_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  33 use util::errors::APIError;
  34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  35 use util::config::UserConfig;
  36
  37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  43
  44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  46
  47 use regex;
  48
  49 use io;
  50 use prelude::*;
  51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  52 use core::default::Default;
  53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  54
  55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  57
  58 #[test]
  59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  60         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  61         use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  62         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  63         cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  64         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  65         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  66         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  67         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  68
  69         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  70         // funding satoshis
  71         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  72         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  73         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  74
  75         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  76         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  77
  78         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  79         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  80
  81         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  82         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  83         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  84                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  85                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  86                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  87                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  88                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  89                         match action {
  90                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  91                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  92                                 },
  93                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  94                         }
  95                 } else { assert!(false); }
  96         };
  97
  98         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  99
 100         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 101         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 102         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 117 }
 118
 119 #[test]
 120 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 121         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 122         // them.
 123         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
 127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 128         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 129
 130         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 131                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 132                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 133                 },
 134                 _ => panic!()
 135         }
 136 }
 137
 138 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 139         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 140         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 141         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 142         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 143         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 144         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 145         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 146         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 147
 148         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 149         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 150         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 151         let opt_anchors = false;
 152         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 153         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 154
 155         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 156         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 157         if !send_from_initiator {
 158                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 159                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 160         }
 161         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 162
 163         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 164         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 165         if send_from_initiator {
 166                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 167                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 168         }
 169         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 170         {
 171                 let mut lock;
 172                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 173                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176
 177         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 178         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 179         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 180
 181         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 182         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 183         if send_from_initiator {
 184                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 185                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 186                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 187                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 188                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 189         } else {
 190                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 191         }
 192 }
 193
 194 #[test]
 195 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 196         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 197         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 198 }
 199
 200 #[test]
 201 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 205         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 207
 208         // balancing
 209         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 210
 211         // A                                        B
 212         // update_fee                            ->
 213         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 214         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 215         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 216         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 217         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 218         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 219         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 220         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 221         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 222         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 223         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 224         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 225         //                                       <- RAA
 226         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 227
 228         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 229         {
 230                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 231                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 232         }
 233         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 235
 236         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 237         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 238         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 239                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 240                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 241                 },
 242                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 243         };
 244
 245         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 246
 247         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 248         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 249         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 250         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 251
 252         let payment_event = {
 253                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 254                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 255                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 256         };
 257         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 258         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 259
 260         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 261         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 262         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 263         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 264         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 266
 267         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 268         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 269         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 270         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 274         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 276         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 277         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 278         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 279         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 281
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 283         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 284         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 285         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 286         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 287         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 288         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 290
 291         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 292         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 293         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 295
 296         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 297         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 298         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 299
 300         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 304         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 305         match events_2[0] {
 306                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 307                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 308         }
 309
 310         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 312 }
 313
 314 #[test]
 315 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 316         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 317         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 318         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 319         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 320         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 321         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 322         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 323
 324         // balancing
 325         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 326
 327         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 328         {
 329                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 330                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 331         }
 332         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 334
 335         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 336         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 337         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 338                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 339                         update_fee.as_ref()
 340                 },
 341                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 342         };
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 345
 346         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 347         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 348         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 350
 351         let payment_event = {
 352                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 353                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 354                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 355         };
 356         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 357         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 358
 359         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 360         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 361         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 362         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 363         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 364         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 365
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 368
 369         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 370 }
 371
 372 #[test]
 373 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 377         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 378         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 379
 380         // A                                        B
 381         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 382         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 383         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 384         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 385         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 386         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 387         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 388         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 389         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 390         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 391         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 392         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 393         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 394         //                                          B should send no response here
 395         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 396         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 397         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 398
 399         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 400         let initial_feerate;
 401         {
 402                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 403                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 404                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 405         }
 406         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 407         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 408
 409         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 410         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 411         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 412                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 413                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 414                 },
 415                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 416         };
 417
 418         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 420         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 421         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 423
 424         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 425         // transaction:
 426         {
 427                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 428                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 429         }
 430         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 431         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 432         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 433
 434         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 435         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 436                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 437                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 438         };
 439
 440         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 441
 442         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 443         // Deliver (3)
 444         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 445
 446         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 447         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 448         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 450         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 451         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 452         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 453         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 454         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 455         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 456         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 457
 458         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 459         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 460         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 462         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 463
 464         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 465         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 467
 468         // Delever (4)
 469         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 470         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 472
 473         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 474         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 476
 477         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 478         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 479         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 481
 482         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 483         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 485 }
 486
 487 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 488         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 489         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 490         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 491         // Node objects.
 492
 493         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 494         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 495         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 496         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 497
 498         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 499                 let block = Block {
 500                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 501                         txdata: vec![],
 502                 };
 503                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 504                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 505         }
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 508         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 509         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 510
 511         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 512         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 513         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 514
 515         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 516         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 517
 518         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 521         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 523         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 524
 525         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 526         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 527         {
 528                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 529                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 530                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 531                 added_monitors.clear();
 532         }
 533         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 534
 535         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 536         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 537         {
 538                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 539                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 540                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 541                 added_monitors.clear();
 542         }
 543
 544         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 545         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 546
 547         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 548         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 549
 550         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 551         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 552         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 553         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 554 }
 555
 556 #[test]
 557 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 558         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 559         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 560         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 561         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 562         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 563         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 564         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 565         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 576 }
 577
 578 #[test]
 579 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 583         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 584         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 585
 586         {
 587                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 588                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 589         }
 590         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 592
 593         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 594         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 595         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 596                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 597                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 598                 },
 599                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 600         };
 601         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 602
 603         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 604         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 606
 607         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 608         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 610
 611         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 612         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 613         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 617         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 619 }
 620
 621 #[test]
 622 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 626         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 627         let channel_value = 5000;
 628         let push_sats = 700;
 629         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 630         let channel_id = chan.2;
 631         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 632         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 633
 634         let opt_anchors = false;
 635
 636         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 637         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 638         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 639         // remote limit.
 640         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 641         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 642         {
 643                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 644                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 645         }
 646         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 648         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 649
 650         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 651
 652         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 653
 654         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 655         {
 656                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 657
 658                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 659                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 660                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 661                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 662                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 663                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 664         }
 665
 666         {
 667                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 668                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 669                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 670         }
 671         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 672         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 674
 675         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 676
 677         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 678         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 679         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 680                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 681                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 682                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 683                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 684                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 685                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 686         };
 687         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 688                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 689                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 690                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 691                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 692                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 693                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 694                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 695         };
 696
 697         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 698         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 699                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 700
 701         let res = {
 702                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 703                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 704                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 705                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 706                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 707                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 708                         push_sats,
 709                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 710                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 711                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 712                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 713                         &mut htlcs,
 714                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 715                 );
 716                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 717         };
 718
 719         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 720                 channel_id: chan.2,
 721                 signature: res.0,
 722                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 723         };
 724
 725         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 726                 channel_id: chan.2,
 727                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 728         };
 729
 730         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 731
 732         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 733         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 734         //Should produce and error.
 735         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 736         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 737         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 738         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 739         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 740 }
 741
 742 #[test]
 743 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 744         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 745         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 746         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 747         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 748         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 749
 750         // balancing
 751         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 752
 753         {
 754                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 755                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 756         }
 757         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 759
 760         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 761         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 762         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 763                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 764                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 765                 },
 766                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 767         };
 768         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 769         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 770         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 772
 773         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 774
 775         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 776         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 777         {
 778                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 779                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 780                 added_monitors.clear();
 781         }
 782         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 783         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 784         // node[1] has nothing to do
 785
 786         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 787         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 788         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 789
 790         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 791         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 792         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 794         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 796         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 797
 798         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 799         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 800         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 801         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 802         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 803         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 804
 805         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 806         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 808         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 809
 810         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 812         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 813
 814         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 816         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 817         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 818
 819         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 821         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 822
 823         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 824
 825         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 826         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 827         match events[0] {
 828                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 829                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 830         };
 831
 832         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 833
 834         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 835         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 836         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 837         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 838         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 839 }
 840
 841 #[test]
 842 fn test_update_fee() {
 843         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 844         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 845         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 846         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 847         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 848         let channel_id = chan.2;
 849
 850         // A                                        B
 851         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 852         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 853         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 854         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 855         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 856         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 857         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 858         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 859         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 860         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 861         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 862         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 863
 864         // Create and deliver (1)...
 865         let feerate;
 866         {
 867                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 868                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 869                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 870         }
 871         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 873
 874         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 875         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 876         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 877                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 878                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 879                 },
 880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 881         };
 882         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 883
 884         // Generate (2) and (3):
 885         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 886         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 887         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 888
 889         // Deliver (2):
 890         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 891         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 893
 894         // Create and deliver (4)...
 895         {
 896                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 897                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 898         }
 899         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 901         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 902         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 903         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 904                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 905                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 906                 },
 907                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 908         };
 909
 910         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 911         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 913         // ... creating (5)
 914         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 915         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 916
 917         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 918         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 920         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 921         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 922
 923         // Deliver (5):
 924         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 925         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 927
 928         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 929         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 930         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 931         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 932         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 933         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 934         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 935         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 937
 938         // Deliver (7)
 939         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 941         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 942         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 943
 944         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 946         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 947
 948         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 949         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 950         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 951         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 952         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 953 }
 954
 955 #[test]
 956 fn fake_network_test() {
 957         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 958         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 959         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 960         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 961         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 962         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 963
 964         // Create some initial channels
 965         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 966         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 967         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 968
 969         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 970         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 971         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 972         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 973         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 974
 975         // Send some more payments
 976         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 977         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 978         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 979
 980         // Test failure packets
 981         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 982         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 983
 984         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 985         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 986
 987         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 988         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 989         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 990         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994
 995         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 996         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 997         hops.push(RouteHop {
 998                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 999                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1000                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1002                 fee_msat: 0,
1003                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1004         });
1005         hops.push(RouteHop {
1006                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1010                 fee_msat: 0,
1011                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1012         });
1013         hops.push(RouteHop {
1014                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1016                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1018                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1019                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1020         });
1021         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1022         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1023         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1024
1025         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026         hops.push(RouteHop {
1027                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1031                 fee_msat: 0,
1032                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1033         });
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1041         });
1042         hops.push(RouteHop {
1043                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1045                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1047                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1048                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1049         });
1050         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1053
1054         // Claim the rebalances...
1055         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1056         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1057
1058         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1059         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1060
1061         // Send some payments across both channels
1062         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1063         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1064         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1065
1066
1067         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1068         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1069         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1070         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1071
1072         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1073
1074         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1075         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1076         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1077
1078         // Close down the channels...
