1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
52 const SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS: [u8; 65] = [0; 65];
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // When a Channel forwards an HTLC to its peer, it will give us back the PendingForwardHTLCInfo
61 // which we will use to construct an outbound HTLC, with a relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData
62 // filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use to either fail-backwards or fulfill
63 // the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
64 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
65 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
66 /// Stores the info we will need to send when we want to forward an HTLC onwards
67 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
68 pub(super) struct PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
69 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
70 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
71 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
72 short_channel_id: u64,
73 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
74 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
77 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
78 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
79 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
80 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
83 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
84 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
85 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
86 Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo),
90 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
91 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
92 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
93 short_channel_id: u64,
95 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
98 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
99 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
100 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
101 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
104 session_priv: SecretKey,
105 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
106 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
107 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
112 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
113 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
114 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
115 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
116 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
124 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
132 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
133 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
134 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
135 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
136 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
137 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
139 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
141 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
142 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
143 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
144 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
145 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
147 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
148 err: msgs::LightningError,
149 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
151 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
153 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
155 err: LightningError {
157 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
158 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
160 data: err.to_string()
164 shutdown_finish: None,
168 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
170 err: LightningError {
172 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
174 shutdown_finish: None,
178 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
179 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
182 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
184 err: LightningError {
186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
189 data: err.to_string()
193 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
197 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
200 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
204 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
206 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
207 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
209 data: msg.to_string()
213 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
215 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
216 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
218 data: msg.to_string()
223 shutdown_finish: None,
228 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
229 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
230 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
231 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
232 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
234 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
236 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
238 forward_info: PendingForwardHTLCInfo,
242 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
247 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
248 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
249 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
250 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
251 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
252 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
254 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
258 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
259 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
260 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
261 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
262 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
263 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
264 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
265 /// ids in the PendingForwardHTLCInfo!
266 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
267 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
268 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
269 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
270 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
272 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
273 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
274 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
275 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
278 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
279 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
281 latest_features: InitFeatures,
284 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
285 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
287 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
288 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
290 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
291 /// to individual Channels.
293 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
294 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
295 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
296 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
298 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
299 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
300 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
301 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
302 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
303 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
304 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
306 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
307 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
308 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
309 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
312 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
313 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
314 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
315 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
316 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfec.
317 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
318 default_configuration: UserConfig,
319 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
320 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
321 monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
322 tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
325 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
327 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
328 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
329 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
332 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
334 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
335 our_network_key: SecretKey,
337 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
338 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
339 /// are currently open with that peer.
340 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
341 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
343 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
345 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
346 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
347 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
348 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
349 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
351 keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
356 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
357 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
358 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
359 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
360 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
362 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
363 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
364 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
365 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
366 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
367 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
368 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
370 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
371 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
372 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
373 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
374 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
375 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
378 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
380 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
381 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
384 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
386 macro_rules! secp_call {
387 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
390 Err(_) => return Err($err),
395 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
396 pub struct ChannelDetails {
397 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
398 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
399 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
400 /// lifetime of the channel.
401 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
402 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
403 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
404 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
405 /// The node_id of our counterparty
406 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
407 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
408 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
409 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
411 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
412 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
413 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
414 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
415 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
416 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
417 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
418 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
419 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
420 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
421 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
422 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
423 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
427 macro_rules! handle_error {
428 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
431 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
432 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
433 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
434 if let Some(update) = update_option {
435 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
440 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
441 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
442 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
443 // Return error in case higher-API need one
450 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
451 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
454 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
455 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
457 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
458 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
459 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
460 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
461 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
463 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
465 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
470 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
471 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
474 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
475 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
477 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
478 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
479 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
480 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
481 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
485 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
486 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
487 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
488 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
489 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
491 if let Some(update) = update {
492 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.add_update_monitor(update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
494 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
495 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
496 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
497 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
498 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
499 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
503 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
504 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
505 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
507 shutdown_res.0.clear();
508 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
514 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
515 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
516 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
518 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
520 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
521 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
522 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
523 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
524 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
526 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
527 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
528 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
529 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
530 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
531 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
532 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
533 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
534 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
535 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
538 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
539 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
540 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
541 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
543 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
544 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
546 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
547 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
549 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
550 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
551 if !$resend_commitment {
552 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
555 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
557 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
558 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
564 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
565 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
566 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
568 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
569 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
573 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
574 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
575 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
576 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
577 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
580 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
585 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
586 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
588 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
589 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
591 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
593 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
595 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
596 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
598 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
599 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
600 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
601 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
602 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
604 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>, tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>,keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner>>, secp256k1::Error> {
605 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
607 let res = Arc::new(ChannelManager {
608 default_configuration: config.clone(),
609 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
610 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
611 monitor: monitor.clone(),
614 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
615 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
618 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
619 by_id: HashMap::new(),
620 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
621 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
622 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
623 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
625 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
627 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
629 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
630 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
640 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
642 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
643 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
644 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
645 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
647 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
648 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
650 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
651 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
652 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
653 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
654 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
657 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
658 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
660 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
661 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
662 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
663 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
664 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
665 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
667 panic!("RNG is bad???");
670 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
672 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
673 node_id: their_network_key,
679 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
680 /// more information.
