 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9029 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9030 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9032 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9033 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9035 let _persistence_guard =
9036 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9037 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9038 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9039 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9041 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9042 if height < last_best_block_height {
9043 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9044 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9048 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9049 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9050 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9051 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9053 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9054 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9056 let _persistence_guard =
9057 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9058 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9059 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9061 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9063 macro_rules! max_time {
9064 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9066 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9067 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9068 // having an explicit local time source.
9069 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9070 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9071 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9072 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9073 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9079 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9080 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9081 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9082 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9086 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9087 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9088 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9089 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9090 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9091 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9092 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9093 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9094 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9095 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9096 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9103 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9104 let _persistence_guard =
9105 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9106 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9107 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9108 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9109 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9110 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9111 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9112 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9117 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9119 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9120 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9121 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9122 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9123 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9124 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9128 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9129 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9131 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9132 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9133 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9134 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9135 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9137 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9138 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9140 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9141 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9142 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9143 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9144 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9145 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9147 // Retain unfunded channels.
9148 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9149 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9150 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9151 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9152 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9153 let res = f(channel);
9154 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9155 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9156 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9157 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9158 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9160 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9161 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9162 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9163 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9164 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9165 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9166 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9167 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9172 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9177 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9178 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9181 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9182 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9183 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9184 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9185 msg: announcement_sigs,
9187 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9188 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9189 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9191 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9192 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9193 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9198 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9199 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9200 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9201 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9202 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9203 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9204 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9205 // is always consistent.
9206 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9207 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9208 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9209 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9210 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9213 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9214 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9215 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9216 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9217 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9218 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9219 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9220 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9224 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9225 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9226 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9227 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9228 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9229 data: reason_message,
9242 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9243 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9244 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9245 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9246 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9247 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9248 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9249 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9250 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9251 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9253 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9254 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9255 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9259 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9262 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9263 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9264 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9265 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9266 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9267 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9268 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9269 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9270 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9271 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9272 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9273 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9276 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9277 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9278 _ => unreachable!(),
9280 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9281 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9282 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9283 let logger = WithContext::from(
9284 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9286 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9292 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9294 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9295 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9299 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9300 /// may have events that need processing.
9302 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9303 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9305 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9306 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9307 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9308 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9311 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9313 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9314 /// indicates this should be checked.
9315 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9316 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9319 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9320 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9321 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9324 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9325 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9326 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9327 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9330 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9331 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9332 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9333 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9336 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9337 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9339 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9340 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9341 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9342 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9343 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9346 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9347 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9348 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9349 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9352 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9353 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9354 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9355 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9358 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9359 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9360 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9361 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9364 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9365 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9366 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9367 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9371 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9372 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9374 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9375 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9376 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9377 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9378 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9379 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9383 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9384 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9385 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9386 // change to the contents.
9387 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9388 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9389 let persist = match &res {
9390 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9391 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9392 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9394 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9396 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9401 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9402 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9403 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9404 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9407 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9408 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9409 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9410 // change to the contents.
9411 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9412 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9413 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9417 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9418 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9419 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9420 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9423 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9424 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9425 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9428 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9429 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9430 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9433 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9434 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9435 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9436 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9437 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9438 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9439 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9440 let persist = match &res {
9441 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9442 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9444 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9449 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9450 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9451 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9452 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9455 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9456 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9457 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9458 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9461 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9462 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9463 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9464 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9467 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9468 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9469 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9470 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9473 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9475 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9478 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9480 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9483 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9484 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9485 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9486 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9487 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9488 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9489 let persist = match &res {
9490 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9491 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9492 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9494 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9499 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9500 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9501 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9504 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9505 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9506 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9507 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9509 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9510 let persist = match &res {
9511 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9512 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9513 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9515 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9520 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9521 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9522 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9523 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9525 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9526 let persist = match &res {
9527 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9528 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9529 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9531 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9536 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9541 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9542 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9543 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9546 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9547 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9548 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9549 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9550 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9551 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9552 let persist = match &res {
9553 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9554 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9555 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9557 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9562 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9564 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9567 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9568 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9569 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9572 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9577 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9579 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9580 let persist = match &res {
9581 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9582 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9583 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9585 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9590 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9591 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9592 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9593 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9594 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9597 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9598 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9599 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9601 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9602 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9603 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9604 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9605 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9606 let context = match phase {
9607 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9608 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9609 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9610 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9615 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9616 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9617 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9620 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9621 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9624 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9625 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9628 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9629 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9633 // Clean up for removal.
