1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
22 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
27 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
28 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
33 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
34 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
35 use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
49 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
50 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
53 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
54 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
55 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
56 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
57 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
59 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
60 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
61 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
65 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
67 self.update_id.write(w)?;
68 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
69 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
70 update_step.write(w)?;
75 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
77 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
78 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
79 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
81 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
83 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
87 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
89 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
90 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
91 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
93 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
94 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
95 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
96 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
98 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
99 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
100 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
102 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
103 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
104 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
105 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
106 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
107 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
110 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
111 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
114 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
115 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
116 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
117 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
118 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
121 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
122 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
123 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
125 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
126 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
127 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
128 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
130 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
135 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
136 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
137 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
139 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
141 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
143 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
144 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
147 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
148 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
149 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
151 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
153 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
154 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
155 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
158 /// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
159 /// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
160 /// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
161 /// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
162 /// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
163 /// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
165 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
166 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
167 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
168 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
170 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
171 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
172 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
173 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
174 /// all registered listeners in one go.
175 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
176 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
178 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
179 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
180 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
182 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
183 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
184 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
186 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
187 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
188 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
190 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
192 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
193 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
194 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
196 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
197 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
198 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
200 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
201 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
202 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
204 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
205 /// with success or failure.
207 /// You should probably just call through to
208 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
210 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
213 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
214 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
216 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
218 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
219 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
220 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
222 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
223 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
224 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref>
225 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
226 F::Target: FeeEstimator
228 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
229 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
231 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
232 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
238 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
239 ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
240 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
241 F::Target: FeeEstimator
243 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
244 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
246 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
247 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
248 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
250 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
251 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
252 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
259 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
260 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
261 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
262 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
263 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
268 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
269 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
270 F::Target: FeeEstimator
272 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
273 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
274 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F> {
275 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
276 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
280 fee_estimator: feeest,
286 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
287 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
288 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
289 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
293 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(monitor.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
294 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&monitor.funding_info.0.txid, &monitor.funding_info.1);
295 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((monitor.funding_info.0.txid, monitor.funding_info.0.index as u32), &monitor.funding_info.1);
296 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
297 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
298 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
301 entry.insert(monitor);
305 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
306 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
307 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
308 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
309 Some(orig_monitor) => {
310 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
311 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster)
313 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
318 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F>
319 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
320 F::Target: FeeEstimator
322 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
323 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
325 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
329 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
330 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
332 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
336 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
337 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
338 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
339 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
341 pending_htlcs_updated
345 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
346 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
347 F::Target: FeeEstimator
349 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
350 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
351 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
352 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
358 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
359 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
360 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
361 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
362 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
363 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
364 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
365 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
366 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
367 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
368 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
369 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
370 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
371 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
372 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
373 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
374 /// accurate block height.
375 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
376 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
377 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
378 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
379 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
380 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
381 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
382 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
383 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
384 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
385 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
386 /// Number of blocks before confirmation at which we fail back an un-relayed HTLC or at which we
387 /// refuse to accept a new HTLC.
389 /// This is used for a few separate purposes:
390 /// 1) if we've received an MPP HTLC to us and it expires within this many blocks and we are
391 /// waiting on additional parts (or waiting on the preimage for any HTLC from the user), we will
393 /// 2) if we receive an HTLC within this many blocks of its expiry (plus one to avoid a race
394 /// condition with the above), we will fail this HTLC without telling the user we received it,
395 /// 3) if we are waiting on a connection or a channel state update to send an HTLC to a peer, and
396 /// that HTLC expires within this many blocks, we will simply fail the HTLC instead.
398 /// (1) is all about protecting us - we need enough time to update the channel state before we hit
399 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, at which point we'd go on chain to claim the HTLC with the preimage.
401 /// (2) is the same, but with an additional buffer to avoid accepting an HTLC which is immediately
402 /// in a race condition between the user connecting a block (which would fail it) and the user
403 /// providing us the preimage (which would claim it).
405 /// (3) is about our counterparty - we don't want to relay an HTLC to a counterparty when they may
406 /// end up force-closing the channel on us to claim it.
