1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxOut,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
22 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
27 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
28 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
33 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction, HTLCType};
34 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
35 use ln::onchaintx::OnchainTxHandler;
36 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
37 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
38 use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
39 use util::logger::Logger;
40 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, MaybeReadable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
41 use util::{byte_utils, events};
43 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
44 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
45 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
49 /// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
50 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
53 pub struct ChannelMonitorUpdate {
54 pub(super) updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>,
55 /// The sequence number of this update. Updates *must* be replayed in-order according to this
56 /// sequence number (and updates may panic if they are not). The update_id values are strictly
57 /// increasing and increase by one for each new update.
59 /// This sequence number is also used to track up to which points updates which returned
60 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure have been applied to all copies of a given
61 /// ChannelMonitor when ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated is called.
65 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
66 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
67 self.update_id.write(w)?;
68 (self.updates.len() as u64).write(w)?;
69 for update_step in self.updates.iter() {
70 update_step.write(w)?;
75 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdate {
76 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
77 let update_id: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
78 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
79 let mut updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / ::std::mem::size_of::<ChannelMonitorUpdateStep>()));
81 updates.push(Readable::read(r)?);
83 Ok(Self { update_id, updates })
87 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
89 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
90 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
91 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
93 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
94 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party. Once the update(s) which failed
95 /// have been successfully applied, ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated can be used to
96 /// restore the channel to an operational state.
98 /// Note that a given ChannelManager will *never* re-generate a given ChannelMonitorUpdate. If
99 /// you return a TemporaryFailure you must ensure that it is written to disk safely before
100 /// writing out the latest ChannelManager state.
102 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
103 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
104 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
105 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
106 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
107 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
110 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
111 /// channel_monitor_updated to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal channel
114 /// Note that the update being processed here will not be replayed for you when you call
115 /// ChannelManager::channel_monitor_updated, so you must store the update itself along
116 /// with the persisted ChannelMonitor on your own local disk prior to returning a
117 /// TemporaryFailure. You may, of course, employ a journaling approach, storing only the
118 /// ChannelMonitorUpdate on disk without updating the monitor itself, replaying the journal at
121 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
122 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
123 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
125 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
126 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
127 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question (which will generate one
128 /// final ChannelMonitorUpdate which must be delivered to at least one ChannelMonitor copy).
130 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local persisted copy of the channel
135 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
136 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::update_monitor this
137 /// means you tried to update a monitor for a different channel or the ChannelMonitorUpdate was
139 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
141 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
143 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
144 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
145 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
146 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
147 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
148 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
149 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
151 impl_writeable!(HTLCUpdate, 0, { payment_hash, payment_preimage, source });
153 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
154 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
155 /// events to it, while also taking any add/update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
158 /// In general, you must always have at least one local copy in memory, which must never fail to
159 /// update (as it is responsible for broadcasting the latest state in case the channel is closed),
160 /// and then persist it to various on-disk locations. If, for some reason, the in-memory copy fails
161 /// to update (eg out-of-memory or some other condition), you must immediately shut down without
162 /// taking any further action such as writing the current state to disk. This should likely be
163 /// accomplished via panic!() or abort().
165 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
166 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
167 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
168 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
170 /// User needs to notify implementors of ManyChannelMonitor when a new block is connected or
171 /// disconnected using their `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods. However, rather
172 /// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
173 /// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
174 /// all registered listeners in one go.
175 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
176 /// Adds a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
178 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
179 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
180 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
182 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
183 /// monitor.get_outputs_to_watch() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
184 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
186 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
187 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
188 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
190 /// Updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
192 /// Implementer must also ensure that the funding_txo txid *and* outpoint are registered with
193 /// any relevant ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected
194 /// callbacks with the funding transaction, or any spends of it.
196 /// Further, the implementer must also ensure that each output returned in
197 /// monitor.get_watch_outputs() is registered to ensure that the provided monitor learns about
198 /// any spends of any of the outputs.
200 /// Any spends of outputs which should have been registered which aren't passed to
201 /// ChannelMonitors via block_connected may result in FUNDS LOSS.
202 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
204 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
205 /// with success or failure.
207 /// You should probably just call through to
208 /// ChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() for each ChannelMonitor and return
210 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
213 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
214 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
216 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
218 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
219 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
220 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
222 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
223 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
224 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref>
225 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
226 F::Target: FeeEstimator
228 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
229 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
231 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
232 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
238 impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
239 ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
240 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
241 F::Target: FeeEstimator
243 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
244 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
246 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
247 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
248 let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
250 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
251 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
252 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
259 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
260 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
261 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
262 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
263 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
268 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
269 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
270 F::Target: FeeEstimator
272 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
273 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
274 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: F) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F> {
275 let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
276 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
280 fee_estimator: feeest,
286 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
287 pub fn add_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
288 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
289 let entry = match monitors.entry(key) {
290 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Channel monitor for given key is already present")),
291 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => e,
293 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(monitor.funding_info.0.to_channel_id()[..]));
294 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&monitor.funding_info.0.txid, &monitor.funding_info.1);
295 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((monitor.funding_info.0.txid, monitor.funding_info.0.index as u32), &monitor.funding_info.1);
296 for (txid, outputs) in monitor.get_outputs_to_watch().iter() {
297 for (idx, script) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
298 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((*txid, idx as u32), script);
301 entry.insert(monitor);
305 /// Updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
306 pub fn update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
307 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
308 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
309 Some(orig_monitor) => {
310 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(orig_monitor));
311 orig_monitor.update_monitor(update, &self.broadcaster)
313 None => Err(MonitorUpdateError("No such monitor registered"))
318 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner, T, F>
319 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
320 F::Target: FeeEstimator
322 fn add_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
323 match self.add_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
325 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
329 fn update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
330 match self.update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, update) {
332 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
336 fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
337 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::new();
338 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
339 pending_htlcs_updated.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated());
341 pending_htlcs_updated
345 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, T: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner, T, F>
346 where T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
347 F::Target: FeeEstimator
349 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
350 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
351 for chan in self.monitors.lock().unwrap().values_mut() {
352 pending_events.append(&mut chan.get_and_clear_pending_events());
358 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
359 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
360 pub(crate) const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
361 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
362 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
363 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
364 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
365 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
366 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
367 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
368 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
369 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
370 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
371 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
372 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
373 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
374 /// accurate block height.
