1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
47 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
48 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus};
49 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
50 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
52 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
54 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
55 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
56 use util::config::UserConfig;
57 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
58 use util::{byte_utils, events};
59 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
60 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
61 use util::logger::Logger;
62 use util::errors::APIError;
66 use core::cell::RefCell;
67 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
68 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
69 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
70 use core::time::Duration;
71 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
72 use std::time::Instant;
74 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
76 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
78 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
79 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
80 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
82 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
83 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
84 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
85 // before we forward it.
87 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
88 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
89 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
90 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
91 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
93 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
94 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
96 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
105 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
106 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
107 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
108 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
109 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
110 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
111 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
114 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
115 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
116 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
117 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
120 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
123 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
124 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
127 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
129 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
131 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
132 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
133 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
135 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
137 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
141 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
145 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
146 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
147 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
148 short_channel_id: u64,
150 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
152 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
153 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
157 struct ClaimableHTLC {
158 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
167 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
168 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
169 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
170 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
173 session_priv: SecretKey,
174 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
175 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
176 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
181 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
182 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
184 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
185 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
190 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
191 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
193 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
201 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
203 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
204 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
205 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
206 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
207 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
209 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
210 err: msgs::LightningError,
211 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
213 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
215 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
217 err: LightningError {
219 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
220 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
226 shutdown_finish: None,
230 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
232 err: LightningError {
234 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
236 shutdown_finish: None,
240 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
241 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
244 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
246 err: LightningError {
248 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
249 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
255 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
259 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
262 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
264 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
266 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
268 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
269 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
275 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
277 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
278 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
285 shutdown_finish: None,
290 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
291 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
292 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
293 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
294 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
296 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
297 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
298 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
299 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
300 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
301 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
302 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
304 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
308 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
309 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
310 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
311 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
312 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
313 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
314 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
315 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
316 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
317 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
318 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
319 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
321 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
322 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
323 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
324 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
327 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
328 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
329 /// quite some time lag.
330 enum BackgroundEvent {
331 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
332 /// commitment transaction.
333 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
336 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
337 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
339 latest_features: InitFeatures,
342 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
343 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
345 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
347 struct PendingInboundPayment {
348 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
349 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
350 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
351 /// this payment being removed.
353 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
354 user_payment_id: u64,
355 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
356 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
357 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
360 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
361 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
362 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
363 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
364 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
365 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
366 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
367 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
369 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
370 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
371 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
372 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
373 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
374 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
375 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
376 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
377 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
379 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
380 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
382 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
383 /// to individual Channels.
385 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
386 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
387 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
388 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
390 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
391 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
392 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
393 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
394 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
395 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
396 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
398 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
399 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
400 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
401 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
404 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
405 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
406 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
407 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
408 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
410 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
411 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
412 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
413 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
414 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
415 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
416 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
417 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
418 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
419 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
422 default_configuration: UserConfig,
423 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
429 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
431 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
432 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
434 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
435 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
436 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
437 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
439 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
440 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
441 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
442 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
443 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
444 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
446 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
447 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
448 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
449 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
450 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
451 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
452 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
453 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
455 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
456 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashSet<[u8; 32]>>,
458 our_network_key: SecretKey,
459 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
461 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
462 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
463 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
465 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
466 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
467 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
468 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
470 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
471 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
472 /// are currently open with that peer.
473 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
474 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
476 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
478 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
479 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
480 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
481 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
482 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
483 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
484 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
485 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
486 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
488 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
495 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
497 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
498 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
499 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
500 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
501 pub struct ChainParameters {
502 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
503 pub network: Network,
505 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
507 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
508 pub best_block: BestBlock,
511 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
512 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
513 pub struct BestBlock {
514 block_hash: BlockHash,
519 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
520 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
522 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
527 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
528 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
529 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
532 /// Returns the best block hash.
533 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
535 /// Returns the best block height.
536 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
539 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
545 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
546 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
547 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
548 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
549 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
550 /// updates are ready for persistence).
552 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
553 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
554 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
555 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
556 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
558 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
559 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
562 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
563 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
564 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
567 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
568 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
570 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
571 persistence_notifier: notifier,
572 should_persist: persist_check,
573 _read_guard: read_guard,
578 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
580 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
581 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
586 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
587 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
589 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
591 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
592 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
593 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
594 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
595 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
597 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
598 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
600 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
602 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
603 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
604 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
605 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
606 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
607 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
608 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
610 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
611 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
613 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
614 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
615 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
616 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
618 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
619 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
620 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
621 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
622 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
623 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
626 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
628 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
629 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
632 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
634 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
636 pub struct ChannelDetails {
637 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
638 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
639 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
640 /// lifetime of the channel.