9634 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9635 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9638 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9639 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9640 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9641 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9643 // V1 Channel Establishment
9644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9646 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9647 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9648 // V2 Channel Establishment
9649 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9651 // Common Channel Establishment
9652 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9653 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9655 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9659 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9660 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9661 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9667 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9670 // Channel Operations
9671 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9672 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9673 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9674 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9676 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9679 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9680 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9681 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9682 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9683 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9684 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9685 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9686 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9689 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9690 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9691 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9692 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9695 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9697 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9699 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9700 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9704 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9705 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9706 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9707 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9711 let mut res = Ok(());
9713 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9714 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9715 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9716 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9717 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9718 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9719 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9722 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9723 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9724 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9725 if inbound_peer_limited {
9727 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9729 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9730 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9731 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9732 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9733 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9734 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9735 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9736 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9741 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9742 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9744 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9745 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9746 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9747 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9750 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9753 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9754 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9759 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9761 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9762 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9763 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9764 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9765 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9767 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9769 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9770 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9771 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9772 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9773 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9777 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9778 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9779 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9780 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9784 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9785 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9786 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9787 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9788 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9789 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9793 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9794 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9795 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9796 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9797 debug_assert!(false);
9800 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9801 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9802 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9803 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9804 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9805 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9806 debug_assert!(false);
9812 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9813 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9818 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9819 match &msg.data as &str {
9820 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9821 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9823 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9824 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9825 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9826 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9827 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9828 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9829 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9830 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9831 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9833 || -> NotifyOption {
9834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9835 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9836 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9837 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9838 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9839 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9840 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9841 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9845 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9846 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9847 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9848 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9849 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9850 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9852 log_level: Level::Trace,
9855 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9856 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9857 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9859 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9868 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9870 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9871 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9873 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9874 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9875 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9876 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9877 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9878 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9879 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9880 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9882 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9883 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9884 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9888 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9890 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9891 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9892 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9893 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9894 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9895 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9896 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9897 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9898 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9904 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9905 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9906 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9907 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9908 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9914 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9915 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9916 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9920 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9921 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9925 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9926 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9929 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9930 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9933 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9934 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9937 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9938 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9939 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9940 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9943 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9944 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9945 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9946 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9949 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9950 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9951 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9952 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9955 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9956 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9957 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9958 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9961 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9962 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9963 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9964 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9967 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9968 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9969 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9970 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9973 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9974 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9975 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9976 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9979 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9980 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9981 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9982 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9985 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9986 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9987 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9988 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9992 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9993 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9995 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9996 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9997 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9998 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9999 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10000 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10004 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10005 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10006 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10009 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10010 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10013 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10014 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10016 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10017 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10019 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10020 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10024 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10025 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10026 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10028 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10030 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10031 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10035 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10036 amount_msats, payment_secret
10038 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10040 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10041 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10045 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10046 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10047 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10050 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10051 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10052 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10053 payment_paths, payment_hash
10055 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10056 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10057 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10059 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
10060 builder.map(|b| b.into());
10061 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
10062 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10063 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10066 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10067 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10068 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10069 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10070 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10072 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
10073 builder.map(|b| b.into());
10074 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10075 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
10076 .and_then(|invoice| {
10078 let mut invoice = invoice;
10079 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10080 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10082 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10083 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
10084 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
10086 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
10087 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
10092 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
10093 Err(error) => Some(error),
10097 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10098 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10100 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
10102 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
10103 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
10105 Ok(payment_id) => {
10106 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
10107 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10108 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
10115 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10116 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10122 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10123 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10127 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10128 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10129 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10130 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10131 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10135 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10136 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10138 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10139 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10140 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10141 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10142 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10145 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10146 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10147 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10148 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10151 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10152 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10153 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10154 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10157 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10158 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10159 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10160 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10163 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10164 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10165 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10166 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10167 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10168 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10169 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10170 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10171 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10172 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10173 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10174 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10175 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10176 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10177 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10178 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10179 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10180 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10181 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10182 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10183 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10188 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10189 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10191 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10192 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10193 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10194 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10197 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10198 (2, node_id, required),
10199 (4, features, required),
10200 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10201 (8, forwarding_info, option),
10202 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10203 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10206 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10207 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10208 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10209 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10210 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10211 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10212 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10213 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10214 (2, self.channel_id, required),
10215 (3, self.channel_type, option),
10216 (4, self.counterparty, required),
10217 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10218 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10219 (7, self.config, option),
10220 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10221 (9, self.confirmations, option),
10222 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10223 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10224 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10225 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10226 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10227 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10228 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10229 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10230 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10231 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10232 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10233 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10234 (30, self.is_usable, required),
