1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
47 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
49 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
50 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
51 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
53 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
54 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
55 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
56 /// the channel to an operational state.
58 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
59 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
60 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
62 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
63 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
64 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
65 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
66 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
67 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
70 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
71 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
72 /// channel operation.
74 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
75 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
76 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
78 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
79 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
80 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
82 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
86 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
87 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
88 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
89 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
90 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
92 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
94 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
95 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
96 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
102 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
104 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
105 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
106 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
109 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
110 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
111 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
112 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
114 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
115 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
116 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
117 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
118 /// all registered listeners in one go.
119 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
120 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
122 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
123 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
124 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
126 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
127 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
128 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
130 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
131 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in funds loss.
132 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
134 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
135 /// with success or failure.
137 /// You should probably just call through to
138 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
140 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
143 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
144 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
146 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
148 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
149 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
150 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
152 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
153 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
154 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
155 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
156 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
158 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
159 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
160 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
161 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
163 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
166 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
167 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
168 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
169 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
171 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
172 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
173 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
174 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
175 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
176 outputs: spendable_outputs,
180 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
181 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
182 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
187 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
188 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
191 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
192 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
193 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
194 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
195 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
200 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
201 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
202 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
203 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
204 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
205 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
208 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
210 fee_estimator: feeest,
216 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
217 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
218 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
219 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
220 Some(orig_monitor) => {
221 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
222 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
226 match monitor.key_storage {
227 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
230 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
232 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
233 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
234 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
235 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
239 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
240 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
243 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
244 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
245 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
248 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
253 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner> {
254 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
255 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
257 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
261 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
262 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
263 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
264 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
266 pending_htlcs_updated
270 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
271 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
272 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
273 let mut ret = Vec::new();
274 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
279 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
280 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
281 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
282 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
283 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
284 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
285 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
286 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
287 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
288 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
289 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
290 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
291 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
292 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
293 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
294 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
295 /// accurate block height.
296 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
297 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
298 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
299 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
300 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
301 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
302 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
303 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
304 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
305 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
306 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
309 enum Storage<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
312 funding_key: SecretKey,
313 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
314 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
315 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
316 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
317 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
318 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
319 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
320 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
323 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
324 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
328 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
329 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for Storage<ChanSigner> {
330 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
332 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
335 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => keys.pubkeys() == k.pubkeys(),
336 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => false,
339 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} => {
340 let (rbk, hbk) = (revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key);
342 Storage::Local { .. } => false,
343 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} =>
344 revocation_base_key == rbk && htlc_base_key == hbk,
351 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
352 struct LocalSignedTx {
353 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
355 tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
356 revocation_key: PublicKey,
357 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
358 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
359 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
360 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
362 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
366 enum InputDescriptors {
371 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
374 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
375 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
376 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
377 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
381 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
389 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
395 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
396 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
401 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
402 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
404 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
405 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
406 script.write(writer)?;
407 pubkey.write(writer)?;
408 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
410 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
412 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
414 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
416 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
417 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
418 script.write(writer)?;
420 preimage.write(writer)?;
421 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
422 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
424 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
425 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
426 script.write(writer)?;
427 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
428 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
429 preimage.write(writer)?;
430 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
437 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
438 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
439 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
441 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
442 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
443 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
444 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
447 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
449 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
450 InputMaterial::Revoked {
459 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
460 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
461 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
462 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
463 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
464 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
473 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
474 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
475 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
476 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
477 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
478 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
480 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
485 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
491 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
492 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
493 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
495 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
496 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
498 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
500 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
501 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
502 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
504 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
506 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
507 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
508 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
509 ContentiousOutpoint {
510 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
511 input_material: InputMaterial,
515 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
516 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
517 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
518 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
519 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
521 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
522 feerate_previous: u64,
523 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
524 // a priority of not feerate
525 soonest_timelock: u32,
526 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
527 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
530 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
531 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
532 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
533 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
534 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
535 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
536 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
538 tx_material.write(writer)?;
544 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
545 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
546 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
547 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
548 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
549 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
550 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
551 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
552 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
553 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
554 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
556 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
560 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
561 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
563 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
564 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
566 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
567 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
569 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
570 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
572 key_storage: Storage<ChanSigner>,
573 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
574 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
575 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
576 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
577 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
578 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
580 our_to_self_delay: u16,
581 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
583 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
584 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
585 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
586 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
587 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
588 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
589 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
590 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
591 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
592 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
593 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
594 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
595 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
597 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
598 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
599 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
600 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
601 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
602 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
604 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
606 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
608 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
610 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
612 destination_script: Script,
613 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
614 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
615 // scan every commitment transaction for that
616 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
618 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
619 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
620 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
621 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
622 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
623 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
624 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
625 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
626 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
627 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
628 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
629 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
630 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
632 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
634 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
635 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
636 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
637 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
638 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
639 // block with output gets disconnected.
