1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
41 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
42 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
43 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 pub use ln::channel::CounterpartyForwardingInfo;
47 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
48 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
51 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
53 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
54 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
55 use util::config::UserConfig;
56 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
57 use util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
59 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
60 use util::logger::Logger;
61 use util::errors::APIError;
64 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
65 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
66 use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
67 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
68 use std::time::Duration;
69 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
70 use std::time::Instant;
71 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
73 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
75 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
77 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
78 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
79 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
81 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
82 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
83 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
84 // before we forward it.
86 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
87 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
88 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
89 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
90 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
92 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
93 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
95 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
96 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
99 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
100 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
105 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
106 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
107 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
108 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
109 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
110 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
113 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
114 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
115 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
116 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
119 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
122 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
123 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
126 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
128 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
130 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
131 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
132 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
134 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
136 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
147 short_channel_id: u64,
149 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
151 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
152 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156 struct ClaimableHTLC {
157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
159 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
160 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
161 /// are part of the same payment.
162 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
166 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
167 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
168 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
169 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
172 session_priv: SecretKey,
173 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
174 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
175 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
180 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
181 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
183 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
184 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
189 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
190 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
192 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
200 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
201 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
202 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
203 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
204 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
205 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
206 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
207 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
208 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
209 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
210 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
211 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
213 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
215 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
216 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
217 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
218 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
219 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
221 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
222 err: msgs::LightningError,
223 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
225 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
227 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
229 err: LightningError {
231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
238 shutdown_finish: None,
242 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
244 err: LightningError {
246 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
248 shutdown_finish: None,
252 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
253 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
256 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
258 err: LightningError {
260 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
261 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
267 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
271 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
274 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
276 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
278 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
280 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
289 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
290 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
297 shutdown_finish: None,
302 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
303 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
304 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
305 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
306 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
308 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
309 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
310 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
311 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
312 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
314 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
316 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
320 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
321 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
322 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
323 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
324 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
325 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
326 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
327 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
328 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
329 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
330 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
331 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
333 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
334 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
335 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
336 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
339 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
340 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
341 /// quite some time lag.
342 enum BackgroundEvent {
343 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
344 /// commitment transaction.
345 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
348 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
349 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
351 latest_features: InitFeatures,
354 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
355 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
357 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
359 struct PendingInboundPayment {
360 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
361 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
362 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
363 /// this payment being removed.
365 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
366 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
367 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
370 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
371 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
372 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
373 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
374 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
375 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
376 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
377 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
379 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
380 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
381 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
382 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
383 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
384 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
385 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
386 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
387 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
389 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
390 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
392 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
393 /// to individual Channels.
395 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
396 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
397 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
398 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
400 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
401 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
402 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
403 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
404 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
405 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
406 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
408 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
409 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
410 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
411 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
414 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
415 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
416 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
417 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
418 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
420 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
421 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
422 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
423 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
424 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
425 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
426 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
427 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
428 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
429 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
432 default_configuration: UserConfig,
433 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
439 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
441 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
442 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
444 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
445 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
446 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
447 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
449 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
450 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
451 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
452 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts.
453 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
454 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
456 our_network_key: SecretKey,
457 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
459 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
460 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
461 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
463 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
464 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
465 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
466 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
468 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
469 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
470 /// are currently open with that peer.
471 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
472 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
474 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
476 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
477 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
478 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
479 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
480 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
481 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
482 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the PersistenceNotifier
483 /// the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
484 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
486 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
493 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
495 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
496 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
497 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
498 pub struct ChainParameters {
499 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
500 pub network: Network,
502 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
504 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
505 pub best_block: BestBlock,
508 /// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
509 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
510 pub struct BestBlock {
511 block_hash: BlockHash,
516 /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
517 pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
519 block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
524 /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
525 pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
526 BestBlock { block_hash, height }
529 /// Returns the best block hash.
530 pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
532 /// Returns the best block height.
533 pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
536 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
537 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
538 /// `await_persistable_update` that new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
539 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
540 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
541 /// updates are ready for persistence).
542 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
543 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
544 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
545 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
548 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
549 fn new(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> Self {
550 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
553 persistence_notifier: notifier,
554 _read_guard: read_guard,
559 impl<'a> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a> {
561 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
565 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
566 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
568 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
570 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
571 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
572 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
573 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
574 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
576 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
577 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly six hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
579 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
581 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
582 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
583 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
584 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
585 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
586 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 6;
587 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
589 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
590 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
591 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
592 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
593 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
594 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
597 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
599 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
600 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
603 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
605 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
607 pub struct ChannelDetails {
608 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
609 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
610 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
611 /// lifetime of the channel.
612 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
613 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
614 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
615 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
616 /// The node_id of our counterparty
617 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
618 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
619 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
620 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
621 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
622 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
623 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
624 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
626 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
627 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
628 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
629 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
630 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
631 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
632 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
633 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
634 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
635 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
636 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
637 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
638 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
641 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
642 /// payments to us through this channel.