10235 (32, self.is_public, required),
10236 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10237 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10238 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10239 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10240 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10241 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10242 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10248 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10249 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10250 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10251 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10252 (2, channel_id, required),
10253 (3, channel_type, option),
10254 (4, counterparty, required),
10255 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10256 (6, funding_txo, option),
10257 (7, config, option),
10258 (8, short_channel_id, option),
10259 (9, confirmations, option),
10260 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10261 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10262 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10263 (16, balance_msat, required),
10264 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10265 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10266 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10267 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10268 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10269 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10270 (22, confirmations_required, option),
10271 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10272 (26, is_outbound, required),
10273 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10274 (30, is_usable, required),
10275 (32, is_public, required),
10276 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10277 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10278 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10279 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10280 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10281 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10282 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10285 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10286 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10287 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10288 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10289 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10292 inbound_scid_alias,
10293 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10295 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10296 outbound_scid_alias,
10300 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10301 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10303 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10304 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10305 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10306 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10307 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10308 confirmations_required,
10310 force_close_spend_delay,
10311 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10312 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10313 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10314 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10315 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10316 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10317 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10318 channel_shutdown_state,
10319 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10320 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10325 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10326 (2, channels, required_vec),
10327 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10328 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10331 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10332 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10333 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10336 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10338 (0, onion_packet, required),
10339 (1, blinded, option),
10340 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10343 (0, payment_data, required),
10344 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10345 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10346 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10347 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10348 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10350 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10351 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10352 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10353 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10354 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10355 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10356 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10360 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10361 (0, routing, required),
10362 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10363 (4, payment_hash, required),
10364 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10365 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10366 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10367 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10371 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10372 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10374 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10375 0u8.write(writer)?;
10376 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10377 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10378 reason.write(writer)?;
10380 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10381 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10383 1u8.write(writer)?;
10384 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10385 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10386 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10387 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10394 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10395 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10396 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10399 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10400 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10401 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10402 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10406 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10407 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10408 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10409 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10410 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10413 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10414 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10415 // messages contained in the variants.
10416 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10417 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10418 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10420 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10421 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10422 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10423 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10424 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10427 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10428 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10429 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10430 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10431 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10433 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10438 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10443 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10444 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10445 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10448 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10449 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10450 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10451 (2, outpoint, required),
10452 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10453 (4, htlc_id, required),
10454 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10455 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10456 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10457 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10458 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10461 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10462 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10463 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10464 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10465 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10467 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10468 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10469 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10470 (2, self.value, required),
10471 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10472 (4, payment_data, option),
10473 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10474 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10475 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10476 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10482 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10483 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10484 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10485 (0, prev_hop, required),
10486 (1, total_msat, option),
10487 (2, value_ser, required),
10488 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10489 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10490 (5, total_value_received, option),
10491 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10492 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10493 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10495 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10496 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10497 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10499 if payment_data.is_some() {
10500 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10502 if total_msat.is_none() {
10503 total_msat = Some(value);
10505 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10508 if total_msat.is_none() {
10509 if payment_data.is_none() {
10510 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10512 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10514 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10518 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10521 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10522 total_value_received,
10523 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10525 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10526 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10531 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10532 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10533 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10536 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10537 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10538 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10539 let mut payment_id = None;
10540 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10541 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10542 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10543 (0, session_priv, required),
10544 (1, payment_id, option),
10545 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10546 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10547 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10548 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10550 if payment_id.is_none() {
10551 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10553 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10555 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10556 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10557 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10559 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10560 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10561 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10562 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10566 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10567 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10568 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10570 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10573 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10574 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10579 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10580 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10582 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10583 0u8.write(writer)?;
10584 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10585 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10586 (0, session_priv, required),
10587 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10588 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10589 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10590 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10591 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10592 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10595 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10596 1u8.write(writer)?;
10597 field.write(writer)?;
10604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10605 (0, forward_info, required),
10606 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10607 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10608 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10609 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10610 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10611 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10612 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10615 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10616 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10617 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10619 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10623 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10624 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10625 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10626 (0, htlc_id, required),
10627 (2, err_packet, required),
10630 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10631 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10632 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10633 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10634 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10635 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10636 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10637 (0, htlc_id, required),
10638 (1, failure_code, required),
10639 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10640 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10648 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10649 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10650 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10652 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10654 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10655 (0, htlc_id, required),
10656 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10657 (2, err_packet, required),
10658 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10660 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10661 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10662 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10664 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10668 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10669 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10673 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10679 (0, payment_secret, required),
10680 (2, expiry_time, required),
10681 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10682 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10683 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10686 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10688 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10689 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10690 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10691 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10692 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10693 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10697 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10698 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10700 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10702 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10704 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10705 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10706 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10709 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10711 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10712 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10713 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10714 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10715 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10716 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10717 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10720 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10721 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10725 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10727 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10728 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10729 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10730 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10731 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10732 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10735 channel.write(writer)?;
10741 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10742 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10743 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10744 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10745 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10746 for forward in pending_forwards {
10747 forward.write(writer)?;
10752 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10754 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10755 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10756 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10758 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10759 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10760 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10761 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10762 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10763 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10764 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10765 htlc.write(writer)?;
10767 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10768 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10771 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10772 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10773 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10774 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10775 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10776 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10777 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10780 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10781 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10782 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10783 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10784 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10786 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10787 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10788 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10789 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10790 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10791 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10792 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10797 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10798 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10799 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10800 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10801 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10802 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10803 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10804 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10805 0u64.write(writer)?;
10807 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10808 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10809 event.write(writer)?;
10813 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10814 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10815 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10816 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10817 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10818 0u64.write(writer)?;
10820 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10821 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10822 // likely to be identical.
