1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
49 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
50 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
53 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
54 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
55 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
56 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
57 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
59 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
60 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
61 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
65 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
67 self.update_id.write(w)?;
68 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
69 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
70 update_step.write(w)?;
75 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
77 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
78 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
79 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
81 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
83 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
87 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
89 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
90 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
91 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
93 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
94 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
95 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
96 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
98 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
99 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
100 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
102 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
103 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
104 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
105 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
106 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
107 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
110 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
111 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
114 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
115 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
116 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
117 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
118 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
121 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
122 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
123 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
125 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
126 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
127 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
129 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
133 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
134 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
135 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
137 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
139 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
141 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
142 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
143 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
144 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
145 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
146 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
147 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
149 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
151 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
152 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
153 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
156 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
157 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
158 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
159 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
161 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
162 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
163 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
164 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
165 /// all registered listeners in one go.
166 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
167 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
169 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
170 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
171 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
173 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
174 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
175 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
177 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
178 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
179 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
181 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
183 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
184 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
185 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
187 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
188 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
189 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
191 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
192 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
193 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
195 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
196 /// with success or failure.
198 /// You should probably just call through to
199 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
201 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
204 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
205 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
207 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
209 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
210 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
211 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
213 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
214 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
215 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface {
216 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
217 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
219 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
220 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
222 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
224 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
227 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
228 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
230 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
231 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
232 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
234 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
235 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
236 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
237 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
238 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
239 outputs: spendable_outputs,
243 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
244 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
245 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
250 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
251 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
254 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
255 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
256 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
257 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
258 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
263 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
264 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
266 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
267 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
268 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T> {
269 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
270 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
273 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
275 fee_estimator: feeest,
281 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
282 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
283 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
284 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
285 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
286 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
288 match monitor.key_storage {
289 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
292 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
294 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
295 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
296 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
297 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
301 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
302 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
305 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
306 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
307 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
310 entry.insert(monitor);
314 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
315 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
316 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
317 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
318 Some(orig_monitor) => {
319 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor.key_storage));
320 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update)
322 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
327 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T>
328 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
330 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
331 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
333 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
337 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
338 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
340 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
344 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
345 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
346 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
347 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
349 pending_htlcs_updated
353 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T>
354 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface
356 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
357 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
358 let mut ret = Vec::new();
359 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
364 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
365 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
366 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
367 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
368 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
369 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
370 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
371 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
372 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
373 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
374 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
375 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
376 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
377 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
378 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
379 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
380 /// accurate block height.
381 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
382 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
383 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
384 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
385 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
386 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
387 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
388 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
389 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
390 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
391 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
394 enum Storage<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
397 funding_key: SecretKey,
398 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
399 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
400 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
401 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
402 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
403 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
404 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
405 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
408 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
409 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
413 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
414 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for Storage<ChanSigner> {
415 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
417 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
420 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => keys.pubkeys() == k.pubkeys(),
421 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => false,
424 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} => {
425 let (rbk, hbk) = (revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key);
427 Storage::Local { .. } => false,
428 Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} =>
429 revocation_base_key == rbk && htlc_base_key == hbk,
436 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
437 struct LocalSignedTx {
438 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
440 tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
441 revocation_key: PublicKey,
442 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
443 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
444 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
445 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
447 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
451 enum InputDescriptors {
456 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
459 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
460 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
461 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
462 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
466 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
474 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
480 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
481 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
486 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
487 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
489 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
490 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
491 script.write(writer)?;
492 pubkey.write(writer)?;
493 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
495 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
497 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
499 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
501 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
502 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
503 script.write(writer)?;
505 preimage.write(writer)?;
506 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
507 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
509 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
510 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
511 script.write(writer)?;
512 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
513 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
514 preimage.write(writer)?;
515 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
522 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InputMaterial {
523 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
524 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
526 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
527 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
528 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
529 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
532 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
534 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
535 InputMaterial::Revoked {
544 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
545 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
546 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
547 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
548 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
549 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
558 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
559 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
560 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
561 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
562 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
563 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
565 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
570 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
576 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
577 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
578 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
580 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
581 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
583 claim_request: Sha256dHash,
585 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
586 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
587 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
589 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
591 /// Claim tx aggregate multiple claimable outpoints. One of the outpoint may be claimed by a remote party tx.
592 /// In this case, we need to drop the outpoint and regenerate a new claim tx. By safety, we keep tracking
593 /// the outpoint to be sure to resurect it back to the claim tx if reorgs happen.
594 ContentiousOutpoint {
595 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
596 input_material: InputMaterial,
600 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
601 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
602 pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
603 // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
604 // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
606 // Tracked in case of reorg to wipe out now-superflous bump material
607 feerate_previous: u64,
608 // Soonest timelocks among set of outpoints claimed, used to compute
609 // a priority of not feerate
610 soonest_timelock: u32,
611 // Cache of script, pubkey, sig or key to solve claimable outputs scriptpubkey.
