1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
98 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
99 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
100 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
101 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
105 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
106 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
107 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
110 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
111 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
112 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
113 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
115 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
116 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
117 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
118 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
119 /// all registered listeners in one go.
120 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
121 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
123 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
124 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
125 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
127 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
128 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
129 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
131 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
132 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in funds loss.
133 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
135 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
136 /// with success or failure.
138 /// You should probably just call through to
139 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
141 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
144 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
145 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
147 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
149 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
150 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
151 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
153 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
154 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
155 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface {
156 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
157 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
159 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
160 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
162 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
164 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
167 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
168 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
170 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
171 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
172 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
174 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
175 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
176 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
177 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
178 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
179 outputs: spendable_outputs,
183 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
184 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
185 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
190 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
191 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
194 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
195 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
196 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
197 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
198 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
203 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
204 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
206 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
207 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
208 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T> {
209 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
210 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
213 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
215 fee_estimator: feeest,
221 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
222 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
223 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
224 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
225 Some(orig_monitor) => {
226 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
227 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
231 match monitor.key_storage {
232 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
235 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
237 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
238 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
239 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
240 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
244 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
245 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
248 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
249 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
250 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
253 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
258 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T>
259 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
261 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
262 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
264 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
268 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
269 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
270 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
271 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
273 pending_htlcs_updated
277 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
278 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
280 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
281 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
282 let mut ret = Vec::new();
283 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
288 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
289 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
290 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
291 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
292 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
293 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
294 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
295 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
296 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
297 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
298 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
299 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
300 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
301 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
302 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
303 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
304 /// accurate block height.
305 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
306 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
307 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
308 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
309 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
310 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
311 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
312 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
313 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
314 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
315 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
318 enum Storage<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
321 funding_key: SecretKey,
322 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
323 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
324 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
325 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
326 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
327 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
328 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
329 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
332 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
333 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
337 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
338 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for Storage<ChanSigner> {
339 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
341 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
344 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => keys.pubkeys() == k.pubkeys(),
345 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => false,
348 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} => {
349 let (rbk, hbk) = (revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key);
351 Storage::Local { .. } => false,
352 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} =>
353 revocation_base_key == rbk && htlc_base_key == hbk,
360 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
361 struct LocalSignedTx {
362 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
364 tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
365 revocation_key: PublicKey,
366 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
367 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
368 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
369 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
371 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
375 enum InputDescriptors {
380 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
383 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
384 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
385 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
386 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
390 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
398 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
404 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
405 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
410 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
411 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
413 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
414 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
415 script.write(writer)?;
416 pubkey.write(writer)?;
417 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
419 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
421 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
423 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
425 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
426 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
427 script.write(writer)?;
429 preimage.write(writer)?;
430 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
431 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
433 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
434 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
435 script.write(writer)?;
436 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
437 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
438 preimage.write(writer)?;
439 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
446 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
447 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
448 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
450 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
451 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
452 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
453 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
456 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
458 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
459 InputMaterial::Revoked {
468 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
469 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
470 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
471 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
472 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
473 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
482 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
483 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
484 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
485 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
486 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
487 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
489 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
494 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
500 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
501 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
502 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
504 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
505 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
507 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
509 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
510 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
511 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
513 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
515 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
516 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
517 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
518 ContentiousOutpoint {
519 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
520 input_material: InputMaterial,
524 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
525 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
526 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
527 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
528 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
530 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
531 feerate_previous: u64,
532 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
533 // a priority of not feerate
534 soonest_timelock: u32,
535 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
536 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
539 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
540 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
541 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
542 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
543 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
544 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
545 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
547 tx_material.write(writer)?;
553 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
554 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
555 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
556 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
557 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
558 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
559 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
560 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
561 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
562 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
563 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
565 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
569 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
570 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
572 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
573 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
575 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
576 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
578 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
579 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
581 key_storage: Storage<ChanSigner>,
582 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
583 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
584 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
585 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
586 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
587 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
589 our_to_self_delay: u16,
590 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
592 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
593 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
594 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
595 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
596 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
597 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
598 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
599 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
600 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
601 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
602 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
603 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
604 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
606 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
607 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
608 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
609 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
610 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
611 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
613 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
615 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
617 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
619 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
621 destination_script: Script,
622 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
623 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
624 // scan every commitment transaction for that
625 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
627 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
628 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
629 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
630 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
631 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
632 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
633 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
634 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
635 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
636 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
637 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
638 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
639 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
641 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
643 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
644 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
645 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
646 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
647 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
648 // block with output gets disconnected.
