1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
113 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
115 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
116 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
117 /// any spends of it.
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
120 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
121 /// with success or failure backward
122 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
125 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
126 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
128 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
130 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
131 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
132 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
134 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
135 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
136 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
137 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
138 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
140 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
141 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
142 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
143 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
144 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
146 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
149 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
150 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
151 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
152 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
153 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
155 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
156 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
157 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
158 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
159 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
160 outputs: spendable_outputs,
164 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
165 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
166 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
169 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
173 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
174 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
175 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
176 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
178 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
179 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
180 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
181 let mut existing_claim = false;
182 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
183 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
184 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
185 existing_claim = true;
191 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
195 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
201 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
204 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
205 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
206 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
207 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
208 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
213 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
214 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
215 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
216 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
217 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
218 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
221 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
222 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
224 fee_estimator: feeest,
230 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
231 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
232 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
233 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
234 Some(orig_monitor) => {
235 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
236 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
240 match monitor.key_storage {
241 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
244 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
246 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
247 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
248 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
249 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
253 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
254 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
257 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
262 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
263 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
264 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
266 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
270 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
271 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
272 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
273 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
275 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
277 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
282 pending_htlcs_updated
286 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
287 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
288 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
289 let mut ret = Vec::new();
290 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
295 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
296 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
297 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
298 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
299 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
300 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
301 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
302 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
303 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
304 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
305 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
306 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
307 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
308 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
309 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
310 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
311 /// accurate block height.
312 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
313 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
314 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
315 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
316 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
317 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
318 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
319 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
320 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
321 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
322 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
324 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
327 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
328 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
329 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
330 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
331 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
332 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
333 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
334 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
335 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
336 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
339 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
340 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
344 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
345 struct LocalSignedTx {
346 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
349 revocation_key: PublicKey,
350 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
351 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
352 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
354 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
358 enum InputDescriptors {
363 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
366 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
367 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
368 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
373 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
381 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
386 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
387 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
392 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
393 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
394 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
396 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
397 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
399 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
401 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
402 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
403 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
405 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
409 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
410 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
412 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
413 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
415 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
416 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
418 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
419 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
421 key_storage: Storage,
422 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
423 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
424 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
425 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
427 our_to_self_delay: u16,
428 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
430 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
431 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
432 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
433 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
434 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
435 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
436 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
437 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
438 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
439 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
440 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
441 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
442 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
444 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
445 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
446 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
447 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
448 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
449 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
451 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
453 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
455 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
457 destination_script: Script,
458 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
459 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
460 // scan every commitment transaction for that
461 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
463 // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
464 // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
465 // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
466 // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
467 // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
468 // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
469 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
471 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
472 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
473 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
474 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
476 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
477 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
478 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
479 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
480 // the full block_connected).
481 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
482 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
486 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
487 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
489 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
490 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
492 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
493 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
495 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
496 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
498 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
499 $spent_txid, fee, $value);
502 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
503 $spent_txid, $value);
508 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
509 $spent_txid, $value);
521 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
522 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
523 /// underlying object
524 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
525 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
526 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
527 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
528 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
529 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
530 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
531 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
532 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
533 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
534 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
535 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
536 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
537 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
538 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
539 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
540 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
541 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
542 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
543 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
547 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
548 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
557 impl ChannelMonitor {
558 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
560 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
562 key_storage: Storage::Local {
563 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
564 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
565 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
566 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
567 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
568 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
569 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
571 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
572 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
574 their_htlc_base_key: None,
575 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
576 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
578 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
579 their_to_self_delay: None,
581 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
582 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
583 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
584 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
586 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
587 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
588 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
590 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
591 destination_script: destination_script,
592 to_remote_rescue: None,
594 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
596 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
598 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
599 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
604 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
605 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
607 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
608 tx_weight += match inp {
609 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
610 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
611 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
613 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
614 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
615 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
617 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
618 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
619 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
621 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
622 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
623 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
625 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
626 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
627 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
634 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
635 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
636 return current_height + 1
637 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
638 return current_height + 3
644 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
646 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
654 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
655 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
657 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
658 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
659 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
660 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
666 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
667 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
668 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
669 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
670 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
672 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
673 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