375 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
376 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
377 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
378 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
379 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
380 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
381 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
382 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
383 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
384 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
385 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 struct LocalSignedTx {
389 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
391 revocation_key: PublicKey,
392 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
393 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
394 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
395 per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
397 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
400 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
401 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
402 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
403 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
404 pub(crate) enum InputMaterial {
406 witness_script: Script,
407 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
413 witness_script: Script,
415 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
420 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
428 impl Writeable for InputMaterial {
429 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
431 &InputMaterial::Revoked { ref witness_script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
432 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
433 witness_script.write(writer)?;
434 pubkey.write(writer)?;
435 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
436 is_htlc.write(writer)?;
437 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
439 &InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref witness_script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount, ref locktime } => {
440 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
441 witness_script.write(writer)?;
443 preimage.write(writer)?;
444 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
445 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(*locktime))?;
447 &InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref preimage, ref amount } => {
448 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
449 preimage.write(writer)?;
450 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
452 &InputMaterial::Funding { ref channel_value } => {
453 writer.write_all(&[3; 1])?;
454 channel_value.write(writer)?;
461 impl Readable for InputMaterial {
462 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
463 let input_material = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
465 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
466 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
467 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
468 let is_htlc = Readable::read(reader)?;
469 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
470 InputMaterial::Revoked {
479 let witness_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
480 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
481 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
482 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
483 let locktime = Readable::read(reader)?;
484 InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
493 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
494 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
495 InputMaterial::LocalHTLC {
501 let channel_value = Readable::read(reader)?;
502 InputMaterial::Funding {
506 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
512 /// ClaimRequest is a descriptor structure to communicate between detection
513 /// and reaction module. They are generated by ChannelMonitor while parsing
514 /// onchain txn leaked from a channel and handed over to OnchainTxHandler which
515 /// is responsible for opportunistic aggregation, selecting and enforcing
516 /// bumping logic, building and signing transactions.
517 pub(crate) struct ClaimRequest {
518 // Block height before which claiming is exclusive to one party,
519 // after reaching it, claiming may be contentious.
520 pub(crate) absolute_timelock: u32,
521 // Timeout tx must have nLocktime set which means aggregating multiple
522 // ones must take the higher nLocktime among them to satisfy all of them.
523 // Sadly it has few pitfalls, a) it takes longuer to get fund back b) CLTV_DELTA
524 // of a sooner-HTLC could be swallowed by the highest nLocktime of the HTLC set.
525 // Do simplify we mark them as non-aggregable.
526 pub(crate) aggregable: bool,
527 // Basic bitcoin outpoint (txid, vout)
528 pub(crate) outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
529 // Following outpoint type, set of data needed to generate transaction digest
530 // and satisfy witness program.
531 pub(crate) witness_data: InputMaterial
534 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
535 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
536 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
538 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
539 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
540 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
542 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
545 descriptor: SpendableOutputDescriptor,
549 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
550 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
552 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(PartialEq))]
554 pub(super) enum ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
555 LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
556 commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
557 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
559 LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
560 unsigned_commitment_tx: Transaction, // TODO: We should actually only need the txid here
561 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>,
562 commitment_number: u64,
563 their_revocation_point: PublicKey,
566 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
572 /// Indicates our channel is likely a stale version, we're closing, but this update should
573 /// allow us to spend what is ours if our counterparty broadcasts their latest state.
574 RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
575 their_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
577 /// Used to indicate that the no future updates will occur, and likely that the latest local
578 /// commitment transaction(s) should be broadcast, as the channel has been force-closed.
580 /// If set to false, we shouldn't broadcast the latest local commitment transaction as we
581 /// think we've fallen behind!