640 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
641 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
643 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
645 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
646 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
647 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
648 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
650 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
651 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
652 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
653 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
654 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
656 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
657 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
658 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
659 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
660 // the full block_connected).
661 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
662 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
666 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
667 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
669 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
670 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
672 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
673 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
675 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
676 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
678 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
682 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
688 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
701 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
702 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
703 /// underlying object
704 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
705 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
706 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
707 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
708 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
709 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
710 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
711 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
712 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
713 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
714 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
715 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
716 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
717 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
718 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
719 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
720 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
721 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
722 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
723 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
724 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
725 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
726 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
727 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
728 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
732 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
733 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
742 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
743 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
744 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
745 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
746 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
747 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
748 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
750 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
751 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
753 macro_rules! write_option {
760 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
765 match self.key_storage {
766 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
767 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
769 writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
770 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
771 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
772 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
773 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
774 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
776 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
777 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
778 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
779 script.write(writer)?;
782 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
785 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
786 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
788 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
791 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
792 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
793 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
794 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
796 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
797 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
798 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
799 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
800 match second_option {
801 Some(second_pubkey) => {
802 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
805 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
810 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
814 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
815 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
817 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
818 writer.write_all(secret)?;
819 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
822 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
823 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
824 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
825 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
826 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
827 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
828 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
832 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
833 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
834 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
835 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
836 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
837 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
838 write_option!(htlc_source);
842 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
843 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
844 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
845 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
846 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
847 for script in txouts.iter() {
848 script.write(writer)?;
852 if for_local_storage {
853 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
854 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
855 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
856 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
859 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
862 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
863 ($local_tx: expr) => {
864 $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
865 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
866 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
867 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
868 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
869 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
871 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
872 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
873 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
874 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
875 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
877 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
881 write_option!(htlc_source);
886 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
887 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
888 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
890 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
893 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
894 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
895 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
897 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
900 if for_local_storage {
901 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
903 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
906 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
907 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
908 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
911 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
912 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
916 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
917 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
918 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
919 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
920 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
921 local_key.write(writer)?;
923 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
926 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
927 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
928 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
929 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
932 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
933 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
935 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
936 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
939 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
940 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
942 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
943 for ev in events.iter() {
945 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
946 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
947 claim_request.write(writer)?;
949 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
950 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
951 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
952 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
954 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
955 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
956 outpoint.write(writer)?;
957 input_material.write(writer)?;
963 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
964 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
966 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
967 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
968 script.write(writer)?;
975 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
977 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
978 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
979 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
980 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
981 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
982 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
983 self.write(writer, true)
986 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
988 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
989 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
990 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
991 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
992 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
993 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
994 self.write(writer, false)
998 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
999 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1001 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
1003 key_storage: Storage::Local {
1005 funding_key: funding_key.clone(),
1006 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
1007 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
1008 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1009 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
1010 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
1012 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1013 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1015 their_htlc_base_key: None,
1016 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
1017 funding_redeemscript: None,
1018 channel_value_satoshis: None,
1019 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1021 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
1022 their_to_self_delay: None,
1024 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
1025 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1026 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1027 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1029 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1030 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1031 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1033 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1034 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1036 destination_script: destination_script,
1037 to_remote_rescue: None,
1039 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
1041 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1043 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1044 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1046 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1047 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1052 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
1053 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
1055 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
1056 tx_weight += match inp {
1057 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1058 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
1059 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
1061 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1062 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
1063 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
1065 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
1066 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
1067 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
1069 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1070 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
1071 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
1073 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
1074 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
1075 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
1082 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
1083 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
1084 return current_height + 1
1085 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
1086 return current_height + 3
1092 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
1094 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
1102 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
1103 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
1105 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
1106 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
1107 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
1108 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
1114 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1115 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1116 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1117 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1118 let pos = ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::place_secret(idx);
1120 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
1121 if ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
1122 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1125 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
1128 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
1130 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1131 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1132 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
1133 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1134 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1135 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1141 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1142 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
1143 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1144 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1145 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1147 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1148 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1149 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1153 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1154 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1155 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1160 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1167 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1176 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1177 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1178 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1179 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1180 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1181 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1182 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1183 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1185 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1186 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1189 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1190 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1191 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1192 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1193 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1194 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1196 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1197 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1198 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1199 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1200 Some(old_points) => {
1201 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1202 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1203 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1204 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1205 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1207 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1210 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1214 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1219 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1220 match self.key_storage {