681 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
682 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
683 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
684 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
685 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
686 res.push(ChannelDetails {
687 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
688 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
689 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
690 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
691 inbound_capacity_msat,
692 outbound_capacity_msat,
693 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
694 is_live: channel.is_live(),
700 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
701 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
703 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
704 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
705 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
706 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
707 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
708 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
709 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
710 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
711 // really wanted anyway.
712 if channel.is_live() {
713 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
714 res.push(ChannelDetails {
715 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
716 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
717 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
718 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
719 inbound_capacity_msat,
720 outbound_capacity_msat,
721 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
729 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
730 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
731 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
733 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
734 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
735 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
737 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
738 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
739 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
740 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
742 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
743 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
744 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
747 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
748 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
749 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
751 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
752 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
757 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
758 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
760 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
761 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
766 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
767 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
768 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
777 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
778 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
779 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
780 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
781 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
783 for tx in local_txn {
784 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
785 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
789 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
790 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
791 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
792 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
795 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
796 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
797 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
798 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
799 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
806 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
807 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
808 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
809 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
810 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
816 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
817 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
818 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
819 for chan in self.list_channels() {
820 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
824 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
825 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
826 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
828 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
829 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
830 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
831 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
832 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
833 failure_code: $err_code,
834 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
839 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
840 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
843 let shared_secret = {
844 let mut arr = [0; 32];
845 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
848 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
850 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
851 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
852 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
853 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
854 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
855 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
856 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
857 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
860 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
861 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
862 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
863 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
864 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
867 let mut channel_state = None;
868 macro_rules! return_err {
869 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
871 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
872 if channel_state.is_none() {
873 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
875 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
876 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
877 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
878 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
879 })), channel_state.unwrap());
884 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
885 let next_hop_data = {
886 let mut decoded = [0; 65];
887 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[0..65], &mut decoded);
888 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut Cursor::new(&decoded[..])) {
890 let error_code = match err {
891 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
892 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
894 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
900 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_data.hmac == [0; 32] {
903 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
904 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
905 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
906 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
907 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
908 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
909 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
910 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 19*65];
911 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
912 assert_ne!(new_packet_data[0..65], [0; 65][..]);
913 assert_ne!(new_packet_data[..], [0; 19*65][..]);
917 // final_expiry_too_soon
918 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
919 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
921 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
922 if next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
923 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
925 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
926 if next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
927 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
930 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
931 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
932 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
933 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
935 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
937 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
939 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
940 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
941 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
944 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
945 chacha.process(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[65..], &mut new_packet_data[0..19*65]);
946 chacha.process(&SIXTY_FIVE_ZEROS[..], &mut new_packet_data[19*65..]);
948 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
950 let blinding_factor = {
951 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
952 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
953 sha.input(&shared_secret);
954 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
957 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
959 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
961 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
964 hop_data: new_packet_data,
965 hmac: next_hop_data.hmac.clone(),
968 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
969 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
970 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
971 short_channel_id: next_hop_data.data.short_channel_id,
972 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
973 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.data.amt_to_forward,
974 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.data.outgoing_cltv_value,
978 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
979 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
980 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
981 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
982 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
983 None => { // unknown_next_peer
984 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
986 Some(id) => id.clone(),
988 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
989 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
991 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
992 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
993 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
994 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
995 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
996 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
997 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
999 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1000 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1002 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1003 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1004 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1006 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1007 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1009 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1010 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1011 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1012 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1014 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1015 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1020 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1021 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1022 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1023 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1025 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1026 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1028 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1029 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1031 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1033 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1038 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1041 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1042 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1043 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1044 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1045 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1049 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1051 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1052 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1053 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1054 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1055 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1056 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1057 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1058 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1059 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1060 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1063 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1064 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1066 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1072 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1074 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1075 /// fields for more info.