10823 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10824 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10826 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10827 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10828 hash.write(writer)?;
10829 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10832 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10833 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10834 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10835 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10836 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10839 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10840 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10842 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10843 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10844 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10845 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10848 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10849 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10850 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10851 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10855 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10856 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10857 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10859 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10860 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10861 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10867 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10868 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10869 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10870 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10873 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10874 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10875 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10876 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10877 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10880 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10881 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10882 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10883 if !updates.is_empty() {
10884 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10885 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10890 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10891 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10892 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10893 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10894 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10895 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10896 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10897 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10898 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10899 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10900 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10901 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10902 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10909 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10910 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10911 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10912 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10915 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10916 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10917 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10918 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10919 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10920 // check that the event is sane here.
10921 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10922 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10923 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10924 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10930 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10931 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10932 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10933 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10934 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10935 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10938 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10939 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10940 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10941 events.push_back((ev, action));
10942 } else if action.is_some() {
10943 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10950 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10951 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10952 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10953 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10954 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10955 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10958 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10960 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10962 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10963 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10964 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10965 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10966 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10967 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10968 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10969 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10970 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10971 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10972 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10973 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10974 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10976 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10977 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10979 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10980 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10982 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10983 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10984 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10985 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10986 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10987 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10989 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10990 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10992 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10993 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10994 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10995 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10996 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10997 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11001 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11002 pub entropy_source: ES,
11004 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11005 pub node_signer: NS,
11007 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11008 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11010 pub signer_provider: SP,
11012 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11014 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11015 pub fee_estimator: F,
11016 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11018 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11019 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11020 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11021 pub chain_monitor: M,
11023 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11024 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11025 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11026 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11027 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11028 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11030 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11032 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11033 /// deserialization.
11035 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11036 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11037 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11039 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11040 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11042 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11043 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11044 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11045 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11047 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11050 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11051 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11054 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11055 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11057 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11058 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11059 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11060 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11061 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11062 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11066 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11067 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11068 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11069 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11070 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11072 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11073 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11074 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11080 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11081 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11082 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11083 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11085 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11086 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11087 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11088 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11089 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11090 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11094 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11095 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11096 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11100 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11101 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11103 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11104 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11105 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11106 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11107 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11108 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11112 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11113 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11115 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11116 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11117 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11119 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11121 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11122 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11123 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11124 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11125 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11126 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11127 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11128 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11129 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11130 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11131 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11133 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11134 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11135 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11136 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11137 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11138 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11139 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11140 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11141 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11142 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11143 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11144 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11145 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11146 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11147 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11149 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11150 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11151 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11153 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11154 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11155 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11157 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11158 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11159 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11161 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11162 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11163 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11165 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11166 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11167 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11170 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11171 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11172 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11173 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11174 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11175 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11176 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11177 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11179 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11180 let mut found_htlc = false;
11181 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11182 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11185 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11186 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11187 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11188 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11189 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11190 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11191 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11193 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11194 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11195 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11199 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
11200 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11201 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11202 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11203 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11205 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11206 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11208 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11209 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11210 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11211 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11214 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11215 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11216 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11220 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11221 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11222 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11223 // safely discard the channel.