649 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
650 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
652 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
654 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
655 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
656 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
657 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
659 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
660 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
661 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
662 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
663 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
665 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
666 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
667 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
668 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
669 // the full block_connected).
670 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
671 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
674 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
675 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
677 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
678 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
680 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
681 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
683 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
684 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
686 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
690 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
696 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
709 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
710 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
711 /// underlying object
712 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
713 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
714 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
715 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
716 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
717 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
718 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
719 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
720 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
721 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
722 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
723 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
724 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
725 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
726 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
727 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
728 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
729 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
730 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
731 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
732 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
733 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
734 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
735 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
736 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
737 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
746 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
747 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
748 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
749 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
750 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
751 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
752 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
754 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
755 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
757 macro_rules! write_option {
764 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
769 match self.key_storage {
770 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
771 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
773 writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
774 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
775 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
776 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
777 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
778 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
780 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
781 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
782 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
783 script.write(writer)?;
786 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
789 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
790 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
792 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
795 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
796 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
797 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
798 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
800 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
801 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
802 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
803 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
804 match second_option {
805 Some(second_pubkey) => {
806 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
809 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
814 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
818 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
819 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
821 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
823 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
824 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
825 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
826 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
827 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
828 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
829 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
833 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
834 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
835 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
836 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
837 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
838 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
839 write_option!(htlc_source);
843 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
844 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
845 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
846 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
847 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
848 for script in txouts.iter() {
849 script.write(writer)?;
853 if for_local_storage {
854 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
855 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
856 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
857 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
860 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
863 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
864 ($local_tx: expr) => {
865 $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
866 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
867 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
868 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
869 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
870 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
873 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
874 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
875 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
876 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
878 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
882 write_option!(htlc_source);
887 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
888 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
889 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
891 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
894 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
895 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
896 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
898 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
901 if for_local_storage {
902 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
904 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
907 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
908 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
909 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
912 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
913 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
917 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
918 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
919 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
920 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
921 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
922 local_key.write(writer)?;
924 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
927 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
928 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
929 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
930 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
933 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
934 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
936 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
937 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
940 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
941 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
942 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
943 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
944 for ev in events.iter() {
946 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
947 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
948 claim_request.write(writer)?;
950 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
951 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
952 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
953 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
955 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
956 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
957 outpoint.write(writer)?;
958 input_material.write(writer)?;
964 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
965 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
967 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
968 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
969 script.write(writer)?;
976 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
978 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
979 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
980 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
981 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
982 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
983 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
984 self.write(writer, true)
987 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
989 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
990 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
991 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
992 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
993 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
994 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
995 self.write(writer, false)
999 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1000 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1002 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
1004 key_storage: Storage::Local {
1006 funding_key: funding_key.clone(),
1007 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
1008 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
1009 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1010 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
1011 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
1013 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1014 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1016 their_htlc_base_key: None,
1017 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
1018 funding_redeemscript: None,
1019 channel_value_satoshis: None,
1020 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1022 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
1023 their_to_self_delay: None,
1025 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1026 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1027 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1028 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1030 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1031 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1032 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1034 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1035 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1037 destination_script: destination_script,
1038 to_remote_rescue: None,
1040 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
1042 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1044 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1045 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1047 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1048 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1053 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
1054 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
1056 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
1057 tx_weight += match inp {
1058 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1059 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
1060 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
1062 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1063 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
1064 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
1066 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
1067 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
1068 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
1070 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1071 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
1072 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
1074 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
1075 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
1076 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
1083 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
1084 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
1085 return current_height + 1
1086 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
1087 return current_height + 3
1092 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1093 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1094 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1095 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1096 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1097 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1100 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1101 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1102 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
1103 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1104 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1105 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1111 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1112 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
1113 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1114 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1115 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1117 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1118 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1119 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1123 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1124 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1125 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1130 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1137 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1146 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1147 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1148 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1149 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1150 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1151 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1152 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1153 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1155 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1156 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1159 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1160 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1161 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1162 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1163 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1164 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1166 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1167 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1168 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1169 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1170 Some(old_points) => {
1171 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1172 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1173 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1174 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1175 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1177 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1180 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1184 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1189 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1190 match self.key_storage {
1191 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, ref keys, .. } => {
1192 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1193 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1194 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1196 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1197 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1201 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1205 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1206 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1207 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1208 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1209 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1210 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
1211 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
1212 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
1213 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
1214 txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
1216 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
1217 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1218 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1219 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1220 per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1226 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1227 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1228 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1229 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1232 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
1233 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
1234 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
1235 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1236 match self.key_storage {
1237 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1238 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1239 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
1240 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1241 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1242 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1243 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1244 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1245 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1248 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1251 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1252 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1255 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1259 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1260 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1261 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1262 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1264 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1265 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1266 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1267 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1268 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1269 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1273 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1274 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1275 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1276 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1277 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1278 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1280 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1281 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1283 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1284 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1286 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1287 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1290 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1294 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1295 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1296 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1297 /// provides slightly better privacy.