641 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
642 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
643 /// our counterparty already.
645 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
646 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
647 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
648 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
649 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
650 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
651 /// The node_id of our counterparty
652 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
653 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
654 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
655 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
656 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
657 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
658 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
661 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
662 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
663 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
664 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
665 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
666 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
667 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
668 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
669 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
670 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
671 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
672 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
673 pub is_outbound: bool,
674 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
675 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
676 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
677 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
678 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
679 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
680 /// the peer is connected, (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution, and (d) the
681 /// channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
683 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
685 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
687 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
688 /// payments to us through this channel.
689 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
692 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
693 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
695 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
696 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
697 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
698 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
699 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
700 ParameterError(APIError),
701 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
702 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
703 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
706 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
708 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
709 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
710 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
711 /// paths than the ones selected).
712 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
713 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
714 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
715 /// in over-/re-payment.
717 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
718 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
719 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
721 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
722 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
723 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
724 /// with the latest update_id.
725 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
728 macro_rules! handle_error {
729 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
732 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
733 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
735 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
736 // entering the macro.
737 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
740 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
742 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
743 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
744 if let Some(update) = update_option {
745 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
751 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
752 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
754 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
755 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
756 action: err.action.clone()
760 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
761 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
764 // Return error in case higher-API need one
771 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
772 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
773 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
775 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
776 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
778 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
779 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
780 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
781 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
783 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
784 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
786 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
787 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
788 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
789 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
791 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
792 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
798 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
799 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
803 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
805 $entry.remove_entry();
813 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
814 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
818 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
820 $entry.remove_entry();
828 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
829 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
830 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
832 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
834 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
835 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
836 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
837 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
839 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
840 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
841 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
842 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
843 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
844 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
845 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
846 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
847 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
848 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&$chan).ok()));
851 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
852 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
853 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
854 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
856 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
857 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
859 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
860 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
862 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
863 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
864 if !$resend_commitment {
865 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
868 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
870 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
871 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
875 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
876 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
878 $entry.remove_entry();
884 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
885 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
886 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
888 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
889 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
893 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
894 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
895 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
896 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
897 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
900 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
905 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
906 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
907 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
908 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
909 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
910 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
912 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
913 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
915 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
916 if !forwards.is_empty() {
917 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
918 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
921 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
922 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
923 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
924 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
925 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
926 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
927 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
928 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
929 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
930 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
931 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
932 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
935 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
936 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
937 // before it should be allowed to.
938 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
939 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
940 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
943 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
944 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
945 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
946 msg: announcement_sigs,
949 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
952 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
953 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
954 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
955 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
956 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
957 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
958 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
959 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
960 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
961 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
962 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
963 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
964 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
965 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
966 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
967 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
968 let mut order = $order;
970 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
972 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
976 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
977 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
978 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
979 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
984 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
985 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
986 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
987 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
993 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
997 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1002 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1003 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1004 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1009 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1010 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1011 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1012 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1013 assert!(res.is_ok());
1016 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1020 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1021 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1022 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1024 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1026 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1027 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1032 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1033 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1034 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1035 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1036 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1039 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1041 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1042 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1044 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1046 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1048 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1049 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1050 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1051 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1052 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1053 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1056 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1057 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1058 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1062 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1064 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1065 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1066 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1067 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1068 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1069 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1071 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1072 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1074 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1075 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1078 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1079 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1081 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1083 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1084 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1085 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1086 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1094 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1095 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1096 &self.default_configuration
1099 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1101 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1102 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1103 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1104 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1105 /// otherwise ignored.
1107 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1108 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1110 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1111 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1112 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1113 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1114 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1117 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1118 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
1119 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1122 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1123 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1125 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1128 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1129 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1131 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1134 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1136 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1137 node_id: their_network_key,
1143 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1144 let mut res = Vec::new();
1146 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1147 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1148 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1149 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1150 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1151 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1152 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1153 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1154 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1155 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1156 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1157 inbound_capacity_msat,
1158 outbound_capacity_msat,
1159 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1160 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1161 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1162 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1163 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1164 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1168 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1169 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1170 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
1171 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1177 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1178 /// more information.
1179 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1180 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1183 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1184 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1186 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1187 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1189 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1190 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1191 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1192 // really wanted anyway.
1193 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1196 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1197 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1198 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1200 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1201 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1202 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1204 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1205 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1206 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1207 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1208 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1209 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1210 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1211 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1214 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1215 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1216 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1218 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1219 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1221 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1224 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1225 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1227 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1228 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1233 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1234 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1235 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1244 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1245 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1246 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1247 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1248 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1250 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1251 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1252 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1253 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1254 // ignore the result here.