674 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
677 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
680 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
682 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
683 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
684 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
685 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
686 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
687 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
693 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
694 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
695 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
696 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
697 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
699 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
700 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
701 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
705 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
706 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
707 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
712 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
719 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
728 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
729 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
730 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
731 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
732 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
733 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
734 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
735 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
737 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
738 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
741 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
742 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
743 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
744 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
745 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
746 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
748 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
749 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
750 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
751 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
752 Some(old_points) => {
753 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
754 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
755 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
756 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
757 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
759 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
762 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
766 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
771 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
772 match self.key_storage {
773 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
774 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
775 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
776 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
778 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
779 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
783 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
787 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
788 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
789 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
790 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
791 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
792 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
793 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
794 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
795 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
796 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
797 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
798 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
799 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
800 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
801 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
802 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
803 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
808 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
809 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
811 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
815 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
816 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
817 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
818 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
821 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
822 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
823 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
824 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
825 match self.key_storage {
826 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
827 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
828 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
829 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
830 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
831 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
832 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
833 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
834 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
837 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
840 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
841 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
844 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
848 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
849 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
850 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
851 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
853 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
854 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
855 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
856 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
857 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
858 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
862 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
863 // local transactions to decide how to merge
864 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
865 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
866 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
867 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
869 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
870 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
872 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
873 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
875 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
876 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
879 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
883 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
884 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
885 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
886 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
889 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
890 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
891 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
892 /// provides slightly better privacy.
893 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
894 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
895 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
896 match self.key_storage {
897 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
898 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
900 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
901 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
906 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
907 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
908 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
909 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
912 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
913 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
916 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
917 match self.key_storage {
918 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
919 *funding_info = None;
921 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
922 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
927 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
928 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
929 match self.key_storage {
930 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
932 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
936 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
942 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
943 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
944 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
945 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
946 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
947 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
948 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
949 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
950 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
956 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
957 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
958 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
959 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
960 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
961 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
963 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
964 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
966 macro_rules! write_option {
973 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
978 match self.key_storage {
979 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
980 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
981 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
982 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
983 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
984 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
985 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
986 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
987 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
989 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
990 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
991 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
992 script.write(writer)?;
995 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
998 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
999 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1001 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1004 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1005 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1007 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1008 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1009 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1010 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1011 match second_option {
1012 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1013 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1016 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1021 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1025 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1026 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1028 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1029 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1030 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1033 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1034 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1035 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1036 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1037 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1038 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1039 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1043 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1044 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1045 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1046 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1047 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1048 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1049 write_option!(htlc_source);
1053 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1054 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1055 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1056 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1057 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1058 for script in txouts.iter() {
1059 script.write(writer)?;
1063 if for_local_storage {
1064 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1065 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1066 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1067 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1070 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1073 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1074 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1075 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1077 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1078 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1082 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1083 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1084 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1085 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1087 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1088 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1089 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1090 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1091 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1093 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1094 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1098 write_option!(htlc_source);
1103 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1104 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1105 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1107 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1110 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1111 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1112 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1114 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1117 if for_local_storage {
1118 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1120 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1123 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1124 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1125 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1128 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1129 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1130 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1131 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1132 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1133 local_key.write(writer)?;
1135 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1138 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
1139 for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
1140 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1141 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
1142 match claim_tx_data.1 {
1143 TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
1144 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1145 script.write(writer)?;
1146 pubkey.write(writer)?;
1147 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
1149 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1151 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1153 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1155 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1156 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1157 script.write(writer)?;
1159 preimage.write(writer)?;
1160 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1162 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1163 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1164 script.write(writer)?;
1165 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
1166 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
1167 preimage.write(writer)?;
1168 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1171 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
1172 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
1173 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
1176 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1177 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1178 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1179 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1180 for ev in events.iter() {
1182 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
1183 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1184 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1186 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1187 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1188 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1189 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1198 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1200 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1201 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1202 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1203 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1204 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1205 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1206 self.write(writer, true)
1209 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1211 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1212 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1213 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1214 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1215 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1216 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1217 self.write(writer, false)
1220 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1221 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1222 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1223 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1224 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1227 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1231 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1232 //TODO This can be optimized?
