1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::Route;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
78 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
84 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
85 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
86 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
87 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
88 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
93 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
94 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
97 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
100 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
101 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
104 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
106 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
108 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
112 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
116 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
117 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
118 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
119 short_channel_id: u64,
121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 struct ClaimableHTLC {
125 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
127 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
128 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
129 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
130 /// are part of the same payment.
131 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
134 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
135 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
136 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
137 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
140 session_priv: SecretKey,
141 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
142 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
143 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
148 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
149 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
150 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
151 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
152 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
157 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
158 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
160 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
168 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
169 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
170 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
171 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
172 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
173 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
174 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
175 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
176 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
178 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
180 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
181 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
182 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
183 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
184 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
186 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
187 err: msgs::LightningError,
188 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
190 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
192 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
194 err: LightningError {
196 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
197 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
199 data: err.to_string()
203 shutdown_finish: None,
207 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
209 err: LightningError {
211 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
213 shutdown_finish: None,
217 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
218 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
221 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
223 err: LightningError {
225 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
226 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
228 data: err.to_string()
232 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
236 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
239 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
241 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
243 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
246 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
248 data: msg.to_string()
252 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
257 data: msg.to_string()
262 shutdown_finish: None,
267 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
268 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
269 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
270 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
271 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
273 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
274 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
275 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
276 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
277 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
278 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
279 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
281 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
285 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
286 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
287 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
288 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
289 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
290 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
291 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
292 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
293 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
294 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
295 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
296 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
297 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
299 /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to
301 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
302 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
303 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
304 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
307 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
308 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
310 latest_features: InitFeatures,
313 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
314 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
316 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
317 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
318 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
319 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
320 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
321 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
322 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
323 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
325 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
326 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
327 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
328 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
329 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
330 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
331 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
332 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
333 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
335 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
336 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
338 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
339 /// to individual Channels.
341 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
342 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
343 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
344 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
346 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
347 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
348 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
349 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
350 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
351 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
352 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
354 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
355 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
356 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
357 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
360 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
361 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
362 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
363 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
364 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
366 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
367 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
368 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
369 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
370 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
371 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
372 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
373 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
374 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
375 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
377 default_configuration: UserConfig,
378 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
384 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
386 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
387 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
388 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
391 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
393 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
394 our_network_key: SecretKey,
396 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
397 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
398 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
400 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
401 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
402 /// are currently open with that peer.
403 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
404 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
406 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
408 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
409 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
410 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
411 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
412 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
419 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
420 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
421 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
422 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
423 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
425 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
426 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
427 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
428 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
429 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
430 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
431 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
433 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
434 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
435 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
436 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
437 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
438 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
441 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
443 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
444 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
447 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
449 macro_rules! secp_call {
450 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
453 Err(_) => return Err($err),
458 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
459 pub struct ChannelDetails {
460 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
461 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
462 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
463 /// lifetime of the channel.
464 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
465 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
466 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
467 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
468 /// The node_id of our counterparty
469 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
470 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
471 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
472 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
473 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
474 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
475 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
476 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
478 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
479 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
480 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
481 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
482 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
483 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
484 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
485 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
486 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
487 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
488 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
489 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
490 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
494 macro_rules! handle_error {
495 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
498 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
499 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
501 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
502 // entering the macro.