612 per_input_material: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, InputMaterial>,
615 impl Writeable for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
616 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
617 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.height_timer))?;
618 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.feerate_previous))?;
619 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.soonest_timelock))?;
620 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_input_material.len() as u64))?;
621 for (outp, tx_material) in self.per_input_material.iter() {
623 tx_material.write(writer)?;
629 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
630 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
631 let height_timer = Readable::read(reader)?;
632 let feerate_previous = Readable::read(reader)?;
633 let soonest_timelock = Readable::read(reader)?;
634 let per_input_material_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
635 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(per_input_material_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
636 for _ in 0 ..per_input_material_len {
637 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
638 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
639 per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
641 Ok(Self { height_timer, feerate_previous, soonest_timelock, per_input_material })
645 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
646 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
648 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
650 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
651 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
652 // TODO: We really need to not be generating a fully-signed transaction in Channel and
653 // passing it here, we need to hold off so that the ChanSigner can enforce a
654 // only-sign-local-state-for-broadcast once invariant:
655 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
656 local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys,
658 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
660 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
661 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
662 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
663 commitment_number: u64,
664 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
667 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
673 /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should
674 /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state.
675 RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
676 their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
680 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
681 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
683 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref local_keys, ref feerate_per_kw, ref htlc_outputs } => {
685 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
686 local_keys.write(w)?;
687 feerate_per_kw.write(w)?;
688 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
689 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
695 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
697 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
698 commitment_number.write(w)?;
699 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
700 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
701 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
704 &None => 0u8.write(w)?,
712 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
714 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
716 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
721 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => {
723 their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
729 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
730 fn read(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
731 match Readable::read(r)? {
733 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
734 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
735 local_keys: Readable::read(r)?,
736 feerate_per_kw: Readable::read(r)?,
738 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
739 let mut res = Vec::new();
741 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
748 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
749 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
750 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
751 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
753 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
754 let mut res = Vec::new();
756 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
763 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
764 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
768 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
769 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
770 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
774 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
775 their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
778 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
783 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
784 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
786 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
787 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
789 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
790 latest_update_id: u64,
791 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
793 key_storage: Storage<ChanSigner>,
794 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
795 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
796 funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
797 channel_value_satoshis: Option<u64>,
798 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
799 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
801 our_to_self_delay: u16,
802 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
804 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
805 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
806 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
807 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
808 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
809 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
810 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
811 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
812 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
813 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
814 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
815 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
816 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
818 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
819 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
820 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
821 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
822 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
823 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
825 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
827 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
829 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
831 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
833 destination_script: Script,
834 // Thanks to data loss protection, we may be able to claim our non-htlc funds
835 // back, this is the script we have to spend from but we need to
836 // scan every commitment transaction for that
837 to_remote_rescue: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
839 // Used to track claiming requests. If claim tx doesn't confirm before height timer expiration we need to bump
840 // it (RBF or CPFP). If an input has been part of an aggregate tx at first claim try, we need to keep it within
841 // another bumped aggregate tx to comply with RBF rules. We may have multiple claiming txn in the flight for the
842 // same set of outpoints. One of the outpoints may be spent by a transaction not issued by us. That's why at
843 // block connection we scan all inputs and if any of them is among a set of a claiming request we test for set
844 // equality between spending transaction and claim request. If true, it means transaction was one our claiming one
845 // after a security delay of 6 blocks we remove pending claim request. If false, it means transaction wasn't and
846 // we need to regenerate new claim request we reduced set of stil-claimable outpoints.
847 // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
848 // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
849 // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
850 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
851 pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
853 pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
855 // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
856 // Key is outpoint than monitor parsing has detected we have keys/scripts to claim
857 // Value is (pending claim request identifier, confirmation_block), identifier
858 // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
859 // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
860 // block with output gets disconnected.
861 #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
862 pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
864 claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
866 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
867 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
868 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
869 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
871 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
872 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
873 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
874 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
875 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
877 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
878 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
879 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
880 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
881 // the full block_connected).
882 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
883 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
886 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
887 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
889 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
890 let mut fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
892 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
893 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
895 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
896 fee = $used_feerate * ($predicted_weight as u64) / 1000;
898 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
902 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
908 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
921 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
922 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
923 /// underlying object
924 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
925 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
926 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
927 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
928 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
929 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
930 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
931 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
932 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
933 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
934 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
935 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
936 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
937 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
938 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
939 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
940 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
941 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
942 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
943 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
944 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
945 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
946 self.to_remote_rescue != other.to_remote_rescue ||
947 self.pending_claim_requests != other.pending_claim_requests ||
948 self.claimable_outpoints != other.claimable_outpoints ||
949 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
950 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
959 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
960 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
961 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
962 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
963 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
964 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
965 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
967 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
969 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
970 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
972 macro_rules! write_option {
979 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
984 match self.key_storage {
985 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
986 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
988 writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
989 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
990 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
991 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
992 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
993 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
995 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
996 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
997 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
998 script.write(writer)?;
1001 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
1004 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1005 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
1007 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
1010 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1011 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
1012 self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
1013 self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
1015 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1016 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
1017 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
1018 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
1019 match second_option {
1020 Some(second_pubkey) => {
1021 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
1024 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1029 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1033 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1034 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1036 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
1038 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1039 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1040 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1041 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1042 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1043 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1044 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1048 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1049 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1050 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1051 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1052 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1053 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1054 write_option!(htlc_source);
1058 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1059 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1060 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1061 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1062 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1063 for script in txouts.iter() {
1064 script.write(writer)?;
1068 if for_local_storage {
1069 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1070 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1071 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1072 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1075 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1078 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1079 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1080 $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
1081 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1082 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1083 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1084 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1085 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
1087 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1088 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1089 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1090 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1091 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
1093 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1097 write_option!(htlc_source);
1102 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1103 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1104 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1106 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1109 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1110 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1111 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1113 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1116 if for_local_storage {
1117 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1119 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1122 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1123 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1124 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1127 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