1255 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1259 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1261 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1262 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1263 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1264 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1265 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1266 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1269 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1270 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1272 chan.remove_entry().1
1274 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1277 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1278 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1279 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1280 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1281 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1286 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1289 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1290 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1291 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1293 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1294 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1295 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1296 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1297 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1298 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1299 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1309 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1310 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1311 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1312 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1313 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1317 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1318 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1319 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1321 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1322 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1323 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1324 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1325 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1326 failure_code: $err_code,
1327 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1332 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1333 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1336 let shared_secret = {
1337 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1338 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1341 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1343 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1344 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1345 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1346 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1347 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1348 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1349 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1350 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1353 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1354 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1355 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1356 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1357 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1360 let mut channel_state = None;
1361 macro_rules! return_err {
1362 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1364 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1365 if channel_state.is_none() {
1366 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1368 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1369 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1370 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1371 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1372 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1377 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1378 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1379 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1380 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1382 let error_code = match err {
1383 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1384 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1385 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1386 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1387 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1389 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1392 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1393 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1394 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1401 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1404 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1405 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1406 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1407 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1408 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1409 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1410 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1411 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1412 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1413 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1414 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1415 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1419 // final_expiry_too_soon
1420 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1421 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1422 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1423 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1424 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1425 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1427 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1428 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1429 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1431 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1432 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1433 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1436 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1437 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1438 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1439 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1442 if payment_data.is_none() {
1443 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1446 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1447 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1448 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1449 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1451 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1452 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1453 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1454 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1456 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1457 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1458 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1459 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1462 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1463 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1464 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1466 // Check two things:
1467 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1468 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1469 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1471 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1473 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1474 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1475 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1477 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1479 let blinding_factor = {
1480 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1481 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1482 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1483 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1486 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1488 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1490 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1493 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1494 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1497 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1498 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1499 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1500 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1501 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1505 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1506 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1507 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1510 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1511 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1512 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1513 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1517 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1518 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1519 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1520 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1521 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1522 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1523 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1524 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1525 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1526 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1528 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1530 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1531 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1533 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1534 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1535 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1536 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1537 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1538 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1539 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1541 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1542 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1544 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1545 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1546 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1548 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1549 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1551 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1552 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1553 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1554 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1555 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1557 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1558 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1560 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1561 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1562 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1563 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1569 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1570 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1571 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1572 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1574 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1575 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1577 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1578 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1579 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1581 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1583 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1588 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1591 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1592 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1593 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1594 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1595 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1599 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1601 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1602 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1604 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1605 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1606 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1607 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1608 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1609 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1610 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1611 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1614 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1615 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1617 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1623 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1624 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1625 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1626 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1627 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1628 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1630 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1631 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1632 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1633 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1634 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1636 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1638 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1639 assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().insert(session_priv_bytes));
1641 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1642 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1643 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1644 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1645 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1648 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1649 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1651 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1652 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1654 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1655 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1657 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1659 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1660 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1661 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1663 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1664 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1665 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1666 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1667 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1668 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1669 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1670 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1671 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1674 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1675 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1676 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1677 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1678 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1679 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1680 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1681 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1689 } else { unreachable!(); }
1693 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1694 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1696 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1701 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1703 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1704 /// fields for more info.
1706 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1707 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1708 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1709 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1710 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1711 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1713 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1715 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1716 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1717 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1719 /// In general, a path may raise:
1720 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1721 /// node public key) is specified.
1722 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1723 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1725 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1726 /// relevant updates.
1728 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1729 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1730 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1732 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1733 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1734 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1735 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1737 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1738 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1739 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1740 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1741 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1742 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1744 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1745 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1746 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1747 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1748 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1750 let mut total_value = 0;
1751 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1752 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1753 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1754 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1755 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1756 continue 'path_check;
1758 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1759 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1760 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1761 continue 'path_check;
1764 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1765 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1767 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1768 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1771 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1772 let mut results = Vec::new();
1773 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1774 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1776 let mut has_ok = false;
1777 let mut has_err = false;
1778 for res in results.iter() {
1779 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1780 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1781 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1782 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1789 if has_err && has_ok {
1790 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1792 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1798 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1799 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1800 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1801 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1803 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1805 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1807 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1808 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1809 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1810 } else { unreachable!(); })
1813 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1815 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1816 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1819 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1820 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1827 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1832 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1834 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1842 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1843 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1844 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1848 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1850 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1851 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1853 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1855 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1856 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1857 /// keys per-channel).