503 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
506 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
508 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
509 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
510 if let Some(update) = update_option {
511 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
517 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
518 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
520 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
521 node_id: $their_node_id,
522 action: err.action.clone()
526 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
527 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
530 // Return error in case higher-API need one
537 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
538 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
541 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
542 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
544 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
545 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
546 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
547 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
548 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
550 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) },
551 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
556 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
557 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
560 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
561 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
563 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
564 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
565 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
566 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
567 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
569 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
571 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
572 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
573 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
574 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
575 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
577 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
579 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
580 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
581 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
582 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
583 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
584 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
587 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
594 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
595 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
596 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
598 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
600 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
601 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
602 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
603 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
604 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
606 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
607 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
608 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
609 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
610 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
611 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
612 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
613 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
614 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
615 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
618 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
619 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
620 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
621 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
623 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
624 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
626 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
627 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
629 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
630 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
631 if !$resend_commitment {
632 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
635 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
637 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
638 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
644 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
645 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
646 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
648 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
649 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
653 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
654 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
655 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
656 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
657 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
660 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
665 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
666 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
667 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
668 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
671 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
673 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
674 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
676 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
678 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
680 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
681 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
683 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
684 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
685 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
686 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
687 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
689 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
692 let res = ChannelManager {
693 default_configuration: config.clone(),
694 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
695 fee_estimator: fee_est,
699 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
700 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
703 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
704 by_id: HashMap::new(),
705 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
706 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
707 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
708 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
710 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
712 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
714 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
716 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
717 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
727 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
729 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
730 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
731 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
732 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
734 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
735 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
737 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
738 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
739 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
740 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
741 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
744 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
745 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
746 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
748 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
749 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
750 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
752 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
753 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
755 panic!("RNG is bad???");
758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
760 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
761 node_id: their_network_key,
767 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
768 let mut res = Vec::new();
770 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
771 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
772 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
773 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
774 res.push(ChannelDetails {
775 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
776 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
777 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
778 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
779 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
780 inbound_capacity_msat,
781 outbound_capacity_msat,
782 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
783 is_live: channel.is_live(),
787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
788 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
789 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
790 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
796 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
797 /// more information.
798 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
799 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
802 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
803 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
805 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
806 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
807 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
808 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
809 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
810 // really wanted anyway.
811 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
814 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
815 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
816 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
818 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
819 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
820 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
822 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
823 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
824 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
825 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
826 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
827 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
828 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
829 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
832 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
833 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
834 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
836 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
837 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
839 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
842 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
843 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
845 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
846 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
851 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
852 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
853 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
862 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
863 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
864 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
865 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
866 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
868 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
869 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
870 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
871 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
872 // ignore the result here.
873 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
877 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
878 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
879 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
880 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
883 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
884 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
885 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
886 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
887 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
894 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
895 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
896 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
897 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
898 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
904 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
905 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
906 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
907 for chan in self.list_channels() {
908 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
912 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
913 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
914 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
916 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
917 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
918 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
919 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
920 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
921 failure_code: $err_code,
922 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
927 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
928 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
931 let shared_secret = {
932 let mut arr = [0; 32];
933 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
936 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
938 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
939 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
940 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
941 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
942 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
943 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
944 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
945 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
948 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
949 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
950 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
951 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
952 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
955 let mut channel_state = None;
956 macro_rules! return_err {
957 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
959 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
960 if channel_state.is_none() {
961 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
963 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
964 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
965 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
966 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
967 })), channel_state.unwrap());
972 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
973 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
974 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
975 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
977 let error_code = match err {
978 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
979 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
980 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
981 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
982 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
984 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
987 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
988 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
989 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
996 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
999 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1000 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1001 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1002 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1003 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1004 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1005 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1006 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1007 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1008 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1009 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1010 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1014 // final_expiry_too_soon
1015 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1016 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1018 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1019 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1020 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1022 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1023 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1024 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1027 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1028 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1029 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1030 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1033 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1034 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1035 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1036 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1038 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1039 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data },
1040 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1041 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1042 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1043 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1046 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1047 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1048 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1050 // Check two things:
1051 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1052 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1053 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1055 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1057 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1058 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1059 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1061 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1063 let blinding_factor = {
1064 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1065 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1066 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1067 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1070 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1072 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1074 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1077 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1078 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1081 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1082 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1083 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1084 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1085 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1089 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1090 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1091 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1092 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1094 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1095 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1096 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1097 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1101 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1102 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1103 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1104 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1105 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1106 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1107 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1108 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1109 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1110 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1112 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1114 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1115 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1117 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1118 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1119 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1120 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1121 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1122 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1123 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1125 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1126 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1128 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1129 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1130 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1132 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1133 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1135 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1136 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1137 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1138 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1140 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1141 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1146 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1147 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1148 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1149 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1151 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1152 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1154 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1155 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1157 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1159 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1164 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1167 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1168 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1169 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1170 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1171 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1175 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1177 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1178 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1179 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1180 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1181 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1182 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1183 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1184 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1185 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1186 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1189 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1190 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1192 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1198 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1200 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1201 /// fields for more info.