1128 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
1129 data.write(writer)?;
1132 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1133 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1134 if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
1135 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1136 to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
1137 local_key.write(writer)?;
1139 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1142 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
1143 for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
1144 ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
1145 claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
1148 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1149 for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1150 outp.write(writer)?;
1151 claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
1152 claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
1155 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1156 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1157 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1158 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1159 for ev in events.iter() {
1161 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
1162 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1163 claim_request.write(writer)?;
1165 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1166 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1167 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1168 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1170 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
1171 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1172 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1173 input_material.write(writer)?;
1179 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1180 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1181 txid.write(writer)?;
1182 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1183 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1184 script.write(writer)?;
1191 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1193 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1194 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1195 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1196 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1197 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1198 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1199 self.write(writer, true)
1202 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1204 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1205 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1206 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1207 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1208 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1209 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1210 self.write(writer, false)
1214 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1215 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1216 our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1217 their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1218 their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1219 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1220 logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1222 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1223 let funding_key = keys.funding_key().clone();
1224 let revocation_base_key = keys.revocation_base_key().clone();
1225 let htlc_base_key = keys.htlc_base_key().clone();
1226 let delayed_payment_base_key = keys.delayed_payment_base_key().clone();
1227 let payment_base_key = keys.payment_base_key().clone();
1229 latest_update_id: 0,
1230 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1232 key_storage: Storage::Local {
1235 revocation_base_key,
1237 delayed_payment_base_key,
1239 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
1240 funding_info: Some(funding_info),
1241 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1242 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1244 their_htlc_base_key: Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone()),
1245 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone()),
1246 funding_redeemscript: Some(funding_redeemscript),
1247 channel_value_satoshis: Some(channel_value_satoshis),
1248 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1250 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
1251 their_to_self_delay: Some(their_to_self_delay),
1253 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1254 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1255 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1256 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1258 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1259 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1260 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1262 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1263 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1265 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1266 to_remote_rescue: None,
1268 pending_claim_requests: HashMap::new(),
1270 claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1272 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1273 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1275 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1276 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1281 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> usize {
1282 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
1284 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
1285 tx_weight += match inp {
1286 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1287 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
1288 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
1290 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1291 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
1292 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
1294 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
1295 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
1296 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
1298 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
1299 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
1300 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
1302 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
1303 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
1304 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
1311 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
1312 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
1313 return current_height + 1
1314 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
1315 return current_height + 3
1320 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1321 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1322 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1323 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1324 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1325 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1328 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1329 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1330 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
1331 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1332 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1333 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1339 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1340 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
1341 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1342 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1343 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1345 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1346 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
1347 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1351 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1352 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1353 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1358 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1365 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1374 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1375 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1376 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1377 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1378 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1379 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1380 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1381 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1383 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1384 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1387 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1388 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1389 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1390 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1391 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1392 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1394 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1395 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1396 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1397 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1398 Some(old_points) => {
1399 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1400 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1401 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1402 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1403 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1405 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1408 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1412 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1417 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1418 match self.key_storage {
1419 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, ref keys, .. } => {
1420 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1421 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1422 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1424 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1425 self.to_remote_rescue = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1429 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1433 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1434 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1435 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1436 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1437 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1438 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1439 if self.their_to_self_delay.is_none() {
1440 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Got a local commitment tx info update before we'd set basic information about the channel"));
1442 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
1443 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
1444 txid: commitment_tx.txid(),
1446 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
1447 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1448 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1449 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1450 per_commitment_point: local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1457 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1458 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1459 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1460 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1463 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1464 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1465 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1467 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } =>
1468 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?,
1469 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1470 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1471 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1472 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1473 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1474 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1475 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1476 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1479 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1483 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1486 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1487 pub fn update_monitor(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1488 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1489 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1491 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1493 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs } =>
1494 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, local_keys, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs)?,
1495 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1496 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1497 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1498 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1499 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1500 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1501 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1502 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1505 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1509 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1511 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1512 self.latest_update_id
1515 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1516 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1517 match self.key_storage {
1518 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
1519 match funding_info {
1520 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
1524 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1530 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1531 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1532 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1533 &self.outputs_to_watch
1536 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1537 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1538 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1539 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1540 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1541 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1542 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1543 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1544 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1550 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1551 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1552 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1553 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1554 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1558 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1559 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1560 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1563 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1564 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1567 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1568 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1571 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1572 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1573 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1574 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1577 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1578 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1579 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1580 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1581 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1582 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1583 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1584 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1585 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1586 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1587 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1588 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1590 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1591 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1593 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1594 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1597 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1602 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1603 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1604 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1605 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1606 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1607 Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1608 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1609 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1610 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
1611 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1613 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1614 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1615 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1616 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1620 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1621 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1622 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1623 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1626 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1627 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1629 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1630 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1631 // script_pubkey version.