1859 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1860 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1861 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1863 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1864 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1865 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1867 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
1868 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1869 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1871 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1872 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1873 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1874 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1878 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1879 let mut output_index = None;
1880 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1881 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1882 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1883 if output_index.is_some() {
1884 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1885 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1888 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1889 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1890 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1893 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1896 if output_index.is_none() {
1897 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1898 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1901 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1905 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1906 if !chan.should_announce() {
1907 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1911 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1913 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1915 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1916 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1918 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1919 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1920 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1921 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1922 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1927 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1928 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1929 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1931 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1934 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1935 // smaller than 500:
1936 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1938 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
1939 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
1940 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
1941 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
1942 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
1943 /// our network addresses.
1945 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
1946 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1948 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
1949 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
1950 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
1951 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
1953 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
1955 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
1956 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1959 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1960 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1963 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
1964 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
1965 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
1967 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1968 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1969 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1970 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1971 rgb, alias, addresses,
1972 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1973 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1975 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1976 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1978 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1981 let mut announced_chans = false;
1982 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
1983 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1984 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
1986 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update(chan) {
1991 announced_chans = true;
1993 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
1994 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
1995 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
1999 if announced_chans {
2000 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2001 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2002 signature: node_announce_sig,
2003 contents: announcement
2009 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2011 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2012 /// Will likely generate further events.
2013 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2014 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2016 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2017 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2018 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2020 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2021 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2023 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2024 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2025 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2026 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2028 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2029 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2030 match forward_info {
2031 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2032 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2033 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2034 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2035 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2036 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2037 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2039 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2040 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2043 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2044 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2045 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2046 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2047 // problem, not ours.
2054 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2055 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2056 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2057 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2058 match forward_info {
2059 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2060 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2062 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2063 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2064 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2065 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2066 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2067 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2068 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2069 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2071 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2073 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2074 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2076 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2078 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
2079 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2080 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2086 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2088 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2089 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2090 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2091 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2092 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2093 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2094 // this channel currently :/.
2100 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2101 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2103 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2104 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2105 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2107 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2108 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2110 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2112 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2113 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2114 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2117 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2119 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2120 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2121 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2122 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2123 // messages when we can.
2124 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2125 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2126 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2133 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2134 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2137 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2138 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2139 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2140 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2141 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
2142 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2144 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2145 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2146 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2147 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2148 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2150 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
2152 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2154 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2158 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2159 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2162 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2163 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2164 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2165 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2166 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2167 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2168 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2169 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2170 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2172 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2180 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2181 match forward_info {
2182 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2183 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
2184 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2185 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2186 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2187 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2188 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2189 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2190 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2191 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2193 value: amt_to_forward,
2194 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
2195 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
2198 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2200 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2201 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2202 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2204 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2205 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2206 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2207 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2208 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2210 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2215 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2216 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2217 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2218 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2219 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2220 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2221 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2222 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2224 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2225 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2228 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2229 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2230 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2231 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2232 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2233 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2234 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2236 let mut total_value = 0;
2237 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2238 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2239 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2240 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2241 total_value += htlc.value;
2242 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2243 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2244 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2245 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2247 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2249 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2251 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2252 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2255 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2256 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2258 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2259 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2261 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2263 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2264 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2266 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2268 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2269 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2276 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2277 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2279 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2280 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2288 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2289 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2292 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2293 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2296 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2297 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2298 events.append(&mut new_events);
2301 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2303 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2304 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2306 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2307 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2308 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2309 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2310 if background_events.is_empty() {
2314 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2316 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2317 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2318 // monitor updating completing.
2319 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2326 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2327 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2328 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2329 self.process_background_events();
2332 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2333 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2334 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2336 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2338 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2339 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2340 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2341 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2342 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2344 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2345 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2346 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2347 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2348 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2349 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2350 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2351 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2352 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2353 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2354 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2358 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2359 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2361 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2362 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2363 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2367 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2368 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2378 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2379 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2380 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2381 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2382 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2383 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2384 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2386 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2387 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2388 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2389 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2390 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2391 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2392 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2393 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2394 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2395 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2396 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2402 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2403 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2404 // be surfaced to the user.
2405 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2406 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2408 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2409 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2410 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2412 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2413 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2415 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2420 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2422 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2424 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2426 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2427 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2428 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2430 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2431 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2433 rejected_by_dest: false,
2441 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2448 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2449 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2450 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2451 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2452 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2453 /// still-available channels.