582 should_broadcast: bool,
586 impl Writeable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
587 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
589 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { ref commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs } => {
591 commitment_tx.write(w)?;
592 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
593 for &(ref output, ref signature, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
599 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref unsigned_commitment_tx, ref htlc_outputs, ref commitment_number, ref their_revocation_point } => {
601 unsigned_commitment_tx.write(w)?;
602 commitment_number.write(w)?;
603 their_revocation_point.write(w)?;
604 (htlc_outputs.len() as u64).write(w)?;
605 for &(ref output, ref source) in htlc_outputs.iter() {
607 source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(w)?;
610 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { ref payment_preimage } => {
612 payment_preimage.write(w)?;
614 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { ref idx, ref secret } => {
619 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { ref their_current_per_commitment_point } => {
621 their_current_per_commitment_point.write(w)?;
623 &ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { ref should_broadcast } => {
625 should_broadcast.write(w)?;
631 impl Readable for ChannelMonitorUpdateStep {
632 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
633 match Readable::read(r)? {
635 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo {
636 commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
638 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
639 let mut res = Vec::new();
641 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?, Readable::read(r)?));
648 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
649 unsigned_commitment_tx: Readable::read(r)?,
650 commitment_number: Readable::read(r)?,
651 their_revocation_point: Readable::read(r)?,
653 let len: u64 = Readable::read(r)?;
654 let mut res = Vec::new();
656 res.push((Readable::read(r)?, <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(r)?.map(|o| Box::new(o))));
663 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
664 payment_preimage: Readable::read(r)?,
668 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
669 idx: Readable::read(r)?,
670 secret: Readable::read(r)?,
674 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo {
675 their_current_per_commitment_point: Readable::read(r)?,
679 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed {
680 should_broadcast: Readable::read(r)?
683 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
688 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
689 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
691 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
692 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
694 /// Pending Events or updated HTLCs which have not yet been read out by
695 /// get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated or get_and_clear_pending_events are serialized to disk and
696 /// reloaded at deserialize-time. Thus, you must ensure that, when handling events, all events
697 /// gotten are fully handled before re-serializing the new state.
698 pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
699 latest_update_id: u64,
700 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
702 destination_script: Script,
703 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>,
704 broadcasted_remote_payment_script: Option<(Script, SecretKey)>,
705 shutdown_script: Script,
708 funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
709 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
710 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
712 their_htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
713 their_delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
714 funding_redeemscript: Script,
715 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
716 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
717 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
719 our_to_self_delay: u16,
720 their_to_self_delay: u16,
722 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
723 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
724 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
725 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
726 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
727 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
728 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
729 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
730 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
731 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
732 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
733 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
734 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
736 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
737 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
738 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
739 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
740 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
741 current_local_commitment_tx: LocalSignedTx,
743 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
745 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
746 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
748 current_local_commitment_number: u64,
750 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
752 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec<HTLCUpdate>,
753 pending_events: Vec<events::Event>,
755 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
756 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
757 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
758 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
760 // If we get serialized out and re-read, we need to make sure that the chain monitoring
761 // interface knows about the TXOs that we want to be notified of spends of. We could probably
762 // be smart and derive them from the above storage fields, but its much simpler and more
763 // Obviously Correct (tm) if we just keep track of them explicitly.
764 outputs_to_watch: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>>,
767 pub onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
769 onchain_tx_handler: OnchainTxHandler<ChanSigner>,
771 // Used to detect programming bug due to unsafe monitor update sequence { ChannelForceClosed, LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo }
772 lockdown_from_offchain: bool,
774 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
775 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
776 // (we do *not*, however, update them in update_monitor to ensure any local user copies keep
777 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
778 // the full block_connected).
779 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
780 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
784 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
785 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
786 /// underlying object
787 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
788 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
789 if self.latest_update_id != other.latest_update_id ||
790 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
791 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
792 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script != other.broadcasted_local_revokable_script ||
793 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script != other.broadcasted_remote_payment_script ||
794 self.keys.pubkeys() != other.keys.pubkeys() ||
795 self.funding_info != other.funding_info ||
796 self.current_remote_commitment_txid != other.current_remote_commitment_txid ||
797 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid != other.prev_remote_commitment_txid ||
798 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
799 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
800 self.funding_redeemscript != other.funding_redeemscript ||
801 self.channel_value_satoshis != other.channel_value_satoshis ||
802 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
803 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
804 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
805 self.commitment_secrets != other.commitment_secrets ||
806 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
807 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
808 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
809 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
810 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
811 self.current_local_commitment_number != other.current_local_commitment_number ||
812 self.current_local_commitment_tx != other.current_local_commitment_tx ||
813 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
814 self.pending_htlcs_updated != other.pending_htlcs_updated ||
815 self.pending_events.len() != other.pending_events.len() || // We trust events to round-trip properly
816 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf ||
817 self.outputs_to_watch != other.outputs_to_watch
826 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
827 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
829 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
830 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
831 /// the "reorg path" (ie disconnecting blocks until you find a common ancestor from both the
832 /// returned block hash and the the current chain and then reconnecting blocks to get to the
833 /// best chain) upon deserializing the object!
