1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
61 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
62 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
63 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
64 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
65 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
66 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
67 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
68 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
69 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
70 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
71 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
72 short_channel_id: u64,
73 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
74 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
79 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
80 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
83 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
86 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
91 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
92 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
93 short_channel_id: u64,
95 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
98 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
99 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
100 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
101 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
104 session_priv: SecretKey,
105 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
106 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
107 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
124 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
132 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
135 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
136 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
137 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
139 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
141 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
142 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
143 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
144 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
145 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
147 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
148 err: msgs::LightningError,
149 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
151 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 err: LightningError {
157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160 data: err.to_string()
164 shutdown_finish: None,
168 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 err: LightningError {
172 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
174 shutdown_finish: None,
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
182 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 err: LightningError {
186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: err.to_string()
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>(err: ChannelError<ChanSigner>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
206 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
213 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
218 data: msg.to_string()
223 shutdown_finish: None,
228 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
229 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
230 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
231 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
232 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
234 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
236 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
238 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
259 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
260 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
261 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
268 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
269 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
270 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
272 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
273 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
274 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
275 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
278 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
279 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
281 latest_features: InitFeatures,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
288 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
289 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
290 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
291 /// issues such as overly long function definitions.
292 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>>>;
294 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
295 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
296 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
297 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
298 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
299 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions.
300 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, M, T> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T>;
302 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
303 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
305 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
306 /// to individual Channels.
308 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
309 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
310 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
311 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
313 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
314 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
315 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
316 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
317 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
318 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
319 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
321 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
322 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
323 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
324 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
327 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
328 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
329 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
330 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
331 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
333 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
334 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
335 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
336 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
337 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
338 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref>
339 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
340 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
342 default_configuration: UserConfig,
343 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
344 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
349 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
351 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
352 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
353 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
356 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
358 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
359 our_network_key: SecretKey,
361 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
362 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
363 /// are currently open with that peer.
364 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
365 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
367 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
369 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
370 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
371 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
372 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
373 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
375 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
380 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
381 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
382 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
383 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
384 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
386 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
387 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
388 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
389 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
390 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
391 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
392 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
394 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
395 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
396 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
397 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
398 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
399 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
402 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
404 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
405 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
408 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
410 macro_rules! secp_call {
411 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
414 Err(_) => return Err($err),
419 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
420 pub struct ChannelDetails {
421 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
422 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
423 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
424 /// lifetime of the channel.
425 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
426 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
427 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
428 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
429 /// The node_id of our counterparty
430 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
431 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
432 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
433 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
434 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
435 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
436 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
437 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
439 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
440 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
441 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
442 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
443 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
444 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
445 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
446 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
447 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
448 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
449 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
450 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
451 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
455 macro_rules! handle_error {
456 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
459 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
460 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
461 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
462 if let Some(update) = update_option {
463 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
468 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
469 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
470 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
471 // Return error in case higher-API need one
478 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
479 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
482 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
483 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close::<ChanSigner>(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
485 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
486 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
487 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
488 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
489 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
491 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
493 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
498 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
499 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
502 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
503 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close::<ChanSigner>(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
505 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
506 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
507 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
508 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
509 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
511 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
513 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
514 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
515 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
516 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
517 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
519 if let Some(update) = update {
520 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update.clone()) {
522 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
523 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
524 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
525 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
526 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
527 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
531 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
532 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
533 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
535 shutdown_res.0.clear();
536 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
542 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
543 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
544 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
546 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
548 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
549 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
550 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
551 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
552 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
554 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
555 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
556 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
557 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
558 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
559 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
560 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
561 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
562 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
563 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
566 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
567 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
568 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
569 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
571 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
572 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
574 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
575 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
577 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
578 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
579 if !$resend_commitment {
580 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
583 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
585 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
586 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close::<ChanSigner>(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
592 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
593 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
594 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
596 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
597 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
601 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
602 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
603 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
604 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
605 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
608 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
613 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T>
614 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
615 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
617 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
619 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
620 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
622 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
624 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
626 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
627 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
629 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
630 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
631 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
632 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
633 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
635 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T>, secp256k1::Error> {
636 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
638 let res = ChannelManager {
639 default_configuration: config.clone(),
640 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
641 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
645 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
646 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
649 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
650 by_id: HashMap::new(),
651 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
652 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
653 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
654 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
656 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
658 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
660 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
661 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
671 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
673 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
674 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
675 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
676 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
678 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
679 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
681 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
682 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
683 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
684 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
685 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
688 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
689 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
691 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
692 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
693 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
695 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
696 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
698 panic!("RNG is bad???");
701 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
703 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
704 node_id: their_network_key,
710 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
711 let mut res = Vec::new();
713 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
714 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
715 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
716 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
717 res.push(ChannelDetails {
718 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
719 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
720 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
721 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
722 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
723 inbound_capacity_msat,
724 outbound_capacity_msat,
725 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
726 is_live: channel.is_live(),
730 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
731 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
732 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
733 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
739 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
740 /// more information.