1079         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1092         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1094 }
1095
1096 #[test]
1097 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1098         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1099         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1100         // commitment dance rounds.
1101         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1102         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1103         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1104         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1105         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1106         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1107
1108         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1110                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1112                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1113         }
1114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1115
1116         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1117         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1118         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1119         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1120
1121         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1122         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1123         // another HTLC.
1124         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125         {
1126                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1127                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1128                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1129                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1130         }
1131
1132         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1134         {
1135                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1137         }
1138
1139         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1140         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1141         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1142         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1143
1144         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1146         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1147         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1148         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1151
1152         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1153         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1154         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1155
1156         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1157
1158         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1159         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1160         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1162
1163         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1164         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1167
1168         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1173                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1174         }
1175         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1179         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1180
1181         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1185         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1186
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1189
1190         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1191
1192         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1193         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1194         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1195                 match event {
1196                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1197                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1198                         },
1199                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1200                 };
1201         }
1202
1203         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1204                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1205         }
1206
1207         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1208 }
1209
1210 #[test]
1211 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1212         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1213         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1214         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1215         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1216         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1217         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1218
1219         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1220         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1222         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1225
1226         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1227
1228         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1229         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1230
1231         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1233
1234         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1235         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1236         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1237 }
1238
1239 #[test]
1240 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1241         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1242         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1243         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1247         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1248
1249         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1250
1251         // balancing
1252         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1253
1254         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1255
1256         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1257         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1258         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1259
1260         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1261         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1263
1264         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1265         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1266
1267         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1268         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1269         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1270                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1271                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1272                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1273                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1274                 }
1275         }
1276         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1277
1278         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1280         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1281         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1282
1283         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1284         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1285         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1286         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1287         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1288         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1289         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1291
1292         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1293         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1294         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1295
1296         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1297         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1298         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1299         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1300         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1301         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1302         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1303         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1304
1305         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1306         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1307         for e in events {
1308                 match e {
1309                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1310                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1311                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1312                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1313                         },
1314                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1315                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1316                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1317                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1318                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1319                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1320                         },
1321                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1322                 }
1323         }
1324 }
1325
1326 #[test]
1327 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1329         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1330         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1331         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1332         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1333
1334         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1335         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1336
1337         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1338         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1339         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1340         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1341         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1342         match err {
1343                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1344                         match &fails[0] {
1345                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1346                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1347                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1348                         }
1349                 },
1350                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1351         }
1352         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1353         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1354
1355         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1356 }
1357
1358 #[test]
1359 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1365
1366         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1367         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1368         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1369         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1370
1371         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1372
1373         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1374         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1375         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1376         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1377                 channel_id: chan.2,
1378                 htlc_id: 0,
1379                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1380                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1381                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1382                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1383         };
1384
1385         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1386
1387         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1388         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1389         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1390
1391         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1392
1393         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1394
1395         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1396         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1397         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1398                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1399                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1400                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1401                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1402                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1403
1404                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1405                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1406                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1407                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1408                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1409         };
1410         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1411                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1412                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1413                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1414                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1415                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1416                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1417                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1418         };
1419
1420         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1421         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1422                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1423
1424         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1425         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1426         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1427
1428         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1429                 offered: false,
1430                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1431                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1432                 payment_hash,
1433                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1434         };
1435
1436         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1437
1438         let res = {
1439                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1440                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1441                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1442                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1443                         commitment_number,
1444                         95000,
1445                         local_chan_balance,
1446                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1447                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1448                         feerate_per_kw,
1449                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1450                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1451                 );
1452                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1453         };
1454
1455         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1456                 channel_id: chan.2,
1457                 signature: res.0,
1458                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1459         };
1460
1461         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1462         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1463         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464
1465         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1466         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1467                 channel_id: chan.2,
1468                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1469                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1470         };
1471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1472
1473         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1474         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1475         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1476         match events[0] {
1477                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1478                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1479                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1480                 },
1481                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1482         };
1483         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1484                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1485
1486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1487 }
1488
1489 #[test]
1490 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1491         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1492         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1493         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1494         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1495         // this situation.
1496         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1497         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1498         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1499         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1500
1501         let opt_anchors = false;
1502
1503         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1504         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1506
1507         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1508
1509         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1512         }
1513
1514         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1520 }
1521
1522 #[test]
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1529
1530         let opt_anchors = false;
1531
1532         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1538         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1539
1540         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1543         }
1544
1545         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1554                 channel_id: chan.2,
1555                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1560         };
1561
1562         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1570 }
1571
1572 #[test]
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1578
1579         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1582
1583         let opt_anchors = false;
1584
1585         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1591         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1592
1593         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597         // commitment transaction fee.
1598         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1599
1600         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1603         }
1604
1605         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1609 }
1610
1611 #[test]
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1620
1621         let opt_anchors = false;
1622
1623         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1624         // HTLC.
1625         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1629
1630         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1633         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1637
1638         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640         match msg_events[0] {
1641                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1643                 },
1644                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1645         }
1646 }
1647
1648 #[test]
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1657
1658         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664
1665         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671
1672         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676 }
1677
1678 #[test]
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1685         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1686
1687         let feemsat = 239;
1688         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1690         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1691         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1692
1693         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1697
1698         // Add a pending HTLC.
1699         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700         let payment_event_1 = {
1701                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1702                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1703
1704                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1707         };
1708         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1709
1710         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1715
1716         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1724                 channel_id: chan.2,
1725                 htlc_id: 1,
1726                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1730         };
1731
1732         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1740 }
1741
1742 #[test]
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1749         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1752         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1753
1754         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1755         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1756         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757
1758         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760 }
1761
1762 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1763         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1764 }
1765
1766 #[test]
1767 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1768         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1769         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1770         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1771         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1772         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1773         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1774         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1775         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1776         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1777         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1778
1779         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1780         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1781
1782         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1783         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1784
1785         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1786                 ($node: expr) => {{
1787                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1788                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1789                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1790                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1791                         payment_event
1792                 }}
1793         }
1794
1795         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1796         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1797         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1798         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1799
1800         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1801
1802         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1803         {
1804                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1805                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1806                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1807                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1808                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1809                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1810                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1811         }
1812
1813         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1814         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1815         loop {
1816                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1817                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1818                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1819                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1820                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1821                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1822                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1823                         break;
1824                 }
1825                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1826
1827                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1828                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1829                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1830                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1831                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1832                 );
1833
1834                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1835                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1836                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1837                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1838                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1839         }
1840
1841         // adding pending output.
1842         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1843         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1844         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1845         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1846         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1847         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1848         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1849         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1850         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1851         // policy.
1852         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1853         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1854         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1855
1856         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1857         let payment_event_1 = {
1858                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1859                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1860
1861                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1862                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1863                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1864         };
1865         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1866
1867         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1868         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1869         {
1870                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1871                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1872                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1873                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1874         }
1875
1876         // split the rest to test holding cell
1877         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1878         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1880         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1881         {
1882                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1883                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1884         }
1885
1886         // now see if they go through on both sides
1887         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1888         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1889         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1891         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1893
1894         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1895         {
1896                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1897                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1898                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1899                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1900                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1901         }
1902
1903         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1904         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1905         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1907         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1908         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909
1910         // flush the pending htlc
1911         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1912         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1914
1915         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1916         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1918         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1919
1920         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1921         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1924
1925         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1926         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1928
1929         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1930
1931         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1932         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1933         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1934
1935         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1936         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1937
1938         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1939         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1940         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1942         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944
1945         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1946         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1947         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1948         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1949
1950         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1951         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1952
1953         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1954         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1955         match events[0] {
1956                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1957                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1958                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1959                         match &purpose {
1960                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1961                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1962                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1963                                 },
1964                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1965                         }
1966                 },
1967                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1968         }
1969         match events[1] {
1970                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1971                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1972                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1973                         match &purpose {
1974                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1975                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1976                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1977                                 },
1978                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1979                         }
1980                 },
1981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1982         }
1983
1984         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1985         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1986         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1987
1988         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1989         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1990         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1991
1992         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1993         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1994         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1995         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1996         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1997
1998         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1999         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2000 }
2001
2002 #[test]
2003 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2004         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2005         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2006         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2007         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2008         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2009         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2010         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2011         // To test this we:
2012         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2013         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2014         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2015         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2016         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2017         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2018         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2019         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2020         //    claim,
2021         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2022         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2023         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2024         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2025         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2026         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2027         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2028         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2029         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2030         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2031
2032         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2033         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2034         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2035         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2036
2037         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2038         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2039         let send_1 = {
2040                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2041                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2042                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2043                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2044                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2045         };
2046
2047         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2048         // initial fulfill/CS.
2049         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2052
2053         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2054         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2055         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2057         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2058
2059         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2060         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2062         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2063         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2064
2065         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2066         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2068         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2069         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2070
2071         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2077         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2078
2079         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2081         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2082
2083         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2084         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2085         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2086         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2087         // on-chain as necessary).
2088         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2089         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2090         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2091         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2092         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2093
2094         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2096         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2097
2098         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2099         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2100
2101         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2102         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2103         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2105         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2106         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2107
2108         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2109         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2110         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2111         let send_2 = {
2112                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2113                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2115                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2116                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2117         };
2118
2119         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2120         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2123
2124         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2125
2126         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2127         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2128         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2129
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132
2133         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2135         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2136         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2137
2138         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2141
2142         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2144
2145         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2146         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2147
2148         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2149         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2150 }
2151
2152 #[test]
2153 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2154         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2155         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2156         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2157         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2158         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2159         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2160
2161         // Create some initial channels
2162         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2163         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2164         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2165         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2166
2167         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2168         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2169         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2170         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2171         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2172         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2173
2174         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2175         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2176         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2177         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2178         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2179
2180         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2181         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2184         {
2185                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2186                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2187                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2189                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190         }
2191         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2192         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2193         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2194         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2195         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2196
2197         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2198         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2199
2200         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2201         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2202         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2203         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2205         {
2206                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2207                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2208                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2209                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2210                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2211                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2212         }
2213         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2214         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2215         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2216         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2217         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2218
2219         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2220                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2221                         {
2222                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2223                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2224
2225                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2226                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2227                                 match events[0] {
2228                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2229                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2230                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2231                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2232                                         },
2233                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2234                                 };
2235                         }
2236                 }
2237         }
2238
2239         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2240         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2241         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2242         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2243         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2244         let node2_commitment_txid;
2245         {
2246                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2247                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2248                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2249                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2250
2251                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2252                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2253                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2254                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2255                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2256         }
2257         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2258         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2259         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2260         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2261         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2262
2263         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2264         // confusing us in the following tests.