1203 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1204 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1205 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1206 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1207 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1208 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1210 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1212 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1213 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1214 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1215 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1216 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1217 /// relevant updates.
1219 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1220 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1221 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1222 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1223 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1225 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1226 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1227 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1228 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1230 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1231 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1232 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1233 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1234 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1235 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1237 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1238 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1239 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1240 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1244 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1246 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1248 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1249 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1250 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1251 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1252 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1254 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1256 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1258 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1259 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1260 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1261 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1262 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1266 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1268 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1269 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1271 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1272 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1274 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1275 route: route.clone(),
1276 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1277 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1278 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1280 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1281 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1282 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1283 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1284 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1285 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1286 // something else in case we will resend later!
1287 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1290 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1291 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1292 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1293 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1294 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1295 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1296 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1304 } else { unreachable!(); }
1308 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1309 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1310 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1314 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1316 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1317 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1319 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1321 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1322 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1323 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1324 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1326 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1327 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1329 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1330 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1331 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1332 } else { unreachable!(); })
1337 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1338 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1339 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1341 Err(_) => { return; }
1344 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1345 // lock before add_monitor
1346 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1348 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1349 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)), chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1350 Err(_) => { return; },
1351 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1354 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1355 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1356 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1357 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1359 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1364 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1365 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1366 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1369 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1370 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1371 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1373 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1379 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1380 if !chan.should_announce() {
1381 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1385 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1387 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1389 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1390 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1392 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1393 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1394 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1395 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1396 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1401 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1402 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1403 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1405 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1408 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1409 // smaller than 500:
1410 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1412 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1413 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1414 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1416 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1417 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1419 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1420 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1421 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1422 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1424 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1425 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1426 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1428 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1429 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1432 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1433 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1434 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1435 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1436 rgb, alias, addresses,
1437 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1438 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1440 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1442 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1444 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1445 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1446 contents: announcement
1451 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1453 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1454 /// Will likely generate further events.
1455 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1456 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1458 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1459 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1460 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1462 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1463 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1465 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1466 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1467 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1468 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1470 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1471 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1472 match forward_info {
1473 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1474 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1475 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1476 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1477 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1479 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1480 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1483 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1484 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1485 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1486 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1487 // problem, not ours.
1494 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1495 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1496 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1497 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1498 match forward_info {
1499 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1500 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1502 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1503 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1504 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1505 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1506 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1507 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1509 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1511 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1512 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1514 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1516 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1517 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1518 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1524 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1526 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1527 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1528 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1529 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1530 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1531 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1532 // this channel currently :/.
1538 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1539 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1541 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1542 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1543 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1545 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1546 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1548 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1550 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1551 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1552 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1555 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1557 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1558 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1559 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1560 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1561 // messages when we can.
1562 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1563 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1564 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1571 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1572 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1575 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1576 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1577 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1578 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1579 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1580 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1582 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1583 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1584 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1585 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1586 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1588 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1590 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1592 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1596 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1597 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1600 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1601 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1602 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1603 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1604 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1605 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1606 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1608 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1616 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1617 match forward_info {
1618 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1619 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data },
1620 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1621 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1622 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1623 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1624 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1627 let mut total_value = 0;
1628 let payment_secret_opt =
1629 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1630 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1631 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1632 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1634 value: amt_to_forward,
1635 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1637 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1638 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1639 total_value += htlc.value;
1640 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1641 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1643 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1645 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1646 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1647 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1648 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1649 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1650 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1652 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() }
1655 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1656 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1657 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1658 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1663 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1664 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1665 payment_secret: None,
1666 amt: amt_to_forward,
1670 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1671 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1673 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1674 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1682 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1683 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1686 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1687 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1690 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1691 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1692 events.append(&mut new_events);
1695 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1696 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1697 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1699 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1700 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1701 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1702 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1703 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1704 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1705 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1706 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1707 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1712 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1714 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1715 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1720 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1721 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1722 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1723 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1724 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1725 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1726 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1728 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1729 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1730 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1731 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1732 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1733 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1734 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1735 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() });
1741 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1742 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1743 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1744 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1745 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1746 /// still-available channels.