407 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER: u32 = CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
409 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
410 struct LocalSignedTx {
411 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
413 revocation_key: PublicKey,
414 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
415 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
416 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
417 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
419 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
422 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
423 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
424 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
425 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
426 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
428 witness_script: Script,
429 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
435 witness_script: Script,
437 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
442 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
448 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
449 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
451 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
452 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
453 witness_script.write(writer)?;
454 pubkey.write(writer)?;
455 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
456 is_htlc.write(writer)?;
457 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
459 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
460 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
461 witness_script.write(writer)?;
463 preimage.write(writer)?;
464 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
465 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
467 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
468 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
469 preimage.write(writer)?;
470 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
472 &InputMaterial::Funding {} => {
473 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
480 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
481 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
482 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
484 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
485 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
486 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
487 let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
488 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
489 InputMaterial::Revoked {
498 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
499 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
500 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
501 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
502 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
503 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
512 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
513 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
514 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
520 InputMaterial::Funding {}
522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
528 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
529 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
530 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
531 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
532 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
533 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
534 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
535 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
536 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
537 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
538 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
539 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
540 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
541 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
542 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
543 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
544 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
545 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
546 // and satisfy witness program.
547 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
550 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
551 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
552 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
554 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
555 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
556 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
558 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
561 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
565 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
566 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
568 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
570 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
571 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
572 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
573 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
575 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
576 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
577 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
578 commitment_number: u64,
579 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
582 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
588 /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should
589 /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state.
590 RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
591 their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
593 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
594 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
596 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
597 /// think we've fallen behind!
598 should_broadcast: bool,
602 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
603 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
605 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
607 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
608 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
609 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
615 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
617 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
618 commitment_number.write(w)?;
619 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
620 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
621 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
623 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
626 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
628 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
630 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
635 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => {
637 their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
639 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
641 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
647 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
648 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
649 match Readable::read(r)? {
651 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
652 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
654 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
655 let mut res = Vec::new();
657 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
664 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
665 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
666 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
667 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
669 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
670 let mut res = Vec::new();
672 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
679 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
680 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
684 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
685 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
686 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
690 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
691 their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
695 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
696 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
699 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
704 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
705 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
707 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
708 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
710 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
711 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
712 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
713 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
714 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
715 latest_update_id: u64,
716 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
718 destination_script: Script,
719 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>,
720 broadcasted_remote_payment_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
721 shutdown_script: Script,
724 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
725 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
726 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
728 their_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
729 their_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
730 funding_redeemscript: Script,
731 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
732 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
733 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
735 our_to_self_delay: u16,
736 their_to_self_delay: u16,
738 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
739 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
740 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
741 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
742 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
743 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
744 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
745 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
746 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
747 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
748 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
749 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
750 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
752 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
753 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
754 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
755 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
756 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
757 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
759 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
761 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
762 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
764 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
766 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
768 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
769 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
771 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
772 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
773 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
774 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
776 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
777 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
778 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
779 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
780 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
783 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
785 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
787 // Used to detect programming bug due to unsafe monitor update sequence { ChannelForceClosed, LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo }
788 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
790 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
791 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
792 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
793 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
794 // the full block_connected).
795 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
796 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
800 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
801 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
802 /// underlying object
803 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
804 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
805 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
806 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
807 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
808 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
809 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script != other.broadcasted_remote_payment_script ||
810 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
811 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
812 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
813 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
814 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
815 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
816 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
817 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
818 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
819 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
820 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
821 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
822 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
823 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
824 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
825 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
826 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
827 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
828 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
829 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
830 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
831 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
832 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
833 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
842 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
843 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
845 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
846 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
847 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
848 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
849 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
850 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
851 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
852 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
853 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
854 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
856 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
858 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
859 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
861 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
862 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
863 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
864 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
865 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
866 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
868 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
871 if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script {
872 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
873 broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0.write(writer)?;
874 broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1.write(writer)?;
876 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
878 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
880 self.keys.write(writer)?;
881 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
882 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
883 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
884 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
885 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
887 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.serialize())?;
888 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?;
889 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
890 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
892 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
893 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
894 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
895 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
896 match second_option {
897 Some(second_pubkey) => {
898 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
901 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
906 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
911 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay))?;
913 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
915 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
916 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
917 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
918 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
919 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
920 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
921 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
925 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
926 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
927 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
928 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
929 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
930 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
931 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
935 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
936 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
937 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
938 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
939 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
940 for script in txouts.iter() {
941 script.write(writer)?;
945 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
946 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
947 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
948 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
951 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
952 ($local_tx: expr) => {
953 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
954 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
955 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
956 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
957 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
958 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
960 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
961 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
962 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
963 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
964 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
966 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
970 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
975 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
976 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
977 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
979 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
982 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
984 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
985 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
987 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
988 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
989 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
992 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
993 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
997 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
998 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
999 event.write(writer)?;
1002 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1004 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1005 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1006 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1007 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1008 for ev in events.iter() {
1010 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1012 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1013 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1015 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1017 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1023 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1024 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1025 txid.write(writer)?;
1026 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1027 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1028 script.write(writer)?;
1031 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1033 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1039 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1040 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1041 our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1042 their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1043 their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1044 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1045 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
1046 logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1048 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1049 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1050 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1052 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), their_to_self_delay, logger.clone());
1054 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64;
1055 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64;
1056 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1057 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1058 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1059 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1060 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1061 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1062 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1063 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1064 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1066 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1067 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1068 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1069 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1070 // now but we should consider it later.