2265         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2266
2267         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2268         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2269         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2270         // buffer space).
2271
2272         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2273                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2274                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2275                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2276                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2277                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2278                                 msg.clone()
2279                         },
2280                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2281                 };
2282                 match events[1] {
2283                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2284                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2285                         },
2286                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2287                 }
2288                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2289
2290                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2291                 {
2292                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2293                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2294                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2295                                         false
2296                                 } else { true }
2297                         });
2298                 }
2299
2300                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2301
2302                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2303                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2304
2305                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2306                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2307                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2308                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2309                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2310                                 msg.clone()
2311                         },
2312                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2313                 };
2314                 match events[1] {
2315                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2316                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2317                         },
2318                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2319                 }
2320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2321                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2322
2323                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2324                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2325                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2326         };
2327         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2328         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2329         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2330         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2331
2332         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2333         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2334         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2335 }
2336
2337 #[test]
2338 fn test_justice_tx() {
2339         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2340         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2341         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2342         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2343         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2344         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2345         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2348         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2349         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2350         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2351         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2352         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2353         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2354         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2355         // Create some new channels:
2356         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2357
2358         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2359         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2360         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2361         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2362         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2363         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2364         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2365         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2366         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2367         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2368         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2369         // Revoke the old state
2370         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2371
2372         {
2373                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2374                 {
2375                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2376                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2377                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2378
2379                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2380                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2381                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2382                 }
2383                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2384                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2385                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2386
2387                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2389                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2390                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2391                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2392                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2393                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2394                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2395                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2396         }
2397         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2398
2399         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2400         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2401
2402         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2403         // Create some new channels:
2404         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2405         {
2406                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2407                 node_txn.clear();
2408         }
2409
2410         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2411         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2412         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2413         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2414         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2416         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2417         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2418         // Revoke the old state
2419         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2420         {
2421                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2422                 {
2423                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2424                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2425                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2426
2427                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2428                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2429                 }
2430                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2431                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2432
2433                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2434                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2435                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2436                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2437                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2438                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2440         }
2441         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2442         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2443         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2444 }
2445
2446 #[test]
2447 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2448         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2449         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2450         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2451         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2453         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2455         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2456         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2457         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2458         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2459         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2460         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2461         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2462
2463         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2464         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2466         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2467         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2468         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2469
2470         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2471         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2472
2473         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2474         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2476         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2477         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2478 }
2479
2480 #[test]
2481 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2482         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2483         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2484         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2485         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2486         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2487         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2488
2489         // Create some new channel:
2490         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2491
2492         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2493         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2494         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2495         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2496         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2497
2498         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2499         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2500         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2501         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2502         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2503         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2504         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2505         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2506         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2507
2508         //Revoke the old state
2509         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2510
2511         {
2512                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2513                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2514                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2515                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2517                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2518                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2519                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2520
2521                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2522                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2523
2524                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2525                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526
2527                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2528                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2529                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2530                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2531                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2532                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2533                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2534                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2535
2536                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2537                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2538                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2539         }
2540         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2541         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2542         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2543 }
2544
2545 #[test]
2546 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2547         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2548         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2549         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2550         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2551         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2552         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2553
2554         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2555
2556         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2557         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2558         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2559         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2560         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2561         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2562
2563         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2564         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2565
2566         //Revoke the old state
2567         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2568
2569         {
2570                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2571                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2572                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2573                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2574                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2575                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2576                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2577                 match events[1] {
2578                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2579                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2580                 }
2581
2582                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2583                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2584
2585                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2586                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2587                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2588                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2589                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2590                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2591
2592                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2593                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2594                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2595                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2596                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2597                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2598                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2599
2600                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2601                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2602                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2603                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2604
2605                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2606                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2607                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2608
2609                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2610                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2611                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2612                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2613                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2614                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2615                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2616                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2617         }
2618         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2619         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2620         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2621 }
2622
2623 #[test]
2624 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2625         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2626         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2627         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2628         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2629         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2630         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2631         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2632         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2633         // towards B.
2634         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2635         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2636         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2637         // PaymentSent event).
2638
2639         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2642         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2643
2644         // Create some initial channels
2645         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2646         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2647
2648         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2649         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2650         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2651         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2652         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2653
2654         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2655         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2656         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2657
2658         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2659         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2660
2661         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2662         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2663         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2664         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2665         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2666         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2667         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2668         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2669         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2670         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2671         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2672         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2673         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2674
2675         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2676         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2678         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2679         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2680         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2681         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2682         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2683         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2684         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2685         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2686         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2687         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2688         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2689         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2690         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2691         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2692
2693         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2694         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2695         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2696         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2697         {
2698                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2699                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2700                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2701                 added_monitors.clear();
2702         }
2703         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2704         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2705         match forwarded_events[0] {
2706                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2707                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2708         }
2709         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2710                 } else { panic!(); }
2711         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2712                 } else { panic!(); }
2713         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2714         {
2715                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2716                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2717                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2718                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2719                 added_monitors.clear();
2720         }
2721         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2722         match events[0] {
2723                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2724                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2725         }
2726         match events[1] {
2727                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729         }
2730
2731         match events[2] {
2732                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2733                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2734                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2735                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2736                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2737                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2738                 },
2739                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2740         };
2741         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2742                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2743                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2744                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2745                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2746                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2747                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2748                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2749                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2750                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2751                         if $htlc_offered {
2752                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2753                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2754                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2755                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2756                         } else {
2757                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2758                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2759                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2760                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2761                         }
2762                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2763                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2764                         node_txn.clear();
2765                 } }
2766         }
2767         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2768         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2769         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2770         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2771
2772         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2773         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2774         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2775         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2776         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2777         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2779         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2780         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2781         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2782         let commitment_spend =
2783                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2784                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2785                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2786                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2787                         &node_txn[0]
2788                 } else {
2789                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2790                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2791                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2792                         &node_txn[2]
2793                 };
2794
2795         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2796         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2797         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2798         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2799         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2800         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2801         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2802         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2803         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2804         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2805         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2806         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2807
2808         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2809         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2810         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2811         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2812         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2814         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2815         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2816         let mut first_claimed = false;
2817         for event in events {
2818                 match event {
2819                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2820                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2821                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2822                                         first_claimed = true;
2823                                 } else {
2824                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2825                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2826                                 }
2827                         },
2828                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2829                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2830                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2831                 }
2832         }
2833         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2834 }
2835
2836 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2837         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2838         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2839         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2840         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2841         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2842         //            \                                  \
2843         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2844
2845         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2846         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2847         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2848         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2849         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2850         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2851         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2852
2853         // Create some intial channels
2854         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2855         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2856
2857         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2858         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2859         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2860
2861         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2862
2863         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2864         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2865         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2866         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2868         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2870
2871         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2872         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2873         match events[0] {
2874                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2875                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2876                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2877                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2878                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2879                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2880                 },
2881                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2882         };
2883         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2884         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2886         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2887         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2888         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2889         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2890         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2891
2892         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2893         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2894         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2895         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2896         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2897         let timeout_tx;
2898         {
2899                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2900                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2901                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2902                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2903
2904                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2905                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2906
2907                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2908                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2909                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2910                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2911
2912                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2913                 node_txn.clear();
2914         }
2915
2916         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2918         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2919         {
2920                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2921                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2922                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2923                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2924         }
2925
2926         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2927         {
2928                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2929                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2930                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2931                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2932                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2933                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2934                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2935                 } else {
2936                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2937                 }
2938         }
2939
2940         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2942         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2943         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2944         match events[0] {
2945                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2946                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2947                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2948                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2949                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2950                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2951                 },
2952                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2953         };
2954
2955         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2956         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2957         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2958
2959         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2960         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2961
2962         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2964         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2965         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2966         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2967         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2968         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2969         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2970         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2971 }
2972
2973 #[test]
2974 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2975         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2976         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2977         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2978 }
2979
2980 #[test]
2981 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2982         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2983         // and fail backward accordingly.
2984
2985         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2986         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2987         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2988         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2989
2990         // Create some initial channels
2991         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2992         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2993
2994         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2995         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2996         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2997         // Revoke the old state
2998         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2999
3000         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3001
3002         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3003         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3004         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3005         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3006         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3007
3008         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3011         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3012         match events[0] {
3013                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3014                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3015                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3016                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3017                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3018                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3019
3020                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3021                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3022                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3023                 },
3024                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3025         }
3026 }
3027
3028 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3029         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3030         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3031         // commitment transaction anymore.