2454 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2455 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2456 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2457 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2460 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2461 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2462 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2464 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, .. } => {
2466 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2467 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2468 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2470 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2473 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2474 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2475 match &onion_error {
2476 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2478 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2480 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2481 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2482 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2483 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2484 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2485 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2486 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2491 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2492 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2493 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2494 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2496 error_code: onion_error_code,
2498 error_data: onion_error_data
2502 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2508 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2509 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2510 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2511 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2513 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2514 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2515 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2516 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2517 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2518 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2520 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2522 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2528 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2529 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2530 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2531 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2532 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2533 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2535 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2536 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2537 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2541 let mut forward_event = None;
2542 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2543 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2545 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2547 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2550 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2553 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2554 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2555 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2556 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2557 time_forwardable: time
2564 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2565 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2566 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2568 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
2569 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
2570 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
2571 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
2573 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2575 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
2576 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
2577 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
2578 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2580 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2582 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2583 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2584 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2585 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2587 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2588 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2589 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2590 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2592 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2593 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2594 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2595 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2596 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2598 let mut valid_mpp = true;
2599 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2600 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2606 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2607 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2608 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2610 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2611 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2612 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2613 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2614 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2615 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2616 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2618 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2620 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2621 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2622 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2623 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2624 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2625 } else { errs.push(e); }
2627 Err(None) => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2628 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2633 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2634 // which were generated.
2635 channel_state.take();
2637 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2638 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2639 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2646 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2647 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2648 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2649 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2650 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2656 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2657 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2658 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2659 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2660 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2661 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2662 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2663 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2665 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2669 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2670 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
2671 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2672 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2673 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2674 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2675 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2676 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2677 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2678 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2687 // TODO: Do something with e?
2688 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2689 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2690 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2691 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2692 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2693 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2694 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2698 } else { unreachable!(); }
2701 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2703 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } => {
2704 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2706 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2707 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2708 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&session_priv_bytes)
2710 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2711 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2715 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
2718 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2719 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2720 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2723 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2724 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2725 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2726 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2729 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2730 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2731 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2732 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2733 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2734 payment_preimage, e);
2738 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2740 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2741 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2742 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2748 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2749 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2750 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2753 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2754 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2757 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2758 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2760 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2761 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2762 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2763 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2765 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2766 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2767 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2768 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2769 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2770 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2771 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2772 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2773 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2776 let (mut pending_failures, chan_restoration_res) = {
2777 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2778 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2779 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2780 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
2781 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
2783 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2787 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2788 (pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
2790 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
2791 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2792 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2796 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2797 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2798 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2801 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2802 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2803 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2804 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2805 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2806 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2807 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2808 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2809 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2810 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2812 entry.insert(channel);
2818 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2819 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2820 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2821 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2822 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2824 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2825 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2827 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2828 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2830 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2833 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2834 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2835 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2836 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2838 user_channel_id: user_id,
2843 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2844 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2845 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2846 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2847 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2848 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2850 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2853 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2855 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2858 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2859 // lock before watch_channel
2860 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2862 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2863 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2864 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2865 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2866 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2867 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2868 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2869 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2870 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2871 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2872 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2874 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2875 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2876 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2877 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2878 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2879 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2883 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2884 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2885 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2887 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2889 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2890 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2891 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2900 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2902 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2903 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2904 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2905 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2906 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2907 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2908 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2910 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2911 Ok(update) => update,
2912 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2914 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2915 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2919 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2922 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
2923 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2927 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2928 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2929 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2930 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2932 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2933 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2935 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2936 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2937 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2938 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2939 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2940 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2941 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2942 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2943 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2944 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2945 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2946 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2947 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2948 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2949 msg: announcement_sigs,
2954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2958 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2959 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2960 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2961 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2963 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2965 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2966 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2968 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2969 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2970 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2971 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2975 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2976 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2977 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2981 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2982 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2983 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2985 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2986 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2988 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2991 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2992 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2994 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2995 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2996 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2997 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3005 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3006 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3007 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3008 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3009 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3011 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3012 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3014 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3015 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3016 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3017 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3022 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3023 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3024 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3025 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3026 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3027 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3028 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3030 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3031 } else { (tx, None) }
3033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3036 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3037 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3038 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3040 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3041 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3042 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3043 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3051 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3052 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3053 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3054 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3056 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3057 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3058 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3059 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3061 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3062 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3064 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3065 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3066 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3067 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3070 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3071 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
3072 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
3073 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
3074 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3075 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3076 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3077 match pending_forward_info {
3078 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3079 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
3080 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3081 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3082 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3083 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3084 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3088 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3089 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3090 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3091 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3092 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3093 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
3094 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3095 // no problem just calling this