1632 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1633 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1636 let mut total_value = 0;
1637 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1638 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1639 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1641 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1642 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1644 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1645 txid: commitment_txid,
1648 script_sig: Script::new(),
1649 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1650 witness: Vec::new(),
1652 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1653 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1654 total_value += outp.value;
1655 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1656 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1657 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1658 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1659 output: outp.clone(),
1664 macro_rules! sign_input {
1665 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1667 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1668 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1669 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1670 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1671 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1673 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1674 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1675 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1677 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1681 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1682 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1683 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1684 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1686 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1688 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1689 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1694 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1695 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1697 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1698 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1699 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1700 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1701 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1702 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1703 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1706 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1707 txid: commitment_txid,
1708 vout: transaction_output_index,
1710 script_sig: Script::new(),
1711 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1712 witness: Vec::new(),
1714 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1716 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1717 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1718 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1720 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1724 output: vec!(TxOut {
1725 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1726 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1729 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1730 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1731 let mut used_feerate;
1732 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1733 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1734 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1735 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1736 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1737 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
1738 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 });
1739 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
1740 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
1743 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
1744 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
1747 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1754 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1755 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1756 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1757 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1758 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1760 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1761 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1762 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1763 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1764 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1765 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1766 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1768 let e = entry.get_mut();
1769 e.retain(|ref event| {
1771 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1772 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1777 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1779 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1780 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1788 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1789 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1790 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1792 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1793 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1796 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1798 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1800 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1801 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1804 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1811 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1813 let mut used_feerate;
1814 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
1815 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1818 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1820 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
1821 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
1822 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
1823 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
1824 soonest_timelock = info.2;
1827 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
1828 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
1829 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1830 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1831 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
1832 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 });
1833 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
1834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
1838 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
1839 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1840 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
1843 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1845 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1846 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1847 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1849 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1850 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1851 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1852 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1853 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1854 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1855 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1856 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1858 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1859 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1861 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1863 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1864 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1865 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1866 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1867 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1868 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1869 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1870 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1871 // payment_preimage.
1872 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1873 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1874 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1875 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1877 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1878 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1882 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1883 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1885 let e = entry.get_mut();
1886 e.retain(|ref event| {
1888 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1889 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1894 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1896 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1897 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1905 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1906 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1907 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1909 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1910 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1914 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1915 let revocation_point_option =
1916 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1917 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1918 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1920 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1921 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1922 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
1923 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
1924 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
1926 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1927 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1928 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1931 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1932 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1933 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1936 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1937 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1938 match self.key_storage {
1939 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1940 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1941 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1942 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1944 output: outp.clone(),
1948 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1950 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1954 let mut total_value = 0;
1955 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1956 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1957 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1959 macro_rules! sign_input {
1960 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
1962 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1963 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1964 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
1965 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1966 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1967 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1968 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1970 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1974 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1975 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1976 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1977 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1978 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1983 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1984 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1985 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1986 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1987 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1988 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1989 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1991 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1994 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1995 txid: commitment_txid,
1996 vout: transaction_output_index,
1998 script_sig: Script::new(),
1999 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
2000 witness: Vec::new(),
2002 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
2004 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
2005 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
2006 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
2008 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
2012 output: vec!(TxOut {
2013 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2014 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2017 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
2018 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2019 let mut used_feerate;
2020 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2021 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
2022 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
2023 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
2024 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2025 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2026 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
2028 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2029 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2030 per_input_material.insert(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: 0 });
2031 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2032 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2033 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((single_htlc_tx.txid(), height)); }
2035 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(single_htlc_tx.txid()) {
2036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2037 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material}); }
2039 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
2045 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
2046 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
2048 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2049 txid: commitment_txid,
2050 vout: transaction_output_index,
2052 script_sig: Script::new(),
2053 sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
2054 witness: Vec::new(),
2056 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
2058 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2060 output: vec!(TxOut {
2061 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2062 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
2065 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
2066 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2067 let mut used_feerate;
2068 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2069 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
2070 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
2071 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
2072 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
2073 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2074 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2075 per_input_material.insert(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry });
2076 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2077 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2078 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((timeout_tx.txid(), height)); }
2080 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(timeout_tx.txid()) {
2081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }); }
2085 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
2090 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
2092 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2093 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2096 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2103 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
2105 let mut used_feerate;
2106 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2107 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
2110 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2112 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(spend_tx.input.len());
2113 let mut soonest_timelock = ::std::u32::MAX;
2114 for info in inputs_info.iter() {
2115 if info.2 <= soonest_timelock {
2116 soonest_timelock = info.2;
2119 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
2120 let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
2121 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
2122 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
2123 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2124 per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
2125 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
2126 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2127 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_txid, height)); }
2130 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_txid) {
2131 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock, per_input_material }); }
2134 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2135 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2136 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2137 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
2139 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
2142 } else if let Some((ref to_remote_rescue, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
2143 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2144 if to_remote_rescue == &outp.script_pubkey {