3032         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3033         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3034         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3035         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3036         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3037         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3038         // transactions:
3039         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3040         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3041         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3042         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3043         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3044         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3045         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3046         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3047         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3048
3049         // Create some initial channels
3050         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3051         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3052
3053         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3054         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3055         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3056         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3057         // Revoke the old state
3058         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3059
3060         let value = if use_dust {
3061                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3062                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3063                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3064         } else { 3000000 };
3065
3066         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3067         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3068         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3069
3070         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3071         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3073         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3074         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3075         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3076         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3077         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3078         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3079         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3080         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3081         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3082
3083         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3084         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3086         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3087         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3088         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3089         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3090         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3091         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3092         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3093         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3095         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3096         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3097         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3099
3100         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3101         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3103         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3104         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3105         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3106         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3107         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3108         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3109         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3110         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3111         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3112         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3114         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3115         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3116         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3118
3119         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3120         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3121         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3122         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3123         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3124         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3126
3127         if deliver_bs_raa {
3128                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3129                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3130                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3131                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3132                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3133                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3134                 match events[0] {
3135                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3136                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3137                 };
3138                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3139                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3140         }
3141
3142         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3143         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3144
3145         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3147         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3148         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3149
3150         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3151         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3152         match events[0] {
3153                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3154                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3155         }
3156         match events[1] {
3157                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3158                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3159                 },
3160                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161         }
3162         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3163                 match events[2] {
3164                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3165                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3166                         },
3167                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3168                 }
3169                 match events[3] {
3170                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3171                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3172                 };
3173         }
3174         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3176
3177         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3178         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3179         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3180                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3182         }
3183         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3184                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3185                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3186                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3187                 },
3188                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3189         }
3190         if deliver_bs_raa {
3191                 match events[0] {
3192                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3193                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3194                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3195                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3196                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3197                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3198                         },
3199                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200                 }
3201         }
3202         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3203                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3204                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3205                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3206                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3207                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3208                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3209
3210                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3211                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3212                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3213
3214                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3215
3216                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3217                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3218                         match events[0] {
3219                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3220                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3221                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3222                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3223                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3224                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3225                                         }
3226                                 },
3227                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3228                         }
3229                         match events[1] {
3230                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3231                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3232                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3233                                 },
3234                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3235                         }
3236                         match events[2] {
3237                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3238                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3239                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3240                                 },
3241                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3242                         }
3243                 },
3244                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3245         }
3246
3247         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3248         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3249         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3250 }
3251
3252 #[test]
3253 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3254         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3255         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3256         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3257         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3258 }
3259
3260 #[test]
3261 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3262         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3263         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3264         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3265         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3266 }
3267
3268 #[test]
3269 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3270         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3271         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3272         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3273         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3274         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3275
3276         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3277         {
3278                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3279                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3280                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3281
3282                 let payment_event = {
3283                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3284                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3285                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3286                 };
3287                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3288                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3289         }
3290
3291         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3292         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3293         {
3294                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3296
3297                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3298         }
3299
3300         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3301         {
3302                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3303
3304                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3305                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3306                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3307                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3308                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3309                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3310
3311                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3312                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3313                         channel_id: chan.2,
3314                         htlc_id: 0,
3315                         amount_msat: 0,
3316                         payment_hash,
3317                         cltv_expiry,
3318                         onion_routing_packet,
3319                 };
3320                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3321         }
3322         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3323         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3324         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3325         match events[0] {
3326                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3327                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3328                 },
3329                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3330         }
3331         match events[1] {
3332                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3333                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3334                 },
3335                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3336         }
3337         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3339 }
3340
3341 #[test]
3342 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3343         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3344         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3345         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3346         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3347         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3348         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3349         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3350
3351         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3352         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3353         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3354         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3355         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3356         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3357
3358         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3359         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3360         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3361
3362         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3363         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3364         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3365         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3366         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3367
3368         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3369         // registering new transactions
3370         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3371         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3372 }
3373
3374 #[test]
3375 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3376         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3377         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3378         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3379         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3380         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3381         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3382         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3383
3384         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3385
3386         let mut payment_event = {
3387                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3388                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3389
3390                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3391                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3392                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3393         };
3394
3395         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3396         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3397
3398         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3399
3400         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3401         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3402         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3403         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3404
3405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3407         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3409         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3410
3411         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3412         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3413         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3414
3415         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3416         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3418         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3419         let tx = {
3420                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3421                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3422                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3423                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3424                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3425                 node_txn.remove(0)
3426         };
3427
3428         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3429
3430         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3431         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3433         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3434
3435         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3436         {
3437                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3438                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3439         }
3440         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3441         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3442         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3443         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3444         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3445         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3446         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3447
3448         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3449 }
3450
3451 #[test]
3452 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3453         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3454         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3455         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3456         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3457
3458         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3459         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3460         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3461         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3462         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3463
3464         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3465
3466         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3468         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3469         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3470         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3471
3472         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3473         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3474
3475         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3476         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3477 }
3478
3479 #[test]
3480 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3481         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3482         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3485         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3486         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3487         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3488
3489         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3490         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3491         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3492
3493         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3494         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3495         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3496         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3497
3498         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3499         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3500         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3501
3502         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3503         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3504         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3505         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3506
3507         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3508         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3509
3510         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3511         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3512
3513         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3514         {
3515                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3516                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3517                 match events[0] {
3518                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3519                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3520                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3521                         },
3522                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3523                 }
3524                 match events[1] {
3525                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3526                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3527                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3528                         },
3529                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3530                 }
3531                 match events[2] {
3532                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3533                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3534                 }
3535         }
3536
3537         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3538         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3539 }
3540
3541 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3542         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3545         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3546         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3547
3548         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3549         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3550                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3551                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3552                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3553                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3554                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3555         } else {
3556                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3557         }
3558
3559         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3560
3561         let payment_event = {
3562                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3563                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3564
3565                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3566                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3567                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3568         };
3569         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3570
3571         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3572                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3573         } else {
3574                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3575                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3576                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3577                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3578                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3579
3580                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3581                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3582                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3583                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3584
3585                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3586                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3587                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3588                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3589                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3590
3591                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3592                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3593                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3594                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3595                                         }
3596                                 }
3597                         }
3598                 }
3599         }
3600
3601         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3602         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3603         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3604                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3605                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3606                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3607                         //
3608                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3609                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3610                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3611                         //
3612                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3613                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3614                 }
3615                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3616                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3617                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3618         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3619                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3620                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3621         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3622                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3623                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3624         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3625                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3626                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3627         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3628                 // Everything was delivered...
3629                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3630         }
3631
3632         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3633         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3634         match events_1[0] {
3635                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3637         };
3638
3639         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3640         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3641         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3642
3643         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3644
3645         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3646         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3647         match events_2[0] {
3648                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3649                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3650                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3651                         match &purpose {
3652                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3653                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3654                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3655                                 },
3656                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3657                         }
3658                 },
3659                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3660         }
3661
3662         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3664
3665         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3666         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3667         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3668                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3669                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3670                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3671                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3672                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3673                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3674                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3675                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3676                 },
3677                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3678         };
3679
3680         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3681                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3682
3683                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3684                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3685                 match events_4[0] {
3686                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3687                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3688                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3689                         },
3690                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3691                 }
3692
3693                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3694                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3695                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3696                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3697
3698                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3699                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3700                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3701                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3702
3703                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3704                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3705                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3706                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3707                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3708
3709                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3710                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3711                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3712                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3713                                         }
3714                                 }
3715                         }
3716                 }
3717         }
3718
3719         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3720         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3721         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3722                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3723                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3724                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3725                 } else {
3726                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3727                 }
3728         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3729                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3730                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3731         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3732                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3733                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3735                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3736                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3737         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3738                 // Everything was delivered...
3739                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3740         }
3741
3742         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3743                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3744         }
3745
3746         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3747         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3748         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3749
3750         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3751                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3752         }
3753
3754         // Channel should still work fine...
3755         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3756         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3757         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3758 }
3759
3760 #[test]
3761 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3762         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3763         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3764         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3765         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3766 }
3767
3768 #[test]
3769 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3770         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3771         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3772         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3773         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3774 }
3775
3776 #[test]
3777 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3778         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3779         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3780         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3781         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3782         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3783         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3784         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3785         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3786         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3787
3788         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3789         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3790
3791         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3792         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3793         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3794
3795         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3796
3797         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3798         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3799
3800         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3801         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3802         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3803
3804         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3805         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3806         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3807         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3808
3809         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3810         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3811         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3812         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3813         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3814                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3815                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3816                         msg.clone()
3817                 },
3818                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3819         };
3820
3821         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3822         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3823         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3824         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3825         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3826         let chan_id;
3827         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3828                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3829                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3830                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3831                         msg.clone()
3832                 },
3833                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3834         };
3835         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3836                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3837                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3838                         msg.clone()
3839                 },
3840                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3841         };
3842         match events_4[2] {
3843                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3844                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3845                 },
3846                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3847         }
3848
3849         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3850         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3851         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3852         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3853         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3854         match events_5[0] {
3855                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3856                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3857                 },
3858                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3859         };
3860
3861         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3862         // announcement_signatures.
3863         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3864         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3865         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3866         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3867                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3868                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3869                         msg.clone()
3870                 },
3871                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3872         };
3873
3874         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3875         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3876         // channel_update.
3877         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3878         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3879         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3880         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3881                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3882                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3883                 },
3884                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3885         };
3886
3887         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3888         // same channel_announcement.
3889         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3890         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3891         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3892         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3893                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3894                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3895                         update_msg.clone()
3896                 },
3897                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3898         };
3899
3900         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3901         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3902         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3903         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3904
3905         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3906         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3907         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3908
3909         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3910         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3911         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3912
3913         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3914         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3915         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3916
3917         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3918         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3919         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3920         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3921         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3922         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3923                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3924         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3925
3926         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3927         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3928                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3929                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3930                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3931                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3932                         keys_manager,
3933                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3934                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3935                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3936                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3937                         channel_monitors,
3938                 }).unwrap()
3939         };
3940         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3941         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3942
3943         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3944         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3946
3947         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3948
3949         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3950         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3951         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3952         let mut found_announcement = false;
3953         for event in msgs.iter() {
3954                 match event {
3955                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3956                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3957                         },
3958                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3959                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3960                 }
3961         }
3962         assert!(found_announcement);
3963 }
3964
3965 #[test]
3966 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
3967         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3968         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3969         // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3970         // funding_locked immediately instead.