834 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
835 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
836 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
837 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
838 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
840 self.latest_update_id.write(writer)?;
842 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
843 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
845 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
846 if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
847 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
848 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0.write(writer)?;
849 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1.write(writer)?;
850 broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.write(writer)?;
852 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
855 if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script {
856 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
857 broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0.write(writer)?;
858 broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1.write(writer)?;
860 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
862 self.shutdown_script.write(writer)?;
864 self.keys.write(writer)?;
865 writer.write_all(&self.funding_info.0.txid[..])?;
866 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.funding_info.0.index))?;
867 self.funding_info.1.write(writer)?;
868 self.current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
869 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
871 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.serialize())?;
872 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.serialize())?;
873 self.funding_redeemscript.write(writer)?;
874 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
876 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
877 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
878 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
879 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
880 match second_option {
881 Some(second_pubkey) => {
882 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
885 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
890 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
894 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
895 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay))?;
897 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
899 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
900 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
901 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
902 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
903 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
904 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
905 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
909 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
910 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
911 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
912 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
913 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
914 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
915 htlc_source.as_ref().map(|b| b.as_ref()).write(writer)?;
919 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
920 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
921 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
922 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
923 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
924 for script in txouts.iter() {
925 script.write(writer)?;
929 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
930 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
931 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
932 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
935 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
936 ($local_tx: expr) => {
937 $local_tx.txid.write(writer)?;
938 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
939 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
940 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
941 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
942 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
944 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
945 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
946 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
947 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
948 if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
950 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
954 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
959 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
960 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
961 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
963 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
966 serialize_local_tx!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
968 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
969 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_local_commitment_number))?;
971 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
972 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
973 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
976 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_htlcs_updated.len() as u64))?;
977 for data in self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter() {
981 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_events.len() as u64))?;
982 for event in self.pending_events.iter() {
983 event.write(writer)?;
986 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
988 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
989 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
990 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
991 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
992 for ev in events.iter() {
994 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
996 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
997 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
999 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { ref descriptor } => {
1001 descriptor.write(writer)?;
1007 (self.outputs_to_watch.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1008 for (txid, output_scripts) in self.outputs_to_watch.iter() {
1009 txid.write(writer)?;
1010 (output_scripts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1011 for script in output_scripts.iter() {
1012 script.write(writer)?;
1015 self.onchain_tx_handler.write(writer)?;
1017 self.lockdown_from_offchain.write(writer)?;
1023 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1024 pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey,
1025 our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: &Script, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script),
1026 their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey,
1027 their_to_self_delay: u16, funding_redeemscript: Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1028 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
1029 initial_local_commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction,
1030 logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
1032 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor <= (1 << 48));
1033 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1034 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
1036 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys.clone(), their_to_self_delay, logger.clone());
1038 let local_tx_sequence = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64;
1039 let local_tx_locktime = initial_local_commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64;
1040 let local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1041 txid: initial_local_commitment_tx.txid(),
1042 revocation_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1043 a_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1044 b_htlc_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1045 delayed_payment_key: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1046 per_commitment_point: initial_local_commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1047 feerate_per_kw: initial_local_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1048 htlc_outputs: Vec::new(), // There are never any HTLCs in the initial commitment transactions
1050 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1051 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1052 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1053 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1054 // now but we should consider it later.
1055 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(initial_local_commitment_tx).unwrap();
1058 latest_update_id: 0,
1059 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1061 destination_script: destination_script.clone(),
1062 broadcasted_local_revokable_script: None,
1063 broadcasted_remote_payment_script: None,
1068 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1069 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
1071 their_htlc_base_key: their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
1072 their_delayed_payment_base_key: their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
1073 funding_redeemscript,
1074 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
1075 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
1078 their_to_self_delay,
1080 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1081 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
1082 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
1083 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
1085 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
1086 current_local_commitment_tx: local_commitment_tx,
1087 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
1088 current_local_commitment_number: 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx_sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx_locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor),
1090 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
1091 pending_htlcs_updated: Vec::new(),
1092 pending_events: Vec::new(),
1094 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
1095 outputs_to_watch: HashMap::new(),
1099 lockdown_from_offchain: false,
1101 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
1102 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
1107 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
1108 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
1109 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
1110 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1111 if let Err(()) = self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(idx, secret) {
1112 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
1115 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
1116 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
1117 if let Some(txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
1118 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
1123 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
1124 let cur_local_signed_commitment_tx = &self.current_local_commitment_tx;
1125 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
1126 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
1127 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
1129 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
1130 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1131 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1135 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1136 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1137 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
1142 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
1149 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
1158 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
1159 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
1160 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
1161 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
1162 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1163 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
1164 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
1165 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
1167 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
1168 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
1171 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
1172 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
1173 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
1174 self.prev_remote_commitment_txid = self.current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
1175 self.current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
1176 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
1177 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
1178 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
1179 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1180 Some(old_points) => {
1181 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
1182 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1183 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
1184 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
1185 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
1187 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1190 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1194 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
1199 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
1200 if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
1201 let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1202 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
1204 if let Ok(to_remote_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()) {
1205 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = Some((to_remote_script, to_remote_key));
1210 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
1211 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
1212 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
1213 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
1214 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
1215 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: LocalCommitmentTransaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1216 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1217 let sequence = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().input[0].sequence as u64;
1218 let locktime = commitment_tx.without_valid_witness().lock_time as u64;
1219 let mut new_local_commitment_tx = LocalSignedTx {
1221 revocation_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.revocation_key,
1222 a_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_htlc_key,
1223 b_htlc_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.b_htlc_key,
1224 delayed_payment_key: commitment_tx.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
1225 per_commitment_point: commitment_tx.local_keys.per_commitment_point,
1226 feerate_per_kw: commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw,
1227 htlc_outputs: htlc_outputs,
1229 // Returning a monitor error before updating tracking points means in case of using
1230 // a concurrent watchtower implementation for same channel, if this one doesn't
1231 // reject update as we do, you MAY have the latest local valid commitment tx onchain
1232 // for which you want to spend outputs. We're NOT robust again this scenario right
1233 // now but we should consider it later.