11224 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11225 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11226 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11227 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11228 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11229 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11230 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11231 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11234 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11235 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11236 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11237 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11238 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11239 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11243 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11244 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11245 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11246 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11247 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11249 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11250 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11251 counterparty_node_id: None,
11252 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11253 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11255 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11259 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11260 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11261 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11262 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11263 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11264 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11265 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11266 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11267 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11269 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11272 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11273 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11274 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11275 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11276 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11277 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11278 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11279 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11281 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11284 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11287 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11288 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11289 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11290 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11291 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11292 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11293 is_connected: false,
11297 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11298 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11299 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11300 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11301 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11302 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11303 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11304 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11307 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11308 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11309 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11310 for _ in 0..event_count {
11311 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11312 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11317 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11318 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11319 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11321 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11322 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11323 // on-startup monitor updates.
11324 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11325 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11327 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11331 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11332 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11334 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11335 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11336 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11337 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11342 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11343 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11344 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11345 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11346 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11347 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11348 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11350 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11351 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11355 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11356 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11357 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11358 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11359 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11360 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11361 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11362 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11363 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11364 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11365 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11366 let mut events_override = None;
11367 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11368 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11369 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11370 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11371 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11372 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11373 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11374 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11375 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11376 (8, events_override, option),
11377 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11378 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11379 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11380 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11382 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11383 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11386 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11387 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11390 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11391 pending_events_read = events;
11394 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11395 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11398 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11399 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11400 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11401 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11402 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11403 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11405 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11407 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11408 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11409 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11412 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11413 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11414 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11415 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11416 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11418 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11419 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11420 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11422 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11423 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11424 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11425 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11426 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11428 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11429 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11430 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11431 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11432 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11433 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11434 pending_background_events.push(
11435 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11436 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11437 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11438 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11439 update: update.clone(),
11442 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11443 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11444 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11445 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11446 pending_background_events.push(
11447 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11448 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11449 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11452 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11453 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11454 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11456 max_in_flight_update_id
11460 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11461 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11462 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11463 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11464 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11465 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11467 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11469 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11470 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11471 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11472 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11473 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11474 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11475 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11476 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11477 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11480 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11481 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
11482 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11483 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11484 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11485 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11486 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11487 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11488 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11489 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11490 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11493 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11494 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11495 debug_assert!(false);
11496 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11501 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11502 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11503 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11504 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11505 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11506 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11507 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11508 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11509 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11510 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11512 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11513 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11514 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11516 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11517 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11518 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11519 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11520 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11521 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11522 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11523 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11528 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11529 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11531 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11532 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11533 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11534 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11537 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11538 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11539 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11540 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11541 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11542 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11543 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11545 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11546 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11547 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11548 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11549 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11550 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11551 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11552 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11553 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11556 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11557 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11558 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11559 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11560 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11561 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11562 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11563 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11565 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11566 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11567 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11568 retry_strategy: None,
11569 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11570 payment_params: None,
11571 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11572 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11573 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11574 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11575 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11576 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11577 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11578 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11579 total_msat: path_amt,
11580 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11581 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11583 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11584 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11589 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11590 match htlc_source {
11591 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11592 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11593 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11594 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11596 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11597 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11598 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11599 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11600 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11601 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11602 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11603 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11604 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11605 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11606 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11611 !forwards.is_empty()
11613 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11614 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11615 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11616 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11617 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11618 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11619 intercepted_id != ev_id
11626 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11627 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11628 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11629 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11630 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11631 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11632 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11633 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11634 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11635 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11636 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11638 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11639 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11640 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11641 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11643 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11644 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11645 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11652 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11653 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11655 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11657 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11658 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11659 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11660 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11661 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11662 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11663 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11664 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11665 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11666 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11669 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11670 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11671 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11672 // channel still live case here.