1071 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1074 latest_update_id: 0,
1075 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1077 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1078 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1079 broadcasted_remote_payment_script: None,
1084 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1085 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1087 their_htlc_base_key: their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
1088 their_delayed_payment_base_key: their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1089 funding_redeemscript,
1090 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1091 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1094 their_to_self_delay,
1096 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1097 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1098 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1099 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1101 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1102 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1103 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1104 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1106 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1107 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1108 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1110 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1111 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1115 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1117 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1118 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1123 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1124 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1125 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1126 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1127 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1128 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1131 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1132 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1133 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1134 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1139 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1140 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1141 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1142 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1143 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1145 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1146 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1147 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1151 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1152 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1153 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1158 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1165 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1174 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1175 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1176 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1177 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1178 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1179 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1180 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1181 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1183 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1184 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1187 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1188 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1189 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1190 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1191 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1192 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1193 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1194 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1195 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1196 Some(old_points) => {
1197 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1198 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1199 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1200 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1201 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1203 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1206 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1210 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1215 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1216 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1217 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1218 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1220 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()) {
1221 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1226 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1227 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1228 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1229 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1230 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1231 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1232 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1233 let sequence = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64;
1234 let locktime = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64;
1235 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1237 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1238 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1239 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1240 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1241 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1242 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1243 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1245 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1246 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1247 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1248 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1249 // now but we should consider it later.
1250 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1251 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1253 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1254 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1255 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1259 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1260 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1261 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1262 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1265 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B)
1266 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1268 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn().iter() {
1269 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1273 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1274 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1275 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1277 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1278 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1279 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1281 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1282 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1283 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1284 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1285 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1286 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1287 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1288 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1289 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1292 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1296 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1299 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1300 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1301 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1303 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1304 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1306 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1308 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1309 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1310 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1312 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1313 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1314 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1315 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1316 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1317 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1318 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1319 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1320 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1321 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1322 if should_broadcast {
1323 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster);
1325 log_error!(self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1330 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1334 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1336 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1337 self.latest_update_id
1340 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1341 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> OutPoint {
1345 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1346 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1347 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1348 &self.outputs_to_watch
1351 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1352 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1353 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1354 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1355 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1356 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1357 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1358 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1359 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1365 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1366 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1367 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1368 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1369 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1373 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1376 /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1377 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1378 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1379 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1380 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1381 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1385 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1386 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1387 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1390 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1391 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1394 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1395 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1398 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1399 self.current_local_commitment_number
1402 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1403 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1404 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1405 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1406 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1407 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1408 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1409 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1410 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1411 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1412 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1414 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1415 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1417 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1418 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1421 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1426 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1427 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1428 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1429 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1430 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1431 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1432 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1433 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1434 let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()));
1435 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1436 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1438 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1439 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1441 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = {
1442 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1443 // script_pubkey version
1444 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize());
1445 Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key))
1448 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1449 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1450 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1451 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value };
1452 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1456 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1457 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1458 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1459 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1460 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1461 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1462 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1463 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1464 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1466 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value };
1467 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1472 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1473 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1474 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1475 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1476 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1477 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1479 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1480 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1481 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1482 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1483 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1484 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1485 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1487 let e = entry.get_mut();
1488 e.retain(|ref event| {
1490 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1491 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1496 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1498 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1499 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1507 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1508 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1510 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1511 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1513 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1515 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1516 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1517 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1518 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1519 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1520 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1521 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1523 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1524 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1526 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1528 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1529 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1530 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1531 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1532 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1533 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1534 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1535 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1536 // payment_preimage.