1233 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1234 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1242 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1243 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1246 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1247 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1248 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1249 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1252 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1253 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1254 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1255 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1256 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1257 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1258 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1259 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1260 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1261 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1262 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1263 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1265 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1266 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1268 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1269 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1272 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1277 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1278 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1279 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1280 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1281 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1282 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1283 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1284 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1285 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1286 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1288 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1289 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1290 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1291 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1295 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1296 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1297 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1298 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1301 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1302 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1304 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1305 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1306 // script_pubkey version.
1307 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1308 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1311 let mut total_value = 0;
1312 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1313 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1314 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1316 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1317 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1319 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1320 txid: commitment_txid,
1323 script_sig: Script::new(),
1324 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1325 witness: Vec::new(),
1327 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1328 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1329 total_value += outp.value;
1330 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1331 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1332 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1333 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1334 output: outp.clone(),
1339 macro_rules! sign_input {
1340 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1342 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1343 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1344 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1345 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1346 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1348 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1349 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1350 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1352 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1356 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1357 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1358 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1359 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1361 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1363 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1364 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1369 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1370 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1372 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1373 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1374 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1375 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1376 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1377 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1378 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1381 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1382 txid: commitment_txid,
1383 vout: transaction_output_index,
1385 script_sig: Script::new(),
1386 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1387 witness: Vec::new(),
1389 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1391 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1392 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1393 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1395 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1399 output: vec!(TxOut {
1400 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1401 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1404 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1405 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1406 let mut used_feerate;
1407 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1408 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1409 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1410 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1411 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1413 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1415 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1422 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1423 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1424 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1425 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1426 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1428 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1429 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1430 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1431 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1432 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1433 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1434 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1435 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1436 let e = entry.get_mut();
1437 e.retain(|ref event| {
1439 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1440 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1445 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1447 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1448 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1456 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1457 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1458 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1460 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1461 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1464 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1466 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1468 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1469 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1472 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1479 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1481 let mut used_feerate;
1482 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1483 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1486 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1488 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1489 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1490 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1491 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1492 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1493 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
1496 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1498 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1499 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1500 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1502 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1503 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1504 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1505 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1506 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1507 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1508 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1509 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1511 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1512 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1514 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1516 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1517 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1518 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1519 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1520 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1521 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1522 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1523 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1524 // payment_preimage.
1525 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1526 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1527 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1528 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1530 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1531 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1535 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1536 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1538 let e = entry.get_mut();
1539 e.retain(|ref event| {
1541 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1542 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1547 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1550 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1558 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1559 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1560 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1562 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1563 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1567 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1568 let revocation_point_option =
1569 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1570 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1571 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1573 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1574 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1575 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1576 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1577 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1579 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1580 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1581 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1584 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1585 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1586 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1589 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1590 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1591 match self.key_storage {
1592 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1593 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1594 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1595 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1597 output: outp.clone(),
1601 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1603 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1607 let mut total_value = 0;
1608 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1609 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1610 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1612 macro_rules! sign_input {
1613 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1615 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1616 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1617 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1618 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1619 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1620 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1621 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1623 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1627 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1628 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1629 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1630 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1631 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1636 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1637 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1638 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1639 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1640 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1641 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1642 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1644 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1647 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1648 txid: commitment_txid,
1649 vout: transaction_output_index,
1651 script_sig: Script::new(),
1652 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1653 witness: Vec::new(),
1655 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1657 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1658 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1659 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1661 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1665 output: vec!(TxOut {
1666 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1667 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1670 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1671 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1672 let mut used_feerate;
1673 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1674 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1675 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1676 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1677 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1678 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1679 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1681 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1682 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1683 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1685 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1691 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1692 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1694 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1695 txid: commitment_txid,
1696 vout: transaction_output_index,
1698 script_sig: Script::new(),
1699 sequence: idx as u32,
1700 witness: Vec::new(),
1702 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1704 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1706 output: vec!(TxOut {
1707 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1708 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1711 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1712 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1713 let mut used_feerate;
1714 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1715 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1716 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1717 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1718 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1719 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1721 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1724 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1729 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1731 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1732 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1735 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1742 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1744 let mut used_feerate;
1745 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1746 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1749 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1751 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1752 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1753 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1754 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1756 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