11676 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11677 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11682 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11683 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11684 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11685 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11686 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11687 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11688 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11689 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11693 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11694 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11696 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11697 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11698 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11699 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11701 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11702 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11703 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11705 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11706 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11708 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11709 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11711 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11714 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11715 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11716 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11718 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11722 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11723 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11724 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11725 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11726 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11728 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11729 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11730 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11731 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11732 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11733 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11734 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11735 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11737 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11738 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11742 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11744 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11746 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11747 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11749 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11750 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11755 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11756 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11758 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11760 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11762 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11763 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11764 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11765 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11769 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11770 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11773 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11774 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11775 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11776 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11777 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11779 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11780 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11781 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11783 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11784 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11785 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11786 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11787 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11788 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11790 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11791 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11792 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11793 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11794 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11795 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11799 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11800 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11801 debug_assert!(false);
11802 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11807 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11809 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11810 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11811 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11812 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11813 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11814 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11815 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11816 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11817 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11818 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11819 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11821 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11822 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11824 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11825 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11826 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11827 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11829 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11830 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11831 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11832 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11834 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11835 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11836 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11837 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11839 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11840 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11841 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11842 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11843 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11844 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11845 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11846 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11849 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11850 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11853 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11856 purpose: payment.purpose,
11857 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11858 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11859 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11865 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11866 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11867 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11868 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11869 for action in actions.iter() {
11870 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11871 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11872 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11874 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11876 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11877 blocked_channel_id);
11878 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11879 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11880 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11882 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11883 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11884 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11885 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11889 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11890 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11894 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11896 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11897 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11901 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11903 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11904 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11905 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11906 router: args.router,
11908 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11910 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11911 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11912 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11913 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11915 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11916 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11917 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11918 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11919 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11920 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11922 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11924 our_network_pubkey,
11927 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11929 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11931 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11932 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11933 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11934 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11935 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11937 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11938 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11940 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11942 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11944 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11945 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11946 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11948 logger: args.logger,
11949 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11952 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11953 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11954 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11955 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11956 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11959 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11960 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11961 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11962 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11963 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11964 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11965 downstream_channel_id, None
11969 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11970 //connection or two.
11972 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11978 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11979 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11980 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11981 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11982 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11983 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11984 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11985 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11986 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11987 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11988 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11989 use crate::prelude::*;
11990 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11991 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11992 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11993 use crate::util::test_utils;
11994 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11995 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11998 fn test_notify_limits() {
11999 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12000 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12001 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12002 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12003 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12004 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12006 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12007 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12008 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12009 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12010 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12012 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12014 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12015 // to connect messages with new values
12016 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12017 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12018 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12019 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12020 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12021 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12023 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12024 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12025 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12026 // ... but the last node should not.
12027 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12028 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12029 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12030 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12032 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12033 // about the channel.
12034 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12035 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12036 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12038 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12040 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12041 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12042 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12043 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12044 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12045 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12047 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12048 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12049 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12051 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12052 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12053 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12054 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12055 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12056 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12058 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12059 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12060 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12061 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12062 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12063 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12064 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12065 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12067 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12068 // the channel info has updated.
12069 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12070 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12071 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12072 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12073 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12074 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12078 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12079 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12081 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12082 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12083 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12084 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12085 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12087 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12088 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12089 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12090 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12092 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12093 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12094 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12095 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12096 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12097 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12098 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12099 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12101 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12102 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12103 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12105 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12106 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12107 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12109 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12111 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12112 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12113 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12115 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12116 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12117 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12119 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12120 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12121 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12122 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12123 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12124 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12125 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12126 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12127 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12129 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12130 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12131 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12133 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12135 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12137 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12138 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12139 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12140 // lightning messages manually.
12141 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12142 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12145 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12146 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12147 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12148 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12150 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12151 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12153 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12156 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12157 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12158 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12160 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12161 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12162 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12164 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12166 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12168 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12169 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12172 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12173 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12174 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12175 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12177 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12178 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12179 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12180 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12185 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12186 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12187 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12188 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12195 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12196 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12197 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12200 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12201 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12202 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12203 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12204 // fails as expected.
12205 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12206 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12207 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12208 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12209 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12210 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12213 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12214 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12216 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12218 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12219 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12221 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12222 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12223 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12225 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12226 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12227 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12228 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12229 let route = find_route(
12230 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12231 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12233 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12234 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12236 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12237 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12238 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12239 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12240 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12243 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12244 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12245 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12246 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12248 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12249 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12250 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12251 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12252 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12253 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12254 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12255 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12256 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12258 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12259 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12261 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12262 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12263 let route = find_route(
12264 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12265 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12267 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12268 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12270 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12271 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12272 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12273 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12274 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12276 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12277 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12278 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12279 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12281 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12282 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12283 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12284 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12285 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12287 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12288 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12289 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12291 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12292 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12293 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12294 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12295 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12296 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12297 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12298 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12299 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12301 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12302 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12304 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12305 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12306 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12307 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12309 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12310 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12311 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12312 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12313 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12315 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12316 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12317 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12320 let route = find_route(
12321 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12322 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12324 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12325 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12326 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12328 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12330 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12331 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12332 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12334 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12336 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12338 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12339 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12340 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12341 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12342 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12343 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12346 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12348 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12349 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12353 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12354 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12355 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12359 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12361 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12362 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12364 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12365 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12366 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12367 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12368 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12369 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12370 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12371 let route = find_route(
12372 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12373 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12376 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12377 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12378 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12379 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12380 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12381 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12384 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12385 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12386 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12387 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12388 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12389 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12390 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12392 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12396 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12397 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12398 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12399 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12400 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12401 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12402 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12403 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12404 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12406 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12407 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12409 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12410 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12411 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12412 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12413 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12414 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12415 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12416 let route = find_route(
12417 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12418 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12421 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12422 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12423 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12424 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12425 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12426 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12427 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12428 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12431 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12432 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12433 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12434 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12435 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12436 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12439 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12443 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12447 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12449 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12450 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12451 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12452 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12454 // Marshall an MPP route.