1537 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1538 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1539 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1540 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1542 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1543 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1547 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1548 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1550 let e = entry.get_mut();
1551 e.retain(|ref event| {
1553 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1554 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1559 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1561 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1562 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1570 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1571 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1573 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1574 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1577 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1578 let revocation_point_option =
1579 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1580 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1581 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1583 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1584 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1585 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1586 let htlc_privkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.htlc_base_key()));
1587 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1588 let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()));
1590 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = {
1591 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1592 // script_pubkey version
1593 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize());
1594 Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key))
1597 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1598 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1599 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1600 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1601 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1602 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1603 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1604 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1606 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1607 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1608 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1609 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry };
1610 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1617 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1620 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1621 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>) {
1622 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1623 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1624 return (Vec::new(), None)
1627 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1628 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1631 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1636 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1637 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1638 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1639 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1640 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1641 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1642 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1644 log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1645 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value };
1646 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1647 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1650 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>) {
1651 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1652 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1654 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1655 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, self.keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) {
1656 Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_delayedkey, redeemscript))
1659 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1660 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1661 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1662 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }});
1663 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1667 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1670 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1671 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1672 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1673 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1674 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1675 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1676 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1678 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1679 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1680 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1681 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1683 let e = entry.get_mut();
1684 e.retain(|ref event| {
1686 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1687 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1692 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1695 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1701 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1702 ($updates: expr) => {
1703 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1704 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1705 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1709 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1710 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1712 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1714 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1715 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1716 append_onchain_update!(res);
1717 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1718 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1720 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1721 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1722 append_onchain_update!(res);
1726 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1727 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1728 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1729 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1730 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1731 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1739 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1740 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1741 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1745 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1748 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1749 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1750 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1751 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1752 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1753 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1754 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1755 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1756 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1757 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1758 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1759 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx() {
1760 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1761 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1762 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1763 if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1764 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1765 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) {
1770 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1771 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1777 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1778 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1779 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1781 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1782 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1783 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx() {
1784 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1785 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1786 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1787 if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1788 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1789 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) {
1799 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
1800 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
1801 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
1802 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
1804 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>
1805 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1806 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1808 for tx in txn_matched {
1809 let mut output_val = 0;
1810 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1811 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1812 output_val += out.value;
1813 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1817 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1818 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1819 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1820 for tx in txn_matched {
1821 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1822 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1823 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1824 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1826 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1827 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1828 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1829 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height);
1830 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1831 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1833 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1834 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
1835 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1836 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1838 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1840 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1843 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1844 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height);
1845 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1846 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1847 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1852 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1853 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1854 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1855 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
1857 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height);
1859 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height);
1860 if should_broadcast {
1861 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding {}});
1863 if should_broadcast {
1864 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx() {
1865 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1866 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1867 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1869 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1872 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1875 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1876 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1877 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1878 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1879 payment_preimage: None,
1880 source: htlc_update.0,
1883 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1884 log_trace!(self, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1885 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1886 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1892 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator);
1894 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1895 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1896 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1902 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)
1903 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1904 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1906 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1907 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1909 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1910 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1913 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator);
1915 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1918 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1919 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1920 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1921 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1922 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1923 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1924 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1925 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1926 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1927 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1928 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1929 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1930 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1931 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1932 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1933 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1934 // time out the HTLC first.
1935 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1936 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1937 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1938 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1939 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1940 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1941 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1942 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1943 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1944 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1945 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1946 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1947 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1948 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1949 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1950 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1951 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1952 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1953 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1954 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1955 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1956 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1957 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1958 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1965 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1967 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1968 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1969 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1972 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1973 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1974 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1981 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1982 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1983 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
1984 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1985 let mut payment_data = None;
1986 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1987 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
1988 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
1989 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
1991 macro_rules! log_claim {
1992 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
1993 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
1994 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
1995 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
1996 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
1997 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
1998 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
1999 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2000 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2001 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2002 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2003 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2005 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2006 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2007 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2008 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2013 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2014 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2015 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2016 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2017 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2018 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2019 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2020 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2029 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2030 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2031 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2032 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2033 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2034 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2035 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2036 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2037 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2038 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2039 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2040 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2041 } else if !$local_tx {
2042 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2043 if payment_data.is_none() {
2044 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2047 if payment_data.is_none() {
2048 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2049 continue 'outer_loop;
2056 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2057 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2058 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2060 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2061 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2062 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2063 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2066 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2067 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2068 "remote commitment tx", false);
2071 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2072 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2073 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2074 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2075 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2076 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2077 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2078 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2080 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2084 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2085 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2086 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2087 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2089 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2094 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2095 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2096 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2097 let e = entry.get_mut();
2098 e.retain(|ref event| {
2100 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2101 return htlc_update.0 != source
2106 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2108 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2109 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2117 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2118 fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2119 let mut spendable_output = None;