1221 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, ref keys, .. } => {
1222 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1223 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1224 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1226 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1227 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1231 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1235 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1236 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1237 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1238 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1239 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1240 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
1241 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
1242 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
1243 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
1244 txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
1246 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
1247 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1248 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1249 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1250 per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1256 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1257 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1258 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1259 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1262 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
1263 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
1264 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
1265 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1266 match self.key_storage {
1267 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1268 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1269 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
1270 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1271 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1272 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1273 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1274 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1275 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1278 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1281 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1282 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1285 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1289 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1290 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1291 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1292 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1294 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1295 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1296 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1297 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1298 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1299 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1303 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1304 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1305 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1306 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1307 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1308 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1310 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1311 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1313 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1314 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1316 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1317 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1320 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1324 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1325 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1326 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1327 /// provides slightly better privacy.
1328 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1329 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1330 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1331 match self.key_storage {
1332 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1333 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1335 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1336 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1341 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1342 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1343 pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1344 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1345 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1346 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1347 self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript);
1348 self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis);
1349 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1350 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1353 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1354 match self.key_storage {
1355 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1356 *funding_info = None;
1358 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1359 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1364 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1365 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1366 match self.key_storage {
1367 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1368 match funding_info {
1369 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1373 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1379 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1380 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1381 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1382 &self.outputs_to_watch
1385 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1386 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1387 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1388 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1389 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1390 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1391 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1392 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1393 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1399 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1400 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1401 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1402 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1403 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1407 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1408 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1409 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1410 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1411 return Some(ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1414 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1418 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1419 //TODO This can be optimized?
1420 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1421 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1429 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1430 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1433 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1434 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1435 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1436 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1439 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1440 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1441 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1442 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1443 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1444 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1445 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1446 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1447 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1448 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1449 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1450 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1452 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1453 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1455 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1456 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1459 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1464 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1465 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1466 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1467 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1468 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1469 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1470 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1471 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1472 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
1473 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1475 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1476 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1477 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1478 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1482 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1483 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1484 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1485 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1488 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1489 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1491 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1492 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1493 // script_pubkey version.
1494 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1495 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1498 let mut total_value = 0;
1499 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1500 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1501 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1503 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1504 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1506 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1507 txid: commitment_txid,
1510 script_sig: Script::new(),
1511 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1512 witness: Vec::new(),
1514 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1515 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1516 total_value += outp.value;
1517 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1518 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1519 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1520 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1521 output: outp.clone(),
1526 macro_rules! sign_input {
1527 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1529 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1530 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1531 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1532 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1533 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1535 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1536 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1537 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1539 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1543 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1544 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1545 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1546 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1548 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1550 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1551 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1556 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1557 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1559 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1560 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1561 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1562 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1563 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1564 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1565 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1568 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1569 txid: commitment_txid,
1570 vout: transaction_output_index,
1572 script_sig: Script::new(),
1573 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1574 witness: Vec::new(),
1576 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1578 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1579 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1580 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1582 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1586 output: vec!(TxOut {
1587 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1588 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1591 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1592 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1593 let mut used_feerate;
1594 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1595 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1596 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1597 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1598 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1599 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1600 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1601 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1602 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1603 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1605 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1606 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1607 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1609 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1616 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1617 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1618 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1619 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1620 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1622 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1623 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1624 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1625 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1626 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1627 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1628 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1629 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1630 let e = entry.get_mut();
1631 e.retain(|ref event| {
1633 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1634 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1639 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1641 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1642 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1650 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1651 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1652 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1654 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1655 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1658 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1660 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1662 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1663 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1666 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1673 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1675 let mut used_feerate;
1676 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1677 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1680 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1682 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1683 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1684 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1685 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1686 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1689 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1690 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1691 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1692 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1693 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1694 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1695 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1696 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1697 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1700 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1701 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1705 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1707 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1708 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1709 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1711 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1712 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1713 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1714 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1715 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1716 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1717 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1718 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1720 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1721 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1723 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1725 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1726 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1727 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1728 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1729 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1730 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1731 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1732 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1733 // payment_preimage.