1077 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1078 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1079 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1080 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1081 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1082 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1084 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1086 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1087 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1088 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1089 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1090 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1091 /// relevant updates.
1093 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1094 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1095 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1096 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1097 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1098 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1099 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1100 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1102 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1103 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1104 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1105 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1109 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1111 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1113 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1114 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1115 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1116 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1118 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1120 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1121 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1123 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1124 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1125 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1128 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1129 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1131 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1132 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1134 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1135 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1137 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1138 route: route.clone(),
1139 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1140 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1141 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1143 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) => {
1144 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1145 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1146 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1147 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1148 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1149 // something else in case we will resend later!
1150 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1153 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1154 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1155 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1156 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1157 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1158 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1159 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1167 } else { unreachable!(); }
1171 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1172 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1173 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1177 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1179 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1180 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1182 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1184 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1185 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1186 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1187 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1189 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1190 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1191 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1193 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1194 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1195 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1196 } else { unreachable!(); })
1201 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1202 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1203 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1205 Err(_) => { return; }
1208 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1209 // lock before add_update_monitor
1210 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1212 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1214 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1215 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1216 Err(_) => { return; },
1217 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1221 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1222 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1223 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1224 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1226 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1231 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1232 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1233 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1236 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1238 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1246 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1247 if !chan.should_announce() { return None }
1249 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1251 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1253 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1254 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1256 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1257 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1258 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1259 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1260 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1264 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1266 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1267 /// Will likely generate further events.
1268 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1269 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1271 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1272 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1273 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1275 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1276 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1278 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1279 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1280 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1281 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1283 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1284 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1285 match forward_info {
1286 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1287 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1288 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1289 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1290 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1292 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1294 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1295 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1296 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1297 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1298 // problem, not ours.
1305 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1306 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1307 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1308 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1309 match forward_info {
1310 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1311 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1312 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1313 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1314 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1315 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1317 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1319 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1320 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1322 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1324 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1325 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1330 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1332 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1333 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1334 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1335 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1336 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1337 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1338 // this channel currently :/.
1344 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1345 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1346 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1348 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1349 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1351 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1353 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1354 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1355 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1358 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1360 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1361 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1362 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1363 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1364 // messages when we can.
1365 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1366 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1367 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1374 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1375 let (commitment_msg, monitor) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1378 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1379 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1380 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1381 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1382 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1383 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1385 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1386 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1387 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1388 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1389 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1391 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1393 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1395 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1396 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1397 Err(_) => { continue; },
1401 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
1402 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1405 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1406 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1407 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1408 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1409 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1410 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1411 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1413 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1421 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1422 match forward_info {
1423 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1424 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1425 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1426 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1427 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1429 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1430 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1431 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1433 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1434 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1435 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1438 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1439 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1447 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1449 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1450 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1454 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1455 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1456 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1457 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1461 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1462 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1463 events.append(&mut new_events);
1466 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1467 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1468 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1470 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1471 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1472 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1473 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1474 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1475 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1476 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1477 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1478 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1483 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1485 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1486 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1491 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1492 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1493 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1494 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1495 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1496 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1497 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1499 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1500 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1501 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1502 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1503 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1504 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1505 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1506 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1512 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1513 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1514 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1515 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1516 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1517 /// still-available channels.
1518 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1519 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1520 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1521 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1524 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1525 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1526 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1527 match &onion_error {
1528 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1530 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1532 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1533 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1534 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1535 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1536 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1537 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1538 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1543 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1544 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1545 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1546 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1548 error_code: onion_error_code
1552 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1556 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1557 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1558 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1559 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1561 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1562 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1563 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1564 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1565 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1566 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1568 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1574 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1575 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1576 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1577 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1578 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1579 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1581 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1582 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1583 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1587 let mut forward_event = None;
1588 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1589 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1591 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1592 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1593 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1595 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1596 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1599 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1600 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1601 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1602 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1603 time_forwardable: time
1610 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1611 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1612 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1614 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1615 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1616 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1617 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1618 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1619 /// motivated attackers.