2120 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2121 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2122 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2123 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2124 output: outp.clone(),
2127 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2128 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2129 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2130 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2131 key: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2132 witness_script: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2133 to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
2134 output: outp.clone(),
2138 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script {
2139 if broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2140 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2141 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2142 key: broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1,
2143 output: outp.clone(),
2147 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2148 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2149 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2150 output: outp.clone(),
2154 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2155 log_trace!(self, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2156 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2157 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2158 let e = entry.get_mut();
2159 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2162 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2169 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2171 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2172 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2173 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2177 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2182 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2183 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2184 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2185 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2188 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2189 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2191 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2192 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2194 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2195 let local_delayedkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2196 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2197 Some((revokable_address, local_delayedkey, revokable_script))
2200 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2202 let broadcasted_remote_payment_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2204 let payment_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2205 let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2206 Some((payment_address, payment_key))
2209 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2211 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2213 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2214 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2215 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2216 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2217 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2218 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2220 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2221 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2222 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2224 let their_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2225 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2226 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2227 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2229 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2230 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2234 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2235 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2236 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2237 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2239 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2244 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2245 let their_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2247 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2249 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2252 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2253 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2254 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2255 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2256 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2258 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2259 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2265 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2266 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2267 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2268 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2269 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2270 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2271 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2272 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2274 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2275 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2279 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2280 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2281 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2282 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2283 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2284 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2285 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2286 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2287 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2289 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2290 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2294 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2295 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2296 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2297 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2298 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2299 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2300 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2304 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2307 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2308 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2309 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2310 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2311 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2312 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2313 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2315 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2316 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2317 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2318 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2319 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2321 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2322 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2324 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2329 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2336 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2339 Some(read_local_tx!())
2341 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2343 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2345 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2346 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2348 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2349 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2350 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2351 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2352 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2353 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2354 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2358 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2359 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2360 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2361 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2364 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2365 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2366 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2367 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2368 pending_events.push(event);
2372 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2374 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2375 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2376 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2377 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2378 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2379 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2380 for _ in 0..events_len {
2381 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2383 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2384 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2385 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2386 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2390 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2391 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2395 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2399 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2402 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2403 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2404 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2405 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2406 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2407 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2408 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2409 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2411 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2412 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2415 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
2417 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2419 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2421 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2424 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2425 broadcasted_remote_payment_script,
2430 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2431 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2433 their_htlc_base_key,
2434 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2435 funding_redeemscript,
2436 channel_value_satoshis,
2437 their_cur_revocation_points,
2440 their_to_self_delay,
2443 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2444 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2445 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2447 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2448 current_local_commitment_tx,
2449 current_remote_commitment_number,
2450 current_local_commitment_number,
2453 pending_htlcs_updated,
2456 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2461 lockdown_from_offchain,
2464 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2472 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2473 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2474 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2475 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2476 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2477 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2478 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2479 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2480 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2482 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2483 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2484 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2485 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2487 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2488 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2489 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2490 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2491 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2493 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2496 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2497 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2498 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2500 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2501 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2503 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2505 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2507 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2508 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2509 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2510 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2514 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2515 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2517 let mut res = Vec::new();
2518 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2519 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2523 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2524 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2531 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2532 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2534 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2535 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2541 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2542 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2543 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2544 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2549 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2551 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2552 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2553 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2554 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2555 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2560 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2562 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2563 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2564 (OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2565 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2566 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2567 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), logger.clone());
2569 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2570 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2571 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2572 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2573 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2574 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2575 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2578 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2579 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2580 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2581 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2582 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2583 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2584 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2586 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2587 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2588 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2589 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2590 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2591 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2593 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2594 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2595 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2596 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2597 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2598 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2599 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2600 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2602 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2603 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2604 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2605 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2606 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2607 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2611 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2612 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2613 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2615 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2616 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2617 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2618 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2620 macro_rules! sign_input {
2621 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2622 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2623 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2625 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2626 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2627 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2629 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2630 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2631 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2632 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2633 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2634 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2635 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2636 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2637 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2638 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2639 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2640 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2642 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2644 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2645 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2646 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2647 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2651 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2652 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2654 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2655 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2657 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2658 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2662 script_sig: Script::new(),
2663 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2664 witness: Vec::new(),
2667 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2668 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2671 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2672 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2673 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2674 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2675 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2677 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2679 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2680 claim_tx.input.clear();
2681 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2683 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2684 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2688 script_sig: Script::new(),
2689 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2690 witness: Vec::new(),
2693 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2694 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2695 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2696 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2697 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2699 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2701 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2702 claim_tx.input.clear();
2703 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2704 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2705 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2709 script_sig: Script::new(),
2710 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2711 witness: Vec::new(),
2713 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2714 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2715 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2716 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2717 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2719 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2722 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.