1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
98 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
99 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
100 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
101 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
105 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
106 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
107 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
110 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
111 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
112 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
113 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
115 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
116 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
117 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
118 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
119 /// all registered listeners in one go.
120 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
121 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
123 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
124 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
125 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
127 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
128 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
129 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
131 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
132 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in funds loss.
133 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
135 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
136 /// with success or failure.
138 /// You should probably just call through to
139 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
141 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
144 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
145 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
147 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
149 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
150 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
151 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
153 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
154 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
155 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface {
156 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
157 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
159 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
160 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
162 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
164 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
167 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
168 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
170 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
171 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
172 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
174 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
175 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
176 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
177 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
178 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
179 outputs: spendable_outputs,
183 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
184 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
185 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
190 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
191 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
194 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
195 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
196 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
197 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
198 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
203 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
204 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
206 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
207 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
208 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T> {
209 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
210 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
213 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
215 fee_estimator: feeest,
221 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
222 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
223 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
224 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
225 Some(orig_monitor) => {
226 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
227 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
231 match monitor.key_storage {
232 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
235 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
237 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
238 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
239 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
240 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
244 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
245 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
248 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
249 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
250 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
253 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
258 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T>
259 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
261 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
262 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
264 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
268 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
269 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
270 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
271 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
273 pending_htlcs_updated
277 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
278 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
280 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
281 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
282 let mut ret = Vec::new();
283 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
288 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
289 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
290 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
291 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
292 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
293 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
294 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
295 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
296 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
297 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
298 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
299 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
300 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
301 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
302 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
303 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
304 /// accurate block height.
305 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
306 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
307 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
308 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
309 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
310 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
311 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
312 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
313 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
314 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
315 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
318 enum Storage<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
321 funding_key: SecretKey,
322 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
323 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
324 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
325 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
326 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
327 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
328 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
329 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
332 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
333 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
337 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
338 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for Storage<ChanSigner> {
339 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
341 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
344 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => keys.pubkeys() == k.pubkeys(),
345 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => false,
348 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} => {
349 let (rbk, hbk) = (revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key);
351 Storage::Local { .. } => false,
352 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} =>
353 revocation_base_key == rbk && htlc_base_key == hbk,
360 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
361 struct LocalSignedTx {
362 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
364 tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
365 revocation_key: PublicKey,
366 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
367 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
368 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
369 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
371 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
375 enum InputDescriptors {
380 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
383 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
384 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
385 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
386 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
390 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
398 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
404 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
405 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
410 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
411 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
413 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
414 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
415 script.write(writer)?;
416 pubkey.write(writer)?;
417 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
419 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
421 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
423 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
425 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
426 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
427 script.write(writer)?;
429 preimage.write(writer)?;
430 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
431 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
433 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
434 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
435 script.write(writer)?;
436 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
437 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
438 preimage.write(writer)?;
439 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
446 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
447 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
448 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
450 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
451 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
452 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
453 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
456 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
458 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
459 InputMaterial::Revoked {
468 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
469 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
470 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
471 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
472 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
473 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
482 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
483 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
484 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
485 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
486 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
487 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
489 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
494 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
500 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
501 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
502 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
504 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
505 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
507 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
509 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
510 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
511 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
513 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
515 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
516 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
517 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
518 ContentiousOutpoint {
519 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
520 input_material: InputMaterial,
524 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
525 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
526 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
527 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
528 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
530 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
531 feerate_previous: u64,
532 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
533 // a priority of not feerate
534 soonest_timelock: u32,
535 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
536 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
539 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
540 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
541 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
542 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
543 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
544 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
545 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
547 tx_material.write(writer)?;
553 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
554 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
555 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
556 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
557 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
558 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
559 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
560 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
561 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
562 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
563 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
565 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
569 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
570 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
572 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
573 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
575 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
576 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
578 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
579 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
581 key_storage: Storage<ChanSigner>,
582 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
583 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
584 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
585 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
586 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
587 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
589 our_to_self_delay: u16,
590 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
592 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
593 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
594 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
595 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
596 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
597 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
598 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
599 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
600 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
601 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
602 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
603 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
604 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
606 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
607 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
608 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
609 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
610 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
611 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
613 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
615 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
617 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
619 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
621 destination_script: Script,
622 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
623 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
624 // scan every commitment transaction for that
625 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
627 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
628 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
629 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
630 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
631 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
632 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
633 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
634 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
635 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
636 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
637 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
638 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
639 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
641 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
643 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
644 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
645 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
646 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
647 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
648 // block with output gets disconnected.