1298 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1299 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1300 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1301 match self.key_storage {
1302 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1303 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1305 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1306 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1311 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1312 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1313 pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1314 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1315 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1316 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1317 self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript);
1318 self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis);
1319 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1320 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1323 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1324 match self.key_storage {
1325 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1326 *funding_info = None;
1328 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1329 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1334 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1335 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1336 match self.key_storage {
1337 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1338 match funding_info {
1339 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1343 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1349 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1350 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1351 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1352 &self.outputs_to_watch
1355 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1356 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1357 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1358 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1359 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1360 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1361 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1362 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1363 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1369 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1370 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1371 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1372 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1373 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1377 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1378 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1379 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1382 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1383 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1386 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1387 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1390 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1391 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1392 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1393 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1396 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1397 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1398 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1399 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1400 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1401 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1402 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1403 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1404 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1405 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1406 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1407 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1409 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1410 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1412 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1413 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1416 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1421 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1422 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1423 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1424 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1425 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1426 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1427 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1428 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1429 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
1430 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1432 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1433 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1434 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1435 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1439 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1440 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1441 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1442 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1445 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1446 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1448 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1449 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1450 // script_pubkey version.
1451 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1452 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1455 let mut total_value = 0;
1456 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1457 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1458 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1460 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1461 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1463 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1464 txid: commitment_txid,
1467 script_sig: Script::new(),
1468 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1469 witness: Vec::new(),
1471 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1472 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1473 total_value += outp.value;
1474 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1475 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1476 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1477 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1478 output: outp.clone(),
1483 macro_rules! sign_input {
1484 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1486 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1487 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1488 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1489 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1490 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1492 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1493 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1494 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1496 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1500 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1501 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1502 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1503 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1505 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1507 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1508 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1513 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1514 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1516 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1517 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1518 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1519 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1520 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1521 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1522 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1525 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1526 txid: commitment_txid,
1527 vout: transaction_output_index,
1529 script_sig: Script::new(),
1530 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1531 witness: Vec::new(),
1533 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1535 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1536 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1537 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1539 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1543 output: vec!(TxOut {
1544 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1545 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1548 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1549 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1550 let mut used_feerate;
1551 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1552 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1553 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1554 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1555 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1556 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1557 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1558 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1559 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1560 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1562 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1563 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1564 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1566 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1573 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1574 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1575 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1576 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1577 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1579 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1580 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1581 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1582 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1583 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1584 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1585 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1586 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1587 let e = entry.get_mut();
1588 e.retain(|ref event| {
1590 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1591 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1596 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1599 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1607 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1608 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1609 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1611 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1612 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1615 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1617 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1619 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1620 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1623 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1630 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1632 let mut used_feerate;
1633 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1634 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1637 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1639 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1640 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1641 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1642 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1643 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1646 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1647 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1648 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1649 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1650 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1651 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1652 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1653 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1654 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1657 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1658 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1659 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1662 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1664 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1665 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1666 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1668 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1669 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1670 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1671 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1672 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1673 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1674 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1675 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1677 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1678 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1680 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1682 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1683 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1684 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1685 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1686 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1687 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1688 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1689 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1690 // payment_preimage.