741 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
742 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
745 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
746 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
748 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
749 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
750 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
751 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
752 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
753 // really wanted anyway.
754 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
757 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
758 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
759 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
761 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
762 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
763 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
765 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
766 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
767 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
768 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
769 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
770 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
771 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
772 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
775 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
776 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
777 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
779 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
780 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
782 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
785 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
786 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
788 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
789 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
794 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
795 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
805 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
806 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
807 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
808 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
809 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
811 for tx in local_txn {
812 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
813 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
817 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
818 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
819 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
820 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
824 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
825 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
826 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
827 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
834 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
835 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
836 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
837 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
838 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
844 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
845 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
846 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
847 for chan in self.list_channels() {
848 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
852 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
853 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
854 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
856 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
857 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
858 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
859 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
860 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
861 failure_code: $err_code,
862 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
867 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
868 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
871 let shared_secret = {
872 let mut arr = [0; 32];
873 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
876 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
878 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
879 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
880 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
881 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
882 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
883 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
884 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
885 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
888 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
889 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
890 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
891 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
892 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
895 let mut channel_state = None;
896 macro_rules! return_err {
897 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
899 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
900 if channel_state.is_none() {
901 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
903 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
904 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
905 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
906 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
907 })), channel_state.unwrap());
912 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
913 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
914 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
915 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
917 let error_code = match err {
918 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
919 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
920 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
921 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
922 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
924 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
927 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
928 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
929 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
936 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
939 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
940 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
941 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
942 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
943 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
944 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
945 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
946 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
947 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
948 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
949 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
950 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
954 // final_expiry_too_soon
955 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
956 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
958 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
959 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
960 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
962 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
963 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
964 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
967 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
968 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
969 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
970 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
972 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
974 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
976 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
977 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
978 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
981 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
982 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
983 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
986 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
987 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
988 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
990 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
992 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
993 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
994 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
996 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
998 let blinding_factor = {
999 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1000 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1001 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1002 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1005 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1007 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1009 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1012 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1013 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1016 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1017 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1018 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1019 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode => {
1020 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1024 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
1025 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1026 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1027 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1028 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1029 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1030 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1034 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1035 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1036 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1037 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1038 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1039 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1040 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1042 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1044 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1045 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1047 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1048 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1049 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1050 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1051 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1052 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1053 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1055 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1056 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1058 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1059 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1060 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1062 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1063 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1065 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1066 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1067 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1068 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1070 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1071 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1076 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1077 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1078 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1079 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1081 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1082 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1084 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1085 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1087 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1089 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1094 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1097 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1098 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1099 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1100 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1101 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1105 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1107 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1108 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1109 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1110 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1111 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1112 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1113 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1114 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1115 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1116 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1119 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1120 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1122 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1128 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1130 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1131 /// fields for more info.