1234 if let Err(_) = self.onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_local_tx(commitment_tx) {
1235 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Local commitment signed has already been signed, no further update of LOCAL commitment transaction is allowed"));
1237 self.current_local_commitment_number = 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((sequence & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (locktime as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1238 mem::swap(&mut new_local_commitment_tx, &mut self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1239 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(new_local_commitment_tx);
1243 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
1244 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
1245 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
1246 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
1249 pub(super) fn broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn<B: Deref>(&mut self, broadcaster: &B)
1250 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1252 for tx in self.get_latest_local_commitment_txn().iter() {
1253 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1257 /// Used in Channel to cheat wrt the update_ids since it plays games, will be removed soon!
1258 pub(super) fn update_monitor_ooo(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
1259 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1261 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1262 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1263 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1265 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1266 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1267 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1268 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1269 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1270 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1271 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1272 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1273 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. } => {},
1276 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1280 /// Updates a ChannelMonitor on the basis of some new information provided by the Channel
1283 /// panics if the given update is not the next update by update_id.
1284 pub fn update_monitor<B: Deref>(&mut self, mut updates: ChannelMonitorUpdate, broadcaster: &B) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError>
1285 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1287 if self.latest_update_id + 1 != updates.update_id {
1288 panic!("Attempted to apply ChannelMonitorUpdates out of order, check the update_id before passing an update to update_monitor!");
1290 for update in updates.updates.drain(..) {
1292 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestLocalCommitmentTXInfo { commitment_tx, htlc_outputs } => {
1293 if self.lockdown_from_offchain { panic!(); }
1294 self.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(commitment_tx, htlc_outputs)?
1296 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point } =>
1297 self.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&unsigned_commitment_tx, htlc_outputs, commitment_number, their_revocation_point),
1298 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage { payment_preimage } =>
1299 self.provide_payment_preimage(&PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner()), &payment_preimage),
1300 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret { idx, secret } =>
1301 self.provide_secret(idx, secret)?,
1302 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::RescueRemoteCommitmentTXInfo { their_current_per_commitment_point } =>
1303 self.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(their_current_per_commitment_point),
1304 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } => {
1305 self.lockdown_from_offchain = true;
1306 if should_broadcast {
1307 self.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(broadcaster);
1309 log_error!(self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take");
1314 self.latest_update_id = updates.update_id;
1318 /// Gets the update_id from the latest ChannelMonitorUpdate which was applied to this
1320 pub fn get_latest_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1321 self.latest_update_id
1324 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
1325 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> OutPoint {
1329 /// Gets a list of txids, with their output scripts (in the order they appear in the
1330 /// transaction), which we must learn about spends of via block_connected().
1331 pub fn get_outputs_to_watch(&self) -> &HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<Script>> {
1332 &self.outputs_to_watch
1335 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
1336 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
1337 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
1338 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
1339 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
1340 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
1341 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1342 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
1343 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
1349 /// Get the list of HTLCs who's status has been updated on chain. This should be called by
1350 /// ChannelManager via ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated().
1351 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated(&mut self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
1352 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1353 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_htlcs_updated);
1357 /// Gets the list of pending events which were generated by previous actions, clearing the list
1360 /// This is called by ManyChannelMonitor::get_and_clear_pending_events() and is equivalent to
1361 /// EventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_events() except that it requires &mut self as we do
1362 /// no internal locking in ChannelMonitors.
1363 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&mut self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
1364 let mut ret = Vec::new();
1365 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut self.pending_events);
1369 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1370 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1371 self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(idx)
1374 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1375 self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret()
1378 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1379 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1382 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1383 self.current_local_commitment_number
1386 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1387 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1388 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1389 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1390 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1391 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1392 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1393 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1394 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1395 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1396 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1398 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1399 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1401 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1402 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1405 Err(_) => return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1410 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1411 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1412 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1413 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1414 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1415 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1416 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1417 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1418 let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()));
1419 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1420 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1422 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1423 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1425 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = {
1426 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1427 // script_pubkey version
1428 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize());
1429 Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key))
1432 // First, process non-htlc outputs (to_local & to_remote)
1433 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1434 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1435 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: revokeable_redeemscript.clone(), pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: outp.value };
1436 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 }, witness_data});
1440 // Then, try to find revoked htlc outputs
1441 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1442 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1443 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1444 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1445 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1446 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1447 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1448 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1450 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: expected_script, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value };
1451 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1456 // Last, track onchain revoked commitment transaction and fail backward outgoing HTLCs as payment path is broken
1457 if !claimable_outpoints.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1458 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1459 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, going to generate general spend tx with {} inputs", claimable_outpoints.len());
1460 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1461 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1463 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1464 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1465 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1466 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1467 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1468 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1469 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1471 let e = entry.get_mut();
1472 e.retain(|ref event| {
1474 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1475 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1480 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1482 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1483 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1491 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1492 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1494 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1495 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1497 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1499 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1500 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1501 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1502 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1503 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1504 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1505 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1507 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1508 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1510 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1512 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1513 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1514 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1515 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1516 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1517 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1518 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1519 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1520 // payment_preimage.