649 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
650 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
652 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
654 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
655 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
656 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
657 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
659 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
660 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
661 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
662 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
663 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
665 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
666 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
667 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
668 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
669 // the full block_connected).
670 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
671 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
675 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
676 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
678 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
679 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
681 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
682 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
684 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
685 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
687 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
691 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
697 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
710 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
711 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
712 /// underlying object
713 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
714 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
715 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
716 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
717 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
718 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
719 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
720 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
721 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
722 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
723 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
724 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
725 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
726 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
727 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
728 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
729 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
730 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
731 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
732 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
733 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
734 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
735 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
736 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
737 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
741 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
742 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
751 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
752 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
753 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
754 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
755 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
756 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
757 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
759 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
760 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
762 macro_rules! write_option {
769 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
774 match self.key_storage {
775 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
776 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
778 writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
779 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
780 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
781 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
782 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
783 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
785 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
786 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
787 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
788 script.write(writer)?;
791 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
794 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
795 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
797 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
800 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
801 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
802 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
803 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
805 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
806 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
807 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
808 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
809 match second_option {
810 Some(second_pubkey) => {
811 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
814 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
819 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
823 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
824 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
826 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
827 writer.write_all(secret)?;
828 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
831 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
832 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
833 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
834 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
835 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
836 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
837 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
841 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
842 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
843 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
844 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
845 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
846 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
847 write_option!(htlc_source);
851 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
852 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
853 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
854 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
855 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
856 for script in txouts.iter() {
857 script.write(writer)?;
861 if for_local_storage {
862 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
863 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
864 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
865 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
868 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
871 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
872 ($local_tx: expr) => {
873 $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
874 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
875 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
876 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
877 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
878 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
880 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
881 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
882 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
883 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
884 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
886 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
890 write_option!(htlc_source);
895 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
896 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
897 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
899 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
902 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
903 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
904 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
906 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
909 if for_local_storage {
910 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
912 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
915 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
916 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
917 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
920 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
921 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
925 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
926 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
927 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
928 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
929 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
930 local_key.write(writer)?;
932 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
935 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
936 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
937 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
938 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
941 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
942 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
944 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
945 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
948 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
949 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
950 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
951 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
952 for ev in events.iter() {
954 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
955 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
956 claim_request.write(writer)?;
958 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
959 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
960 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
961 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
963 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
964 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
965 outpoint.write(writer)?;
966 input_material.write(writer)?;
972 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
973 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
975 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
976 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
977 script.write(writer)?;
984 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
986 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
987 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
988 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
989 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
990 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
991 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
992 self.write(writer, true)
995 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
997 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
998 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
999 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1000 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1001 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1002 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1003 self.write(writer, false)
1007 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1008 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1010 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
1012 key_storage: Storage::Local {
1014 funding_key: funding_key.clone(),
1015 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
1016 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
1017 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1018 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
1019 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
1021 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1022 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1024 their_htlc_base_key: None,
1025 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
1026 funding_redeemscript: None,
1027 channel_value_satoshis: None,
1028 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1030 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
1031 their_to_self_delay: None,
1033 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
1034 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1035 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1036 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1038 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1039 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1040 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1042 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1043 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1045 destination_script: destination_script,
1046 to_remote_rescue: None,
1048 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
1050 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1052 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1053 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1055 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1056 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1061 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
1062 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
1064 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
1065 tx_weight += match inp {
1066 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1067 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
1068 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
1070 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1071 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
1072 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
1074 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
1075 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
1076 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
1078 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1079 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
1080 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
1082 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
1083 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
1084 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
1091 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
1092 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
1093 return current_height + 1
1094 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
1095 return current_height + 3
1101 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
1103 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
1111 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
1112 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
1114 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
1115 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
1116 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
1117 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
1123 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1124 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1125 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1126 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1127 let pos = ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::place_secret(idx);
1129 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
1130 if ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
1131 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1134 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
1137 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
1139 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1140 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1141 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
1142 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1143 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1144 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1150 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1151 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
1152 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1153 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1154 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1156 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1157 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1158 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1162 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1163 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1164 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1169 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1176 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1185 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1186 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1187 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1188 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1189 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1190 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1191 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1192 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1194 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1195 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1198 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1199 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1200 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1201 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1202 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1203 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1205 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1206 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1207 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1208 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1209 Some(old_points) => {