1133 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1134 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1135 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1136 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1137 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1138 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1140 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1142 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1143 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1144 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1145 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1146 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1147 /// relevant updates.
1149 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1150 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1151 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1152 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1153 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1154 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1155 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1156 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1158 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1159 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1160 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1161 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1165 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1167 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1169 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1170 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1171 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1172 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1173 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1175 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1177 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1179 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1180 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1182 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1183 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1184 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1187 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1188 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1190 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1191 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1193 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1194 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1196 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1197 route: route.clone(),
1198 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1199 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1200 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1202 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1203 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1204 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1205 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1206 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1207 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1208 // something else in case we will resend later!
1209 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1212 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1213 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1214 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1215 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1216 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1217 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1218 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1226 } else { unreachable!(); }
1230 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1231 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1232 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1236 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1238 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1239 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1241 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1243 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1244 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1245 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1246 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1248 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1249 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1250 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1252 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1253 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1254 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1255 } else { unreachable!(); })
1260 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1261 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1262 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1264 Err(_) => { return; }
1267 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1268 // lock before add_update_monitor
1269 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1271 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1273 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1274 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1275 Err(_) => { return; },
1276 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1280 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1281 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1282 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1283 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1285 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1290 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1291 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1292 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1295 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1296 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1297 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1299 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1305 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1306 if !chan.should_announce() {
1307 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1311 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1313 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1315 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1316 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1318 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1319 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1320 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1321 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1322 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1326 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1328 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1329 /// Will likely generate further events.
1330 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1331 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1333 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1334 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1335 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1337 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1338 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1340 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1341 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1342 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1343 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1345 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1346 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1347 match forward_info {
1348 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1349 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1350 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1351 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1352 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1354 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1356 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1357 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1358 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1359 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1360 // problem, not ours.
1367 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1368 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1369 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1370 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1371 match forward_info {
1372 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1373 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1374 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1375 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1376 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1377 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1379 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1381 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1382 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1384 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1386 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1387 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1392 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1394 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1395 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1396 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1397 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1398 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1399 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1400 // this channel currently :/.
1406 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1407 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1408 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1410 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1411 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1413 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1415 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1416 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1417 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1420 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1422 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1423 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1424 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1425 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1426 // messages when we can.
1427 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1428 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1429 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1436 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1437 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1440 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1441 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1442 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1443 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1444 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1445 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1447 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1448 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1449 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1450 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1451 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1453 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1455 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1457 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1458 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1459 Err(_) => { continue; },
1463 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1464 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1467 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1468 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1469 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1470 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1471 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1472 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1473 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1475 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1483 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1484 match forward_info {
1485 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1486 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1487 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1488 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1489 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1491 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1492 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1495 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1496 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1497 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1500 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1501 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1509 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1511 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1512 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1516 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1517 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1518 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1519 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1523 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1524 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1525 events.append(&mut new_events);
1528 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1529 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1530 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1532 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1533 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1534 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1535 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1536 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1537 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1538 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1539 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1540 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1545 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1547 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1548 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1553 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1554 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1555 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1556 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1557 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1558 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1559 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1561 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1562 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1563 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1564 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1565 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1566 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1567 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1568 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1574 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1575 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1576 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1577 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1578 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1579 /// still-available channels.
1580 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1581 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1582 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1583 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1586 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1587 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1588 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1589 match &onion_error {
1590 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1592 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1594 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1595 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1596 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1597 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1598 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1599 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1600 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1605 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1606 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1607 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1608 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1610 error_code: onion_error_code
1614 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1618 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1619 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1620 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1621 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1623 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1624 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1625 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1626 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1627 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1628 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1630 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1636 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1637 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1638 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1639 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1640 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1641 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1643 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1644 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1645 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1649 let mut forward_event = None;
1650 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1651 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1653 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1654 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1655 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1658 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1661 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1662 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1663 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1664 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1665 time_forwardable: time
1672 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1673 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1674 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1676 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1677 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1678 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1679 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1680 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1681 /// motivated attackers.