1759 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1760 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1761 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1762 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1764 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1767 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1768 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1769 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1770 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1771 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1772 key: local_key.clone(),
1773 output: outp.clone(),
1779 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1782 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1783 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1784 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1788 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1789 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1792 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1797 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1798 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1799 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1800 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1801 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1802 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1804 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1805 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1808 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1809 None => return (None, None),
1810 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1812 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1813 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1814 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1816 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1819 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1821 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1825 script_sig: Script::new(),
1826 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1827 witness: Vec::new(),
1829 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1832 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1833 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1834 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1838 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1844 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1845 let mut used_feerate;
1846 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1847 return (None, None);
1850 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1852 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1853 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1854 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1855 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1856 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
1858 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1862 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1863 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1864 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1865 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1867 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1868 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1869 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1870 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
1871 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1872 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
1875 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1876 } else { (None, None) }
1879 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
1880 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1881 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1882 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1883 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1885 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1886 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1887 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1888 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1889 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1890 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1891 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1892 key: local_delayedkey,
1893 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1894 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1895 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1904 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1905 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1906 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1907 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1908 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1913 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1914 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1915 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1917 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1918 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1920 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1922 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1923 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1924 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1925 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1927 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1928 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1929 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1931 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1932 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1933 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1934 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1936 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1937 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1938 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1940 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1942 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1943 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1944 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1945 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1947 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1948 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1949 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1951 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1952 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1953 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1954 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1957 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1958 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1962 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
1965 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1966 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1967 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1968 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1969 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1970 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
1971 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1972 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1974 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1975 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1976 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1977 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1979 let e = entry.get_mut();
1980 e.retain(|ref event| {
1982 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1983 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1988 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1990 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1991 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1997 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1998 ($updates: expr) => {
1999 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2000 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2001 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2002 for claim in $updates.3 {
2003 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2005 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2011 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2012 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2014 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2015 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2017 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2018 match self.key_storage {
2019 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2020 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2022 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2023 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2028 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2029 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2031 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2032 match self.key_storage {
2033 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2034 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
2036 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2037 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2043 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2044 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2045 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2046 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2047 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2048 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2056 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2057 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2059 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2060 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2064 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2067 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2068 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2069 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2070 match self.key_storage {
2071 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2072 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2073 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2074 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2075 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2076 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2077 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2078 output: output.clone(),
2083 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2084 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2085 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2092 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2093 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2094 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2095 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2096 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2097 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2098 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2099 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2100 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2101 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2102 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2103 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2104 match self.key_storage {
2105 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2106 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2107 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2108 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2110 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2118 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2119 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2120 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2121 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2122 for tx in txn_matched {
2123 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2124 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2125 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2126 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2128 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2129 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2130 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2131 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2132 funding_info.clone()
2134 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2138 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2139 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2140 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
2142 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2143 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2144 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2147 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
2148 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2150 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2151 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2155 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2156 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
2157 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2161 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2162 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2163 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2166 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2167 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2171 for tx in txn.iter() {
2172 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2175 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2176 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2177 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2178 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
2179 if updated.len() > 0 {
2180 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2182 for inp in &tx.input {
2183 if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
2184 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2185 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2186 let e = entry.get_mut();
2187 e.retain(|ref event| {
2189 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2190 return outpoint != inp.previous_output
2195 e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
2197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2198 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
2204 let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
2205 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2206 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2207 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2208 match self.key_storage {
2209 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2210 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2211 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2212 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2213 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2214 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2217 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2220 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2221 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2222 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2223 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2224 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2225 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2228 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2234 for claim in pending_claims {
2235 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2236 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2240 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2243 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2244 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
2246 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2247 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2248 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2253 //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
2254 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2255 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2258 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
2259 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2261 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2262 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2264 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
2265 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2268 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2269 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2270 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2271 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2272 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2273 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2274 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2275 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2276 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2277 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2278 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2279 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2280 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2281 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2282 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2283 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2284 // time out the HTLC first.