643 pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
646 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
647 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
649 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
650 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
651 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
652 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
653 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
654 ParameterError(APIError),
655 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
656 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
657 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
660 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
662 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
663 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
664 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
665 /// paths than the ones selected).
666 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
667 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
668 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
669 /// in over-/re-payment.
671 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
672 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
673 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
675 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
676 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
677 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
678 /// with the latest update_id.
679 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
682 macro_rules! handle_error {
683 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
686 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
687 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
689 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
690 // entering the macro.
691 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
694 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
696 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
697 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
698 if let Some(update) = update_option {
699 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
705 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
706 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
708 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
709 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
710 action: err.action.clone()
714 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
715 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
718 // Return error in case higher-API need one
725 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
726 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
729 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
730 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
732 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
733 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
734 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
735 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
736 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
738 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
740 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
745 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
746 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
749 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
750 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
752 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
753 log_trace!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
754 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
755 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
756 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
758 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
760 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg)) => {
761 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
762 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
763 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
764 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
766 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
767 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
773 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
774 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
775 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
777 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
779 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
780 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
781 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
782 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
783 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
785 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
786 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
787 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
788 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
789 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
790 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
791 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
792 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
793 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
794 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
797 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
798 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
799 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
800 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
802 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
803 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
805 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
806 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
808 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
809 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
810 if !$resend_commitment {
811 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
814 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
816 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
817 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$entry.key()))
823 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
824 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
825 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
827 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
828 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
832 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
833 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
834 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
835 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
836 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
839 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
844 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
845 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
846 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
847 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
848 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
851 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
853 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
854 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
856 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
858 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
860 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
861 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
862 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
863 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
864 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
865 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
868 default_configuration: config.clone(),
869 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
870 fee_estimator: fee_est,
874 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
876 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
877 by_id: HashMap::new(),
878 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
879 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
880 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
881 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
883 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
885 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
886 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
889 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
890 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
892 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
894 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
895 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
896 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
897 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
905 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
906 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
907 &self.default_configuration
910 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
912 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
913 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
914 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
915 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
916 /// otherwise ignored.
918 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
919 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
921 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
922 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
923 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
924 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
928 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
929 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?;
930 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
932 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
933 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
934 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
936 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
937 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
939 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
942 panic!("RNG is bad???");
945 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
947 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
948 node_id: their_network_key,
954 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
955 let mut res = Vec::new();
957 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
958 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
959 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
960 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
961 res.push(ChannelDetails {
962 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
963 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
964 remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
965 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
966 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
967 inbound_capacity_msat,
968 outbound_capacity_msat,
969 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
970 is_live: channel.is_live(),
971 counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
975 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
976 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
977 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
978 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
984 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
985 /// more information.
986 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
987 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
990 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
991 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
993 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
994 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
995 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
996 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
997 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
998 // really wanted anyway.
999 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1002 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1003 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1004 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1006 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1007 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1010 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1011 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1012 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1013 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1015 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
1016 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1017 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1020 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1021 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1022 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1024 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
1025 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
1027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1030 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1031 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1033 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
1034 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1039 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
1040 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1041 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1050 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1051 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1052 log_trace!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1053 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1054 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1056 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1057 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1058 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1059 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1060 // ignore the result here.
1061 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1065 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1067 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1068 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1069 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1070 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1071 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1072 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1075 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1076 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1078 chan.remove_entry().1
1080 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1084 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1085 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1086 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1087 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1092 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1095 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1096 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1097 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1098 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1099 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1100 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1101 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1102 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1103 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1104 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1105 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1115 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1116 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1117 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1118 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1119 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1123 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1124 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1125 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1127 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1128 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1129 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1130 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1131 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1132 failure_code: $err_code,
1133 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1138 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1139 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1142 let shared_secret = {
1143 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1144 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1147 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1149 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1150 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1151 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1152 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1153 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1154 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1155 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1156 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1159 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1160 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1161 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1162 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1163 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1166 let mut channel_state = None;
1167 macro_rules! return_err {
1168 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1170 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1171 if channel_state.is_none() {
1172 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1174 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1175 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1176 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1177 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1178 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1183 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1184 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1185 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1186 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1188 let error_code = match err {
1189 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1190 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1191 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1192 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1193 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1195 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1198 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1199 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1200 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1207 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1210 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1211 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1212 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1213 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1214 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1215 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1216 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1217 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1218 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1219 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1220 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1221 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1225 // final_expiry_too_soon
1226 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure we have at least
1227 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1228 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown payment hash, our payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward
1229 // before our onchain logic triggers a channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational).