1210 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1211 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1212 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1213 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1214 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1216 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1219 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1223 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1228 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1229 match self.key_storage {
1230 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, ref keys, .. } => {
1231 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1232 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1233 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1235 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1236 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1240 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1244 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1245 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1246 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1247 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1248 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1249 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
1250 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
1251 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
1252 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
1253 txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
1255 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
1256 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1257 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1258 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1259 per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1265 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1266 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1267 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1268 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1271 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
1272 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
1273 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
1274 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1275 match self.key_storage {
1276 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1277 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1278 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
1279 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
1280 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
1281 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
1282 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
1283 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
1284 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
1287 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
1290 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1291 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
1294 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
1298 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
1299 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1300 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
1301 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
1303 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1304 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1305 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1306 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1307 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
1308 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
1312 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
1313 // local transactions to decide how to merge
1314 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
1315 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
1316 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
1317 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
1319 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1320 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1322 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1323 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
1325 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
1326 self.to_remote_rescue = other.to_remote_rescue;
1329 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
1333 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
1334 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
1335 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
1336 /// provides slightly better privacy.
1337 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
1338 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
1339 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
1340 match self.key_storage {
1341 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1342 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
1344 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1345 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1350 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
1351 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
1352 pub(super) fn set_basic_channel_info(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
1353 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
1354 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
1355 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
1356 self.funding_redeemscript = Some(funding_redeemscript);
1357 self.channel_value_satoshis = Some(channel_value_satoshis);
1358 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
1359 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
1362 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
1363 match self.key_storage {
1364 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
1365 *funding_info = None;
1367 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1368 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
1373 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1374 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1375 match self.key_storage {
1376 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1377 match funding_info {
1378 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1382 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1388 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1389 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1390 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1391 &self.outputs_to_watch
1394 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1395 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1396 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1397 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1398 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1399 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1400 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1401 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1402 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1408 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1409 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1410 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1411 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1412 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1416 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1417 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1418 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1419 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1420 return Some(ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1423 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1427 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1428 //TODO This can be optimized?
1429 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1430 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1438 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1439 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1442 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1443 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1444 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1445 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1448 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1449 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1450 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1451 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1452 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1453 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1454 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1455 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1456 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1457 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1458 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1459 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1461 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1462 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1464 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1465 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1468 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1473 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1474 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1475 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1476 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1477 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1478 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1479 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1480 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1481 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
1482 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1484 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1485 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1486 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1487 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1491 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1492 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1493 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1494 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1497 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1498 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1500 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1501 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1502 // script_pubkey version.
1503 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1504 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1507 let mut total_value = 0;
1508 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1509 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1510 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1512 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1513 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1515 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1516 txid: commitment_txid,
1519 script_sig: Script::new(),
1520 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1521 witness: Vec::new(),
1523 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1524 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1525 total_value += outp.value;
1526 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1527 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1528 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1529 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1530 output: outp.clone(),
1535 macro_rules! sign_input {
1536 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1538 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1539 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1540 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1541 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1542 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1544 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1545 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1546 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1548 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1552 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1553 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1554 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1555 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1557 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1559 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1560 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1565 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1566 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1568 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1569 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1570 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1571 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1572 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1573 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1574 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1577 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1578 txid: commitment_txid,
1579 vout: transaction_output_index,
1581 script_sig: Script::new(),
1582 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1583 witness: Vec::new(),
1585 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1587 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1588 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1589 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1591 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1595 output: vec!(TxOut {
1596 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1597 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1600 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1601 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1602 let mut used_feerate;
1603 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1604 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1605 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1606 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1607 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1608 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1609 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1610 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1612 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1614 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1618 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1625 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1626 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1627 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1628 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1629 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1631 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1632 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1633 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1634 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1635 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1636 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1637 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1638 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1639 let e = entry.get_mut();
1640 e.retain(|ref event| {
1642 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1643 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1648 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1651 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1659 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1660 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1661 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1663 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1664 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1667 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1669 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1671 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1672 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1675 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1682 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1684 let mut used_feerate;
1685 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1686 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1689 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1691 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1692 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1693 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1694 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1695 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1698 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1699 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1700 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1701 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1702 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1703 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1704 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1706 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1709 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1710 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1711 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1714 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1716 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1717 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1718 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1720 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1721 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1722 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1723 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1724 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1725 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1726 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1727 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1729 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1730 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1732 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1734 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1735 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1736 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1737 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1738 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1739 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1740 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1741 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1742 // payment_preimage.