1521 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1522 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1523 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1524 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1526 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1527 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1531 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1532 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1533 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1534 let e = entry.get_mut();
1535 e.retain(|ref event| {
1537 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1538 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1543 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1545 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1546 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1554 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1555 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1557 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1558 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1561 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1562 let revocation_point_option =
1563 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1564 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1565 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1567 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1568 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1569 let b_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint));
1570 let htlc_privkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.htlc_base_key()));
1571 let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.their_htlc_base_key));
1572 let local_payment_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &self.keys.payment_base_key()));
1574 self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script = {
1575 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1576 // script_pubkey version
1577 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_payment_key).serialize());
1578 Some((Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script(), local_payment_key))
1581 // Then, try to find htlc outputs
1582 for (_, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1583 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1584 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1585 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1586 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1587 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1588 return (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1590 let preimage = if htlc.offered { if let Some(p) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*p) } else { None } } else { None };
1591 let aggregable = if !htlc.offered { false } else { true };
1592 if preimage.is_some() || !htlc.offered {
1593 let witness_data = InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { witness_script: expected_script, key: htlc_privkey, preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, locktime: htlc.cltv_expiry };
1594 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: htlc.cltv_expiry, aggregable, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: transaction_output_index }, witness_data });
1601 (claimable_outpoints, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1604 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1605 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Option<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>) {
1606 let htlc_txid = tx.txid();
1607 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 || tx.input[0].witness.len() != 5 {
1608 return (Vec::new(), None)
1611 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1612 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1615 Err(_) => return (Vec::new(), None)
1620 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (Vec::new(), None); };
1621 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1622 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1623 let revocation_pubkey = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint));
1624 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.keys.revocation_base_key()));
1625 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key));
1626 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1628 log_trace!(self, "Remote HTLC broadcast {}:{}", htlc_txid, 0);
1629 let witness_data = InputMaterial::Revoked { witness_script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value };
1630 let claimable_outpoints = vec!(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, aggregable: true, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_txid, vout: 0}, witness_data });
1631 (claimable_outpoints, Some((htlc_txid, tx.output.clone())))
1634 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, Vec<TxOut>, Option<(Script, SecretKey, Script)>) {
1635 let mut claim_requests = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1636 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1638 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1639 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_tx.per_commitment_point, self.keys.delayed_payment_base_key()) {
1640 Some((redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh(), local_delayedkey, redeemscript))
1643 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1644 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1645 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1646 claim_requests.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: ::std::u32::MAX, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: local_tx.txid, vout: transaction_output_index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::LocalHTLC { preimage, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }});
1647 watch_outputs.push(commitment_tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1651 (claim_requests, watch_outputs, broadcasted_local_revokable_script)
1654 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1655 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1656 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1657 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<ClaimRequest>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1658 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1659 let mut claim_requests = Vec::new();
1660 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1662 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1663 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1664 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1665 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1667 let e = entry.get_mut();
1668 e.retain(|ref event| {
1670 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1671 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1676 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1678 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1679 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1685 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1686 ($updates: expr) => {
1687 claim_requests = $updates.0;
1688 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1689 self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script = $updates.2;
1693 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1694 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1696 if self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1698 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1699 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1700 append_onchain_update!(res);
1701 } else if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1702 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1704 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1705 let mut res = self.broadcast_by_local_state(tx, local_tx);
1706 append_onchain_update!(res);
1710 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
1711 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1712 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
1713 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
1714 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
1715 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
1723 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1724 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1725 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
1729 (claim_requests, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
1732 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
1733 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
1734 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
1735 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
1736 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
1737 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
1738 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
1739 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
1740 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
1741 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1742 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed latest local commitment transaction!");
1743 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx() {
1744 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1745 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1746 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1747 if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1748 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1749 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) {
1754 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
1755 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
1761 /// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_local_commitment_txn used by our test framework
1762 /// to bypass LocalCommitmentTransaction state update lockdown after signature and generate
1763 /// revoked commitment transaction.
1765 pub fn unsafe_get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&mut self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1766 log_trace!(self, "Getting signed copy of latest local commitment transaction!");
1767 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_local_tx() {
1768 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
1769 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
1770 for htlc in self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1771 if let Some(htlc_index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
1772 let preimage = if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(*preimage) } else { None };
1773 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(txid, htlc_index, preimage) {
1783 /// Called by SimpleManyChannelMonitor::block_connected, which implements
1784 /// ChainListener::block_connected.
1785 /// Eventually this should be pub and, roughly, implement ChainListener, however this requires
1786 /// &mut self, as well as returns new spendable outputs and outpoints to watch for spending of
1788 fn block_connected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>
1789 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1790 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1792 for tx in txn_matched {
1793 let mut output_val = 0;
1794 for out in tx.output.iter() {
1795 if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1796 output_val += out.value;
1797 if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
1801 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
1802 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1803 let mut claimable_outpoints = Vec::new();
1804 for tx in txn_matched {
1805 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1806 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1807 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1808 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1810 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1811 if prevout.txid == self.funding_info.0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_info.0.index as u32 {
1812 if (tx.input[0].sequence >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x80 && (tx.lock_time >> 8*3) as u8 == 0x20 {
1813 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(&tx, height);
1814 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1815 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1817 if new_outpoints.is_empty() {
1818 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(&tx, height);
1819 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1820 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1822 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1824 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1827 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1828 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs_option) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(&tx, commitment_number, height);
1829 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1830 if let Some(new_outputs) = new_outputs_option {
1831 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1836 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
1837 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
1838 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
1839 self.is_resolving_htlc_output(&tx, height);
1841 self.is_paying_spendable_output(&tx, height);
1843 let should_broadcast = self.would_broadcast_at_height(height);
1844 if should_broadcast {
1845 claimable_outpoints.push(ClaimRequest { absolute_timelock: height, aggregable: false, outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: self.funding_info.0.txid.clone(), vout: self.funding_info.0.index as u32 }, witness_data: InputMaterial::Funding { channel_value: self.channel_value_satoshis }});
1847 if should_broadcast {
1848 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_local_tx() {
1849 let (mut new_outpoints, new_outputs, _) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&commitment_tx, &self.current_local_commitment_tx);
1850 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
1851 watch_outputs.push((self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
1853 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
1856 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
1859 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
1860 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
1861 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
1862 payment_hash: htlc_update.1,
1863 payment_preimage: None,
1864 source: htlc_update.0,
1867 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor } => {
1868 log_trace!(self, "Descriptor {} has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_spendable!(descriptor));
1869 self.pending_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
1870 outputs: vec![descriptor]
1876 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_connected(txn_matched, claimable_outpoints, height, &*broadcaster, &*fee_estimator);
1878 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1879 for &(ref txid, ref output_scripts) in watch_outputs.iter() {
1880 self.outputs_to_watch.insert(txid.clone(), output_scripts.iter().map(|o| o.script_pubkey.clone()).collect());
1886 fn block_disconnected<B: Deref, F: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: B, fee_estimator: F)
1887 where B::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1888 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1890 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} disconnected", block_hash, height);
1891 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
1893 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
1894 //- maturing spendable output has transaction paying us has been disconnected
1897 self.onchain_tx_handler.block_disconnected(height, broadcaster, fee_estimator);
1899 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1902 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1903 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
1904 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
1905 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
1906 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
1907 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
1908 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
1909 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
1910 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
1911 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
1912 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
1913 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
1914 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
1915 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
1916 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1917 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1918 // time out the HTLC first.