2285 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2286 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2287 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2288 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2289 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2290 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2291 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2292 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2293 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2294 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2295 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2296 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2297 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2298 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2299 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2300 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2301 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2302 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2303 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2304 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2305 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2306 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2307 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2308 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2315 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2316 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2319 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2320 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2321 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2322 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2325 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2326 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2327 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2335 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2336 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2337 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2338 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2340 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2341 let mut payment_data = None;
2342 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2343 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2344 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2345 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2347 macro_rules! log_claim {
2348 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2349 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2350 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2351 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2352 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2353 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2354 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2355 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2356 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2357 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2358 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2359 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2361 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2362 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2363 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2364 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2369 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2370 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2371 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2372 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2373 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2374 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2375 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2376 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2385 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2386 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2387 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2388 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2389 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2390 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2391 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2392 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2393 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2394 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2395 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2396 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2397 } else if !$local_tx {
2398 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2399 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2401 if payment_data.is_none() {
2402 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2403 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2407 if payment_data.is_none() {
2408 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2409 continue 'outer_loop;
2416 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2417 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2418 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2419 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2422 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2423 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2424 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2425 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2428 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2429 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2430 "remote commitment tx", false);
2433 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2434 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2435 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2436 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2437 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2438 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2439 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2440 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2441 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2442 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2444 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2445 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2447 let e = entry.get_mut();
2448 e.retain(|ref event| {
2450 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2451 return htlc_update.0 != source
2456 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2459 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2469 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2471 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2472 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2473 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2474 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2478 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2483 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2484 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2485 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2486 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2489 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2491 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2493 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2494 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2495 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2496 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2497 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2498 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2499 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2500 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2501 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2502 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2503 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2504 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2506 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2507 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2508 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2510 revocation_base_key,
2512 delayed_payment_base_key,
2515 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2516 latest_per_commitment_point,
2518 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2519 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2522 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2525 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2526 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2528 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2529 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2533 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2534 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2535 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2536 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2538 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2543 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2544 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2546 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2547 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2548 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2549 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2552 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2555 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2556 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2557 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2558 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2559 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2561 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2562 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2568 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2569 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2570 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2571 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2572 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2573 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2574 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2575 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2577 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2578 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2582 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2583 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2584 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2585 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2586 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2587 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2588 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2589 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2590 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2592 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2593 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2597 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2598 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2599 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2600 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2601 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2602 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2603 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2607 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2610 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2613 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2614 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2618 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2619 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2620 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2623 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2624 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2625 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2626 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2627 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2629 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2630 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2631 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2632 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2633 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2635 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2636 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2638 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2643 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2650 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2653 Some(read_local_tx!())
2655 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2658 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2661 Some(read_local_tx!())
2663 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2666 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2668 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2669 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2670 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2671 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2672 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2673 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2674 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2678 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2679 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2680 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2683 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2684 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2685 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
2687 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2690 let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2691 let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2692 for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
2693 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2694 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2695 let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2697 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2698 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2699 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2700 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2703 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2705 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2706 TxMaterial::Revoked {
2715 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2716 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2717 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2718 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2719 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
2727 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2728 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2729 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2730 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2731 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2732 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
2734 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
2739 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2741 let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
2742 let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
2743 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2744 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
2747 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2748 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2749 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2750 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2751 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2752 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2753 for _ in 0..events_len {
2754 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2756 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2757 OnchainEvent::Claim {
2762 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2763 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2764 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2765 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2768 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2772 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2775 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2776 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2779 their_htlc_base_key,
2780 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2781 their_cur_revocation_points,
2784 their_to_self_delay,
2787 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2788 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2789 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2791 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2792 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2793 current_remote_commitment_number,
2800 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
2802 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2814 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2815 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2816 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2817 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2818 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2819 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2820 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2821 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2822 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2824 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2825 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2827 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2828 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2829 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2830 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2831 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2835 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2836 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2837 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2838 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2839 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2840 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2842 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2844 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2845 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2846 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2849 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2850 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2855 // insert_secret correct sequence