1743 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1744 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1745 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1746 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1748 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1749 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1753 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1754 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1756 let e = entry.get_mut();
1757 e.retain(|ref event| {
1759 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1760 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1765 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1767 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1768 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1776 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1777 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1778 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1780 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1781 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1785 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1786 let revocation_point_option =
1787 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1788 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1789 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1791 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1792 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1793 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
1794 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1795 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
1797 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1798 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1799 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1802 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1803 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1804 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1807 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1808 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1809 match self.key_storage {
1810 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1811 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1812 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1813 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1815 output: outp.clone(),
1819 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1821 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1825 let mut total_value = 0;
1826 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1827 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1828 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1830 macro_rules! sign_input {
1831 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
1833 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1834 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1835 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
1836 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1837 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1838 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1839 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1841 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1845 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1846 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1847 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1848 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1849 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1854 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1855 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1856 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1857 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1858 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1859 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1860 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1862 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1865 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1866 txid: commitment_txid,
1867 vout: transaction_output_index,
1869 script_sig: Script::new(),
1870 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
1871 witness: Vec::new(),
1873 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1875 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1876 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
1877 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1879 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1883 output: vec!(TxOut {
1884 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1885 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1888 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1889 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1890 let mut used_feerate;
1891 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1892 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1893 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
1894 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1895 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1896 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1897 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1899 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1900 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1901 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
1902 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1903 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1904 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1906 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1907 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
1910 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1916 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1917 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1919 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1920 txid: commitment_txid,
1921 vout: transaction_output_index,
1923 script_sig: Script::new(),
1924 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
1925 witness: Vec::new(),
1927 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1929 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1931 output: vec!(TxOut {
1932 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1933 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1936 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1937 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1938 let mut used_feerate;
1939 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1940 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1941 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
1942 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1943 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1944 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1945 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1946 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
1947 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1948 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
1951 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
1952 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1956 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1961 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1963 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1964 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1967 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1974 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1976 let mut used_feerate;
1977 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1978 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1981 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1983 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1984 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1985 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1986 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1987 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1990 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1991 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1992 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1993 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
1994 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1995 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
1996 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1998 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
2001 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
2002 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2003 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
2005 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2006 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2007 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2008 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
2010 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
2013 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
2014 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2015 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
2016 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2017 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
2018 key: local_key.clone(),
2019 output: outp.clone(),
2025 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
2028 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2029 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
2030 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
2031 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
2035 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2036 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2039 Err(_) => return (None, None)
2044 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
2045 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2046 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2047 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
2048 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
2049 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
2051 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2052 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2055 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2056 None => return (None, None),
2057 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2059 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2060 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2061 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2063 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2066 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2068 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2072 script_sig: Script::new(),
2073 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2074 witness: Vec::new(),
2076 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2079 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2080 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2081 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2085 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2091 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2092 let mut used_feerate;
2093 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2094 return (None, None);
2097 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2099 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2100 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2101 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2102 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2103 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2105 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2109 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2110 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2111 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2112 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2114 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2115 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2116 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2117 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
2118 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2119 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2120 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2121 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2123 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2125 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2127 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2129 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2130 } else { (None, None) }
2133 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2134 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2135 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2136 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2137 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2139 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2140 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2141 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2142 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2143 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2144 key: local_delayedkey,
2145 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2146 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2147 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2153 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2154 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2155 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
2156 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2157 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
2162 if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
2163 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2164 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2165 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
2167 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2168 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2169 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2170 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2175 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2176 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2177 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2178 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2179 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2180 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2181 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2182 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2184 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2185 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2186 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2187 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2188 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2193 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2194 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2195 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2196 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2197 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2198 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2199 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2200 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2203 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2204 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2209 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2212 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2213 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2214 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2215 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2216 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2217 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2218 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2219 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2221 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2222 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2223 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2224 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2226 let e = entry.get_mut();