1230 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1231 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1233 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1234 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1235 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1237 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1238 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1239 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1242 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1243 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1244 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1245 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1248 if payment_data.is_none() {
1249 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1252 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1253 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1254 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1255 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1257 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1258 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1259 payment_data: payment_data.unwrap(),
1260 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1262 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1263 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1264 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1265 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1268 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1269 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1270 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1272 // Check two things:
1273 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1274 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1275 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1277 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1279 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1280 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1281 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1283 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1285 let blinding_factor = {
1286 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1287 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1288 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1289 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1292 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1294 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1296 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1299 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1300 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1303 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1304 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1305 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1306 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1307 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1311 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1312 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1313 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1316 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1317 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1318 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1319 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1323 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1324 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1325 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1326 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1327 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1328 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1329 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1330 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1331 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1332 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1334 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1336 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1337 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1339 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1340 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1341 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1342 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1343 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1344 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1345 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1347 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1348 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1350 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1351 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1352 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1354 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1355 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1357 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1358 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1359 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1360 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1361 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1363 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1364 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1366 // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1367 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
1368 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1369 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1375 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1376 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1377 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1378 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1380 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1381 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1383 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1384 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1385 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1387 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1389 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1394 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1397 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1398 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1399 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1400 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1401 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1405 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1407 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1408 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1410 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1411 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1412 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1413 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1414 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1415 fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1416 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1417 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1420 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1421 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1423 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1429 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1430 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1431 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1432 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1433 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1435 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1436 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1437 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height)?;
1438 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1439 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1441 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1443 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1445 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1446 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1447 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1448 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1449 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1453 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1455 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1456 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1458 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1459 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1461 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1463 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1464 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1465 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1467 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1468 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1469 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1470 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1471 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1472 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1473 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1474 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1475 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1479 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1480 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1481 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1482 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1484 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1492 } else { unreachable!(); }
1496 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1497 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1499 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1504 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1506 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1507 /// fields for more info.
1509 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1510 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1511 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1512 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1513 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1514 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1516 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1518 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1519 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1520 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1522 /// In general, a path may raise:
1523 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1524 /// node public key) is specified.
1525 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1526 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1528 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1529 /// relevant updates.
1531 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1532 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1533 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1535 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1536 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1537 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1538 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1540 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1541 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1542 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1543 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1544 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1545 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1547 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1548 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1549 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1550 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1551 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1553 let mut total_value = 0;
1554 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1555 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1556 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1557 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1558 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1559 continue 'path_check;
1561 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1562 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1563 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1564 continue 'path_check;
1567 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1568 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1570 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1571 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1574 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1575 let mut results = Vec::new();
1576 for path in route.paths.iter() {
1577 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height));
1579 let mut has_ok = false;
1580 let mut has_err = false;
1581 for res in results.iter() {
1582 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1583 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1584 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1585 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1592 if has_err && has_ok {
1593 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1595 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1601 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
1602 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
1603 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
1604 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1606 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1608 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
1610 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
1611 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1612 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1613 } else { unreachable!(); })
1616 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
1618 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
1619 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1622 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
1623 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
1628 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1629 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1630 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1633 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1635 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1645 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1646 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
1647 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
1651 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1653 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
1654 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1656 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1658 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
1659 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
1660 /// keys per-channel).
1662 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
1663 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
1664 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
1666 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
1667 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
1668 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
1669 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1672 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
1673 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
1674 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1675 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
1679 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
1680 let mut output_index = None;
1681 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1682 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1683 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
1684 if output_index.is_some() {
1685 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1686 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
1689 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
1690 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1691 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
1694 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
1697 if output_index.is_none() {
1698 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
1699 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
1702 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
1706 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1707 if !chan.should_announce() {
1708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1712 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1714 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1716 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1717 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1719 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1720 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1721 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1722 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1723 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1728 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1729 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1730 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1732 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1735 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1736 // smaller than 500:
1737 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1739 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1740 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1741 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1743 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1744 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1746 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1747 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1748 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1749 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1751 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1752 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
1753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1755 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1756 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1759 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1760 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1761 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1762 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1763 rgb, alias, addresses,
1764 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1765 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1767 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1769 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1770 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1771 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1772 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1773 contents: announcement
1778 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1780 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1781 /// Will likely generate further events.
1782 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1783 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1785 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1786 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1787 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1789 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1790 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1792 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1793 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1794 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1795 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1797 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1798 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1799 match forward_info {
1800 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
1801 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1802 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1803 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1804 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1805 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1806 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1808 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1809 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1812 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1813 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1814 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1815 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1816 // problem, not ours.
1823 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1824 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1825 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1826 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1827 match forward_info {
1828 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1829 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1831 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
1832 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1833 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1834 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1835 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1836 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1837 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1838 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1840 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1842 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1843 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1845 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1847 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1848 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1849 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1855 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1857 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1858 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1859 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1860 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1861 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1862 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1863 // this channel currently :/.
1869 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1870 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1872 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1873 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1874 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1876 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1877 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1879 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1881 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1882 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1883 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1886 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1888 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1889 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1890 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1891 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1892 // messages when we can.