2145 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2146 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
2147 key: local_key.clone(),
2148 output: outp.clone(),
2154 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
2157 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
2158 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
2159 //TODO: send back new outputs to guarantee pending_claim_request consistency
2160 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
2164 macro_rules! ignore_error {
2165 ( $thing : expr ) => {
2168 Err(_) => return (None, None)
2173 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
2174 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
2175 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
2176 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
2177 Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
2178 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
2180 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2181 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
2184 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
2185 None => return (None, None),
2186 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
2188 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
2189 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2190 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
2192 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
2195 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
2197 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2201 script_sig: Script::new(),
2202 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2203 witness: Vec::new(),
2205 amount = tx.output[0].value;
2208 if !inputs.is_empty() {
2209 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
2210 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
2214 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
2220 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
2221 let mut used_feerate;
2222 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
2223 return (None, None);
2226 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
2228 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
2229 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
2230 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
2231 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
2232 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
2234 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2238 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2239 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2240 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
2241 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
2243 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
2244 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
2245 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
2246 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32);
2247 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
2248 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2249 per_input_material.insert(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value });
2250 match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output) {
2251 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2252 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((spend_tx.txid(), height)); }
2254 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(spend_tx.txid()) {
2255 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: used_feerate, soonest_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, per_input_material }); }
2258 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
2259 } else { (None, None) }
2262 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial)>) {
2263 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2264 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2265 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2266 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
2268 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
2269 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
2270 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
2271 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2272 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
2273 key: local_delayedkey,
2274 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
2275 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
2276 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
2282 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
2283 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2284 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output.iter().enumerate() {
2285 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
2286 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness(), idx as u32);
2291 if let &Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } = &self.key_storage {
2292 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
2293 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2294 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sigs {
2296 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
2297 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2298 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2299 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_timeout_tx, their_sig, &None, htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2304 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
2305 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2306 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2307 per_input_material.insert(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2308 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2309 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2310 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2311 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
2313 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
2314 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
2315 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
2316 let (our_sig, htlc_script) = match
2317 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_success_tx, their_sig, &Some(*payment_preimage), htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key, &self.secp_ctx) {
2322 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
2323 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2324 let mut per_input_material = HashMap::with_capacity(1);
2325 per_input_material.insert(htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output, InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000});
2326 //TODO: with option_simplified_commitment track outpoint too
2327 log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, height_timer);
2328 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.txid(), ClaimTxBumpMaterial { height_timer, feerate_previous: 0, soonest_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, per_input_material }));
2329 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
2332 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.without_valid_witness().output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
2333 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
2338 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
2341 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
2342 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
2343 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
2344 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
2345 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
2346 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
2347 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2348 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2350 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
2351 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2352 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2353 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2354 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2355 let e = entry.get_mut();
2356 e.retain(|ref event| {
2358 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2359 return htlc_update.0 != $source
2364 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
2366 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2367 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
2373 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
2374 ($updates: expr) => {
2375 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
2376 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
2377 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
2378 for claim in $updates.3 {
2379 match self.pending_claim_requests.entry(claim.0) {
2380 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2381 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2387 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
2388 let mut is_local_tx = false;
2390 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2391 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2392 match self.key_storage {
2393 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2394 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2400 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2401 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2403 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2404 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2405 match self.key_storage {
2406 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2407 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2408 append_onchain_update!(res);
2410 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2414 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2415 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2416 match self.key_storage {
2417 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2418 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2424 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2425 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
2427 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
2428 assert!(local_tx.tx.has_local_sig());
2429 match self.key_storage {
2430 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2431 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2432 append_onchain_update!(res);
2434 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { }
2439 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2440 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2441 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2442 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2443 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2444 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2452 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2453 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2455 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2456 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2460 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2463 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2464 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2465 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2466 match self.key_storage {
2467 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2468 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2469 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2470 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2471 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2472 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2473 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2474 output: output.clone(),
2479 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2480 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2481 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2488 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2489 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2490 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2491 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2492 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2493 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2494 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2495 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2496 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2497 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2498 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
2499 if let &mut Some(ref mut local_tx) = &mut self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2500 match self.key_storage {
2501 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2502 local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2507 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2508 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness().clone()];
2509 match self.key_storage {
2510 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2511 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, 0).0);
2512 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2513 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2515 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2523 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
2524 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
2525 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
2526 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
2528 fn block_connected<B: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>)
2529 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
2531 for tx in txn_matched {
2532 let mut output_val = 0;
2533 for out in tx.output.iter() {
2534 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2535 output_val += out.value;
2536 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
2540 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2541 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2542 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2543 let mut bump_candidates = HashSet::new();
2544 for tx in txn_matched {
2545 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2546 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2547 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2548 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2550 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2551 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2552 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2553 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2554 funding_info.clone()
2556 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2560 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2561 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
2562 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height, fee_estimator);
2564 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2565 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2566 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2569 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
2570 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2572 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2573 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2577 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2578 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(&tx) {
2579 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2583 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2584 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2585 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2588 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2589 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2593 for tx in txn.iter() {
2594 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2595 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2598 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2599 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2600 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2601 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
2603 // Scan all input to verify is one of the outpoint spent is of interest for us
2604 let mut claimed_outputs_material = Vec::new();
2605 for inp in &tx.input {
2606 if let Some(first_claim_txid_height) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&inp.previous_output) {
2607 // If outpoint has claim request pending on it...
2608 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&first_claim_txid_height.0) {
2609 //... we need to verify equality between transaction outpoints and claim request
2610 // outpoints to know if transaction is the original claim or a bumped one issued
2612 let mut set_equality = true;
2613 if claim_material.per_input_material.len() != tx.input.len() {
2614 set_equality = false;
2616 for (claim_inp, tx_inp) in claim_material.per_input_material.keys().zip(tx.input.iter()) {
2617 if *claim_inp != tx_inp.previous_output {
2618 set_equality = false;
2623 macro_rules! clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay {
2625 let new_event = OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request: first_claim_txid_height.0.clone() };
2626 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2628 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2629 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2632 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2633 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2639 // If this is our transaction (or our counterparty spent all the outputs
2640 // before we could anyway with same inputs order than us), wait for
2641 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY and clean the RBF tracking map.