3096 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3097 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3099 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3100 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3101 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3104 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3106 _ => pending_forward_info
3109 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3116 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3117 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3119 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3120 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3121 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3122 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3125 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3127 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3130 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
3134 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3135 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3136 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3137 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3139 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3140 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3142 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3149 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3150 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3151 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3152 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3154 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3155 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3157 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3158 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3159 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3161 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3164 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3168 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3169 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3170 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3171 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3173 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3174 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3176 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
3177 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
3178 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3179 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3180 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3181 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3182 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3187 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3188 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3189 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
3191 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3192 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3193 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3195 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3196 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3197 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3198 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3199 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3200 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3201 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3202 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3204 commitment_signed: msg,
3208 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3209 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3210 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3216 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3221 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3222 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3223 let mut forward_event = None;
3224 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3225 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3226 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3227 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3229 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3230 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3231 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3232 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3234 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3235 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3236 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3238 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3239 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3240 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3245 match forward_event {
3247 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3248 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3249 time_forwardable: time
3257 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3258 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3260 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3261 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3262 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3263 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3264 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3265 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3267 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3268 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3269 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3270 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3271 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3272 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3273 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3274 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3276 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3278 } else { unreachable!(); }
3281 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3282 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3283 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3287 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3288 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3289 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3293 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3298 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3300 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3301 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3302 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3304 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3311 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3312 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3313 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3314 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3315 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3316 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3317 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3319 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3321 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3326 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3327 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3328 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3330 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3332 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3333 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3335 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3336 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3339 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3340 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3341 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3344 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3349 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3350 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3351 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3352 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3353 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3355 // It's not a local channel
3359 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3360 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3361 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3362 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3363 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3364 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3365 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3368 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3370 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3372 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3377 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3378 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround, chan_restoration_res) = {
3379 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3380 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3382 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3383 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3384 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3385 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3387 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3388 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3389 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3390 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3391 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3392 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3393 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3394 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3395 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3399 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3400 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround,
3401 handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked))
3403 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3406 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3407 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3409 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3410 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3415 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3416 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3417 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3418 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3419 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3421 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3422 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3423 let counterparty_node_id;
3424 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3425 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3426 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3428 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3431 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3432 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3434 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3435 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3437 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3438 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3440 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3441 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3442 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3444 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3447 log_debug!(self.logger, "Updating fee resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3449 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3450 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3451 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3452 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3453 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3454 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3455 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3465 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3466 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3467 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3471 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3472 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3473 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3474 let pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3475 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3476 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events {
3477 match monitor_event {
3478 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3479 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3480 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3481 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3484 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3487 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3488 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3489 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3490 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3491 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3492 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3493 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3494 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3495 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3497 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3498 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3499 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3503 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3504 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3505 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3506 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3514 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3515 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3518 has_pending_monitor_events
3521 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3522 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3523 /// update was applied.
3525 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3526 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3527 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3528 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3529 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3530 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3531 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3532 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3534 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3535 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3536 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3537 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3538 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3540 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
3541 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
3542 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
3543 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
3544 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
3546 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
3547 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3548 has_monitor_update = true;
3549 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
3550 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
3551 if close_channel { return false; }
3553 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3554 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3555 updates: commitment_update,
3562 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
3563 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
3570 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
3571 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3572 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
3575 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3576 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3582 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3583 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3585 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3586 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3587 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3588 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3589 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3590 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3591 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3592 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3593 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3594 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3595 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3596 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3597 assert!(should_broadcast);
3598 } else { unreachable!(); }
3599 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3601 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3605 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3606 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3608 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3610 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3611 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3612 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3613 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3614 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3615 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
3616 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3617 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3618 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3619 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3620 // never fail a payment too early.
3621 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3623 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3626 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3631 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3634 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3635 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3637 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
3638 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
3639 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
3641 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3643 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
3644 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3645 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
3646 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3647 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3648 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3649 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3652 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3653 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3656 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3657 /// stored external to LDK.
3659 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3660 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3661 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3663 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3664 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3666 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`] events to
3667 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
3668 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
3669 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
3670 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
3672 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3673 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3674 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3675 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3677 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3678 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3679 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3680 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
3681 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3683 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3684 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3685 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3686 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3687 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3689 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
3690 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
3691 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
3693 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3695 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
3696 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
3698 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3699 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3700 /// [`PaymentReceived::user_payment_id`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::user_payment_id
3701 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3702 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
3705 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
3706 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
3707 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3708 let event_handler = |event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
3709 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
3714 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3715 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3716 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3717 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3721 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3722 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
3723 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3724 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3726 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3727 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3728 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3729 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3732 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3733 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3736 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
3737 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3738 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3740 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3741 events.replace(pending_events);
3750 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3752 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3753 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3754 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3755 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3758 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
3760 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
3761 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
3763 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
3764 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
3765 /// restarting from an old state.