1691 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1692 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1693 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1694 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1696 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1697 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1701 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1702 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1703 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1704 let e = entry.get_mut();
1705 e.retain(|ref event| {
1707 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1708 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1713 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1715 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1716 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1724 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1725 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1726 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1728 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1729 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1733 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1734 let revocation_point_option =
1735 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1736 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1737 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1739 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1740 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1741 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
1742 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1743 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
1745 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1746 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1747 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1750 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1751 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1752 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1755 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1756 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1757 match self.key_storage {
1758 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1759 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1760 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1761 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1763 output: outp.clone(),
1767 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1769 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1773 let mut total_value = 0;
1774 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1775 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1776 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1778 macro_rules! sign_input {
1779 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
1781 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1782 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1783 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
1784 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1785 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1786 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1787 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1789 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1793 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1794 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1795 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1796 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1797 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1802 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1803 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1804 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1805 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1806 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1807 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1808 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1810 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1813 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1814 txid: commitment_txid,
1815 vout: transaction_output_index,
1817 script_sig: Script::new(),
1818 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
1819 witness: Vec::new(),
1821 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1823 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1824 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
1825 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1827 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1831 output: vec!(TxOut {
1832 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1833 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1836 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1837 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1838 let mut used_feerate;
1839 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1840 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1841 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
1842 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1843 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1844 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1845 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1847 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1848 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1849 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1850 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1852 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1854 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1858 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1864 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1865 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1867 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1868 txid: commitment_txid,
1869 vout: transaction_output_index,
1871 script_sig: Script::new(),
1872 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
1873 witness: Vec::new(),
1875 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1877 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1879 output: vec!(TxOut {
1880 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1881 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1884 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1885 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1886 let mut used_feerate;
1887 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1888 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1889 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
1890 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1891 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1892 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1893 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1894 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1895 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1896 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1897 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
1899 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1900 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1904 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1909 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1911 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1912 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1915 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1922 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1924 let mut used_feerate;
1925 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1926 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1929 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1931 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1932 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1933 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1934 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1935 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1938 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1939 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1940 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1941 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
1942 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1943 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
1944 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1945 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1946 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1949 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1951 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1953 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1954 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1955 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1956 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1958 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1961 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1962 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1963 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
1964 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1965 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1966 key: local_key.clone(),
1967 output: outp.clone(),
1973 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1976 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1977 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1978 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
1979 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1983 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1984 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1987 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1992 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1993 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1994 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1995 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1996 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
1997 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
1999 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2000 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2003 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2004 None => return (None, None),
2005 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2007 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2008 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2009 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2011 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2014 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2016 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2020 script_sig: Script::new(),
2021 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2022 witness: Vec::new(),
2024 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2027 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2028 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2029 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2033 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2039 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2040 let mut used_feerate;
2041 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2042 return (None, None);
2045 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2047 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2048 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2049 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2050 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2051 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2053 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2057 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2058 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2059 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2060 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2062 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2063 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2064 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2065 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
2066 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2067 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2068 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2069 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2070 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2071 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2073 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2074 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2075 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2077 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2078 } else { (None, None) }
2081 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2082 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2083 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2084 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2085 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2087 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2088 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2089 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2090 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2091 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2092 key: local_delayedkey,
2093 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2094 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2095 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2101 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2102 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2103 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
2104 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2105 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
2110 if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
2111 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2112 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2113 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
2115 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2116 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2117 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2118 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2123 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2124 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2125 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2126 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2127 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2128 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2129 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2130 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2132 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2133 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2134 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2135 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2136 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2141 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2142 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2143 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2144 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2145 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2146 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2147 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2148 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2151 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2152 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2157 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2160 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2161 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2162 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2163 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2164 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2165 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2166 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2167 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2169 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2170 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2171 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2172 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2173 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2174 let e = entry.get_mut();
2175 e.retain(|ref event| {
2177 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2178 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2183 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2186 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2192 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2193 ($updates: expr) => {
2194 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2195 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2196 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2197 for claim in $updates.3 {
2198 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2200 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2206 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2207 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2209 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2210 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2211 match self.key_storage {
2212 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2213 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2219 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2220 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2222 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2223 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2224 match self.key_storage {
2225 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2226 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2227 append_onchain_update!(res);
2229 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2233 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2234 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2235 match self.key_storage {
2236 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2237 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2243 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2244 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2246 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2247 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2248 match self.key_storage {
2249 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2250 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2251 append_onchain_update!(res);
2253 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2258 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2259 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2260 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2261 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2262 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2263 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2271 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2272 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2274 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2275 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2279 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2282 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2283 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2284 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2285 match self.key_storage {
2286 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2287 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2288 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2289 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2290 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2291 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2292 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2293 output: output.clone(),
2298 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2299 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2300 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2307 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2308 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2309 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2310 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2311 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2312 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2313 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2314 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2315 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2316 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2317 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2318 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2319 match self.key_storage {