1919 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1920 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1921 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1922 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1923 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1924 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1925 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1926 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1927 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1928 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1929 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1930 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1931 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1932 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1933 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1934 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1935 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
1936 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1937 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
1938 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
1939 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
1940 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1941 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1942 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1949 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
1951 if let Some(ref txid) = self.current_remote_commitment_txid {
1952 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1953 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1956 if let Some(ref txid) = self.prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1957 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
1958 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
1965 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
1966 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
1967 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
1968 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
1969 let mut payment_data = None;
1970 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
1971 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
1972 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[4].len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
1973 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(input.witness[2].len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);
1975 macro_rules! log_claim {
1976 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
1977 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
1978 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
1979 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
1980 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
1981 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
1982 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
1983 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
1984 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
1985 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1986 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1987 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
1989 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
1990 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
1991 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
1992 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
1997 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
1998 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
1999 if let Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2000 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2001 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2002 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2003 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2004 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2013 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2014 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2015 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2016 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2017 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2018 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2019 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2020 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2021 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2022 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2023 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2024 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2025 } else if !$local_tx {
2026 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2027 if payment_data.is_none() {
2028 check_htlc_valid_remote!(self.prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2031 if payment_data.is_none() {
2032 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2033 continue 'outer_loop;
2040 if input.previous_output.txid == self.current_local_commitment_tx.txid {
2041 scan_commitment!(self.current_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2042 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2044 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2045 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2046 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2047 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2050 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2051 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2052 "remote commitment tx", false);
2055 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2056 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2057 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2058 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2059 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2060 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2061 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2062 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2064 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2068 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2069 if !self.pending_htlcs_updated.iter().any(|update| update.source == source) {
2070 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2071 self.pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
2073 payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage),
2078 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2079 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2081 let e = entry.get_mut();
2082 e.retain(|ref event| {
2084 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2085 return htlc_update.0 != source
2090 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2092 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2093 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2101 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is paying fund back to some address we can assume to own
2102 fn is_paying_spendable_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) {
2103 let mut spendable_output = None;
2104 for (i, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() { // There is max one spendable output for any channel tx, including ones generated by us
2105 if outp.script_pubkey == self.destination_script {
2106 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2107 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2108 output: outp.clone(),
2111 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_local_revokable_script) = self.broadcasted_local_revokable_script {
2112 if broadcasted_local_revokable_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2113 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
2114 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2115 key: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.1,
2116 witness_script: broadcasted_local_revokable_script.2.clone(),
2117 to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
2118 output: outp.clone(),
2122 } else if let Some(ref broadcasted_remote_payment_script) = self.broadcasted_remote_payment_script {
2123 if broadcasted_remote_payment_script.0 == outp.script_pubkey {
2124 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
2125 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2126 key: broadcasted_remote_payment_script.1,
2127 output: outp.clone(),
2131 } else if outp.script_pubkey == self.shutdown_script {
2132 spendable_output = Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2133 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: i as u32 },
2134 output: outp.clone(),
2138 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2139 log_trace!(self, "Maturing {} until {}", log_spendable!(spendable_output), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2140 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2141 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2142 let e = entry.get_mut();
2143 e.push(OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output });
2145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2146 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput { descriptor: spendable_output }]);
2153 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2155 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable> ReadableArgs<Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
2156 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2157 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2161 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2166 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2167 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2168 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2169 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2172 let latest_update_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2173 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2175 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2176 let broadcasted_local_revokable_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2178 let revokable_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2179 let local_delayedkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2180 let revokable_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2181 Some((revokable_address, local_delayedkey, revokable_script))
2184 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2186 let broadcasted_remote_payment_script = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2188 let payment_address = Readable::read(reader)?;
2189 let payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2190 Some((payment_address, payment_key))
2193 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2195 let shutdown_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2197 let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
2198 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2199 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2200 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2201 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2202 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2204 let funding_info = (outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?);
2205 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2206 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2208 let their_htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2209 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2210 let funding_redeemscript = Readable::read(reader)?;
2211 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
2213 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2214 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2218 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2219 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2220 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2221 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2223 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2228 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2229 let their_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2231 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
2233 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2236 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2237 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2238 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2239 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2240 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2242 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2243 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2249 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2250 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2251 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2252 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2253 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2254 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2255 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2256 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2258 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2259 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2263 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2264 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2265 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2266 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2267 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2268 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable>::read(reader)?;
2269 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2270 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2271 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2273 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2274 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2278 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2279 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2280 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2281 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2282 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2283 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2284 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2288 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2291 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2292 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2293 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2294 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2295 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2296 let per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2297 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2299 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2300 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2301 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2302 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2303 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2305 1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