1734 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1735 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1736 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1737 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1739 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1740 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1744 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1745 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1747 let e = entry.get_mut();
1748 e.retain(|ref event| {
1750 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1751 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1756 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1758 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1759 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1767 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1768 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1769 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1771 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1772 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1776 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1777 let revocation_point_option =
1778 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1779 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1780 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1782 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1783 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1784 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
1785 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1786 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
1788 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1789 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1790 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1793 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1794 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1795 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1798 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1799 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1800 match self.key_storage {
1801 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1802 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1803 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1804 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1806 output: outp.clone(),
1810 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1812 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1816 let mut total_value = 0;
1817 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1818 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1819 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1821 macro_rules! sign_input {
1822 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
1824 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1825 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1826 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
1827 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1828 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1829 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1830 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1832 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1836 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1837 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1838 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1839 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1840 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1845 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1846 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1847 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1848 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1849 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1850 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1851 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1853 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1856 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1857 txid: commitment_txid,
1858 vout: transaction_output_index,
1860 script_sig: Script::new(),
1861 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
1862 witness: Vec::new(),
1864 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1866 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1867 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
1868 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1870 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1874 output: vec!(TxOut {
1875 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1876 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1879 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1880 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1881 let mut used_feerate;
1882 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1883 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1884 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
1885 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1886 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1887 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1888 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1890 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1891 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1892 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1893 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1895 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1897 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1898 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1899 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1901 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1907 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1908 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1910 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1911 txid: commitment_txid,
1912 vout: transaction_output_index,
1914 script_sig: Script::new(),
1915 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
1916 witness: Vec::new(),
1918 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1920 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1922 output: vec!(TxOut {
1923 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1924 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1927 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1928 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1929 let mut used_feerate;
1930 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1931 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1932 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
1933 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1934 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1935 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1936 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1937 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1938 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1939 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1940 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
1942 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1943 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1944 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1947 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1952 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1954 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1955 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1958 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1965 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1967 let mut used_feerate;
1968 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1969 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1972 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1974 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1975 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1976 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1977 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1978 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1981 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1982 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1983 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1984 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
1985 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1986 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
1987 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1988 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1989 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1992 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1993 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1996 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1997 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1998 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1999 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
2001 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
2004 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
2005 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2006 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
2007 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2008 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
2009 key: local_key.clone(),
2010 output: outp.clone(),
2016 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
2019 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2020 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
2021 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
2022 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
2026 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2027 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2030 Err(_) => return (None, None)
2035 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
2036 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2037 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2038 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
2039 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
2040 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
2042 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2043 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2046 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2047 None => return (None, None),
2048 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2050 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2051 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2052 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2054 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2057 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2059 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2063 script_sig: Script::new(),
2064 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2065 witness: Vec::new(),
2067 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2070 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2071 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2072 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2076 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2082 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2083 let mut used_feerate;
2084 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2085 return (None, None);
2088 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2090 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2091 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2092 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2093 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2094 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2096 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2100 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2101 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2102 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2103 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2105 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2106 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2107 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2108 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
2109 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2110 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2111 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2112 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2114 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2116 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2117 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2118 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2120 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2121 } else { (None, None) }
2124 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2125 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2126 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2127 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2128 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2130 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2131 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2132 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2133 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2134 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2135 key: local_delayedkey,
2136 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2137 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2138 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2144 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2145 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2146 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
2147 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2148 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
2153 if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
2154 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2155 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2156 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
2158 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2159 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2160 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2161 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2166 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2167 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2168 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2169 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2170 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2171 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2172 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2173 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2175 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2176 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2177 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2178 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2179 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2184 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2185 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2186 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2187 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2188 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2189 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2190 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2191 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2194 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2195 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2200 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2203 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2204 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2205 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2206 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2207 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2208 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2209 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2210 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2212 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2213 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2214 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2215 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2216 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2217 let e = entry.get_mut();