2856 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2859 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2860 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2861 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2864 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2865 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2866 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2869 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2870 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2871 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2874 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2875 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2876 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2879 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2880 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2881 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2884 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2885 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2886 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2889 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2890 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2891 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2894 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2895 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2896 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2901 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2902 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2912 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2913 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2917 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2918 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2921 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2922 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2923 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2926 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2927 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2928 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2931 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2932 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2933 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2936 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2937 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2938 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2939 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2943 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2944 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2947 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2948 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2949 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2952 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2953 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2954 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2957 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2958 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2959 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2962 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2963 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2964 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2965 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2969 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2970 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2973 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2974 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2975 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2978 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2979 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2980 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2983 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2984 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2985 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2988 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2989 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2990 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2993 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2994 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2995 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2998 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2999 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3000 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3003 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3004 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3005 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3008 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3009 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3010 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3011 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3015 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3016 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3019 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3020 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3021 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3024 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3025 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3026 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3029 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3030 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3031 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3034 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3035 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3036 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3039 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3040 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3041 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3044 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3045 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3046 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3047 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3051 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3052 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3055 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3056 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3057 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3060 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3061 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3062 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3065 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3066 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3067 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3070 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3071 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3072 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3075 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3076 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3077 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3080 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3081 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3082 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3085 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3086 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3087 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3090 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3091 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3092 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3093 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3097 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3098 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3101 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3102 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3103 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3106 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3107 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3108 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3111 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3112 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3113 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3116 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3117 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3118 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3121 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3122 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3123 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3126 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3127 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3128 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3131 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3132 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3133 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3136 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3137 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3138 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3139 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3143 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3144 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3147 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3148 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3149 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3152 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3153 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3154 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3157 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3158 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3159 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3162 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3163 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3164 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3167 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3168 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3169 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3172 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3173 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3174 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3177 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3178 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3179 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3182 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3183 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3184 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3185 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3190 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3191 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3192 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3194 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3195 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3199 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3200 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3201 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3202 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3203 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3204 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3209 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3211 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3213 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3215 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3216 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3217 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3218 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3222 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3223 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3225 let mut res = Vec::new();
3226 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3227 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3231 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3232 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3239 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3240 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3242 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3243 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3249 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3250 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3251 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3252 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3257 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3259 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3260 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
3262 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3263 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3264 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3265 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3266 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3267 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3268 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3271 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3272 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3273 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3274 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3275 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3276 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3277 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3279 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3280 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3281 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3282 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3283 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3284 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3286 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3287 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3288 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3289 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3290 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3291 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3292 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3293 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3295 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3296 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3297 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3298 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3299 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3300 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3304 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3305 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3306 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3308 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3309 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3310 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3311 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3313 macro_rules! sign_input {
3314 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3315 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3316 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3318 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3319 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3320 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3322 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3323 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3324 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3325 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3326 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3327 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3328 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3329 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3330 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3331 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3332 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3333 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3335 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3337 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3338 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3339 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3340 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3344 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3345 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3347 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3348 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3350 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3351 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3355 script_sig: Script::new(),
3356 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3357 witness: Vec::new(),
3360 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3361 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3364 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3365 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3366 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3367 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3368 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3370 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3372 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3373 claim_tx.input.clear();
3374 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3376 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3377 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3381 script_sig: Script::new(),
3382 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3383 witness: Vec::new(),
3386 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3387 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3388 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3389 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3390 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3392 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3394 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3395 claim_tx.input.clear();
3396 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3397 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3398 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3402 script_sig: Script::new(),
3403 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3404 witness: Vec::new(),
3406 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3407 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3408 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3409 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3410 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3412 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3415 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.