1683 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1684 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1685 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1687 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1689 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1690 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1691 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1692 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1693 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1694 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1695 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1696 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1697 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1698 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1699 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1700 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1702 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1708 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1709 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1711 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1712 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1713 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1714 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1718 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1719 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1720 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1722 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1723 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1725 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1726 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1727 // why it's missing.
1732 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1733 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1734 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1735 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1736 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1737 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1738 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1739 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1741 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1745 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1746 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1747 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1748 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1749 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1750 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1751 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1752 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1760 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1761 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1762 //TODO: Do something with e?
1766 } else { unreachable!(); }
1772 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1775 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1776 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1777 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1780 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1781 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1783 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1784 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1785 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1786 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1787 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1788 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1791 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1793 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1794 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1795 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1796 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1797 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1798 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1800 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1801 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1802 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1803 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1804 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1805 // on-chain confirmations.
1806 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1807 // should be written.
1808 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1809 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1811 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1812 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1813 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1819 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1822 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1823 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1824 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1826 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1828 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1829 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1831 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1836 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1837 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1838 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1839 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1840 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1845 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1849 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1854 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1855 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1856 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1857 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1860 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1861 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1862 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1865 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1866 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1867 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1868 msg: announcement_sigs,
1871 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1879 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1881 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1882 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1884 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1886 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1887 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1891 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1892 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1893 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1896 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1897 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1899 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1900 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1901 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1902 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1903 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1904 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1905 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1907 entry.insert(channel);
1913 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1914 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1915 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1916 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1917 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1918 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1919 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1920 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1922 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1923 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1928 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1929 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1930 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1931 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1932 output_script: output_script,
1933 user_channel_id: user_id,
1938 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1939 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1940 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1941 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1942 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1944 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1945 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1947 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1952 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1953 // lock before add_update_monitor
1954 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1956 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1957 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1958 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1959 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1960 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1961 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1963 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1964 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1965 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1966 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1967 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1968 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1972 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1973 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1974 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1975 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1976 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1978 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1980 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1989 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1990 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1991 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1992 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1993 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1994 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1995 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1996 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1998 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1999 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2000 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2002 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2007 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2008 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2009 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2010 user_channel_id: user_id,
2015 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2016 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2017 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2018 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2020 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2021 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2023 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2024 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2025 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2026 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2027 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2028 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2029 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2030 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2031 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2032 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2033 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2034 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2035 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2036 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2037 msg: announcement_sigs,
2042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2046 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2047 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2048 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2049 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2051 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2052 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2053 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2054 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2056 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2057 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2058 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2059 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2063 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2064 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2065 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2069 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2070 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2071 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2073 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2074 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2076 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2079 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2080 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2082 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2083 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2084 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2085 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2093 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2094 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2095 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2096 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2097 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2099 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2102 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2103 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2104 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2105 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2110 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2111 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2112 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2113 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2114 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2115 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2116 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2118 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2119 } else { (tx, None) }
2121 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2124 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2125 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2126 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2128 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2129 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2130 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2131 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2139 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2140 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2141 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2142 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2144 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2145 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2146 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2147 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2149 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2150 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2152 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2154 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2155 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2157 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2158 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2159 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2160 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2161 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2162 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2163 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2164 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2165 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2166 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2167 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2168 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2169 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2170 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2172 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2173 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2174 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2175 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2179 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2180 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2181 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2182 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2183 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2184 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2189 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2191 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2196 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2197 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2199 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2200 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2202 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2203 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2205 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2207 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2210 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2214 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2215 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2216 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2217 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2219 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2220 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2222 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2224 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2229 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2230 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2231 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2232 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2233 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2234 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2235 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2237 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2238 let chan_err: ChannelError<ChanSigner> = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2239 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2241 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2248 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2249 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2250 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2251 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2252 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2253 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2254 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2256 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2257 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2258 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2259 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2260 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2262 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2263 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2264 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2266 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2267 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2268 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2269 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2270 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2271 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2272 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2273 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2275 commitment_signed: msg,