3971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3973         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3974         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3975         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3976
3977         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3978
3979         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3980         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3981         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3982         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3983         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3984         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3985
3986         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
3987         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3988         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3989 }
3990
3991 #[test]
3992 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3993         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3994         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3995         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3996         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3997         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3998         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3999         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4000
4001         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4002
4003         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4004         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4005         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4007
4008         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4009         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4010         match events_1[0] {
4011                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4012                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4013         }
4014
4015         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4017
4018         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4019         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4020         match events_2[0] {
4021                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4022                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4023                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4024                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4025                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4026                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4027                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4028
4029                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4030                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4031                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4032                         match events_3[0] {
4033                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4034                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4035                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4036                                 },
4037                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4038                         }
4039
4040                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4041                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4042                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4043                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4044                 },
4045                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4046         }
4047
4048         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4049         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4050
4051         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4052         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4053         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4054         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4055         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4056         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4057
4058         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4059         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4060         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4061         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4062
4063         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4064         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4065
4066         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4067         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4068
4069         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4070
4071         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4072         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4073         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4074         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4075         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4076         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4077         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4078         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4079         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4081
4082         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4083         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4084         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4085         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4086         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4087         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4088         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4090
4091         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4092         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4093         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4094         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4095         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4096         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4097         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4099
4100         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4101         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4102         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4104
4105         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4106         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4107         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4109
4110         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4111         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4113
4114         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4115
4116         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4117         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4118         match events_5[0] {
4119                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4120                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4121                         match &purpose {
4122                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4123                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4124                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4125                                 },
4126                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4127                         }
4128                 },
4129                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4130         }
4131
4132         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4133         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4135
4136         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4137         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4138 }
4139
4140 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4141         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4142         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4143         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4144         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4145         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4146         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4147
4148         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4149
4150         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4151                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4152                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4153                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4154                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4155                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4156                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4157                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4158                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4159                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4160                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4161                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4162                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4163                 our_payment_hash
4164         } else {
4165                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4166         };
4167
4168         let mut block = Block {
4169                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4170                 txdata: vec![],
4171         };
4172         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4173         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4174         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4175         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4176                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4177                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4178                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4179         }
4180
4181         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4182
4183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4184         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4185         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4186         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4187         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4188         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4189
4190         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4191         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4192         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4193         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4194         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4195         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4196 }
4197
4198 #[test]
4199 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4200         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4201         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4202 }
4203
4204 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4205         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4206         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4207         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4208         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4209         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4210         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4211         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4212
4213         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4214         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4215         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4216         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4217
4218         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4219         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4220         {
4221                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4222         }
4223         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4224         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4225
4226         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4227         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4228         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4229         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4230         if forwarded_htlc {
4231                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4232                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4233                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4234                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4235                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4236         }
4237         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4238
4239         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4240         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4241         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4242         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4243
4244         if forwarded_htlc {
4245                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4246                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4247                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4248                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4249                 match fail_commit[0] {
4250                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4251                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4252                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4253                         },
4254                         _ => unreachable!(),
4255                 }
4256                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4257         } else {
4258                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4259                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4260                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4261                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4262                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4263                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4264                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4265                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4266         }
4267 }
4268
4269 #[test]
4270 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4271         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4272         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4273 }
4274
4275 #[test]
4276 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4277         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4278         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4280         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4281         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4282         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4283         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4284         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4285         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4286
4287         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4288
4289         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4290
4291         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4292         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4293         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4294                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4295
4296         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4297         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4298         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4299         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4300         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4301         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4302         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4303         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4304                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4305         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4306
4307         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4308         let config = UserConfig::default();
4309         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4310                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4311                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4312                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4313                         default_config: config,
4314                         keys_manager,
4315                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4316                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4317                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4318                         logger: &logger,
4319                         channel_monitors,
4320                 }).unwrap()
4321         };
4322         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4323         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4324
4325         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4326         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4327         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4329
4330         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4331         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4332         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4333         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4334
4335         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4336         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4337         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4338         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4339
4340         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4341         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4342         for node in nodes.iter() {
4343                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4344                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4345                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4346         }
4347
4348         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4349 }
4350
4351 #[test]
4352 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4353         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4354         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4355         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4356         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4357         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4358         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4359         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4360         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4361         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4362         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4363
4364         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4365         let channel_value = 100000;
4366         let push_msat = 10001;
4367         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4368         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4369         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4370         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4371         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4372         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4373         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4374
4375         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4376
4377         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4378         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4379
4380         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4381         {
4382                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4383                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4384                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4385                 added_monitors.clear();
4386         }
4387
4388         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4389         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4390         {
4391                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4392                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4393                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4394                 added_monitors.clear();
4395         }
4396         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4397
4398         nodes.push(node_a);
4399         nodes.push(node_b);
4400
4401         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4402         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4403         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4404         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4405
4406         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4407         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4408         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4409         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4410         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4411         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4412         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4413         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4414                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4415         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4416
4417         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4418         let config = UserConfig::default();
4419         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4420                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4421                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4422                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4423                         default_config: config,
4424                         keys_manager,
4425                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4426                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4427                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4428                         logger: &logger,
4429                         channel_monitors,
4430                 }).unwrap()
4431         };
4432         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4433         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4434
4435         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4436
4437         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4438         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4439
4440         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4441         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4442         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4443         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4444         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4445
4446         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4447         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4449
4450         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4451         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4452         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4453         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4454
4455         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4456         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4457         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4458         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4459
4460         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4461         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4462         for node in nodes.iter() {
4463                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4464                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4465                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4466         }
4467
4468         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4469 }
4470
4471 #[test]
4472 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4476         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4477         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4478         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4479         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4480         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4481         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4482         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4483
4484         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4485         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4486
4487         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4488
4489         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4490         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4491         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4492
4493         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4494         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4495         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4496         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4497         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4498         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4499         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4500         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4501                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4502         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4503
4504         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4505         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4506                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4507                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4508                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4509                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4510                         keys_manager,
4511                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4512                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4513                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4514                         logger: &logger,
4515                         channel_monitors,
4516                 }).unwrap()
4517         };
4518         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4519         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4520
4521         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4522         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4524
4525         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4526
4527         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4528         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4529 }
4530
4531 #[test]
4532 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4533         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4534         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4535         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4536         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4537         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4538         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4539         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4540         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4541         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4542         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4543         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4544         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4545         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4546
4547         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4548         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4549                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4550                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4551                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4552         }
4553
4554         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4555
4556         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4557         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4558
4559         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4560         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4561         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4562         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4563
4564         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4565         // nodes[3])
4566         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4567         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4568                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4569                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4570                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4571         }
4572
4573         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4574         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4575         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4576         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4577         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4578         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4579
4580
4581         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4582         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4583                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4584                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4585                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4586                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4587         }
4588
4589         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4590         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4591                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4592                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4593                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4594                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4595         }
4596
4597         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4598         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4599                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4600                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4601                 keys_manager,
4602                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4603                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4604                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4605                 logger: &logger,
4606                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4607         }) { } else {
4608                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4609         };
4610
4611         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4612         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4613                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4614                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4615                 keys_manager,
4616                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4617                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4618                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4619                 logger: &logger,
4620                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4621         }).unwrap();
4622         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4623         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4624
4625         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4626                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4627                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4628                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4629                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4630         }
4631
4632         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4633                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4634                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4635         }
4636         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4637         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4638
4639         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4640         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4641         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4642         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4643         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4644
4645         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4646         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4647         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4648         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4649         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4650         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4651         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4652                 match action {
4653                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4654                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4655                         },
4656                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4657                 }
4658         }
4659 }
4660
4661 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4662         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4663                 {
4664                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4665                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4666                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4667                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4668                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4669                                 match event {
4670                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4671                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4672                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4673                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4674                                                 }
4675                                         },
4676                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4677                                 };
4678                         }
4679                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4680                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4681                                         txn.push(tx);
4682                                 }
4683                         }
4684                         txn
4685                 }
4686         }
4687 }
4688
4689 #[test]
4690 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4691         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4692         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4693         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4694         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4695         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4696
4697         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4698         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4699         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4701         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4702         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4703         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4704         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4705         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4706
4707         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4708         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4709
4710         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4711         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4712         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4713         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4714         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4715 }
4716
4717 #[test]
4718 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4719         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4720         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4721         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4722         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4723         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4724         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4725
4726         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4727         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4728         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4730         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4731
4732         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4733         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4734         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4735         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4736
4737         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4738         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4740         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4741         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4742
4743         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4744         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4745         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4746 }
4747
4748 #[test]
4749 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4750         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4751         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4752
4753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4756         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4757
4758         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4759         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4760         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4761         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4762         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4763
4764         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4765         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4766         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4767         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4768         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4769
4770         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4771         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4772         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4773
4774         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4775         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4776         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4777         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4778         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4779 }
4780
4781 #[test]
4782 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4786         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4787
4788         // Create some initial channels
4789         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4790
4791         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4792
4793         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4794         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4795         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4796
4797         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4798         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4800         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4802         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4803         match events[0] {
4804                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4805                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4806         }
4807         match events[1] {
4808                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4809                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4810         }
4811
4812         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4813         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4814         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4815         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4816         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4817         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4818         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4819
4820         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4821         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4822         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4823
4824         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4825         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4826         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4827 }
4828
4829 #[test]
4830 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4831         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4832         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4833         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4834         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4835
4836         // Create some initial channels
4837         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4838
4839         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4840         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4841
4842         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4843
4844         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4845         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4846         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4847
4848         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4849         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4851         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4852         match events[0] {
4853                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4854                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4855         }
4856         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4857
4858         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4859         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4860         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4861         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4862         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4863         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4864
4865         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4866         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4867         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4868         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4869
4870         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4871         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4872         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4873         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4874         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4875 }
4876
4877 #[test]
4878 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4879         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4880         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4881         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4882         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4883
4884         // Create some initial channels
4885         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4886
4887         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4888         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4889         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4890         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4891
4892         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4893
4894         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4895         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4897         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4898
4899         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4900         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4901         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4902         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4903
4904         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4905         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4906
4907         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4908         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4909         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4910 }
4911
4912 #[test]
4913 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4914         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4915         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4916         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4917         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4918         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4919
4920         // Create some initial channels
4921         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4922
4923         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4924         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4925         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4926         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4927
4928         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4929
4930         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4931         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4932         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4934         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4935         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4936
4937         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4938         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4939         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4940         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4941         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4942         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4943         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4944
4945         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4946         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4947         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4948         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4950         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4951
4952         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4953         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4954         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4955         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4956         // transactions next...
4957         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4958         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4959
4960         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4961         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4962         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4963                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4964         } else {
4965                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4966                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4967         }
4968
4969         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4970         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4971
4972         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4973         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4974
4975         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4976         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4977         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4978         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4979         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4980 }
4981
4982 #[test]
4983 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4984         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4985         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4986         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4987         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4988         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4989
4990         // Create some initial channels
4991         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4992
4993         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4994         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4995         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4996         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4997
4998         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4999         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5000
5001         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5002
5003         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5004         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5005         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5007         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5008         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5009
5010         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5011         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5012         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5013         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5014
5015         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5016         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5017         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5018
5019         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5020         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5021         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5022         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5023         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5024         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5025
5026         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5027         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5028
5029         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5030         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5031         // transactions next...
5032         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5033         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5034         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5035                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5036         } else {
5037                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5038                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5039         }
5040
5041         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5042         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5043
5044         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5045
5046         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5047         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5048
5049         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5050         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5051
5052         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5053         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5054         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5055         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5056         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5057         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5058         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5059         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5060 }
5061
5062 #[test]
5063 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5064         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5065         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5066         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5067         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5068         // channel.
5069         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5070         // gets broadcast.