2218 e.retain(|ref event| {
2220 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2221 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2226 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2228 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2229 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2235 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2236 ($updates: expr) => {
2237 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2238 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2239 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2240 for claim in $updates.3 {
2241 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2243 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2249 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2250 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2252 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2253 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2254 match self.key_storage {
2255 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2256 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2262 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2263 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2265 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2266 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2267 match self.key_storage {
2268 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2269 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2270 append_onchain_update!(res);
2272 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2276 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2277 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2278 match self.key_storage {
2279 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2280 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2286 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2287 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2289 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2290 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2291 match self.key_storage {
2292 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2293 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2294 append_onchain_update!(res);
2296 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2301 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2302 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2303 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2304 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2305 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2306 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2314 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2315 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2317 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2318 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2322 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2325 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2326 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2327 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2328 match self.key_storage {
2329 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2330 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2331 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2332 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2333 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2334 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2335 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2336 output: output.clone(),
2341 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2342 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2343 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2350 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2351 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2352 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2353 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2354 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2355 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2356 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2357 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2358 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2359 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2360 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2361 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2362 match self.key_storage {
2363 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2364 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2369 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2370 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
2371 match self.key_storage {
2372 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2373 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
2374 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2375 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2377 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2385 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
2386 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
2387 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
2388 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
2390 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
2391 for tx in txn_matched {
2392 let mut output_val = 0;
2393 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2394 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2395 output_val += out.value;
2396 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2400 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2401 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2402 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2403 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2404 for tx in txn_matched {
2405 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2406 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2407 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2408 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2410 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2411 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2412 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2413 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2414 funding_info.clone()
2416 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2420 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2421 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2422 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2424 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2425 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2426 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2429 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2430 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2432 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2433 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2437 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2438 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2439 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2443 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2444 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2445 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2448 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2449 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2453 for tx in txn.iter() {
2454 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2455 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2458 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2459 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2460 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2461 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2463 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2464 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2465 for inp in &tx.input {
2466 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2467 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2468 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2469 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2470 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2472 let mut set_equality = true;
2473 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2474 set_equality = false;
2476 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2477 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2478 set_equality = false;
2483 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2485 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2486 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2487 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2488 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2489 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2493 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2499 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2500 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2501 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2503 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2504 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2505 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2506 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2507 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2509 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2510 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2511 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2514 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2515 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2517 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2519 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2523 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2524 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2525 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2526 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2527 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2528 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2531 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2532 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2537 let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2538 self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
2540 if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2541 if should_broadcast {
2542 match self.key_storage {
2543 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2544 cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2550 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2551 if should_broadcast {
2552 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
2553 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
2554 match self.key_storage {
2555 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2556 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2557 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2558 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2559 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2562 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2563 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2566 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
2570 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2573 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2574 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2575 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2576 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2577 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2578 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2582 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2583 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2584 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2585 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2586 payment_preimage: None,
2587 source: htlc_update.0,
2590 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2591 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2596 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2597 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2598 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2601 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2602 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2603 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2604 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2605 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2606 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2608 } else { unreachable!(); }
2610 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2611 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2612 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2613 } else { unreachable!(); }
2616 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2617 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
2618 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
2620 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
2623 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) {
2624 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
2625 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2626 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2628 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2629 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2630 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2633 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2634 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2635 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2636 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2637 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2638 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2639 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2647 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2648 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2649 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2650 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2651 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2654 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2655 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2657 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2658 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2659 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2660 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2662 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2665 for req in remove_request {
2666 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2668 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2671 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2672 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2673 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2674 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2675 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2676 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2677 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2678 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2679 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2680 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2681 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2682 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2683 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2684 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2685 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2686 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2687 // time out the HTLC first.