2279 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2280 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2281 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2287 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2292 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2293 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2294 let mut forward_event = None;
2295 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2296 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2298 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2300 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2301 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2303 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2306 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2311 match forward_event {
2313 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2314 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2315 time_forwardable: time
2323 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2324 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2325 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2326 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2327 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2328 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2329 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2330 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2332 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2333 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2334 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2335 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2336 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2337 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2338 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2340 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2343 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2344 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2345 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2349 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2350 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2351 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2355 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2360 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2361 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2363 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2368 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2369 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2370 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2371 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2372 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2373 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2374 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2376 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2383 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2384 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2387 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2388 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2389 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2390 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2392 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2393 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2396 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2397 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2398 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2400 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2401 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2402 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2403 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2404 let chan_err: ChannelError<ChanSigner> = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2405 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2408 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2410 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2411 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2412 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2413 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2414 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2415 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2416 contents: announcement,
2418 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2426 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2427 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2428 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2430 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2432 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2435 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2436 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2437 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2438 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2439 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2440 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2441 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2442 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2443 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2445 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2446 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2448 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2449 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2452 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2453 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2454 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2458 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2459 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2460 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2461 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2466 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2467 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2468 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2469 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2475 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2479 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2484 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2485 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2486 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2496 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2497 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2498 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2499 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2501 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2502 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2503 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2505 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2506 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2508 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2509 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2510 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2511 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2512 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2514 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2515 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2517 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2518 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2520 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2521 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2522 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2524 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2527 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2528 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2529 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2530 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2531 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2532 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2533 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2534 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2544 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2545 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2546 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2551 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T>
2552 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2553 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2555 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2556 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2557 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2558 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2560 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2561 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2562 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2563 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2564 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2566 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2567 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2572 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2573 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2574 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2579 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T>
2580 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2581 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2583 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2584 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2585 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2586 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2588 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2589 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2590 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2591 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2592 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2594 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2595 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2600 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2602 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2607 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T>
2608 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2609 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2611 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2612 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2613 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2614 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2615 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2617 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2618 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2619 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2620 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2621 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2622 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2623 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2624 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2625 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2626 msg: funding_locked,
2628 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2629 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2630 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2631 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2632 msg: announcement_sigs,
2635 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2637 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2638 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2639 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2640 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2645 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2646 for tx in txn_matched {
2647 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2648 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2649 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2650 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2651 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2653 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2654 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2655 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2656 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2657 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2658 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2667 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2668 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2669 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2671 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2672 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2673 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2674 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2675 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2676 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2686 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2687 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2689 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2690 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2693 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2694 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2695 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2696 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2698 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2699 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2700 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2701 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2702 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2703 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2704 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2705 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2707 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2708 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2709 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2719 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2720 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2722 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2723 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2727 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T>
2728 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2729 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2731 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2732 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2733 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2735 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2736 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2740 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2741 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2742 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2744 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2745 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2749 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2750 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2751 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2753 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2754 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2758 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2759 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2760 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2762 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2763 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2767 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2768 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2769 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2771 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2772 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2776 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2777 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2778 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2780 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2781 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2785 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2786 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2787 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2789 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2790 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2794 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2795 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2796 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2798 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2799 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2803 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2804 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2805 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2807 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2808 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2812 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2813 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2814 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2816 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2817 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2821 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2822 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2823 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2825 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2826 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2830 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2831 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2832 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2834 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2835 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2839 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2840 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2841 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2844 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2848 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2849 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2850 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2852 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2853 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2857 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2858 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2859 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2861 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2862 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2866 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2867 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2868 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2870 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2871 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2875 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2876 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2877 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2878 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2879 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2881 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2882 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2883 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2884 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2885 if no_connection_possible {