5071
5072         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5073         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5074         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5075         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5076
5077         // Create some initial channels
5078         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5079         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5080
5081         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5082         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5083         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5084         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5085         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5086
5087         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5088         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5089         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5090
5091         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5092         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5093         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5094         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5096         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5097         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5098         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5099         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5100         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5101
5102         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5103         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5105         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5106
5107         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5108         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5109         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5110         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5111         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5112         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5113         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5114         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5115         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5116         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5117
5118         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5119         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5120         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5122         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5123         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5124         match events[0] {
5125                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5126                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5127         }
5128         match events[1] {
5129                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5130                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5131                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5132                 },
5133                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5134         }
5135         {
5136                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5137                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5138                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5139                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5140                 b_txn.clear();
5141         }
5142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5143         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5144         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5145         match msg_events[0] {
5146                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5147                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5148         }
5149         match msg_events[1] {
5150                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5151                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5152         }
5153         match msg_events[2] {
5154                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5155                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5156                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5157                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5158                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5159                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5160                 },
5161                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5162         };
5163         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5164         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5165         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5166         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5167         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5168         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5169         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5170         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5171         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5172         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5173         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5174         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5175         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5176
5177         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5179 }
5180
5181 #[test]
5182 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5183         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5184         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5185         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5186         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5187         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5188         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5189         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5190         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5191         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5192         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5193         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5194                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5195         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5196
5197         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5198         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5199         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5200
5201         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5202         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5203         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5204         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5205         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5206
5207         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5208
5209         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5210         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5211         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5212         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5213         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5214         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5215
5216         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5217         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5218         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5219
5220         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5221         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5223         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5224         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5225
5226         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5227         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5228                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5229                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5230                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5231                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5232
5233                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5234                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5235                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5236                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5237                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5238                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5239                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5240
5241                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5242                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5243                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5244                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5245         }
5246
5247         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5248         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5250         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5251         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5252         match events[0] {
5253                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5254                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5255         }
5256         match events[1] {
5257                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5258                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5259         }
5260         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5261         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5262         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5263         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5264         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5265         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5266         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5267         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5268         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5269         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5270         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5271         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5272         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5273
5274         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5275         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5276         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5277         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5278         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5279         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5280         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5281         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5282         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5284
5285         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5286         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5287         {
5288                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5289         }
5290         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5291
5292         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5293         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5294         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5295         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5296         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5297         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5298         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5299         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5300         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5301         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5302         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5303         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5304
5305         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5306         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5307
5308         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5309         match events[0] {
5310                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5311                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5312                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5313                 }
5314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5315         }
5316 }
5317
5318 #[test]
5319 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5323         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5324
5325         // Create some initial channels
5326         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5327
5328         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5329         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5330         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5331         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5332         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5333
5334         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5335         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5336         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5337         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5339         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5340         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5341         match events[0] {
5342                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5343                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5344         }
5345         match events[1] {
5346                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5347                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5348         }
5349         let node_tx = {
5350                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5351                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5352                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5353                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5354                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5355                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5356                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5357                 node_txn[0].clone()
5358         };
5359
5360         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5361         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5362
5363         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5364         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5365         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5366         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5367         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5368         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5369 }
5370
5371 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5372         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5373         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5374         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5375         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5376         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5377         // use the same payment hashes.
5378         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5379         //
5380         // A \         / E
5381         //    - C - D -
5382         // B /         \ F
5383         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5384         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5385         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5386         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5387         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5388         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5389         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5390         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5391                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5392         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5393
5394         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5395         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5396         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5397         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5398         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5399
5400         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5401         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5402         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5403         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5404
5405         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5406         // 0th HTLC:
5407         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5408         // 1st HTLC:
5409         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5410         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5411         // 2nd HTLC:
5412         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5413         // 3rd HTLC:
5414         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5415         // 4th HTLC:
5416         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5417         // 5th HTLC:
5418         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5419         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5420         // 6th HTLC:
5421         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5422         // 7th HTLC:
5423         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5424
5425         // 8th HTLC:
5426         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5427         // 9th HTLC:
5428         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5429         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5430
5431         // 10th HTLC:
5432         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5433         // 11th HTLC:
5434         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5435         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5436
5437         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5438         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5439         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5440         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5441         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5442
5443         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5444         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5445         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5446         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5447         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5448         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5450         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5452
5453         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5454         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5455         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5456         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5457         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5458         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5459
5460         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5461         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5462         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5464         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5465         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5466
5467         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5468         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5469         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5470         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5471
5472         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5473
5474         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5476         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5477         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5478         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5479         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5480         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5481         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5482         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5483         if deliver_last_raa {
5484                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5485         } else {
5486                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5487         }
5488
5489         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5490         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5491         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5492         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5493         //
5494         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5495         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5496         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5497         //
5498         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5499         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5500         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5501
5502         if announce_latest {
5503                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5504         } else {
5505                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5506         }
5507         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5508         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5509                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5510                 events[1].clone()
5511         } else {
5512                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5513                 events[0].clone()
5514         };
5515         match close_event {
5516                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5517                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5518         }
5519
5520         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5521         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5522         if deliver_last_raa {
5523                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5524         } else {
5525                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5526         }
5527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5528
5529         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5530         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5531         let mut a_done = false;
5532         for msg in cs_msgs {
5533                 match msg {
5534                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5535                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5536                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5537                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5538                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5539                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5540                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5541                                         }
5542                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5543                                         assert!(!a_done);
5544                                         a_done = true;
5545                                         &nodes[0]
5546                                 } else {
5547                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5548                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5549                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5550                                         }
5551                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5552                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5553                                         &nodes[1]
5554                                 };
5555                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5556                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5557                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5558                                 if announce_latest {
5559                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5560                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5561                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5562                                         }
5563                                 }
5564                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5565                         },
5566                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5567                 }
5568         }
5569
5570         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5571         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5572         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5573         let mut as_updates = 0;
5574         for event in as_events.iter() {
5575                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5576                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5577                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5578                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5579                         } else {
5580                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5581                         }
5582                         if network_update.is_some() {
5583                                 as_updates += 1;
5584                         }
5585                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5586         }
5587         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5588         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5589         if announce_latest {
5590                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5591                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5592         }
5593         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5594
5595         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5596         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5597         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5598         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5599         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5600                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5601                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5602                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5603                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5604                         } else {
5605                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5606                         }
5607                         if network_update.is_some() {
5608                                 bs_updates += 1;
5609                         }
5610                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5611         }
5612         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5613         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5614         if announce_latest {
5615                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5616         }
5617         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5618
5619         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5620         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5621         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5622         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5623         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5624         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5625 }
5626
5627 #[test]
5628 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5629         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5630 }
5631
5632 #[test]
5633 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5634         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5635 }
5636
5637 #[test]
5638 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5639         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5640         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5641         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5642 }
5643
5644 #[test]
5645 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5649         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5650
5651         // Create some initial channels
5652         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5653
5654         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5655         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5656         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5657         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5658
5659         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5660         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5661         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5663         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5664         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5665
5666         let htlc_timeout = {
5667                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5668                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5669                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5670                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5671                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5672                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5673                 node_txn[1].clone()
5674         };
5675
5676         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5677         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5678         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5679
5680         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5681         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5682         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5683         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5684         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5685         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5686         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5687         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5688         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5689         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5690                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5691 }
5692
5693 #[test]
5694 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5695         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5696         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5697         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5698
5699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5700
5701         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5702         let seed = [42; 32];
5703         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5704         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5705         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5706         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5707         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5708         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5709
5710         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5711         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5712
5713         // Create some initial channels
5714         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5715         // for node 0
5716         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5717         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5718         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5719
5720         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5721         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5722         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5723         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5724         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5725
5726         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5727         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5728         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5729         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5730         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5731
5732         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5733         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5734         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5735         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5736             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5737             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5738             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5739                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5740         }
5741
5742         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5743         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5744         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5745         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5747         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5748
5749         let htlc_timeout = {
5750                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5751                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5752                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5753                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5754                 node_txn[1].clone()
5755         };
5756
5757         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5758         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5759         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5760
5761         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5762         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5763         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5764         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5765         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5766         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5767         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5768         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5769         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5770         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5771         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5772                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5773 }
5774
5775 #[test]
5776 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5777         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5778         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5780         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5781
5782         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5783
5784         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5785         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5786
5787         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5788         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5789         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5790
5791         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5792         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5793         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5794
5795         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5796         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5797         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5798
5799         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5800         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5801         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5802 }
5803
5804 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5805         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5806         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5807         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5808         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5809         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5810
5811         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5812
5813         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5814         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5815         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5817
5818         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5819         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5820         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5821
5822         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5824         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5825         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5827
5828         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5829         let mut block = Block {
5830                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5831                 txdata: vec![],
5832         };
5833         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5834                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5835                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5836         }
5837         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5838         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5839         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5840         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5841 }
5842
5843 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5844         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5845         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5846         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5847         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5848         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5849
5850         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5851         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5853
5854         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5855
5856         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5857         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5858         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5859
5860         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5861         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5862
5863         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5864                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5865                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5866         }
5867         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5868         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5869         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5870         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5871 }
5872
5873 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5874         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5875         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5876         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5877         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5878         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5879
5880         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5881         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5882         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5883         // actually revoked.
5884         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5885         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5886         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5887         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5889
5890         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5891         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5892         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5894         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5895         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5897         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5899         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5900
5901         if check_revoke_no_close {
5902                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5903                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5904         }
5905
5906         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5907         let mut block = Block {
5908                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5909                 txdata: vec![],
5910         };
5911         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5912                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5913                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5914         }
5915         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5916                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5917                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5918                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5919                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5920         } else {
5921                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5922                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5923                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5924                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5925                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5926                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5927                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5928                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5929         }
5930 }
5931
5932 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5933 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5934 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5935 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5936 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5937 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5938 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5939 // non-dust HTLCs.
5940 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5941 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5942 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5943 #[test]
5944 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5945         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5946         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5947
5948         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5949         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5950 }
5951
5952 #[test]
5953 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5954         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5955         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5956         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5957         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5958 }
5959
5960 #[test]
5961 #[should_panic]
5962 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5963         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5964         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5965         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5966         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5967         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5968         for node in nodes.iter() {
5969                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5970         }
5971
5972         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5973         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5974         let push_msat=10001;
5975         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5976         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5977         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5978         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5979
5980         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5981         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5982         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5983 }
5984
5985 #[test]
5986 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5987         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5988         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5989         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5990         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5991
5992         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5993         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5994         let push_msat=10001;
5995         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5996
5997         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5998         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5999         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6000         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6001         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6002
6003         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6004         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6005         let push_msat=10001;
6006         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6007         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6008         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6009
6010         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6011         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6012         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6013
6014         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6015         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6016         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6017
6018         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6019         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6020         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6021
6022         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6023         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6024         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6025         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6026         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6027         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6028 }
6029
6030 #[test]
6031 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6032         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6033         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6034         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6035         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6036
6037         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6038         let push_msat=10001;
6039         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6040         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6041         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6042         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6043
6044         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6045         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6046         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6047                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6048                         msg.clone()
6049                 },
6050                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6051         };
6052         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6053 }
6054
6055 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6056 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6057 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6058 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6059 #[test]
6060 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6061         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6062         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6063         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6064         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6065         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6066
6067         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6068         // pending_update_fee.