2643 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2644 } else { // If false, generate new claim request with update outpoint set
2645 for input in tx.input.iter() {
2646 if let Some(input_material) = claim_material.per_input_material.remove(&input.previous_output) {
2647 claimed_outputs_material.push((input.previous_output, input_material));
2649 // If there are no outpoints left to claim in this request, drop it entirely after ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2650 if claim_material.per_input_material.is_empty() {
2651 clean_claim_request_after_safety_delay!();
2654 //TODO: recompute soonest_timelock to avoid wasting a bit on fees
2655 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid_height.0.clone());
2657 break; //No need to iterate further, either tx is our or their
2659 panic!("Inconsistencies between pending_claim_requests map and claimable_outpoints map");
2663 for (outpoint, input_material) in claimed_outputs_material.drain(..) {
2664 let new_event = OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material };
2665 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2667 if !entry.get().contains(&new_event) {
2668 entry.get_mut().push(new_event);
2671 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2672 entry.insert(vec![new_event]);
2677 let should_broadcast = if let Some(_) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2678 self.would_broadcast_at_height(height)
2680 if let Some(ref mut cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2681 if should_broadcast {
2682 match self.key_storage {
2683 Storage::Local { ref funding_key, .. } => {
2684 cur_local_tx.tx.add_local_sig(funding_key, self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap(), self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap(), &self.secp_ctx);
2690 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2691 if should_broadcast {
2692 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness()));
2693 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx.with_valid_witness());
2694 match self.key_storage {
2695 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, .. } => {
2696 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, delayed_payment_base_key, height);
2697 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2698 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2699 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2702 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
2703 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2706 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => { },
2710 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2713 OnchainEvent::Claim { claim_request } => {
2714 // We may remove a whole set of claim outpoints here, as these one may have
2715 // been aggregated in a single tx and claimed so atomically
2716 if let Some(bump_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&claim_request) {
2717 for outpoint in bump_material.per_input_material.keys() {
2718 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2722 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2723 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2724 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2725 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
2726 payment_preimage: None,
2727 source: htlc_update.0,
2730 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, .. } => {
2731 self.claimable_outpoints.remove(&outpoint);
2736 for (first_claim_txid, ref mut cached_claim_datas) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter_mut() {
2737 if cached_claim_datas.height_timer == height {
2738 bump_candidates.insert(first_claim_txid.clone());
2741 for first_claim_txid in bump_candidates.iter() {
2742 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate)) = {
2743 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get(first_claim_txid) {
2744 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2745 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2746 Some((new_timer, new_feerate))
2748 } else { unreachable!(); }
2750 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(first_claim_txid) {
2751 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2752 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2753 } else { unreachable!(); }
2756 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2757 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
2758 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
2760 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
2763 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)
2764 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface
2766 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
2767 let mut bump_candidates = HashMap::new();
2768 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2770 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2771 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2772 //- resurect outpoint back in its claimable set and regenerate tx
2775 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { outpoint, input_material } => {
2776 if let Some(ancestor_claimable_txid) = self.claimable_outpoints.get(&outpoint) {
2777 if let Some(claim_material) = self.pending_claim_requests.get_mut(&ancestor_claimable_txid.0) {
2778 claim_material.per_input_material.insert(outpoint, input_material);
2779 // Using a HashMap guarantee us than if we have multiple outpoints getting
2780 // resurrected only one bump claim tx is going to be broadcast
2781 bump_candidates.insert(ancestor_claimable_txid.clone(), claim_material.clone());
2789 for (_, claim_material) in bump_candidates.iter_mut() {
2790 if let Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bump_tx)) = self.bump_claim_tx(height, &claim_material, fee_estimator) {
2791 claim_material.height_timer = new_timer;
2792 claim_material.feerate_previous = new_feerate;
2793 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&bump_tx);
2796 for (ancestor_claim_txid, claim_material) in bump_candidates.drain() {
2797 self.pending_claim_requests.insert(ancestor_claim_txid.0, claim_material);
2799 //TODO: if we implement cross-block aggregated claim transaction we need to refresh set of outpoints and regenerate tx but
2800 // right now if one of the outpoint get disconnected, just erase whole pending claim request.
2801 let mut remove_request = Vec::new();
2802 self.claimable_outpoints.retain(|_, ref v|
2804 remove_request.push(v.0.clone());
2807 for req in remove_request {
2808 self.pending_claim_requests.remove(&req);
2810 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2813 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2814 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2815 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2816 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2817 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2818 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2819 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2820 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2821 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2822 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2823 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2824 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2825 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2826 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2827 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2828 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2829 // time out the HTLC first.