2688 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2689 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2690 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2691 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2692 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2693 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2694 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2695 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2696 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2697 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2698 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2699 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2700 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2701 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2702 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2703 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2704 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2705 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2706 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2707 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2708 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2709 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2710 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2711 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2718 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2719 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2722 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2723 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2724 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2725 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2728 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2729 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2730 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2738 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2739 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2740 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2741 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2742 let mut payment_data = None;
2743 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2744 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2745 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2746 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2748 macro_rules! log_claim {
2749 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2750 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2751 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2752 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2753 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2754 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2755 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2756 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2757 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2758 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2759 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2760 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2762 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2763 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2764 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2765 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2770 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2771 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2772 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2773 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2774 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2775 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2776 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2777 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2786 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2787 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2788 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2789 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2790 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2791 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2792 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2793 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2794 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2795 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2796 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2797 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2798 } else if !$local_tx {
2799 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2800 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2802 if payment_data.is_none() {
2803 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2804 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2808 if payment_data.is_none() {
2809 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2810 continue 'outer_loop;
2817 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2818 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2819 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2820 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2823 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2824 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2825 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2826 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2829 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2830 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2831 "remote commitment tx", false);
2834 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2835 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2836 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2837 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2838 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2839 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2840 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2842 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2845 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2846 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2847 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2849 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2853 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2854 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2856 let e = entry.get_mut();
2857 e.retain(|ref event| {
2859 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2860 return htlc_update.0 != source
2865 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2867 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2868 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2876 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2877 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2878 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2879 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2880 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2881 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2883 previous_output: *outp,
2884 script_sig: Script::new(),
2885 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2886 witness: Vec::new(),
2889 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2893 output: vec![TxOut {
2894 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2899 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2900 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2902 let mut used_feerate;
2903 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2904 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2905 let mut value = $amount;
2906 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2907 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2910 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2913 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2915 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2917 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2923 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2924 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2925 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2926 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2927 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2928 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2929 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2933 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2938 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2939 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2941 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2942 match per_outp_material {
2943 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2944 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
2947 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2948 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2951 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2955 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2957 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2958 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2960 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2962 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2964 new_feerate = feerate;
2968 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2970 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2971 match per_outp_material {
2972 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2973 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2974 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2975 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2976 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2977 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2979 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2981 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2983 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2984 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2986 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
2987 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
2988 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2989 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2990 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2991 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2992 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2993 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
2994 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
2996 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
2998 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2999 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
3001 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
3002 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
3003 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
3004 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
3009 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
3010 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
3014 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3016 impl<R: ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
3017 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3018 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3019 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3023 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3028 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3029 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3030 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3031 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3034 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3036 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3038 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3039 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3040 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3041 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3043 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3044 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3045 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3046 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3047 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3048 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3049 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3051 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
3052 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3053 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3057 revocation_base_key,
3059 delayed_payment_base_key,
3063 current_remote_commitment_txid,
3064 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
3067 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3070 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3071 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3072 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3073 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3075 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3076 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3080 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3081 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3082 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3083 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3085 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3090 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3091 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3093 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
3094 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
3095 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
3096 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3099 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3102 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3103 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3104 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3105 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3106 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3108 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3109 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3115 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3116 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3117 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3118 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3119 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3120 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3121 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3122 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3124 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3125 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3129 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3130 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3131 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3132 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3133 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3134 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3135 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3136 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3137 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3139 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3140 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3144 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3145 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3146 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3147 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3148 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3149 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3150 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3154 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3157 let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3158 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3159 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3160 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3161 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3162 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3163 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3165 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3166 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3167 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3168 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3169 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3171 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3172 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3174 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3179 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
3186 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3189 Some(read_local_tx!())
3191 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3194 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3197 Some(read_local_tx!())
3199 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3202 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3204 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3205 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3206 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3207 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3208 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3209 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3210 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3214 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3215 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
3216 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
3217 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3220 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3221 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3222 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3225 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3226 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3227 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3229 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3232 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3233 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3234 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3235 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3238 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3239 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3240 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3241 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3242 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3243 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3244 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3247 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3248 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3249 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3250 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3251 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3252 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3253 for _ in 0..events_len {
3254 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3256 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3257 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3262 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3263 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3264 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3265 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3269 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3270 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3271 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3276 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3280 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3283 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3284 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3285 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3286 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3287 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3288 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
3289 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3290 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3292 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3293 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3297 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3298 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3301 their_htlc_base_key,
3302 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3303 funding_redeemscript,
3304 channel_value_satoshis,
3305 their_cur_revocation_points,
3308 their_to_self_delay,
3311 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3312 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3313 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3315 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3316 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3317 current_remote_commitment_number,
3320 pending_htlcs_updated,
3325 pending_claim_requests,
3327 claimable_outpoints,