1893 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1894 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1895 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1902 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1903 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
1906 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1907 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1908 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1909 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1910 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1911 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1913 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1914 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1915 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1916 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1917 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1919 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1921 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1923 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
1927 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1928 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1931 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1932 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
1933 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1934 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1935 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1936 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1937 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1939 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1947 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1948 match forward_info {
1949 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1950 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry },
1951 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
1952 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
1953 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
1954 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
1955 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1956 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1957 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1958 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1960 value: amt_to_forward,
1961 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1962 cltv_expiry: incoming_cltv_expiry,
1965 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
1967 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
1968 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
1969 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
1971 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1972 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1973 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
1974 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1975 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1977 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
1982 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
1983 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
1984 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
1985 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
1986 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
1987 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
1988 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1989 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
1990 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
1991 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1992 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
1994 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
1995 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
1996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1997 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
1998 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
1999 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2000 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2001 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2003 let mut total_value = 0;
2004 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2005 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2006 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2007 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2008 total_value += htlc.value;
2009 if htlc.payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2010 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2011 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc.payment_data.total_msat);
2012 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2014 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2016 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2017 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2018 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2019 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2022 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2023 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2025 payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
2028 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2029 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2031 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2033 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2034 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2041 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2042 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2044 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2045 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2053 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2054 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2057 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2058 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2061 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2062 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2063 events.append(&mut new_events);
2066 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2068 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2069 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2071 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2072 fn process_background_events(&self) {
2073 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2074 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2075 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2077 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2078 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2079 // monitor updating completing.
2080 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2086 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2087 pub(crate) fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2088 self.process_background_events();
2091 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
2092 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
2093 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
2095 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
2097 /// Note that in some rare cases this may generate a `chain::Watch::update_channel` call.
2098 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2100 self.process_background_events();
2102 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2103 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2104 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
2105 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
2106 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2107 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2112 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
2114 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
2115 chan.to_disabled_staged();
2120 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2121 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2122 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2123 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2124 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2125 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, _payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
2126 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2128 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2129 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2130 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2131 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2132 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2133 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2134 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2135 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2136 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2137 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2138 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2144 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2145 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2146 // be surfaced to the user.
2147 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2148 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2150 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2151 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2152 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2153 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2154 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
2155 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2157 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2160 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2162 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2163 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2164 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2166 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2167 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2168 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2170 rejected_by_dest: false,
2182 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2183 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2184 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2185 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2186 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2187 /// still-available channels.
2188 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2189 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2190 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2191 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2194 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2195 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2196 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2198 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
2199 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2200 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2201 match &onion_error {
2202 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2204 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2206 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2207 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2208 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2209 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2210 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
2211 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2212 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
2217 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2218 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2219 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2220 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2222 error_code: onion_error_code,
2224 error_data: onion_error_data
2228 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2234 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2235 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
2236 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2237 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2239 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2240 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2241 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2242 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2243 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2244 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2246 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2248 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2254 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2255 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2256 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2257 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2258 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2259 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2261 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2262 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2263 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2267 let mut forward_event = None;
2268 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2269 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2271 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2272 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2273 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2275 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2276 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
2279 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2280 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
2281 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2282 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2283 time_forwardable: time
2290 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
2291 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
2292 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
2294 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
2295 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
2296 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
2297 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
2298 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
2299 /// motivated attackers.
2301 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
2302 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
2304 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
2305 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, _payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
2306 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2308 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2310 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2311 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
2312 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2313 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
2315 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
2316 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
2317 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
2318 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
2320 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
2321 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
2322 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
2323 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
2324 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
2328 let mut valid_mpp = sources[0].payment_data.total_msat >= expected_amount;
2330 for htlc in sources.iter() {
2331 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
2332 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2337 let mut errs = Vec::new();
2338 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
2339 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2340 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2341 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
2342 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2343 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2344 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2345 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2346 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
2347 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2349 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
2351 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
2352 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
2353 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
2354 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
2355 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
2356 } else { errs.push(e); }
2358 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2360 log_warn!(self.logger, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2362 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2367 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2368 // which were generated.
2369 channel_state.take();
2371 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2372 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2373 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2380 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2381 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2382 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2383 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2384 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2390 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2391 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2392 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
2393 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2394 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2395 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2396 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2397 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2399 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2403 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2404 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2405 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2406 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2407 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2408 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2409 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2410 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2419 // TODO: Do something with e?