2886 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2887 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2888 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2889 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2890 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2892 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2893 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2894 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2904 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2905 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2906 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2907 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2908 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2909 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2910 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2911 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2913 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2914 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2915 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2919 no_channels_remain = false;
2925 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2927 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2928 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2929 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2930 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2931 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2932 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2933 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2934 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2935 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2936 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2937 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2938 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2939 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2940 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2941 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2945 if no_channels_remain {
2946 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2949 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2950 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2952 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2953 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2954 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2959 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2960 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2962 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2965 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
2966 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
2967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2968 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
2969 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
2972 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
2973 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
2978 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2979 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2980 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2981 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2982 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2983 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2984 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2985 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2986 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2990 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2991 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2992 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2998 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3001 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3002 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3004 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3005 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3006 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3007 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3011 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3016 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3017 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3019 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3020 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3021 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3022 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3023 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3024 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3025 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3026 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3031 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3032 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3033 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
3034 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3035 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3036 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3037 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3038 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3039 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3044 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3045 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3047 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3049 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3051 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3053 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3060 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3061 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3062 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3063 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3064 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3065 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3070 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3071 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3073 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3075 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3077 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3079 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3086 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3087 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3088 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3089 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3090 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3091 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3096 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3099 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3102 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3103 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3105 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3107 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3109 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3111 route.write(writer)?;
3112 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3113 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3120 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3121 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3122 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3123 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3124 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3125 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3126 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3127 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3129 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3134 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3135 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3137 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3141 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3143 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3144 data.write(writer)?;
3151 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3152 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3153 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3154 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3155 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3156 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3157 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3159 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3164 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3165 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3167 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3169 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3170 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3171 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3173 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3175 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3176 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3183 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3184 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3185 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3186 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3187 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3188 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3189 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3191 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3192 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3193 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3195 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3200 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T>
3201 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3202 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3204 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3205 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3207 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3208 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3210 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3211 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3212 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3214 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3215 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3216 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3217 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3218 unfunded_channels += 1;
3221 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3222 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3223 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3224 channel.write(writer)?;
3228 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3229 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3230 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3231 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3232 for forward in pending_forwards {
3233 forward.write(writer)?;
3237 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3238 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3239 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3240 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3241 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3242 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3243 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3247 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3248 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3249 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3250 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3251 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3252 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3259 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3261 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3263 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3264 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3265 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3266 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3267 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3268 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3269 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3270 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3271 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3272 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3273 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3274 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref>
3275 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3276 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3279 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3280 /// deserialization.
3281 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3283 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3285 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3286 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3287 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3289 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3290 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3291 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3294 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3295 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3296 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3297 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3298 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3299 /// deserialization.
3300 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3301 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3302 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3303 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3305 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3306 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3308 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3309 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3310 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3311 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3313 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3315 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3318 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref, T: Deref> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T>)
3319 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3320 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3322 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3323 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3324 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3325 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3326 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3329 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3330 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3331 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3333 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3335 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3336 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3337 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3338 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3339 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3340 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3341 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3342 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3345 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3346 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3347 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3348 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3349 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3350 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3351 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3352 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3353 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3355 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3356 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3358 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3361 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3365 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3366 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3367 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3371 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3372 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3373 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3374 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3375 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3376 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3377 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3378 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3380 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3383 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3384 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3385 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3386 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3387 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3388 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3389 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3390 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3392 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3395 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3396 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3397 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3398 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3399 let peer_state = PeerState {
3400 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3402 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3405 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3407 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3408 monitor: args.monitor,
3409 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3411 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3412 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3413 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3415 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3420 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3422 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3424 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3426 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3427 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3428 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3429 logger: args.logger,
3430 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3433 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3434 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3435 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3436 //connection or two.
3439 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))