1621 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1622 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1623 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1625 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1627 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1628 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1629 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1630 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1631 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1632 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1633 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1634 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1635 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1636 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1637 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1638 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1640 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1646 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1647 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1649 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1650 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1651 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1652 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1656 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1657 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1660 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1661 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1663 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1664 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1665 // why it's missing.
1670 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1671 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1672 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1673 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1674 if let Some(chan_monitor) = monitor_option {
1675 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1676 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1677 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1679 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1683 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1685 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1686 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1687 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1688 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1689 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1690 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1698 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1699 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1700 //TODO: Do something with e?
1704 } else { unreachable!(); }
1710 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1713 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1714 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1715 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1718 /// Used to restore channels to normal operation after a
1719 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1721 pub fn test_restore_channel_monitor(&self) {
1722 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1723 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1724 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1725 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1726 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1729 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1730 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1731 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1732 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1733 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
1734 if channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
1735 let chan_monitor = channel.channel_monitor().clone();
1736 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1738 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1739 // TODO: There may be some pending HTLCs that we intended to fail
1740 // backwards when a monitor update failed. We should make sure
1741 // knowledge of those gets moved into the appropriate in-memory
1742 // ChannelMonitor and they get failed backwards once we get
1743 // on-chain confirmations.
1744 // Note I think #198 addresses this, so once it's merged a test
1745 // should be written.
1746 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1747 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1749 close_results.push(channel.force_shutdown());
1750 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
1751 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1757 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => true,
1760 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1761 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1762 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1764 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1766 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1767 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1768 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1769 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1774 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1775 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1776 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1777 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1778 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1783 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1787 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1792 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1793 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1794 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1795 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1798 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1799 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1800 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1803 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1804 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1805 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1806 msg: announcement_sigs,
1809 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1817 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1819 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1820 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1822 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1824 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1825 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1829 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1830 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1831 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1834 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1835 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1836 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1837 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1838 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1841 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1842 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1843 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1845 entry.insert(channel);
1851 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1852 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1853 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1854 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1855 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1856 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1857 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1858 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1860 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1861 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1863 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1866 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1867 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1868 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1869 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1870 output_script: output_script,
1871 user_channel_id: user_id,
1876 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1877 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1878 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1879 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1880 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1882 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1883 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1885 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1890 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1891 // lock before add_update_monitor
1892 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1894 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1895 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1896 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1897 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1898 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1899 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1901 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1902 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1903 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1904 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1905 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1906 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1910 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1911 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1912 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1913 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1914 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1916 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1918 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1927 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1928 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1929 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1930 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1933 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1934 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1936 let chan_monitor = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1937 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1938 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
1940 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1945 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1946 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1947 funding_txo: funding_txo,
1948 user_channel_id: user_id,
1953 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1954 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1955 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1956 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1957 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1958 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1959 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1961 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
1962 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
1963 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
1964 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
1965 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
1966 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
1967 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
1968 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
1969 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
1970 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
1971 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
1972 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1973 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1974 msg: announcement_sigs,
1979 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
1983 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1984 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
1985 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1986 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1988 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
1989 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1990 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1991 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
1993 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
1994 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
1995 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1996 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2000 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2001 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2002 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2006 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2007 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2008 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2010 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2011 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2016 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2017 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2019 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2020 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2021 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2022 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2030 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2031 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2032 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2033 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2034 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2035 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2036 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2037 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2039 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2040 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2041 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2042 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2047 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2048 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2049 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2050 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2051 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2052 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2053 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2055 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2056 } else { (tx, None) }
2058 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2061 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2062 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2063 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2065 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2066 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2067 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2068 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2076 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2077 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2078 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2079 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2081 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2082 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2083 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2084 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2086 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2089 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2090 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2091 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2092 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2094 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2095 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2096 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2097 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2098 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingForwardHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2099 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2100 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2101 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2102 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2103 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2104 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2105 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2106 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2107 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2109 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2110 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2111 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2112 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2116 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2117 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2118 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2119 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2120 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2121 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2126 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2128 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2133 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2134 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2136 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2137 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2138 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2139 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2140 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2142 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2147 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2151 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2152 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2153 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2154 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2155 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2156 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2157 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2159 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2166 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2167 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2168 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2169 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2171 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2172 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2174 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2175 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set")), channel_state, chan);