2420 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2421 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2422 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2423 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2424 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2425 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2426 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2430 } else { unreachable!(); }
2433 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2435 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2436 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2437 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2438 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2442 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2443 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
2444 if let Err((counterparty_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2447 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2448 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
2449 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2450 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2453 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
2454 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
2455 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
2456 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
2457 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
2458 payment_preimage, e);
2462 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2464 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2465 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2466 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
2472 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2473 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2474 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
2477 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2478 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2481 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2482 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2484 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2485 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2486 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2487 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2489 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2490 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
2491 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2492 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2493 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2494 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2495 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2496 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2497 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2498 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2500 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2501 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2502 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2503 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2506 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2507 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2508 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2509 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2510 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2514 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2518 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
2519 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2520 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), funding_txo.clone(), pending_forwards));
2522 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2524 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2525 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2526 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2527 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2532 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2533 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2534 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2535 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2536 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2541 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2545 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2550 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
2551 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2553 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2554 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2555 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2558 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2559 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2560 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2561 msg: announcement_sigs,
2564 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2568 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2570 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2571 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2573 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2575 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2576 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2580 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2581 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2582 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2585 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
2586 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2587 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2588 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2589 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2590 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2592 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2593 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2594 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2596 entry.insert(channel);
2602 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2603 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2604 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2605 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2606 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2608 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2609 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2611 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2612 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2614 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2617 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2618 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2619 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2620 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2622 user_channel_id: user_id,
2627 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2628 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
2629 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2630 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2631 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2632 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2634 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2635 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
2637 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2639 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
2642 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2643 // lock before watch_channel
2644 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
2646 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2647 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2648 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2649 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2650 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2651 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
2652 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
2653 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
2654 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
2655 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
2656 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
2658 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2659 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2660 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2661 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2662 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2663 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2667 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2668 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2669 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2670 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2671 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
2673 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2674 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2675 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2684 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2686 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
2687 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2688 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2689 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2691 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2692 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2694 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
2695 Ok(update) => update,
2696 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2698 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2699 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2703 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2706 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
2710 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2711 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2713 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2714 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2715 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2716 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2718 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2719 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2720 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2721 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2722 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2723 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2724 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2725 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2726 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2727 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2728 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2729 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2730 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2731 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2732 msg: announcement_sigs,
2737 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2741 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2742 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2743 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2744 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2746 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2748 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2749 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2751 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2752 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2753 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2754 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2758 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2759 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2760 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2764 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2765 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2766 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2768 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2769 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2774 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2775 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2777 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2778 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2779 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2780 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2788 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2789 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2790 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2791 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2792 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2794 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2795 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2797 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2798 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2799 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2800 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2805 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2806 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2807 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2808 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2809 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2810 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2811 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2813 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2814 } else { (tx, None) }
2816 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2819 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2820 log_trace!(self.logger, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2821 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2823 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2824 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2825 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2826 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2834 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2835 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2836 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2837 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2839 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2840 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2841 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2842 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2844 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2845 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2847 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2848 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2849 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2850 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2853 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
2854 // Ensure error_code has the UPDATE flag set, since by default we send a
2855 // channel update along as part of failing the HTLC.
2856 assert!((error_code & 0x1000) != 0);
2857 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2858 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2859 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2860 match pending_forward_info {
2861 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2862 let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
2863 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
2864 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2865 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2866 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2867 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
2871 // The only case where we'd be unable to
2872 // successfully get a channel update is if the
2873 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
2874 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
2875 // payments over the channel back to themselves
2876 // (cause no one else should know the short_id
2877 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
2878 // no problem just calling this
2879 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
2880 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2882 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2883 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2884 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2887 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
2889 _ => pending_forward_info
2892 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
2894 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2899 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2900 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2902 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2903 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2905 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2906 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2908 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2910 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2913 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2917 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2918 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2919 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2920 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2922 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2925 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2927 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2932 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2933 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2934 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2935 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2936 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2937 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2938 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2940 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2941 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
2942 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2944 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2947 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
2951 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2952 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2953 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2954 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2955 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2956 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
2957 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
2959 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2960 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
2961 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2962 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2963 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2964 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2965 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2970 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2971 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2972 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2974 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2975 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2976 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2978 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2979 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2980 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2981 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2982 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2983 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2984 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2985 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2987 commitment_signed: msg,
2991 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2992 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2993 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
2999 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3004 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3005 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3006 let mut forward_event = None;