2227 e.retain(|ref event| {
2229 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2230 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2235 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2238 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2244 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2245 ($updates: expr) => {
2246 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2247 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2248 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2249 for claim in $updates.3 {
2250 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2251 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2258 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2259 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2261 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2262 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2263 match self.key_storage {
2264 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2265 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2271 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2272 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2274 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2275 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2276 match self.key_storage {
2277 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2278 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2279 append_onchain_update!(res);
2281 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2285 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2286 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2287 match self.key_storage {
2288 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2289 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2295 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2296 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2298 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2299 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2300 match self.key_storage {
2301 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2302 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2303 append_onchain_update!(res);
2305 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2310 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2311 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2312 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2313 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2314 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2315 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2323 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2324 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2326 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2327 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2331 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2334 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2335 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2336 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2337 match self.key_storage {
2338 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2339 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2340 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2341 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2342 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2343 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2344 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2345 output: output.clone(),
2350 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2351 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2352 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2359 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2360 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2361 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2362 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2363 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2364 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2365 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2366 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2367 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2368 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2369 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2370 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2371 match self.key_storage {
2372 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2373 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2378 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2379 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
2380 match self.key_storage {
2381 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2382 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
2383 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2384 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2386 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2394 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
2395 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
2396 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
2397 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
2399 fn block_connected<B: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>)
2400 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
2402 for tx in txn_matched {
2403 let mut output_val = 0;
2404 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2405 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2406 output_val += out.value;
2407 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2411 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2412 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2413 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2414 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2415 for tx in txn_matched {
2416 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2417 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2418 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2419 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2421 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2422 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2423 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2424 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2425 funding_info.clone()
2427 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2431 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2432 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2433 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2435 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2436 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2437 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2440 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2441 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2443 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2444 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2448 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2449 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2450 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2454 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2455 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2456 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2459 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2460 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2464 for tx in txn.iter() {
2465 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2466 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2469 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2470 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2471 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2472 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2474 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2475 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2476 for inp in &tx.input {
2477 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2478 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2479 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2480 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2481 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2483 let mut set_equality = true;
2484 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2485 set_equality = false;
2487 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2488 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2489 set_equality = false;
2494 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2496 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2497 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2498 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2499 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2500 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2503 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2504 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2510 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2511 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2512 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2514 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2515 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2516 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2517 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2518 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2520 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2521 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2522 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2525 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2526 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2528 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2530 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2534 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2535 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2536 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2537 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2538 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2539 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2542 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2543 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2548 let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2549 self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
2551 if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2552 if should_broadcast {
2553 match self.key_storage {
2554 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2555 cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2561 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2562 if should_broadcast {
2563 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
2564 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
2565 match self.key_storage {
2566 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2567 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2568 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2569 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2570 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2573 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2574 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2577 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
2581 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2584 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2585 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2586 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2587 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2588 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2589 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2593 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2594 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2595 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2596 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2597 payment_preimage: None,
2598 source: htlc_update.0,
2601 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2602 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2607 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2608 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2609 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2612 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2613 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2614 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2615 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2616 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2617 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2619 } else { unreachable!(); }
2621 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2622 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2623 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2624 } else { unreachable!(); }
2627 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2628 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
2629 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
2631 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
2634 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)
2635 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
2637 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
2638 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2639 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2641 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2642 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2643 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2646 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2647 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2648 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2649 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2650 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2651 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2652 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2660 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2661 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2662 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2663 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2664 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2667 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2668 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2670 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2671 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2672 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2673 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2675 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2678 for req in remove_request {
2679 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2681 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2684 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2685 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2686 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2687 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2688 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2689 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2690 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2691 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2692 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2693 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2694 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2695 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2696 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2697 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2698 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2699 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2700 // time out the HTLC first.