2830 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2831 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2832 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2833 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2834 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2835 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2836 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2837 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2838 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2839 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2840 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2841 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2842 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2843 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2844 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2845 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2846 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2847 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2848 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2849 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2850 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2851 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2852 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2853 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2860 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2861 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2864 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2865 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2866 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2867 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2870 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2871 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2872 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2880 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2881 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2882 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2883 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2884 let mut payment_data = None;
2885 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2886 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2887 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
2888 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
2890 macro_rules! log_claim {
2891 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2892 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2893 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2894 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2895 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2896 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2897 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2898 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2899 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2900 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2901 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2902 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2904 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2905 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2906 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2907 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2912 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2913 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2914 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2915 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2916 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2917 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2918 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2919 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2928 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2929 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2930 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2931 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2932 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2933 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2934 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2935 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2936 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2937 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2938 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2939 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2940 } else if !$local_tx {
2941 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2942 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2944 if payment_data.is_none() {
2945 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2946 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2950 if payment_data.is_none() {
2951 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2952 continue 'outer_loop;
2959 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2960 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2961 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2962 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2965 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2966 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2967 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2968 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2971 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2972 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2973 "remote commitment tx", false);
2976 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2977 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2978 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2979 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2980 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2981 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2982 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2984 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2987 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2988 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2989 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2991 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2995 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2996 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2998 let e = entry.get_mut();
2999 e.retain(|ref event| {
3001 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
3002 return htlc_update.0 != source
3007 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
3009 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3010 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
3018 /// Lightning security model (i.e being able to redeem/timeout HTLC or penalize coutnerparty onchain) lays on the assumption of claim transactions getting confirmed before timelock expiration
3019 /// (CSV or CLTV following cases). In case of high-fee spikes, claim tx may stuck in the mempool, so you need to bump its feerate quickly using Replace-By-Fee or Child-Pay-For-Parent.
3020 fn bump_claim_tx(&self, height: u32, cached_claim_datas: &ClaimTxBumpMaterial, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<(u32, u64, Transaction)> {
3021 if cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.len() == 0 { return None } // But don't prune pending claiming request yet, we may have to resurrect HTLCs
3022 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
3023 for outp in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.keys() {
3025 previous_output: *outp,
3026 script_sig: Script::new(),
3027 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3028 witness: Vec::new(),
3031 let mut bumped_tx = Transaction {
3035 output: vec![TxOut {
3036 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
3041 macro_rules! RBF_bump {
3042 ($amount: expr, $old_feerate: expr, $fee_estimator: expr, $predicted_weight: expr) => {
3044 let mut used_feerate;
3045 // If old feerate inferior to actual one given back by Fee Estimator, use it to compute new fee...
3046 let new_fee = if $old_feerate < $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) {
3047 let mut value = $amount;
3048 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, $fee_estimator, value, $predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
3049 // Overflow check is done in subtract_high_prio_fee
3052 log_trace!(self, "Can't new-estimation bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
3055 // ...else just increase the previous feerate by 25% (because that's a nice number)
3057 let fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 750;
3059 log_trace!(self, "Can't 25% bump new claiming tx, amount {} is too small", $amount);
3065 let previous_fee = $old_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
3066 let min_relay_fee = MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT * $predicted_weight / 1000;
3067 // BIP 125 Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling
3068 // * 3. The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions.
3069 // * 4. The replacement transaction must also pay for its own bandwidth at or above the rate set by the node's minimum relay fee setting.
3070 let new_fee = if new_fee < previous_fee + min_relay_fee {
3071 new_fee + previous_fee + min_relay_fee - new_fee
3075 Some((new_fee, new_fee * 1000 / $predicted_weight))
3080 let new_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, cached_claim_datas.soonest_timelock);
3081 let mut inputs_witnesses_weight = 0;
3083 for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
3084 match per_outp_material {
3085 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
3086 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
3089 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount, .. } => {
3090 inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if preimage.is_some() { &[InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC] } else { &[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC] });
3093 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => { return None; }
3097 let predicted_weight = bumped_tx.get_weight() + inputs_witnesses_weight;
3099 if let Some((new_fee, feerate)) = RBF_bump!(amt, cached_claim_datas.feerate_previous, fee_estimator, predicted_weight as u64) {
3100 // If new computed fee is superior at the whole claimable amount burn all in fees
3102 bumped_tx.output[0].value = 0;
3104 bumped_tx.output[0].value = amt - new_fee;
3106 new_feerate = feerate;
3110 assert!(new_feerate != 0);
3112 for (i, (outp, per_outp_material)) in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.iter().enumerate() {
3113 match per_outp_material {
3114 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount } => {
3115 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
3116 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
3117 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
3118 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3119 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3121 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(pubkey.unwrap().clone().serialize().to_vec());
3123 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec!(1));
3125 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
3126 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Penalty Transaction {} claiming revoked {} output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if !is_htlc { "to_local" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { "offered" } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { "received" } else { "" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
3128 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
3129 if !preimage.is_some() { bumped_tx.lock_time = *locktime };
3130 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&bumped_tx);
3131 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&bumped_tx.input[i], &script, *amount)[..]);
3132 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &key);
3133 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3134 bumped_tx.input[i].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3135 if let &Some(preimage) = preimage {
3136 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(preimage.clone().0.to_vec());
3138 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(vec![0]);
3140 bumped_tx.input[i].witness.push(script.clone().into_bytes());
3141 log_trace!(self, "Going to broadcast bumped Claim Transaction {} claiming remote {} htlc output {} from {} with new feerate {}", bumped_tx.txid(), if preimage.is_some() { "offered" } else { "received" }, outp.vout, outp.txid, new_feerate);
3143 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { .. } => {
3144 //TODO : Given that Local Commitment Transaction and HTLC-Timeout/HTLC-Success are counter-signed by peer, we can't
3145 // RBF them. Need a Lightning specs change and package relay modification :
3146 // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2018-November/016518.html
3151 assert!(predicted_weight >= bumped_tx.get_weight());
3152 Some((new_timer, new_feerate, bumped_tx))
3156 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
3158 impl<R: ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
3159 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3160 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3161 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
3165 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3170 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3171 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3172 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3173 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3176 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3177 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3179 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3181 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3182 let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3183 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3184 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3185 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3186 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3187 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3188 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
3189 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
3190 let outpoint = OutPoint {
3191 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
3192 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
3194 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
3195 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3196 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3200 revocation_base_key,
3202 delayed_payment_base_key,
3206 current_remote_commitment_txid,
3207 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
3210 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3213 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3214 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3215 let funding_redeemscript = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3216 let channel_value_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3218 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
3219 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3223 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3224 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
3225 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
3226 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
3228 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
3233 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3234 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
3236 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
3238 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
3241 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
3242 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3243 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3244 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3245 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
3247 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3248 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
3254 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3255 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
3256 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
3257 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3258 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3259 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3260 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
3261 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