12455 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12456 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12457 route.paths.push(path);
12458 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12459 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12460 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12461 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12462 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12463 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12465 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12466 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12468 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12469 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12471 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12476 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12480 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12482 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12484 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12485 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12487 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12488 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12490 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12493 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12494 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12495 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12496 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12497 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12498 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12501 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12504 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12505 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12510 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12511 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12517 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12518 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12520 total_msat: 100_000,
12523 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12524 // payment verification fails as expected.
12525 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12526 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12527 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12528 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12530 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12534 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12535 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12539 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12540 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12541 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12542 // the channel is successfully closed.
12543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12546 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12548 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12549 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12550 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12551 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12552 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12554 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12555 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12557 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12558 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12560 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12563 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12565 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12566 // as it has the funding transaction.
12567 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12568 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12569 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12572 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12574 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12576 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12578 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12579 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12580 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12582 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12585 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12586 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12587 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12588 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12589 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12592 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12593 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12595 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12596 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12597 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12598 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12600 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12601 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12602 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12603 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12605 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12606 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12608 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12609 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12610 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12611 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12612 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12613 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12614 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12618 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12619 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12620 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12621 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12622 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12623 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12624 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12627 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12629 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12630 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12631 // closing transaction).
12632 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12633 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12634 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12636 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12637 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12638 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12639 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12640 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12643 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12645 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12647 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12648 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12649 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12651 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12653 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12654 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12657 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12658 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12659 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12662 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12663 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12664 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12667 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12668 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12669 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12672 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12673 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12674 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12677 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12679 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12680 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12682 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12683 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12685 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12686 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12691 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12692 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12693 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12694 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12695 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12696 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12697 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12698 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12701 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12702 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12703 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12705 // Test the API functions.
12706 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12708 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12710 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12712 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12714 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12716 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12718 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12722 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12723 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12724 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12725 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12726 // the given `channel_id`.
12727 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12728 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12729 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12732 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12735 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12737 // Test the API functions.
12738 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12740 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12742 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12744 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12746 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12748 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12752 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12753 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12757 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12759 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12761 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12762 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12764 let mut funding_tx = None;
12765 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12766 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12767 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12770 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12771 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12772 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12773 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12774 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12776 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12778 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12780 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12782 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12784 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12786 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12789 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12790 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12791 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12792 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12793 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12794 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12796 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12797 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12799 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12800 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12801 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12802 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12803 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12804 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12805 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12808 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12809 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12810 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12811 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12812 }, true).unwrap_err();
12814 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12815 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12816 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12817 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12818 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12819 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12820 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12822 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12823 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12825 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12826 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12827 }, true).unwrap_err();
12829 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12830 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12831 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12832 }, false).unwrap();
12833 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12835 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12836 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12838 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12839 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12840 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12841 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12842 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12844 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12845 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12846 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12848 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12849 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12850 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12852 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12853 // "protected" and can connect again.
12854 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12855 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12856 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12858 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12860 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12862 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12863 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12867 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12868 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12872 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12874 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12876 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12877 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12879 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12880 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12881 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12882 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12885 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12887 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12888 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12889 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12891 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12892 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12893 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12895 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12896 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12897 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12898 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12902 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12903 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12904 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12907 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12908 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12910 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12912 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12914 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12915 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12917 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12918 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12919 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12920 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12921 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12922 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12925 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12926 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12928 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12929 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12931 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12933 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12934 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12937 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12938 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12939 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12940 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12941 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12943 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12944 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12946 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12947 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12948 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12949 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12955 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12956 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12958 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12959 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12960 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12962 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12963 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12967 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12971 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12972 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12973 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12974 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12975 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12976 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12977 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12978 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12979 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12980 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12981 payment_metadata: None,
12982 keysend_preimage: None,
12983 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12984 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12986 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12988 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12989 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12990 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12991 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12992 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12993 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12994 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12996 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12997 } else { panic!(); }
12999 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13000 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13001 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13002 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13003 payment_metadata: None,
13004 keysend_preimage: None,
13005 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13006 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13008 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13010 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13011 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13012 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13013 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13017 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13018 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13019 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13020 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13021 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13023 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13024 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13025 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13026 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13027 payment_metadata: None,
13028 keysend_preimage: None,
13029 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13030 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13032 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13033 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13034 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13036 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13037 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13038 // is not satisfied.