3007 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3008 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3009 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3010 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3012 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3013 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3014 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3015 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3017 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3018 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3019 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3022 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3023 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3028 match forward_event {
3030 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3031 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3032 time_forwardable: time
3040 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3041 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3043 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3044 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3045 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3046 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3047 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3048 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3050 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3051 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3052 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3053 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3054 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3055 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3056 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3057 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3059 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3061 } else { unreachable!(); }
3064 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3065 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3066 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3070 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3071 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3072 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3076 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3081 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3083 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3084 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3085 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3087 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3094 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3095 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3096 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3097 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3098 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3099 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3100 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3102 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3104 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3109 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3110 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3111 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3113 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3114 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3115 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3118 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3119 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3122 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
3123 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
3124 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
3126 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3127 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3129 let their_node_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 };
3130 let their_bitcoin_key = if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 };
3131 match (self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, their_node_key),
3132 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, their_bitcoin_key)) {
3134 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature: {:?}. Maybe using different node_secret for transport and routing msg? UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}", e, &announcement, their_node_key));
3135 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3138 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close(format!("Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature: {:?}. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})", e, &announcement, their_bitcoin_key));
3139 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3145 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
3147 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3148 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3149 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
3150 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
3151 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
3152 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3153 contents: announcement,
3155 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
3158 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3163 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3164 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3165 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3166 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3167 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3169 // It's not a local channel
3173 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3174 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3175 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3176 // TODO: see issue #153, need a consistent behavior on obnoxious behavior from random node
3177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3179 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3186 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3187 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3188 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3190 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3191 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3192 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3195 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3196 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3197 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3198 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3199 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
3200 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3201 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
3202 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3203 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
3204 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
3205 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
3206 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
3207 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3209 if commitment_update.is_none() {
3210 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3212 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
3213 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
3216 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
3217 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3218 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3222 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
3223 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
3224 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3225 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3230 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
3231 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3232 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3233 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3239 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
3243 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
3248 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3249 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3250 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3260 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
3261 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
3262 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
3263 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
3264 /// (C-not exported) Cause its doc(hidden) anyway
3266 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3267 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3268 let counterparty_node_id;
3269 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3270 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3271 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3273 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3274 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("Failed to find corresponding channel for id {}", channel_id.to_hex())}),
3275 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3276 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
3277 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel".to_owned()});
3279 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3280 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
3282 if !chan.get().is_live() {
3283 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3285 counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3286 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
3287 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
3289 if let Err(_e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3292 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3293 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3294 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3295 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3296 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3297 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3298 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3299 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3309 match handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id) {
3310 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3311 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
3315 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`.
3316 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) {
3317 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3319 for monitor_event in self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events() {
3320 match monitor_event {
3321 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3322 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3323 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3324 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
3326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3327 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3330 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3331 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3332 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3333 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3334 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3335 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3336 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3337 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3338 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3340 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3341 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3342 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3346 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3347 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3348 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3349 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3358 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3359 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3363 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
3364 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
3366 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
3367 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3368 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
3369 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
3370 // reorganized out of the main chain.
3371 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
3372 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
3373 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
3374 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
3375 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
3376 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
3377 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
3378 assert!(should_broadcast);
3379 } else { unreachable!(); }
3380 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
3382 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3386 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3387 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
3389 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3391 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3392 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3393 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3395 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
3396 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
3397 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
3398 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
3399 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
3400 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
3401 // never fail a payment too early.
3402 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
3404 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
3407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
3412 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
3415 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
3416 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
3418 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
3420 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3421 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
3422 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
3423 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3426 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
3427 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
3430 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
3431 /// stored external to LDK.
3433 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
3434 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
3435 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
3437 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
3438 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
3440 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
3441 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
3442 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
3443 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
3445 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
3446 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
3447 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
3448 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 7,200 secs as a default validity time for
3449 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
3451 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
3452 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
3453 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
3454 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
3455 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
3457 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
3459 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3460 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
3461 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
3462 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
3466 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3467 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3468 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3469 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3470 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3473 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
3474 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3475 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3476 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3478 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3479 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3480 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
3485 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3486 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3487 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3488 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3489 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3492 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<Event> {
3493 //TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's non-intuitive that we query
3494 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3495 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
3497 let mut ret = Vec::new();
3498 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3499 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
3504 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3506 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3507 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3508 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3509 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3512 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
3514 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3515 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
3516 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
3517 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
3518 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
3521 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
3522 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
3523 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
3526 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3527 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3528 let new_height = height - 1;
3530 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
3531 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
3532 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
3533 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
3534 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
3535 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
3538 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time));
3542 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3544 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3545 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3546 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3547 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3550 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
3551 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3552 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3553 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3555 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3556 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
3558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3559 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
3562 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
3563 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3564 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3565 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3567 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
3568 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
3570 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3572 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
3574 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time));
3576 macro_rules! max_time {
3577 ($timestamp: expr) => {
3579 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
3580 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3581 // having an explicit local time source.