3766 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
3767 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3768 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3770 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3771 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3772 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3773 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3776 let mut pending_events = std::mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
3777 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3778 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3781 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
3782 handler.handle_event(event);
3790 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3792 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3793 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3794 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3795 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3798 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3800 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3801 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3802 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3803 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3804 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3807 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3808 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3809 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3812 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3814 let new_height = height - 1;
3816 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3817 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3818 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3819 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3820 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3821 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3824 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
3828 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3830 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3831 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3832 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3833 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3836 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3837 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3838 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3839 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3841 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3842 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3844 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3845 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3848 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3849 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3850 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3851 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3853 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3854 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3856 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3858 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3860 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
3862 macro_rules! max_time {
3863 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3865 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3866 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3867 // having an explicit local time source.
3868 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3869 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3870 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3871 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3872 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3878 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3879 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3880 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3881 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
3882 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
3886 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3887 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3888 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3889 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3890 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3891 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3897 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3899 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3900 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3901 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3902 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3903 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3904 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3909 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3911 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3912 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3913 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3914 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3917 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3918 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3920 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3921 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3922 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3923 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3924 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3926 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3927 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3929 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3930 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3931 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3932 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3933 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3934 let res = f(channel);
3935 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3936 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3937 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3938 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3939 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3943 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3944 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3945 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3946 msg: funding_locked,
3948 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3950 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3951 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3952 msg: announcement_sigs,
3955 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3957 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3959 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3960 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3961 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3963 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3964 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3965 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3966 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3967 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3971 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3972 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3973 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3980 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3981 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3982 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3983 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3984 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3985 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3986 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3987 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3988 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3989 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3990 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3991 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3992 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3997 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4002 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4004 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4005 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4009 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4010 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4011 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4013 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4014 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4015 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4016 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4019 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4020 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4022 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4023 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4026 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4027 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4028 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4029 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4030 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4035 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4036 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4037 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4038 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4039 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4040 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4043 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4044 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4045 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4048 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4050 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4053 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4054 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4055 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4058 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4059 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4060 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4063 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4064 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4065 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4068 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4070 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4073 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4075 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4078 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4079 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4080 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4083 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4084 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4085 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4088 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4089 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4090 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4093 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4094 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4095 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4098 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4100 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4103 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4104 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4105 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4108 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4109 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4110 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4113 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4114 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4115 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4118 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4119 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4120 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4123 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4124 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4125 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4128 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4129 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4130 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4131 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4133 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4134 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4135 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4136 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4137 if no_connection_possible {
4138 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4139 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4140 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4141 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4142 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4144 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4145 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
4146 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4156 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4157 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4158 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4159 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4160 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4161 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4162 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4166 no_channels_remain = false;
4172 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4174 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4175 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4176 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4177 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4178 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4179 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4180 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4181 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4182 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4183 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4184 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4185 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4186 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4187 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4188 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4189 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
4190 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4191 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4192 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4196 if no_channels_remain {
4197 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4200 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4201 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4205 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4206 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4208 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4211 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4212 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4213 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4214 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4215 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4219 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4224 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4225 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4226 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4227 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4228 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4229 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4230 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4231 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4232 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4236 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4237 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4238 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4244 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4247 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4248 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4250 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4251 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4252 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4253 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4254 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4258 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4259 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4264 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4265 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4266 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4267 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4268 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4269 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4272 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4275 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4281 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4282 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4287 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4288 let result = *guard;
4296 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4297 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4298 let current_time = Instant::now();
4300 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4301 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4306 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4307 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4308 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4309 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4310 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4312 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4313 let result = *guard;
4314 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4318 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4319 None => return result,
4325 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4327 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4328 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4329 *persistence_lock = true;
4330 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4335 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4336 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4338 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4340 (0, onion_packet, required),
4341 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4344 (0, payment_data, required),
4345 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4349 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4350 (0, routing, required),
4351 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4352 (4, payment_hash, required),
4353 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4354 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4357 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4361 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4366 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4367 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4368 (2, outpoint, required),
4369 (4, htlc_id, required),
4370 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4373 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimableHTLC, {
4374 (0, prev_hop, required),
4375 (2, value, required),
4376 (4, payment_data, required),
4377 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4380 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCSource,
4381 (0, OutboundRoute) => {
4382 (0, session_priv, required),
4383 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4384 (4, path, vec_type),
4386 (1, PreviousHopData)
4389 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
4390 (0, LightningError) => {
4394 (0, failure_code, required),
4395 (2, data, vec_type),
4399 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
4401 (0, forward_info, required),
4402 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
4403 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
4404 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
4407 (0, htlc_id, required),
4408 (2, err_packet, required),
4412 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
4413 (0, payment_secret, required),
4414 (2, expiry_time, required),
4415 (4, user_payment_id, required),
4416 (6, payment_preimage, required),
4417 (8, min_value_msat, required),
4420 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4421 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4422 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4423 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4424 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4427 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4428 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4430 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4432 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4434 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4435 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4436 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4439 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4440 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4441 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4442 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4443 unfunded_channels += 1;
4446 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4447 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4448 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4449 channel.write(writer)?;
4453 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4454 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4455 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4456 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4457 for forward in pending_forwards {
4458 forward.write(writer)?;
4462 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4463 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4464 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4465 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4466 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4467 htlc.write(writer)?;
4471 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4472 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4473 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4474 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4475 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4476 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4479 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4480 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4481 for event in events.iter() {
4482 event.write(writer)?;
4485 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4486 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4487 for event in background_events.iter() {
4489 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4491 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4492 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4497 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4498 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4500 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4501 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4502 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4503 hash.write(writer)?;
4504 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4507 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4508 (pending_outbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4509 for session_priv in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
4510 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4513 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
4519 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4521 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4523 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4524 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4525 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4526 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4527 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4528 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4529 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4530 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4531 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4532 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4533 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4535 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4536 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4538 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4539 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4540 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4541 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4542 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4543 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4544 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4545 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4546 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4547 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4548 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4551 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4552 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4554 pub keys_manager: K,
4556 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4558 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4559 pub fee_estimator: F,
4560 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4562 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4563 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4564 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4565 pub chain_monitor: M,
4567 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4568 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4569 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4570 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4571 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4572 /// deserialization.