2177 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2180 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2184 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2185 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2186 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2187 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2189 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2192 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2193 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2194 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2195 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2196 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2198 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2199 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2200 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2202 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2203 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2204 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2205 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2206 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2207 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2208 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2209 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2211 commitment_signed: msg,
2215 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2216 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2217 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2223 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2228 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2229 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2230 let mut forward_event = None;
2231 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2232 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2233 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2234 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2236 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2237 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2238 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2239 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2241 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2242 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2247 match forward_event {
2249 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2250 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2251 time_forwardable: time
2259 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2260 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2261 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2262 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2263 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2265 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2268 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2269 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, chan_monitor) =
2270 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2271 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2272 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2273 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2274 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2276 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2279 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2280 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2281 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2285 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2287 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2291 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2293 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2296 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2297 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2299 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2304 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2305 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2306 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2307 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2309 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2310 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2312 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2319 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2320 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2321 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2323 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2325 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2326 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2328 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2329 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2332 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2333 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2334 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2336 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2337 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2338 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2339 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2340 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature")), channel_state, chan);
2343 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2345 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2346 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2347 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2348 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2349 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2350 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2351 contents: announcement,
2353 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2356 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2361 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2362 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2363 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2365 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2366 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2367 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2368 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2370 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, channel_monitor, mut order, shutdown) =
2371 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2372 if let Some(monitor) = channel_monitor {
2373 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
2374 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2375 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2376 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2377 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2378 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2380 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2381 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2383 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2384 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2387 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2388 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2389 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2393 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2394 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2395 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2396 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2401 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2402 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2403 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2404 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2410 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2414 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2419 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2420 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2421 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2427 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2431 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2432 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2433 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2434 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2436 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2437 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2438 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2440 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2441 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2443 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2445 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2446 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2447 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2449 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2450 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2452 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2453 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2455 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2456 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, chan_monitor)) =
2457 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2459 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.add_update_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
2462 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2463 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2464 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2465 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2466 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2467 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2468 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2469 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2479 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2480 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2481 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2486 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2487 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2488 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2489 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2490 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2492 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2493 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2494 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2495 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2496 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2498 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2499 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2504 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2505 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2506 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2511 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2512 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2513 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2514 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2515 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2517 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2518 for htlc_update in self.monitor.fetch_pending_htlc_updated() {
2519 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2520 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2521 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2523 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2524 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2529 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2530 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2531 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2536 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2537 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2538 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2539 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2540 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2541 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2543 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2545 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2546 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2547 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2548 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2549 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2550 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2551 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2552 msg: funding_locked,
2554 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2555 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2556 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2557 msg: announcement_sigs,
2560 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2561 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2562 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2563 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2564 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2568 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2569 for tx in txn_matched {
2570 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2571 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2572 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2573 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2574 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2576 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2577 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2578 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2579 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2580 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2581 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2590 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2591 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2592 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2594 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2595 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2596 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2597 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2598 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2599 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2600 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2609 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2610 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2612 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2613 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2616 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2617 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2618 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2619 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2621 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2622 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2623 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2624 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2625 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2626 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2627 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2628 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2630 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2631 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2632 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2642 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2643 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2645 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2646 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2650 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
2651 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2652 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2653 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2655 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2656 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2660 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2661 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2662 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2664 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2665 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2669 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2670 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2671 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2673 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2674 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2678 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2679 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2680 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2683 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2687 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2688 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2689 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2691 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2692 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2696 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2697 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2698 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2700 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2701 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2705 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2706 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2707 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2709 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2710 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2714 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2715 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2716 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2718 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2719 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2723 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2724 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2725 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2727 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2728 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2732 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2733 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2734 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2736 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2737 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2741 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2742 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2743 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2745 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2746 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2750 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2751 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2752 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2754 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2755 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2759 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2760 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2761 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2763 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2764 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2768 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2769 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2770 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2772 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2773 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2777 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2778 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2779 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2781 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2782 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2786 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2787 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2788 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2790 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2791 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2795 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2796 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2797 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2798 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2799 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2801 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2802 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2803 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2804 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2805 if no_connection_possible {