3582 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
3583 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
3584 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3585 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3586 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3592 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
3593 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
3596 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
3597 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3598 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
3599 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
3600 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
3601 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
3607 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
3608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3609 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
3610 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
3611 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
3612 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed().map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
3613 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3614 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3619 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3621 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3622 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3623 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3624 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3627 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
3628 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
3630 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
3631 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
3632 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3633 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
3634 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3636 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3637 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3639 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3640 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3641 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3642 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3643 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
3644 let res = f(channel);
3645 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
3646 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
3647 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3648 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3649 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
3653 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
3654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
3655 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3656 msg: funding_locked,
3658 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
3659 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3661 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3662 msg: announcement_sigs,
3665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3667 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
3669 } else if let Err(e) = res {
3670 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3671 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3673 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
3674 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
3675 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3676 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3681 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3682 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3683 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
3690 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
3691 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
3692 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3693 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
3694 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
3695 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
3696 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
3697 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
3698 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3699 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
3700 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3701 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
3702 data: htlc_msat_height_data
3707 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
3712 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
3714 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
3715 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
3719 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
3720 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
3721 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3723 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
3724 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
3725 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
3726 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
3729 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
3730 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
3732 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
3733 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
3736 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3737 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
3738 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
3739 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
3740 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
3745 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send>
3746 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
3747 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
3748 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3749 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
3750 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3753 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3754 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3755 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3758 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3759 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3760 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3763 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3765 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3768 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3769 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3770 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3773 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3774 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3775 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3778 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3779 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3780 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3783 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3784 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3785 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3788 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3789 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3790 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3793 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3794 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3795 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3798 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3799 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3800 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3803 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3804 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3805 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3808 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3809 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3810 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3813 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3814 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3815 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3818 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3819 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3820 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3823 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3824 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3825 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3828 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
3829 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3830 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3833 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3834 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3835 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
3838 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3839 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3840 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3841 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3842 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3844 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3845 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3846 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3847 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3848 if no_connection_possible {
3849 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3850 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3851 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3852 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3853 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3855 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3856 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3857 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3867 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3868 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3869 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3870 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are no
3871 // holding cell add-HTLCs, so if in the future we stop removing uncommitted HTLCs
3872 // on peer disconnect here, there will need to be corresponding changes in
3873 // reestablish logic.
3874 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
3875 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3876 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3877 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3878 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3880 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3881 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3882 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3886 no_channels_remain = false;
3892 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3894 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3895 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3896 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3897 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3898 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3899 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3900 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3901 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3902 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3903 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3904 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3905 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3906 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3907 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3908 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
3909 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3910 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
3911 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
3912 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
3916 if no_channels_remain {
3917 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
3920 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3921 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3923 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3924 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3925 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3930 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3931 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
3933 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3936 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3937 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
3938 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3939 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3940 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3944 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3949 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3950 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3951 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3952 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3953 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
3954 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3955 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3956 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3957 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3961 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3962 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3963 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
3969 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3972 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3973 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::new(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3975 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3976 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3977 if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
3978 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3979 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3983 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
3984 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
3989 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
3990 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
3991 struct PersistenceNotifier {
3992 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
3993 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
3994 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
3997 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4000 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4006 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4007 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4008 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4009 let result = *guard;
4017 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4018 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4019 let current_time = Instant::now();
4021 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4022 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4023 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4024 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4025 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4026 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4027 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4029 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4030 let result = *guard;
4031 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4035 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4036 None => return result,
4042 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4044 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4045 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4046 *persistence_lock = true;
4047 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4052 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4053 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4055 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4056 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4057 match &self.routing {
4058 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
4060 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4061 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4063 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data, ref incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
4065 payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4066 payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4067 incoming_cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4070 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
4071 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4072 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
4073 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
4078 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
4079 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
4080 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
4081 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
4082 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4083 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4084 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4086 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4087 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4088 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4089 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4091 incoming_cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4093 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4095 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4096 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4097 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
4098 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4103 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4104 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4106 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
4108 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4110 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
4112 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4119 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
4120 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
4121 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4122 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4123 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4124 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4129 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4130 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4132 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
4134 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4136 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
4138 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
4145 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
4146 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
4147 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4148 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4149 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4150 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4155 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
4159 incoming_packet_shared_secret
4162 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4163 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4164 self.prev_hop.write(writer)?;
4165 self.value.write(writer)?;
4166 self.payment_data.payment_secret.write(writer)?;
4167 self.payment_data.total_msat.write(writer)?;
4168 self.cltv_expiry.write(writer)
4172 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4173 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4175 prev_hop: Readable::read(reader)?,
4176 value: Readable::read(reader)?,
4177 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
4178 payment_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
4179 total_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4181 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4186 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
4187 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4189 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
4191 hop_data.write(writer)?;
4193 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
4195 path.write(writer)?;
4196 session_priv.write(writer)?;
4197 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
4204 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4205 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
4206 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4207 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4208 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4209 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
4210 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
4211 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4213 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4218 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
4219 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4221 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4225 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4227 failure_code.write(writer)?;
4228 data.write(writer)?;
4235 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
4236 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
4237 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4238 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
4239 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4240 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
4241 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
4243 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4248 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4249 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4251 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_funding_outpoint, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
4253 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4254 prev_funding_outpoint.write(writer)?;
4255 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4256 forward_info.write(writer)?;
4258 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4260 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4261 err_packet.write(writer)?;
4268 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
4269 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
4270 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4271 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
4272 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4273 prev_funding_outpoint: Readable::read(reader)?,
4274 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4275 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
4277 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4278 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4279 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4281 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4286 impl_writeable!(PendingInboundPayment, 0, {
4293 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4294 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4295 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4296 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4297 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4300 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4301 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
4303 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4304 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
4306 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
4308 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4309 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
4310 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
4313 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4314 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
4315 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4316 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4317 unfunded_channels += 1;
4320 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
4321 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
4322 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
4323 channel.write(writer)?;
4327 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4328 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
4329 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4330 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4331 for forward in pending_forwards {
4332 forward.write(writer)?;
4336 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4337 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
4338 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4339 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4340 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
4341 htlc.write(writer)?;
4345 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4346 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4347 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4348 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4349 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4350 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
4353 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4354 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4355 for event in events.iter() {
4356 event.write(writer)?;
4359 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
4360 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4361 for event in background_events.iter() {
4363 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
4365 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
4366 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
4371 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4372 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
4374 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4375 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4376 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
4377 hash.write(writer)?;
4378 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
4385 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
4387 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
4389 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
4390 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
4391 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
4392 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
4393 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
4394 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
4395 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
4396 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
4397 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
4398 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
4399 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
4401 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
4402 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
4404 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
4405 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
4406 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
4407 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
4408 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
4409 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
4410 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4411 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4412 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4413 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4414 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4417 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
4418 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
4420 pub keys_manager: K,
4422 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4424 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
4425 pub fee_estimator: F,
4426 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
4428 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
4429 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
4430 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
4431 pub chain_monitor: M,
4433 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
4434 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
4435 /// force-closed during deserialization.