4574 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4575 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4576 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4578 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4579 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4581 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4582 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4583 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4584 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4586 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4589 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4590 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4593 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4594 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4595 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4596 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4597 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4598 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4601 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4602 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4603 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4604 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4605 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4607 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4608 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4613 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4614 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4615 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4616 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4617 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4618 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4619 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4620 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4623 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4624 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4625 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4629 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4630 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4631 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4632 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4633 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4634 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4637 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4638 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4640 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4641 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4642 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4644 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4646 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4647 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4648 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4649 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4650 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4651 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4652 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4653 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4654 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4655 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4656 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4657 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4658 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4659 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4660 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
4661 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
4662 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4663 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4664 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4665 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4666 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4667 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4668 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4669 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4670 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4671 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4672 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4673 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4675 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4676 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4678 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4681 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4682 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
4683 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
4684 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4688 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4689 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4690 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4694 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4695 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4696 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4697 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4698 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4699 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4700 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4701 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4702 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4704 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4707 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4708 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4709 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4710 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4711 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4712 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4713 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4714 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4716 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4719 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4720 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4721 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4722 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4723 let peer_state = PeerState {
4724 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4726 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4729 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4730 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4731 for _ in 0..event_count {
4732 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4733 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4738 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4739 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4740 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4741 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4742 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4743 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4747 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4748 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4750 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4751 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4752 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4753 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4754 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4758 let pending_outbound_payments_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4759 let mut pending_outbound_payments: HashSet<[u8; 32]> = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
4760 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count {
4761 if !pending_outbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?) {
4762 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4766 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
4768 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4769 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4771 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4773 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4774 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4775 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4777 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4779 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4784 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4786 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4787 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments),
4789 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4790 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4793 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4794 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4796 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4798 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4799 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4800 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4801 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4803 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4804 logger: args.logger,
4805 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4808 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4809 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4812 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4813 //connection or two.
4815 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4821 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4823 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4825 use core::time::Duration;
4828 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4829 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4830 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4832 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4833 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4834 thread::spawn(move || {
4836 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4837 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4838 *persistence_lock = true;
4841 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4847 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4848 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4850 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4853 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4858 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4860 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4863 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4870 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4873 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4874 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4875 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4876 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4877 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4878 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4879 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4880 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4881 use routing::router::get_route;
4882 use util::test_utils;
4883 use util::config::UserConfig;
4884 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4886 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4887 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4888 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4890 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
4894 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4895 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4896 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4897 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4898 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4899 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4900 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4905 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4906 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4909 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4910 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4911 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4913 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4914 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4916 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
4917 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4919 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4920 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4922 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4923 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4924 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4925 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4926 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4928 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4930 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4932 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4933 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4934 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4935 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4936 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4938 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4940 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4942 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4943 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4944 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4947 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4948 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4949 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4951 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4952 } else { panic!(); }
4954 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4955 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4957 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4960 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4963 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4964 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4966 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4967 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4969 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4971 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
4972 macro_rules! send_payment {
4973 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4974 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4975 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
4976 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4978 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4979 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
4981 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4982 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
4984 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
4985 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4986 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4987 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4988 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4989 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4990 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4991 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4993 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4994 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
4995 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4997 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4998 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4999 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
5000 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5001 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
5003 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
5006 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
5007 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5008 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
5009 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
5011 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
5016 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
5017 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);