2806 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2807 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2808 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2809 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2810 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2812 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2813 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2814 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2824 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2825 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2826 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2827 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2828 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2829 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2830 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2831 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2833 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2834 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2835 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2839 no_channels_remain = false;
2845 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2847 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2848 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2849 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2850 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2851 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2852 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2853 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2854 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2855 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2856 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2857 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2858 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2859 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2860 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2861 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2865 if no_channels_remain {
2866 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2869 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2870 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2872 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2873 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2874 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2879 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2880 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2882 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2885 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
2886 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
2887 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2888 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
2889 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
2892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
2893 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
2898 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2899 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2900 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2901 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2902 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2903 if !chan.have_received_message() {
2904 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
2905 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
2906 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
2910 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
2911 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
2912 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
2918 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
2921 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
2922 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2924 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
2925 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2926 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
2927 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2931 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
2936 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2937 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
2939 impl Writeable for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2940 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2941 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
2942 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
2943 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
2944 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
2945 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
2946 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
2951 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2952 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingForwardHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
2953 Ok(PendingForwardHTLCInfo {
2954 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
2955 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
2956 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
2957 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
2958 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
2959 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
2964 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
2965 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2967 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
2969 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2971 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
2973 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
2980 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
2981 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
2982 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2983 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2984 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
2985 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2990 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
2991 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
2993 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
2995 forward_info.write(writer)?;
2997 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
2999 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3006 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3007 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3008 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3009 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3010 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3011 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3016 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3019 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3022 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3023 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3025 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3027 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3029 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3031 route.write(writer)?;
3032 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3033 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3040 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3041 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3042 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3043 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3044 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3045 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3046 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3047 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3049 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3054 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3055 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3057 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3061 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3063 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3064 data.write(writer)?;
3071 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3072 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3073 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3074 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3075 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3076 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3077 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3079 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3084 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3085 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3087 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3089 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3090 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3091 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3093 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3095 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3096 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3103 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3104 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3105 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3106 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3107 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3108 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3109 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3111 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3112 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3113 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3115 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3120 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner> {
3121 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3122 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3124 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3125 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3127 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3128 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3129 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3131 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3132 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3133 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3134 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3135 unfunded_channels += 1;
3138 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3139 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3140 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3141 channel.write(writer)?;
3145 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3146 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3147 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3148 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3149 for forward in pending_forwards {
3150 forward.write(writer)?;
3154 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3155 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3156 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3157 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3158 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3159 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3160 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3164 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3165 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3166 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3167 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3168 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3169 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3176 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3178 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3180 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3181 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3182 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3183 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3184 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3185 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3186 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3187 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3188 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3189 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3190 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3191 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
3192 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3193 /// deserialization.
3194 pub keys_manager: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>,
3196 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3198 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3199 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3200 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3202 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3203 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3204 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3205 pub monitor: Arc<ManyChannelMonitor>,
3207 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3208 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3209 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3210 pub tx_broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
3211 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3212 /// deserialization.
3213 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3214 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3215 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3216 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3218 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3219 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3221 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3222 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3223 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3224 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3226 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3228 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor>,
3231 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner>) {
3232 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3233 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3234 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3235 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3236 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3239 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3240 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3241 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3243 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3245 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3246 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3247 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3248 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3249 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3250 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3251 if channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3252 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3255 let funding_txo = channel.channel_monitor().get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3256 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3257 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3258 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3259 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3260 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() {
3261 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3262 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3263 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3265 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3266 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3268 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3271 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3275 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3276 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3277 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3281 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3282 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3283 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3284 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3285 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3286 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3287 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3288 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3290 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3293 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3294 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3295 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3296 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3297 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3298 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3299 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3300 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3302 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3305 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3306 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3307 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3308 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3309 let peer_state = PeerState {
3310 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3312 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3315 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3317 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3318 monitor: args.monitor,
3319 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3321 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3322 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3323 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3325 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3330 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3332 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3334 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3336 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3337 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3338 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3339 logger: args.logger,
3340 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3343 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3344 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3345 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3346 //connection or two.
3349 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))