4436 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
4437 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
4438 /// deserialization.
4440 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
4441 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
4442 pub default_config: UserConfig,
4444 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
4445 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
4447 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
4448 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
4449 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
4450 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
4452 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
4455 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
4456 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
4459 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4460 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4461 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4462 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4463 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4464 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4467 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
4468 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
4469 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
4470 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
4471 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
4473 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
4474 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
4479 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
4480 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
4481 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4482 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
4483 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4484 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4485 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4486 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4489 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4490 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
4491 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
4495 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
4496 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
4497 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4498 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4499 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4500 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4503 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4504 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4505 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4506 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
4507 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
4510 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4511 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4512 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4514 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4516 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4517 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4518 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4519 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
4520 for _ in 0..channel_count {
4521 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
4522 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
4523 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
4524 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
4525 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4526 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4527 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4528 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4529 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
4530 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4531 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
4532 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
4533 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
4534 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
4535 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
4536 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
4537 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
4538 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4540 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4541 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
4543 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
4546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4550 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
4551 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
4552 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
4556 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
4557 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4558 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4559 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
4560 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4561 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4562 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
4563 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
4564 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4566 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
4569 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4570 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
4571 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
4572 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
4573 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4574 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
4575 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
4576 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
4578 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
4581 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4582 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
4583 for _ in 0..peer_count {
4584 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4585 let peer_state = PeerState {
4586 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
4588 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
4591 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4592 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
4593 for _ in 0..event_count {
4594 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
4595 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
4600 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4601 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
4602 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
4603 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4604 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
4605 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4609 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4610 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4612 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4613 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
4614 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
4615 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
4616 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
4620 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4621 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4623 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
4625 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
4626 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
4627 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
4629 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
4631 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
4636 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
4638 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
4640 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
4641 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
4644 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
4645 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
4647 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
4649 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
4650 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
4651 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
4652 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
4654 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
4655 logger: args.logger,
4656 default_configuration: args.default_config,
4659 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4660 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4663 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
4664 //connection or two.
4666 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
4672 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
4674 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
4676 use std::time::Duration;
4679 fn test_wait_timeout() {
4680 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
4681 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
4683 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
4684 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
4685 thread::spawn(move || {
4687 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
4688 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4689 *persistence_lock = true;
4692 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
4698 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
4699 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
4701 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
4704 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4709 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
4711 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
4714 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
4721 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
4724 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
4725 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
4726 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
4727 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
4728 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
4729 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
4730 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
4731 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
4732 use routing::router::get_route;
4733 use util::test_utils;
4734 use util::config::UserConfig;
4735 use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
4737 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4738 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4739 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
4741 use std::sync::Mutex;
4745 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
4746 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
4747 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
4748 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
4749 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
4750 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
4751 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
4756 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
4757 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
4760 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
4761 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
4762 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
4764 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
4765 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
4767 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())};
4768 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
4770 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
4771 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
4773 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4774 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
4775 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
4776 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
4777 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4779 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4781 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
4783 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
4784 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
4785 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
4786 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
4787 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
4789 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
4791 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
4793 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
4794 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4795 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4798 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
4799 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
4800 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
4802 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4803 } else { panic!(); }
4805 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4806 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4808 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
4811 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4814 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
4815 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
4817 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4818 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4820 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
4822 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
4823 macro_rules! send_payment {
4824 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
4825 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
4826 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
4827 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
4829 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
4830 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
4832 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
4833 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4835 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
4836 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
4837 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4838 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
4839 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4840 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4841 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4842 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
4844 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
4845 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
4846 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage, &Some(payment_secret), 10_000));
4848 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
4849 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
4850 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
4851 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4852 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
4854 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
4857 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
4858 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
4859 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
4860 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
4862 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
4867 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
4868 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);