13039 assert!(result.is_ok());
13043 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13044 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13045 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13046 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13047 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13049 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13050 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13052 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13053 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13054 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13055 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13056 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13058 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13059 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13061 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13062 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13063 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13064 match &msg_events[0] {
13065 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13066 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13068 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13069 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13070 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13073 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13076 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13077 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13079 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13080 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13083 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13087 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13088 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13089 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13090 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13091 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13092 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13093 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13094 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13095 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13096 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13097 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13099 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13100 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13101 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13103 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13104 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13106 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13107 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13112 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13113 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13115 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13116 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13118 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13119 // not have generated any events.
13120 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13124 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13125 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13126 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13127 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13128 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13129 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13130 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13131 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13133 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13134 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13135 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13137 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13138 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13139 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13140 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13141 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13143 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13144 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13147 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13148 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13149 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13151 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13152 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13153 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13154 ..Default::default()
13156 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13157 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13160 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13161 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13164 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13165 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13166 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13167 ..Default::default()
13169 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13170 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13171 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13174 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13175 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13178 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13179 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13180 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13181 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13182 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13185 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13186 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13187 ..Default::default()
13189 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13192 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13193 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13194 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13199 fn test_payment_display() {
13200 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13201 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13202 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13203 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13204 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13205 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13209 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13210 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13211 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13212 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13213 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13214 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13216 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13217 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13218 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13219 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13220 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13221 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13222 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13223 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13225 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13226 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13227 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13230 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13231 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13233 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13234 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13236 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13237 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13238 }, false).unwrap();
13239 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13240 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13241 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13243 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13245 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13246 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13247 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13248 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13249 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13250 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13251 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13252 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13253 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13254 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13255 } else { panic!() };
13256 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13257 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13258 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13259 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13261 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13263 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13264 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13265 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13270 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13271 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13272 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13273 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13276 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13277 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13278 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13280 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13281 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13283 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13284 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13287 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13288 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13289 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13291 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13295 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13296 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13297 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13299 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13304 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13305 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13306 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13307 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13309 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13310 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13311 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13313 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13315 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13316 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13317 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13318 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13320 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13321 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13323 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13329 use crate::chain::Listen;
13330 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13331 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13332 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13333 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13334 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13335 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13336 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13337 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13338 use crate::util::test_utils;
13339 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13341 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13342 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13343 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13344 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13346 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13348 use criterion::Criterion;
13350 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13351 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13352 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13353 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13354 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13355 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13356 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13358 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13359 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13361 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13362 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13364 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13366 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13369 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13370 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13373 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13374 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13375 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13377 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13378 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13380 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13381 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13382 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13383 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13384 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13386 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13387 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13388 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13390 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13391 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13392 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13393 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13395 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13396 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13397 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13399 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13400 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13401 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13402 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13403 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13405 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13406 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13407 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13409 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13410 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13412 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13413 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13414 }, false).unwrap();
13415 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13416 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13417 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13420 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13421 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13422 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13424 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13425 } else { panic!(); }
13427 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13428 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13429 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13430 match events_b[0] {
13431 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13432 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13434 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13437 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13438 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13439 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13440 match events_a[0] {
13441 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13442 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13444 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13447 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13449 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13450 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13451 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13453 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13454 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13455 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13456 match msg_events[0] {
13457 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13458 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13459 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13463 match msg_events[1] {
13464 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13468 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13469 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13470 match events_a[0] {
13471 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13472 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13477 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13478 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13479 match events_b[0] {
13480 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13481 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13486 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13487 macro_rules! send_payment {
13488 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13489 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13490 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13491 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13492 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13493 payment_count += 1;
13494 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13495 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13497 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13498 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13499 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13500 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13501 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13502 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13503 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13504 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13505 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13506 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13507 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13509 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13510 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13511 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13512 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13514 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13515 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13516 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13517 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13518 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13520 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13523 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13524 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13525 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13526 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13528 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13532 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13533 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13534 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);