3329 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3342 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3343 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3344 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3345 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3346 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3347 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3348 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3349 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3350 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3352 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3353 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3355 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
3356 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3357 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3358 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3359 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3361 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
3365 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
3366 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
3367 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
3368 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor<InMemoryChannelKeys>;
3369 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3370 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3372 macro_rules! test_secrets {
3374 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
3375 for secret in secrets.iter() {
3376 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
3379 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
3380 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
3384 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3386 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3387 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3388 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3389 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3390 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3396 // insert_secret correct sequence
3397 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3400 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3401 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3402 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3405 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3406 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3407 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3410 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3411 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3412 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3415 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3416 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3417 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3420 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3421 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3422 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3425 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3426 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3427 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3430 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3431 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3432 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3435 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3436 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3437 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3442 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
3443 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3446 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3447 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3448 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3451 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3452 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3453 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3454 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3458 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
3459 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3462 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3463 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3464 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3467 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3468 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3469 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3472 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3473 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3474 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3477 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3478 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3479 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3480 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3484 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
3485 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3488 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3489 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3490 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3493 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3494 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3495 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3498 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3499 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3500 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3503 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3504 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3505 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3506 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3510 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
3511 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3514 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3515 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3516 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3519 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3520 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3521 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3524 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3525 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3526 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3529 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3530 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3531 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3534 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3535 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3536 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3539 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3540 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3541 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3544 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3545 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3546 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3549 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3550 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3551 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3552 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3556 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3557 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3560 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3561 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3562 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3565 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3566 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3567 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3570 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3571 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3572 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3575 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3576 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3577 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3580 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3581 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3582 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3585 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3586 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3587 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3588 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3592 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3593 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3596 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3597 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3598 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3601 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3602 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3603 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3606 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3607 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3608 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3611 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3612 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3616 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3617 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3618 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3621 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3622 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3623 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3626 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3627 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3628 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3631 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3632 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3633 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3634 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3638 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3639 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3642 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3643 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3644 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3647 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3648 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3649 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3652 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3653 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3654 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3657 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3658 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3659 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3662 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3663 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3664 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3667 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3668 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3669 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3672 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3673 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3674 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3677 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3678 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3679 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3680 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3684 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3685 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3688 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3689 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3690 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3693 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3694 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3695 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3698 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3699 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3700 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3703 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3704 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3705 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3708 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3709 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3710 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3713 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3714 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3715 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3718 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3719 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3720 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3723 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3724 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3725 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3726 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3731 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3732 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3733 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3735 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3736 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3740 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3741 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3742 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3743 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3744 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3745 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3750 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3752 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3754 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3756 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3757 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3758 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3759 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3763 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3764 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3766 let mut res = Vec::new();
3767 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3768 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3772 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3773 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3780 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3781 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3783 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3784 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3790 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3791 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3792 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3793 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3798 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3800 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3801 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3802 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3803 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3804 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3809 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3811 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3812 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3814 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3815 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3816 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3817 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3818 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3819 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3820 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3823 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3824 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3825 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3826 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3827 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3828 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3829 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3831 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3832 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3833 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3834 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3835 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3836 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3838 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3839 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3840 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3841 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3842 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3843 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3844 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3845 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3847 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3848 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3849 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3850 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3851 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3852 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3856 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3857 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3858 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3860 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3861 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3862 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3863 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3865 macro_rules! sign_input {
3866 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3867 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3868 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3870 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3871 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3872 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3874 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3875 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3876 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3877 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3878 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3879 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3880 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3881 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3882 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3883 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3884 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3885 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3887 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3889 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3890 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3891 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3892 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3896 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3897 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3899 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3900 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3902 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3903 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3907 script_sig: Script::new(),
3908 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3909 witness: Vec::new(),
3912 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3913 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3916 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3917 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3918 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3919 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3920 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3922 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3924 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3925 claim_tx.input.clear();
3926 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3928 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3929 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3933 script_sig: Script::new(),
3934 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3935 witness: Vec::new(),
3938 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3939 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3940 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3941 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3942 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3944 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3946 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3947 claim_tx.input.clear();
3948 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3949 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3950 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3954 script_sig: Script::new(),
3955 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3956 witness: Vec::new(),
3958 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3959 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3960 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3961 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3962 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3964 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3967 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.