2306 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2308 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2313 revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, per_commitment_point, feerate_per_kw,
2320 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2323 Some(read_local_tx!())
2325 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2327 let current_local_commitment_tx = read_local_tx!();
2329 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2330 let current_local_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable>::read(reader)?.0;
2332 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2333 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2334 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2335 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2336 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2337 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2338 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2342 let pending_htlcs_updated_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2343 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_htlcs_updated_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (32 + 8*3)));
2344 for _ in 0..pending_htlcs_updated_len {
2345 pending_htlcs_updated.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2348 let pending_events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2349 let mut pending_events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
2350 for _ in 0..pending_events_len {
2351 if let Some(event) = MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
2352 pending_events.push(event);
2356 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2358 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2359 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2360 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2361 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2362 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2363 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2364 for _ in 0..events_len {
2365 let ev = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
2367 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2368 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2369 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2370 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2374 let descriptor = Readable::read(reader)?;
2375 OnchainEvent::MaturingOutput {
2379 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2383 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2386 let outputs_to_watch_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2387 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_to_watch_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / (mem::size_of::<Sha256dHash>() + mem::size_of::<Vec<Script>>())));
2388 for _ in 0..outputs_to_watch_len {
2389 let txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2390 let outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2391 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<Script>()));
2392 for _ in 0..outputs_len {
2393 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2395 if let Some(_) = outputs_to_watch.insert(txid, outputs) {
2396 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2399 let onchain_tx_handler = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
2401 let lockdown_from_offchain = Readable::read(reader)?;
2403 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2405 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2408 broadcasted_local_revokable_script,
2409 broadcasted_remote_payment_script,
2414 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2415 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2417 their_htlc_base_key,
2418 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2419 funding_redeemscript,
2420 channel_value_satoshis,
2421 their_cur_revocation_points,
2424 their_to_self_delay,
2427 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2428 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2429 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2431 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2432 current_local_commitment_tx,
2433 current_remote_commitment_number,
2434 current_local_commitment_number,
2437 pending_htlcs_updated,
2440 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2445 lockdown_from_offchain,
2448 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
2456 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2457 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2458 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2459 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2460 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2461 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2462 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2463 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2464 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2466 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
2467 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2468 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
2469 use ln::onchaintx::{OnchainTxHandler, InputDescriptors};
2471 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, LocalCommitmentTransaction};
2472 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2473 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2474 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2475 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2477 use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
2480 fn test_prune_preimages() {
2481 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2482 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2484 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
2485 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2487 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2489 let mut rng = thread_rng();
2491 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2492 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
2493 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2494 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2498 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2499 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2501 let mut res = Vec::new();
2502 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2503 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2507 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2508 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
2515 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2516 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2518 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2519 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
2525 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2526 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2527 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2528 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2533 let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
2535 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2536 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2537 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2538 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2539 SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
2544 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2546 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys,
2547 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap()), 0, &Script::new(),
2548 (OutPoint { txid: Sha256dHash::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }, Script::new()),
2549 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap()),
2550 &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()),
2551 10, Script::new(), 46, 0, LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), logger.clone());
2553 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10])).unwrap();
2554 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
2555 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
2556 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
2557 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
2558 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2559 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2562 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2563 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2564 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2565 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2566 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2567 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2568 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2570 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2571 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2572 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2573 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2574 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2575 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2577 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2578 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2579 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5])).unwrap();
2580 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2581 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2582 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2583 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2584 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2586 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2587 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3])).unwrap();
2588 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2589 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
2590 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2591 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2595 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
2596 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
2597 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
2599 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2600 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2601 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
2602 let mut sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2604 macro_rules! sign_input {
2605 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
2606 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2607 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
2609 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
2610 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
2611 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
2613 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
2614 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
2615 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
2616 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2617 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2618 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len();
2619 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
2620 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
2621 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
2622 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
2623 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
2624 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
2626 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
2628 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
2629 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
2630 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
2631 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
2635 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
2636 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
2638 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
2639 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2641 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2642 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2646 script_sig: Script::new(),
2647 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2648 witness: Vec::new(),
2651 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
2652 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
2655 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2656 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2657 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
2658 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2659 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2661 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2663 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
2664 claim_tx.input.clear();
2665 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2667 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2668 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2672 script_sig: Script::new(),
2673 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2674 witness: Vec::new(),
2677 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2678 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2679 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
2680 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2681 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2683 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2685 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
2686 claim_tx.input.clear();
2687 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
2688 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
2689 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
2693 script_sig: Script::new(),
2694 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
2695 witness: Vec::new(),
2697 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
2698 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
2699 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
2700 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
2701 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
2703 assert_eq!(base_weight + OnchainTxHandler::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
2706 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.