2701 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2702 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2703 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2704 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2705 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2706 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2707 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2708 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2709 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2710 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2711 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2712 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2713 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2714 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2715 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2716 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2717 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2718 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2719 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2720 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2721 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2722 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2723 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2724 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2731 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2732 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2735 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2736 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2737 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2738 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2741 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2742 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2743 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2751 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2752 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2753 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2754 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2755 let mut payment_data = None;
2756 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2757 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2758 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2759 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2761 macro_rules! log_claim {
2762 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2763 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2764 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2765 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2766 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2767 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2768 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2769 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2770 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2771 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2772 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2773 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2775 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2776 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2777 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2778 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2783 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2784 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2785 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2786 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2787 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2788 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2789 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2790 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2799 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2800 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2801 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2802 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2803 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2804 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2805 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2806 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2807 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2808 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2809 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2810 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2811 } else if !$local_tx {
2812 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2813 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2815 if payment_data.is_none() {
2816 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2817 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2821 if payment_data.is_none() {
2822 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2823 continue 'outer_loop;
2830 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2831 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2832 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2833 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2836 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2837 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2838 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2839 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2842 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2843 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2844 "remote commitment tx", false);
2847 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2848 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2849 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2850 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2851 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2852 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2853 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2855 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2858 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2859 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2860 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2862 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2866 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2867 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2868 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2869 let e = entry.get_mut();
2870 e.retain(|ref event| {
2872 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2873 return htlc_update.0 != source
2878 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2881 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2889 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
2890 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
2891 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
2892 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
2893 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2894 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
2896 previous_output: *outp,
2897 script_sig: Script::new(),
2898 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2899 witness: Vec::new(),
2902 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
2906 output: vec![TxOut {
2907 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2912 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
2913 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
2915 let mut used_feerate;
2916 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
2917 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
2918 let mut value = $amount;
2919 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2920 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
2923 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2926 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
2928 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
2930 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
2936 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2937 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
2938 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
2939 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
2940 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
2941 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
2942 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
2946 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
2951 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
2952 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
2954 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
2955 match per_outp_material {
2956 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
2957 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
2960 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
2961 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
2964 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
2968 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
2970 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
2971 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
2973 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
2975 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
2977 new_feerate = feerate;
2981 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
2983 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
2984 match per_outp_material {
2985 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
2986 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
2987 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
2988 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
2989 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2990 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2992 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
2994 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
2996 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
2997 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
2999 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
3000 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
3001 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
3002 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
3003 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
3004 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3005 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3006 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
3007 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
3009 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
3011 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
3012 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
3014 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
3015 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
3016 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
3017 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
3022 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
3023 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
3027 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3029 impl<R: ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
3030 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3031 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3032 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3036 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3041 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3042 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3043 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3044 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3047 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3049 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3051 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3052 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3053 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3054 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3055 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3056 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3057 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3058 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3059 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3060 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3061 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3062 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3064 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
3065 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3066 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3070 revocation_base_key,
3072 delayed_payment_base_key,
3076 current_remote_commitment_txid,
3077 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
3080 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3083 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3084 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3085 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3086 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3088 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3089 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3093 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3094 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3095 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3096 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3098 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3103 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3104 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3106 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
3107 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
3108 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
3109 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
3112 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3115 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3116 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3117 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3118 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3119 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3121 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3122 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3128 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3129 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3130 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3131 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3132 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3133 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3134 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3135 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3137 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3138 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3142 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3143 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3144 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3145 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3146 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3147 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3148 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3149 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3150 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3152 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3153 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3157 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3158 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3159 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3160 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3161 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3162 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3163 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3167 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3170 let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3171 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3172 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3173 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3174 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3175 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3176 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3178 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3179 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3180 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3181 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3182 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3184 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3185 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3187 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3192 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
3199 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3202 Some(read_local_tx!())
3204 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3207 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3210 Some(read_local_tx!())
3212 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3215 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3217 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3218 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3219 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3220 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3221 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3222 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3223 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3227 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3228 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
3229 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
3230 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3233 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3234 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3235 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3238 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3239 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3240 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3242 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3245 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3246 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3247 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3248 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3251 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3252 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3253 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3254 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3255 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3256 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3257 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3260 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3261 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3262 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3263 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3264 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3265 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3266 for _ in 0..events_len {
3267 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3269 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3270 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3275 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3276 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3277 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3278 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3282 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3283 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3284 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3289 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3293 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3296 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3297 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3298 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3299 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3300 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3301 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
3302 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3303 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3305 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3306 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3310 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3311 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3314 their_htlc_base_key,
3315 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3316 funding_redeemscript,
3317 channel_value_satoshis,
3318 their_cur_revocation_points,
3321 their_to_self_delay,
3324 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3325 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3326 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3328 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3329 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3330 current_remote_commitment_number,
3333 pending_htlcs_updated,
3338 pending_claim_requests,
3340 claimable_outpoints,