1747 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1748 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1749 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1750 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1753 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1754 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1755 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1756 match &onion_error {
1757 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1759 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1761 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1762 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1763 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1764 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1765 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1766 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1767 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1772 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1773 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1774 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1775 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1777 error_code: onion_error_code
1781 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1785 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1786 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1787 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1788 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1790 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1791 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1792 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1793 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1794 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1795 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1797 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1803 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1804 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1805 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1806 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1807 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1808 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1810 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1811 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1812 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1816 let mut forward_event = None;
1817 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1818 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1820 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1821 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1822 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1824 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1825 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1828 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1829 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1830 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1831 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1832 time_forwardable: time
1839 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1840 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1841 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1843 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1844 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1845 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1846 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1847 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1848 /// motivated attackers.
1850 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1851 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1852 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1854 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1856 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1857 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1858 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1859 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1860 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1861 if htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2 {
1862 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1863 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1864 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1865 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1866 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
1867 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1869 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_preimage);
1875 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1876 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1878 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1879 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1880 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1881 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1885 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1886 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1887 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1889 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1890 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1892 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1893 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1894 // why it's missing.
1899 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1900 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1901 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1902 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1903 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
1904 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1905 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1906 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1908 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1912 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1913 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1914 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1915 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1916 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1917 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1918 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1919 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1927 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1928 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1929 //TODO: Do something with e?
1933 } else { unreachable!(); }
1939 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1940 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1943 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1944 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1945 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1948 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
1949 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1952 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
1953 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
1955 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
1956 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
1957 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
1958 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
1960 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
1961 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
1962 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
1963 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
1964 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
1965 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
1966 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
1967 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
1968 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
1969 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1971 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1972 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1973 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1974 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1977 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1978 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1979 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1980 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1981 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
1985 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
1989 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1990 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1991 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1993 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1995 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1996 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1997 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1998 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2003 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2004 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2005 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2006 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2007 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2012 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2016 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2021 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2022 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2023 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2024 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2027 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2028 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2029 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2032 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2033 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2034 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2035 msg: announcement_sigs,
2038 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2042 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2044 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2045 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2047 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2049 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2050 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2054 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2055 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2056 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2059 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
2060 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2061 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2062 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2063 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2064 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2065 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2066 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2067 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2068 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2070 entry.insert(channel);
2076 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2077 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2078 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2079 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2080 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2082 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2083 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2085 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2086 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2088 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2091 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2092 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2093 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2094 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2095 output_script: output_script,
2096 user_channel_id: user_id,
2101 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2102 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2103 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2104 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2105 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2106 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2107 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2108 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2110 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2115 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2116 // lock before add_monitor
2117 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2119 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2120 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2121 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2122 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2123 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2124 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2126 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2127 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2128 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2129 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2130 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2131 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2135 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2136 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2137 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2139 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2141 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2142 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2143 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2152 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2153 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2154 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2155 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2156 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2157 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2158 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2159 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2161 let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2162 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2163 Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
2164 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2165 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2166 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2169 Ok(update) => update,
2171 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2172 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2174 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2179 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2180 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2181 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2182 user_channel_id: user_id,
2187 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2188 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2189 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2190 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2192 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2195 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2196 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2197 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2198 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2199 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2200 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2201 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2202 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2203 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2204 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2205 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2206 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2207 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2208 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2209 msg: announcement_sigs,
2214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2218 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2219 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2220 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2221 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2223 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2225 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2226 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2228 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2229 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2230 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2231 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2235 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2236 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2237 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2241 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2242 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2243 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2245 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2246 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2248 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2251 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2252 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2254 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2255 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2256 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2257 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2265 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2266 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2267 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2268 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2269 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2270 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2271 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2272 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2274 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2275 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2276 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2277 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2282 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2283 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2284 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2285 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2286 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2287 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2288 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2290 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2291 } else { (tx, None) }