6069         {
6070                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6071                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6072         }
6073         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6075
6076         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6077         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6078         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6079                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6080                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6081                 },
6082                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6083         };
6084
6085         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6086
6087         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6088         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6089         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6090         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6091
6092         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6093         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6094         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6095
6096         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6097         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6098         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6099         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6100
6101         // Flush the pending fee update.
6102         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6103         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6105         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6107
6108         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6109         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6110         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6111         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6112         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6113         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6114         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6115                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6116         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6117
6118         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6119         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6120         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6121         match &events[0] {
6122                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6123                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6124                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6125                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6126                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6127                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6128                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6129                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6130                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6131                 },
6132                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6133         }
6134 }
6135
6136 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6137 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6138 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6139 #[test]
6140 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6141         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6142         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6143         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6144         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6145         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6146
6147         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6148         // pending_update_fee.
6149         {
6150                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6151                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6152         }
6153         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6155
6156         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6157         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6158         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6159                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6160                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6161                 },
6162                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6163         };
6164
6165         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6166
6167         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6168         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6169         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6170         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6171
6172         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6173         let amt_1 = 20000;
6174         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6175         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6176         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6177
6178         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6179         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6180         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6181         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6182         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6183         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6184         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6185
6186         // Flush the pending fee update.
6187         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6188         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6190         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6191         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6193
6194         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6195         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6196         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6197         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6198         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6199         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6200         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6201                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6202         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6203
6204         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6205         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6206         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6207         match &events[0] {
6208                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6209                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6210                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6211                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6212                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6213                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6214                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6215                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6216                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6217                 },
6218                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6219         }
6220
6221         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6222         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6223                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6224                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6225                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6226         };
6227         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6228                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6230         };
6231         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6233         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6234         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6235         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6236         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6237         match events[0] {
6238                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6239                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6240         }
6241         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6242         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6243         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6244         match events[0] {
6245                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6246                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6247         }
6248         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6250         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6251         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6252         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6253         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6254 }
6255
6256 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6257 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6258 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6259 // once it's freed.
6260 #[test]
6261 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6262         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6263         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6264         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6265         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6266         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6267         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6268         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6269         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6270         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6271         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6272
6273         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6274         // pending_update_fee.
6275         {
6276                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6277                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6278         }
6279         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6281
6282         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6283         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6284         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6285                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6286                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6287                 },
6288                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6289         };
6290
6291         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6292
6293         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6294         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6295         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6296         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6297
6298         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6299         let feemsat = 239;
6300         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6301         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6302         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6303         let payment_event = {
6304                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6305                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6306
6307                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6308                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6309
6310                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6311         };
6312         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6314         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6315         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6316
6317         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6318         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6319
6320         // Flush the pending fee update.
6321         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6322         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6323         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6324         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6325         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6326         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6327
6328         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6329         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6330         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6331
6332         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6333                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6334                         msg.clone()
6335                 },
6336                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6337         };
6338
6339         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6341         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6342
6343         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6344         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6345         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6346         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6347                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6349         }
6350
6351         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6352         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6354
6355         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6356         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6357         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6358         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6359                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6360                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6361                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6362                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6363                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6364                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6365                 },
6366                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6367         };
6368
6369         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6370         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6371         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6372
6373         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6374         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6376         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6377         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6379         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6380         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6381         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6382                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6383                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6384         };
6385         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6386         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6387         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6388 }
6389
6390 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6391 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6392 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6393
6394 #[test]
6395 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6396         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6397         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6398         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6399         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6400         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6401         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6402
6403         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6404         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6405
6406         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6407                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6408         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6409         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6410 }
6411
6412 #[test]
6413 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6414         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6418         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6419         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6420
6421         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6422         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6423         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6424                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6425
6426         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6427         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6428 }
6429
6430 #[test]
6431 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6432         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6433         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6434         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6435         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6436         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6437         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6438
6439         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6440         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6442         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6443         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6444
6445         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6446         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6447         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6449         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6450 }
6451
6452 #[test]
6453 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6454         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6455         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6456         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6457         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6458         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6459         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6460         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6461
6462         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 0);
6463         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6464         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6465                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6466 }
6467
6468 #[test]
6469 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6470         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6471         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6472         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6473         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6474         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6475         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6476         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6477         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6478         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6479
6480         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6481                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6482                 let payment_event = {
6483                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6484                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6485
6486                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6487                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6488                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6489                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6490                         } else {
6491                                 assert!(false);
6492                         }
6493                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6494                 };
6495                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6496                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6497                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6498
6499                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6500                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6501         }
6502         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6503         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6504                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6505
6506         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6507         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6508 }
6509
6510 #[test]
6511 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6512         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6517         let channel_value = 100000;
6518         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6519         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6520
6521         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6522
6523         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6524         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6525         // limits us to.
6526         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6527         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6528                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6529
6530         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6531         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6532
6533         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6534 }
6535
6536 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6537 #[test]
6538 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6539         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6543         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6544         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6545         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6546         {
6547                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6548                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6549                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6550         }
6551
6552         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6553         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6554         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6555         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6556         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6557         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6558         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6559         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6560         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6561         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6562         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6563 }
6564
6565 #[test]
6566 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6567         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6568         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6571         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6572         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6573
6574         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6575         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6576         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6577         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6578         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6579         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6580
6581         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6582         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6583         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6585         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6586
6587         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6588         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6589         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6590         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6591         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6592
6593         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6594         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6595         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6597         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6598 }
6599
6600 #[test]
6601 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6602         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6603         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6604         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6607         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6608         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6609
6610         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6611         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6612         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6613         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6614         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6615         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6616
6617         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6618                 channel_id: chan.2,
6619                 htlc_id: 0,
6620                 amount_msat: 1000,
6621                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6622                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6623                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6624         };
6625
6626         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6627                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6628                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6629         }
6630         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6631         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6632
6633         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6634         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6635         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6636         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6637         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6638 }
6639
6640 #[test]
6641 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6642         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6646         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6647         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6648
6649         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6650         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6652         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6653         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6654         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6655
6656         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6657         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6658         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6659         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6660         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6661 }
6662
6663 #[test]
6664 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6665         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6666         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6667         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6668         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6669         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6670
6671         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6672         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6673         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6674         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6675         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6676         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6677         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6678
6679         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6680         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6681         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6683         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6684 }
6685
6686 #[test]
6687 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6688         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6689         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6690         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6691         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6692         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6693         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6694         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6695
6696         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6697         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6698         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6700         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6701         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6702
6703         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6704         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6705         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6706         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6707         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6708         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6709         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6710         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6711         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6712         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6713         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6714         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6715         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6716
6717         //Resend HTLC
6718         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6719         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6720         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6722         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6723
6724         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6725
6726         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6727         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6728         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6730         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6731 }
6732
6733 #[test]
6734 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6735         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6736
6737         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6738         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6739         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6740         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6741         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6742         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6743         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6744
6745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6746         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6747         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6748
6749         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6750                 channel_id: chan.2,
6751                 htlc_id: 0,
6752                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6753         };
6754
6755         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6756
6757         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6758         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6759         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6761         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6762 }
6763
6764 #[test]
6765 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6766         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6767
6768         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6769         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6770         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6771         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6772         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6773
6774         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6775         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6776         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6777         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6778         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6779
6780         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6781                 channel_id: chan.2,
6782                 htlc_id: 0,
6783                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6784         };
6785
6786         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6787
6788         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6789         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6790         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6792         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6793 }
6794
6795 #[test]
6796 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6797         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6798
6799         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6800         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6801         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6802         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6803         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6804
6805         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6806         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6808         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6809         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6810         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6811                 channel_id: chan.2,
6812                 htlc_id: 0,
6813                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6814                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6815         };
6816
6817         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6818
6819         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6820         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6821         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6823         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6824 }
6825
6826 #[test]
6827 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6828         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6829
6830         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6831         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6832         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6833         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6834         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6835
6836         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6837
6838         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6839         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6840
6841         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6842         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6843         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6844                 match events[0] {
6845                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6846                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6847                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6848                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6849                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6850                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6851                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6852                         },
6853                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6854                 }
6855         };
6856
6857         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6858
6859         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6860
6861         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6862         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6863         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6864         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6865         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6866 }
6867
6868 #[test]
6869 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6870         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6871
6872         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6873         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6874         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6875         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6876         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6877
6878         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6879
6880         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6881         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6882
6883         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6884         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6885         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6886                 match events[0] {
6887                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6888                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6889                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6890                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6891                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6892                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6893                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6894                         },
6895                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6896                 }
6897         };
6898
6899         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6900
6901         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6902
6903         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6904         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6905         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6907         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6908 }
6909
6910 #[test]
6911 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6912         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6913
6914         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6915         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6916         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6917         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6918         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6919
6920         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6921         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6923
6924         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6925         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6926
6927         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6929         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6930
6931         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6932
6933         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6934                 match events[0] {
6935                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6936                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6937                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6938                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6939                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6940                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6941                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6942                         },
6943                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6944                 }
6945         };
6946         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6947         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6948
6949         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6950         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6951         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6953         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6954 }
6955
6956 #[test]
6957 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6958         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6959         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6960
6961         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6962         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6963         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6964         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6965         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6966         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6967
6968         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6969
6970         //First hop
6971         let mut payment_event = {
6972                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6973                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6974                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6975                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6976                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6977         };
6978         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6980         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6981         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6982         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6983         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6985         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6986         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6987
6988         //Second Hop
6989         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6990         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6992         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6993
6994         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6995         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6996         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6997                 match events_3[0] {
6998                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6999                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7000                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7001                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7002                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7003                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7004                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7005                         },
7006                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7007                 }
7008         };
7009
7010         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7011
7012         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7013         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7014         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7015         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7016         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7017
7018         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7019         match events_4[0] {
7020                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7021                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7022                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7023                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7024                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7025                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7026                 },
7027                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7028         };
7029
7030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7031 }
7032
7033 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7034         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7035         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7036         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7037
7038         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7039         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7042         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7043         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7044
7045         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7046
7047         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7048         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7049         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7050         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7051
7052         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7053         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7054
7055         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7056         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7058         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7059         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7060
7061         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7062         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7063         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7065
7066         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7067         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7068
7069         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7070         match events[0] {
7071                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7072                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7073                 },
7074                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7075         }
7076         match events[1] {