3342 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3355 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3356 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3357 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3358 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3359 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3360 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3361 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3362 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3363 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3365 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3366 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3368 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
3369 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3370 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3371 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3372 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3374 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
3378 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
3379 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
3380 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
3381 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor<InMemoryChannelKeys>;
3382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3383 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3385 macro_rules! test_secrets {
3387 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
3388 for secret in secrets.iter() {
3389 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
3392 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
3393 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
3397 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3399 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3400 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3401 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3402 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3403 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3409 // insert_secret correct sequence
3410 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3413 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3414 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3415 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3418 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3419 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3420 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3423 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3424 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3425 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3428 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3429 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3430 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3433 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3434 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3435 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3438 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3439 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3440 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3443 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3444 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3445 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3448 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3449 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3450 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3455 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
3456 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3459 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3460 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3461 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3464 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3465 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3466 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3467 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3471 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
3472 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3475 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3476 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3477 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3480 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3481 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3482 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3485 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3486 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3487 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3490 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3491 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3492 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3493 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3497 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
3498 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3501 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3502 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3503 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3506 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3507 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3508 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3511 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3512 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3513 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3516 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3517 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3518 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3519 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3523 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
3524 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3527 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3528 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
3529 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3532 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3533 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
3534 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3537 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3538 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
3539 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3542 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3543 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
3544 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3547 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3548 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3549 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3552 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3553 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3554 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3557 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3558 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3559 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3562 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3563 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3564 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3565 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3569 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
3570 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3573 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3574 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3575 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3578 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3579 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3580 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3583 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3584 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3585 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3588 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3589 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3590 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3593 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3594 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3595 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3598 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3599 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3600 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3601 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3605 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3606 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3609 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3610 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3611 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3614 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3615 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3616 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3619 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3620 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3621 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3624 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3625 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3626 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3629 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3630 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3631 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3634 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3635 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3636 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3639 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3640 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3641 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3644 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3645 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3646 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3647 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3651 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3652 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3655 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3656 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3657 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3660 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3661 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3662 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3665 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3666 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3667 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3670 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3671 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3672 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3675 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3676 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3677 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3680 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3681 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3682 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3685 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3686 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3687 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3690 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3691 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3692 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3693 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3697 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3698 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3701 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3702 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3703 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3706 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3707 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3708 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3711 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3712 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3713 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3716 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3717 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3718 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3721 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3722 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3723 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3726 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3727 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3728 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3731 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3732 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3733 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3736 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3737 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3738 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3739 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3744 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3745 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3746 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3748 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3749 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3753 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3754 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3755 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3756 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3757 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3758 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3763 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3765 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3767 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3769 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3770 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3771 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3772 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3776 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3777 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3779 let mut res = Vec::new();
3780 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3781 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3785 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3786 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3793 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3794 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3796 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3797 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3803 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3804 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3805 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3806 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3811 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3813 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3814 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3815 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3816 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3817 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3822 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3824 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3825 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3827 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3828 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3829 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3830 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3831 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3832 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3833 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3836 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3837 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3838 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3839 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3840 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3841 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3842 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3844 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3845 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3846 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3847 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3848 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3849 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3851 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3852 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3853 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3854 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3855 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3856 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3857 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3858 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3860 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3861 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3862 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3863 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3864 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3865 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3869 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3870 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3871 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3873 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3874 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3875 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3876 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3878 macro_rules! sign_input {
3879 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3880 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3881 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3883 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3884 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3885 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3887 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3888 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3889 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3890 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3891 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3892 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3893 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3894 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3895 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3896 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3897 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3898 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3900 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3902 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3903 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3904 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3905 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3909 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3910 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3912 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3913 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3915 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3916 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3920 script_sig: Script::new(),
3921 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3922 witness: Vec::new(),
3925 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3926 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3929 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3930 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3931 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3932 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3933 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3935 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3937 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3938 claim_tx.input.clear();
3939 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3941 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3942 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3946 script_sig: Script::new(),
3947 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3948 witness: Vec::new(),
3951 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3952 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3953 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3954 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3955 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3957 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3959 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3960 claim_tx.input.clear();
3961 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3962 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3963 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3967 script_sig: Script::new(),
3968 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3969 witness: Vec::new(),
3971 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3972 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3973 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3974 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3975 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3977 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3980 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.