2293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2296 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2297 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2298 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2300 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2301 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2302 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2311 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2312 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2313 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2314 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2316 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2317 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2318 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2319 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2321 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2322 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2324 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2325 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2326 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2327 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2329 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2330 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2331 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2332 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2333 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2334 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2335 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2336 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2337 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2338 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2339 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2340 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2341 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2342 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2344 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2345 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2346 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2347 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2351 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2352 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2353 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2354 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2355 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2356 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2361 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2363 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2368 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2369 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2371 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2372 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2373 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2374 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2375 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2377 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2379 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2382 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2386 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2387 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2388 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2389 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2390 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2391 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2392 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2394 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2396 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2401 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2402 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2403 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2404 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2405 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2406 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2407 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2409 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2410 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2411 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2413 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2420 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2421 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2422 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2423 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2424 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2425 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2426 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2428 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2429 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
2430 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2431 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2432 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2433 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2434 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2439 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2440 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2441 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2444 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2445 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2447 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2448 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2449 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2450 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2451 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2452 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2453 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2454 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2456 commitment_signed: msg,
2460 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2461 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2462 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2468 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2473 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2474 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2475 let mut forward_event = None;
2476 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2477 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2478 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2479 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2481 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2482 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2483 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2484 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2487 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2489 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2490 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2495 match forward_event {
2497 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2498 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2499 time_forwardable: time
2507 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2508 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2509 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2510 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2511 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2512 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2513 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2514 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2516 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2517 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2518 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2519 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2520 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2521 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2522 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2524 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2527 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2528 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2529 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2533 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2534 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2535 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2539 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2541 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2544 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2545 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2547 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2552 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2553 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2554 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2555 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2556 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2557 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2558 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2560 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2562 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2567 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2568 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2569 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2571 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2572 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2573 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2574 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2576 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2577 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2580 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2581 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2582 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2584 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2585 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2586 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2587 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2588 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2589 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2592 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2594 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2595 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2596 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2597 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2598 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2599 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2600 contents: announcement,
2602 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2610 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2611 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2612 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2614 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2616 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2617 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2619 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2620 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2621 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2622 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2623 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2624 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2625 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2626 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2627 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2629 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2630 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2632 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2633 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2636 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2637 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2638 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2642 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2643 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2644 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2645 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2650 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2651 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2652 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2653 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2659 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2663 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2668 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2669 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2670 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2680 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2681 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2682 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2683 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2685 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2686 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2688 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2689 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2690 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2692 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2695 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2696 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2698 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2699 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2701 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2702 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2704 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2705 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2706 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2708 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2711 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2712 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2713 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2714 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2715 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2716 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2717 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2718 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2728 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2729 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2730 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2735 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2736 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2737 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2738 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2741 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2742 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2743 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2744 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2746 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2747 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2748 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2749 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2750 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2752 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2753 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2758 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2759 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2760 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2765 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2766 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2767 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2768 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2769 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2771 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2772 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2773 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2774 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2776 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2777 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2778 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2779 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2780 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2782 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2783 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2788 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2789 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2790 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2795 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2796 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2797 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2798 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2799 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2800 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2802 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2803 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2804 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2805 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2806 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2808 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2809 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2810 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2811 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2812 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2813 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2814 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2815 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2816 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2817 msg: funding_locked,
2819 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2820 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2821 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2822 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2823 msg: announcement_sigs,
2826 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2828 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2829 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2830 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2831 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2832 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2836 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2837 for tx in txn_matched {
2838 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2839 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2840 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2841 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2842 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2844 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2845 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2846 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2847 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
2848 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2849 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2858 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2859 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2860 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2862 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2863 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2864 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2865 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
2866 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2876 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2877 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2879 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2880 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2882 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
2883 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
2884 // having an explicit local time source.