2320 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2321 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2326 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2327 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
2328 match self.key_storage {
2329 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2330 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
2331 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2332 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2334 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2342 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
2343 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
2344 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
2345 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
2347 fn block_connected<B: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>)
2348 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
2350 for tx in txn_matched {
2351 let mut output_val = 0;
2352 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2353 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2354 output_val += out.value;
2355 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2359 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2360 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2361 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2362 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2363 for tx in txn_matched {
2364 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2365 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2366 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2367 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2369 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2370 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2371 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2372 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2373 funding_info.clone()
2375 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2379 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2380 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2381 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2383 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2384 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2385 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2388 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2389 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2391 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2392 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2396 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2397 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2398 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2402 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2403 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2404 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2407 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2408 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2412 for tx in txn.iter() {
2413 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2414 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2417 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2418 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2419 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2420 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2422 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2423 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2424 for inp in &tx.input {
2425 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2426 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2427 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2428 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2429 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2431 let mut set_equality = true;
2432 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2433 set_equality = false;
2435 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2436 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2437 set_equality = false;
2442 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2444 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2445 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2446 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2447 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2448 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2451 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2452 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2458 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2459 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2460 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2462 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2463 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2464 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2465 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2466 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2468 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2469 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2470 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2473 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2474 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2476 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2478 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2482 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2483 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2484 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2485 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2486 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2487 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2490 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2491 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2496 let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2497 self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
2499 if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2500 if should_broadcast {
2501 match self.key_storage {
2502 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2503 cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2509 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2510 if should_broadcast {
2511 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
2512 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
2513 match self.key_storage {
2514 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2515 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2516 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2517 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2518 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2521 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2522 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2525 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
2529 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2532 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2533 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2534 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2535 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2536 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2537 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2541 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2542 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2543 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2544 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2545 payment_preimage: None,
2546 source: htlc_update.0,
2549 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2550 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2555 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2556 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2557 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2560 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2561 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2562 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2563 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2564 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2565 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2567 } else { unreachable!(); }
2569 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2570 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2571 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2572 } else { unreachable!(); }
2575 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2576 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
2577 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
2579 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
2582 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)
2583 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
2585 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
2586 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2587 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2589 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2590 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2591 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2594 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2595 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2596 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2597 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2598 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2599 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2600 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2608 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2609 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2610 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2611 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2612 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2615 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2616 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2618 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2619 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2620 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2621 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2623 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2626 for req in remove_request {
2627 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2629 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2632 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2633 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2634 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2635 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2636 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2637 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2638 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2639 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2640 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2641 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2642 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2643 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2644 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2645 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2646 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2647 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2648 // time out the HTLC first.
2649 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2650 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2651 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2652 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2653 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2654 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2655 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2656 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2657 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2658 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2659 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2660 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2661 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2662 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2663 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2664 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2665 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2666 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2667 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2668 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2669 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2670 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2671 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2672 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2679 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2680 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2683 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2684 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2685 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2686 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2689 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2690 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2691 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2699 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2700 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2701 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2702 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2703 let mut payment_data = None;
2704 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2705 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2706 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2707 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2709 macro_rules! log_claim {
2710 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2711 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2712 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2713 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2714 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2715 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2716 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2717 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2718 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2719 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2720 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2721 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2723 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2724 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2725 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2726 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2731 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2732 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2733 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2734 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2735 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2736 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2737 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2738 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2747 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2748 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2749 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2750 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2751 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2752 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2753 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2754 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2755 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2756 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2757 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2758 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2759 } else if !$local_tx {
2760 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2761 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2763 if payment_data.is_none() {
2764 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2765 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2769 if payment_data.is_none() {
2770 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2771 continue 'outer_loop;
2778 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2779 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2780 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2781 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2784 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2785 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2786 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2787 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2790 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2791 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2792 "remote commitment tx", false);
2795 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2796 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2797 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2798 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2799 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2800 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2801 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2803 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2806 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2807 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2808 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2810 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2814 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2815 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2817 let e = entry.get_mut();
2818 e.retain(|ref event| {
2820 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2821 return htlc_update.0 != source
2826 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2828 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2829 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2837 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2838 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2839 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2840 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2841 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2842 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2844 previous_output: *outp,
2845 script_sig: Script::new(),
2846 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2847 witness: Vec::new(),
2850 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2854 output: vec![TxOut {
2855 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2860 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2861 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2863 let mut used_feerate;
2864 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2865 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2866 let mut value = $amount;
2867 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2868 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2871 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2874 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2876 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2878 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2884 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2885 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2886 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2887 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2888 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2889 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2890 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2894 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2899 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2900 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2902 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2903 match per_outp_material {
2904 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2905 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
2908 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2909 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2912 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2916 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2918 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2919 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2921 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2923 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2925 new_feerate = feerate;
2929 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2931 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2932 match per_outp_material {