3263 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
3264 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3268 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3269 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3270 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
3271 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3272 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3273 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3274 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
3275 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
3276 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3278 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
3279 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3283 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3284 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3285 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
3286 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3287 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3288 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
3289 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3293 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
3296 let tx = <LocalCommitmentTransaction as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
3297 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3298 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3299 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3300 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3301 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3302 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3304 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3305 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3306 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
3307 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
3308 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3310 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
3311 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3313 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
3318 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
3325 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3328 Some(read_local_tx!())
3330 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3333 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3336 Some(read_local_tx!())
3338 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3341 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
3343 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3344 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
3345 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
3346 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
3347 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3348 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
3349 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3353 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3354 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
3355 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
3356 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3359 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3360 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3361 let to_remote_rescue = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3364 let to_remote_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
3365 let local_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
3366 Some((to_remote_script, local_key))
3368 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3371 let pending_claim_requests_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3372 let mut pending_claim_requests = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3373 for _ in 0..pending_claim_requests_len {
3374 pending_claim_requests.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
3377 let claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3378 let mut claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_claim_requests_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3379 for _ in 0..claimable_outpoints_len {
3380 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3381 let ancestor_claim_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3382 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
3383 claimable_outpoints.insert(outpoint, (ancestor_claim_txid, height));
3386 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3387 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3388 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
3389 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
3390 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3391 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
3392 for _ in 0..events_len {
3393 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3395 let claim_request = Readable::read(reader)?;
3396 OnchainEvent::Claim {
3401 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
3402 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3403 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
3404 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
3408 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
3409 let input_material = Readable::read(reader)?;
3410 OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint {
3415 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3419 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
3422 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3423 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
3424 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
3425 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
3426 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3427 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
3428 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
3429 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3431 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
3432 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3436 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
3438 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
3441 their_htlc_base_key,
3442 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
3443 funding_redeemscript,
3444 channel_value_satoshis,
3445 their_cur_revocation_points,
3448 their_to_self_delay,
3451 remote_claimable_outpoints,
3452 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
3453 remote_hash_commitment_number,
3455 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3456 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
3457 current_remote_commitment_number,
3460 pending_htlcs_updated,
3465 pending_claim_requests,
3467 claimable_outpoints,
3469 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
3482 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
3483 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
3484 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
3485 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
3486 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
3487 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
3488 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
3489 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
3490 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
3492 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
3493 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
3494 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
3496 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
3497 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
3498 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
3499 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
3500 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
3502 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
3505 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3506 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3507 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3509 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3510 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3514 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3515 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3516 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3517 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3518 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3519 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3524 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3526 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3528 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3530 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3531 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3532 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3533 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3537 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3538 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3540 let mut res = Vec::new();
3541 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3542 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3546 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3547 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3554 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3555 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3557 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3558 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3564 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3565 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3566 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3567 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3572 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
3574 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3575 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3576 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3577 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3578 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
3583 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3585 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
3586 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
3587 (OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
3588 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
3589 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
3590 0, Script::new(), 46, 0, logger.clone());
3592 monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
3594 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
3595 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3596 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3597 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3598 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3599 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3600 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3603 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3604 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3605 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3606 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3607 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3608 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3609 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3611 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3612 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3613 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3614 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3615 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3616 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3618 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3619 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3620 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
3621 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3622 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3623 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3624 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3625 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3627 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3628 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
3629 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3630 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3631 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3632 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3636 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3637 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3638 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3640 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3641 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3642 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3643 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3645 macro_rules! sign_input {
3646 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3647 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3648 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3650 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3651 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3652 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3654 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3655 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3656 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3657 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3658 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3659 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
3660 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3661 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3662 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3663 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3664 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3665 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3667 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3669 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3670 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3671 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3672 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3676 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3677 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3679 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3680 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3682 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3683 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3687 script_sig: Script::new(),
3688 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3689 witness: Vec::new(),
3692 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3693 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3696 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3697 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3698 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3699 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3700 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3702 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3704 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3705 claim_tx.input.clear();
3706 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3708 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3709 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3713 script_sig: Script::new(),
3714 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3715 witness: Vec::new(),
3718 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3719 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3720 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3721 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3722 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3724 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3726 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3727 claim_tx.input.clear();
3728 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3729 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3730 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3734 script_sig: Script::new(),
3735 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3736 witness: Vec::new(),
3738 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3739 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3740 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3741 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3742 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3744 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
3747 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.