2885 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
2886 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
2887 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
2888 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
2889 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
2895 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2896 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2897 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2898 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2900 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2901 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2902 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2903 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2904 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2905 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2906 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2907 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2909 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
2910 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2911 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2921 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2922 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2924 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2925 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2929 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2930 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2931 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2932 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2933 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2934 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2936 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2937 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2938 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
2941 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2942 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2943 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
2946 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2947 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2948 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2951 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2952 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2953 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2956 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2957 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2958 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2961 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2962 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2963 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2966 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2967 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2968 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2971 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2972 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2973 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2976 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2977 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2978 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2981 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2982 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2983 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2986 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2987 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2988 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2991 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2992 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2993 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
2996 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2997 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2998 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3001 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3002 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3003 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3006 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3007 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3008 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3011 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3012 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3013 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3016 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3017 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3018 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3019 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3020 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3022 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3023 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3024 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3025 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3026 if no_connection_possible {
3027 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3028 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3029 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3030 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3031 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3033 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3034 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3035 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3045 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3046 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3047 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3048 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3049 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3050 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3051 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3052 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3054 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3055 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3056 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3060 no_channels_remain = false;
3066 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3068 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3069 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3070 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3071 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3072 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3073 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3074 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3075 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3076 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3077 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3078 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3079 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3080 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3081 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3082 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3083 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3087 if no_channels_remain {
3088 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3091 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3092 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3094 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3095 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3096 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3101 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3102 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3104 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3107 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3108 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3109 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3110 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3111 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3115 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3120 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3121 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3122 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3123 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3124 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3125 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3126 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3127 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3128 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3132 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3133 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3134 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3140 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3143 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3144 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3146 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3147 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3148 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3149 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3153 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3158 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3159 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3161 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3162 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3163 match &self.routing {
3164 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3166 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3167 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3169 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data } => {
3171 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3174 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3175 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3176 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3177 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3182 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3183 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3184 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3185 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3186 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3187 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3188 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3190 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3191 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3193 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3195 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3196 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3197 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3198 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3203 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3204 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3206 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3208 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3210 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3212 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3219 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3220 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3221 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3222 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3223 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3224 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3229 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3230 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3232 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3234 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3236 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3238 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3245 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3246 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3247 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3248 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3249 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3250 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3255 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3258 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3261 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3267 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3268 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3270 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3272 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3274 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3276 route.write(writer)?;
3277 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3278 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3285 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3286 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3287 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3288 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3289 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3290 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3291 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3292 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3294 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3299 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3300 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3302 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3306 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3308 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3309 data.write(writer)?;
3316 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3317 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3318 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3319 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3320 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3321 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3322 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3324 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3329 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3330 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3332 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3334 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3335 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3336 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3338 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3340 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3341 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3348 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3349 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3350 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3351 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3352 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3353 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3354 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3356 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3357 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3358 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3360 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3365 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3366 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3367 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3368 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3369 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3371 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3372 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3374 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3375 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3377 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3378 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3379 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3381 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3382 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3383 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3384 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3385 unfunded_channels += 1;
3388 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3389 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3390 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3391 channel.write(writer)?;
3395 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3396 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3397 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3398 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3399 for forward in pending_forwards {
3400 forward.write(writer)?;
3404 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3405 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3406 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3407 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3408 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3409 htlc.write(writer)?;
3413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3414 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3415 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3416 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3417 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3418 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3421 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3427 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3429 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3431 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3432 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3433 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3434 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3435 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3436 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3437 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3438 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3439 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3440 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3441 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3442 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3443 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3444 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3445 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3446 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3449 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3450 /// deserialization.
3451 pub keys_manager: K,
3453 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3455 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3456 pub fee_estimator: F,
3457 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3459 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3460 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3461 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3464 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3465 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3466 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3467 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3468 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3469 /// deserialization.
3470 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3471 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3472 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3473 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3475 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3476 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3478 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3479 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3480 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3481 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3483 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3485 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3488 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3489 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3490 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3491 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
3492 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3493 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3494 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3495 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3497 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3498 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3499 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3503 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3504 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
3505 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3506 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3507 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3508 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3510 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3511 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3512 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3513 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3514 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3517 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3518 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3519 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3521 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3523 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3524 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3525 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3526 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3527 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3528 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3529 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3530 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3533 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3534 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3535 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3536 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3537 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3538 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3539 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3540 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3541 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3542 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3543 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3544 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3545 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3546 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3547 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3548 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3549 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3551 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3552 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3554 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3557 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3561 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3562 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3563 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3567 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3568 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3569 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3570 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3571 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3572 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3573 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3574 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3576 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3579 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3580 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3581 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3582 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3583 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3584 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3585 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3586 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3588 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3591 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3592 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3593 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3594 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3595 let peer_state = PeerState {
3596 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3598 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3601 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3603 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3605 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3606 monitor: args.monitor,
3607 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3609 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3610 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3611 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3613 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3618 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3620 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3622 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3624 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3626 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3627 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3628 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3629 logger: args.logger,
3630 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3633 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3634 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3637 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3638 //connection or two.
3640 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))