2933 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2934 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2935 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2936 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2937 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2938 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2940 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2942 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2944 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2945 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2947 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
2948 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
2949 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2950 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2951 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2952 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2953 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2954 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
2955 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
2957 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
2959 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2960 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2962 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
2963 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
2964 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
2965 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
2970 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
2971 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
2975 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2977 impl<R: ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2978 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2979 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2980 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2984 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2989 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2990 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2991 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2992 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2995 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2997 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2999 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3000 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3001 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3002 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3003 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3004 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3005 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3006 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3007 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3008 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3009 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3010 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3012 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
3013 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3014 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3018 revocation_base_key,
3020 delayed_payment_base_key,
3024 current_remote_commitment_txid,
3025 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
3028 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3031 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3032 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3033 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3034 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3036 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3037 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3041 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3043 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3044 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3046 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3051 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3052 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3054 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3056 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3059 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3060 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3061 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3062 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3063 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3065 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3066 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3072 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3073 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3074 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3075 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3076 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3077 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3078 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3079 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3081 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3082 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3086 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3087 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3088 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3089 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3090 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3091 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3092 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3093 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3094 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3096 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3097 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3101 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3102 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3103 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3104 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3105 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3106 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3107 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3111 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3114 let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3115 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3116 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3117 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3118 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3119 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3120 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3122 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3123 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3124 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3125 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3126 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3128 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3129 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3131 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3136 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
3143 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3146 Some(read_local_tx!())
3148 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3151 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3154 Some(read_local_tx!())
3156 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3159 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3161 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3162 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3163 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3164 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3165 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3166 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3167 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3171 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3172 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
3173 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
3174 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3177 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3178 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3179 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3182 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3183 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3184 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3186 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3189 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3190 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3191 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3192 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3195 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3196 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3197 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3198 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3199 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3200 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3201 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3204 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3205 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3206 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3207 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3208 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3209 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3210 for _ in 0..events_len {
3211 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3213 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3214 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3219 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3220 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3221 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3222 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3226 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3227 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3228 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3233 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3237 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3240 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3241 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3242 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3243 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3244 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3245 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
3246 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3247 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3249 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3250 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3254 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3255 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3258 their_htlc_base_key,
3259 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3260 funding_redeemscript,
3261 channel_value_satoshis,
3262 their_cur_revocation_points,
3265 their_to_self_delay,
3268 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3269 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3270 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3272 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3273 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3274 current_remote_commitment_number,
3277 pending_htlcs_updated,
3282 pending_claim_requests,
3284 claimable_outpoints,
3286 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3299 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3300 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3301 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3302 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3303 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3304 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3305 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3306 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3307 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3309 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3310 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3312 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
3313 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3314 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3315 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3316 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3318 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
3321 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3322 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3323 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3325 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3326 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3330 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3331 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3332 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3333 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3334 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3335 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3340 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3342 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3344 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3346 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3347 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3348 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3349 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3353 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3354 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3356 let mut res = Vec::new();
3357 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3358 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3362 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3363 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3370 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3371 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3373 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3374 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3380 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3381 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3382 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3383 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3388 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3390 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3391 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3392 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3393 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3394 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3399 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3401 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3402 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3404 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3405 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3406 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3407 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3408 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3409 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3410 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3413 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3414 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3415 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3416 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3417 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3418 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3419 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3421 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3422 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3423 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3424 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3425 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3426 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3428 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3429 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3430 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3431 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3432 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3433 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3434 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3435 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3437 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3438 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3439 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3440 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3441 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3442 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3446 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3447 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3448 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3450 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3451 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3452 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3453 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3455 macro_rules! sign_input {
3456 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3457 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3458 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3460 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3461 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3462 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3464 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3465 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3466 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3467 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3468 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3469 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3470 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3471 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3472 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3473 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3474 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3475 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3477 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3479 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3480 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3481 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3482 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3486 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3487 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3489 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3490 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3492 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3493 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3497 script_sig: Script::new(),
3498 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3499 witness: Vec::new(),
3502 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3503 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3506 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3507 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3508 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3509 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3510 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3512 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3514 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3515 claim_tx.input.clear();
3516 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3518 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3519 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3523 script_sig: Script::new(),
3524 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3525 witness: Vec::new(),
3528 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3529 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3530 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3531 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3532 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3534 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3536 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3537 claim_tx.input.clear();
3538 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3539 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3540 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3544 script_sig: Script::new(),
3545 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3546 witness: Vec::new(),
3548 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3549 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3550 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3551 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3552 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3554 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3557 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.