7077                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7078                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7079                 },
7080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7081         }
7082
7083         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7084         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7085         if announce_latest {
7086                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7087         } else {
7088                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7089         }
7090
7091         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7093         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7094
7095         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7096         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7097         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7098         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7099         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7100         let mut first_failed = false;
7101         for event in events {
7102                 match event {
7103                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7104                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7105                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7106                                         first_failed = true;
7107                                 } else {
7108                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7109                                 }
7110                         }
7111                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7112                 }
7113         }
7114 }
7115
7116 #[test]
7117 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7118         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7119         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7120 }
7121
7122 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7123         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7124         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7125         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7126         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7127         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7128         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7129
7130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7131         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7132         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7133         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7134         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7135
7136         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7137
7138         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7139         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7140
7141         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7142         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7143
7144         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7145         if revoked {
7146                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7147                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7148         }
7149
7150         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7151         if local {
7152                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7153                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7154                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7155                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7156                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7157
7158                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7159                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7160                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7161                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7162                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7163                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7164                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7165                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7166                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7167                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7168                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7169         } else {
7170                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7171                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7172                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7173                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7174                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7175                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7176                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7177                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7178                 if !revoked {
7179                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7180                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7181                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7182                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7183                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7184                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7185                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7186                 } else {
7187                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7188                         // commitment tx
7189                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7190                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7191                         let first;
7192                         match events[0] {
7193                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7194                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7195                                         else { first = false; }
7196                                 },
7197                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7198                         }
7199                         match events[1] {
7200                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7201                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7202                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7203                                 },
7204                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7205                         }
7206                 }
7207         }
7208 }
7209
7210 #[test]
7211 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7212         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7213         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7214         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7215 }
7216
7217 #[test]
7218 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7219         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7220
7221         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7222         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7223         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7224         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7225         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7226         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7227         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7228         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7229         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7230
7231         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7232         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7233                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7234                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7235         {
7236                 match error {
7237                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7238                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7239                 }
7240         } else { assert!(false) }
7241
7242         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7243         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7244         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7245         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7246         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7247                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7248                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7249         {
7250                 match error {
7251                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7252                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7253                 }
7254         } else { assert!(false); }
7255
7256         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7257         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7258         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7259         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7260         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7261         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7262         let reason_msg;
7263         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7264                 match action {
7265                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7266                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7267                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7268                         },
7269                         _ => { panic!(); }
7270                 }
7271         } else { panic!(); }
7272         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7273
7274         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7275         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7276         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7277         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7278         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7279                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7280                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7281         {
7282                 match error {
7283                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7284                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7285                 }
7286         } else { assert!(false); }
7287 }
7288
7289 #[test]
7290 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7291         // We want to be sure that :
7292         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7293         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7294         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7295         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7296         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7297         let persister;
7298         let logger;
7299         let fee_estimator;
7300         let tx_broadcaster;
7301         let chain_source;
7302         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7303         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7304         // during signing due to revoked tx
7305         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7306         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7307         let monitor;
7308         let node_state_0;
7309         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7310         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7311         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7312
7313         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7314
7315         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7316         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7317         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7318         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7319
7320         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7321         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7322
7323         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7324         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7325
7326         // Restore node A from previous state
7327         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7328         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7329         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7330         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7331         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7332         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7333         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7334         node_state_0 = {
7335                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7336                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7337                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7338                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7339                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7340                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7341                         logger: &logger,
7342                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7343                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7344                         channel_monitors,
7345                 }).unwrap().1
7346         };
7347         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7348         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7349         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7350         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7351
7352         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7353
7354         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7355         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7356
7357         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7358
7359         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7360         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7362
7363         {
7364                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7365                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7366         }
7367
7368         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7369         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7370                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7371                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7372                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7373                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7374                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7375                         match action {
7376                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7377                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7378                                 },
7379                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7380                         }
7381                 } else {
7382                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7383                 }
7384         }
7385
7386         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7387         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7388         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7389         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7390         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7391
7392         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7393         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7394         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7395         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7396         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7397         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7398         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7399         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7400         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7401         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7402         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7403 }
7404
7405 #[test]
7406 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7407         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7408         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7409         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7410
7411         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7412         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7413         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7414         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7415
7416         // Create some initial channels
7417         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7418
7419         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7420         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7421         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7422         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7423         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7424         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7425         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7427
7428         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7429         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7430         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7431         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7432         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7433
7434         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7435         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7436         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7437         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7438
7439         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7440         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7441         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7442
7443         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7444         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7445         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7446                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7447                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7448                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7449                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7450                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7451                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7452                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7453                 },
7454                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7455         };
7456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7457
7458         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7459         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7460
7461         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7462         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7463         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7464         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7465 }
7466
7467 #[test]
7468 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7469         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7470         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7471
7472         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7473         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7474         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7475         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7476
7477         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7478         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7479         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7480
7481         // Disconnect peers
7482         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7483         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7484
7485         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7486         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7487         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7488         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7489         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7490         for e in msg_events {
7491                 match e {
7492                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7493                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7494                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7495                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7496                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7497                                 }
7498                         },
7499                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7500                 }
7501         }
7502         // Reconnect peers
7503         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7504         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7505         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7506         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7507         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7508         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7509
7510         // Reestablish chan_1
7511         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7512         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7513         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7514         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7515         // Reestablish chan_2
7516         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7517         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7518         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7519         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7520         // Reestablish chan_3
7521         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7522         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7523         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7524         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7525
7526         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7527         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7528         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7529         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7530         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7531         for e in msg_events {
7532                 match e {
7533                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7534                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7535                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7536                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7537                                         // the old one.
7538                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7539                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7540                                 }
7541                         },
7542                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7543                 }
7544         }
7545         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7546         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7547 }
7548
7549 #[test]
7550 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7551         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7552         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7553
7554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7557         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7558
7559         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7560
7561         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7562         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7563         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7564
7565         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7566         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7567         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7568         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7569         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7570         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7571
7572         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7573         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7574                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7575                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7576                 }
7577         }
7578
7579         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7580         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7581
7582         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7583         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7584         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7585         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7587
7588         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7589         let penalty_1;
7590         let feerate_1;
7591         {
7592                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7593                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7594                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7595                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7596                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7597                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7598                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7599                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7600                 node_txn.clear();
7601         };
7602
7603         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7604         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7605         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7606         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7607         {
7608                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7609                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7610                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7611                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7612                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7613                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7614                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7615                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7616                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7617                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7618                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7619                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7620                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7621                         node_txn.clear();
7622                 }
7623         }
7624         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7625
7626         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7627         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7628         let penalty_3;
7629         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7630         {
7631                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7632                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7633                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7634                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7635                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7636                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7637                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7638                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7639                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7640                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7641                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7642                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7643                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7644                         node_txn.clear();
7645                 }
7646         }
7647         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7648
7649         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7650         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7651 }
7652
7653 #[test]
7654 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7655         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7656         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7657
7658         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7659         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7663
7664         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7665         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7666         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7667         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7668         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7669         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7670                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7671         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7672         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7673         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7674                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7675         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7676
7677         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7678         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7679         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7680
7681         // Revoke local commitment tx
7682         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7683
7684         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7685         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7686         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7687         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7688         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7689         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7690         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7691
7692         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7693         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7694         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7695
7696         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7697         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7698         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7699
7700         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7701         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7702         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7703         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7704
7705         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7706         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7707         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7708         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7709         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7710         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7711         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7712         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7713         match events[1] {
7714                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7715                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7716         }
7717         let first;
7718         let feerate_1;
7719         let penalty_txn;
7720         {
7721                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7722                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7723                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7724
7725                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7726                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7727                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7728                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7729                 // future).
7730                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7731                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7732                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7733                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7734                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7735                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7736
7737                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7738                 // available, which we check here:
7739                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7740                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7741                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7742
7743                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7744                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7745
7746                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7747                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7748                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7749                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7750
7751                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7752                 // output, checked above).
7753                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7754                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7755                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7756
7757                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7758                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7759                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7760                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7761                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7762                 node_txn.clear();
7763         }
7764
7765         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7766         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7767         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7768         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7769         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7770         {
7771                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7772                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7773
7774                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7775                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7776                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7777                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7778                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7779                 } else {
7780                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7781                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7782                 }
7783
7784                 node_txn.clear();
7785         };
7786
7787         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7788         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7789         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7790         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7791         let node_txn = {
7792                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7793                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7794
7795                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7796                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7797                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7798                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7799                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7800                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7801                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7802                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7803                 node_txn.clear();
7804                 txn
7805         };
7806         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7807         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7808         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7809         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7810         {
7811                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7812                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7813                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7814                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7815                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7816                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7817                 // up bumped justice generation.
7818                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7819                 node_txn.clear();
7820         }
7821         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7823 }
7824
7825 #[test]
7826 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7827         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7828         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7829
7830         // Create 2 HTLCs
7831         // Provide preimage for one
7832         // Check aggregation
7833
7834         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7835         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7836         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7837         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7838
7839         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7840         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7841         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7842
7843         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7844         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7845         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7846         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7847         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7848
7849         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7850         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7851         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7853         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7854
7855         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7856         let timeout;
7857         let preimage;
7858         let preimage_bump;
7859         let feerate_timeout;
7860         let feerate_preimage;
7861         {
7862                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7863                 // 9 transactions including:
7864                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7865                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7866                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7867                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7868                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7869                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7870                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7871                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7872                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7873                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7874                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7875
7876                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7877                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7878                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7879                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7880
7881                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7882                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7883                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7884                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7885
7886                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7887                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7888                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7889                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7890
7891                 node_txn.clear();
7892         };
7893         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7894         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7895
7896         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7897         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7898         {
7899                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7900                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7901                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7902                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7903                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7904                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7905
7906                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7907                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7908                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7909                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7910                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7911
7912                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7913                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7914                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7915                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7916                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7917
7918                 node_txn.clear();
7919         }
7920
7921         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7922         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7923 }
7924
7925 #[test]
7926 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7927         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7928         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7929         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7930         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7931         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7932         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7933         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7934         // implement that).
7935         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7936         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7937         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7938         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7939         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7940
7941         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7942         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7943
7944         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7945
7946         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7947         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7948         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7949
7950         // Must revoke without gaps
7951         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7952         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7953
7954         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7955         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7956                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7957
7958         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7959                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7960         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7962         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7963 }
7964
7965 #[test]
7966 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7967         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7968         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7969
7970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7973         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7974
7975         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7976         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7977         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7978         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7979
7980         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7981         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7982         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7983
7984         // Revoke local commitment tx
7985         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7986
7987         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7988         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7989         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7990         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7991
7992         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7993         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7995         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7996         let penalty_txn = {
7997                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7998                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7999                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8000                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8001                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8002                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8003                 node_txn.clear();
8004                 penalty_txn
8005         };
8006         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8007         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8008         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8009         {
8010                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8011                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8012                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8013         }
8014 }
8015
8016 #[test]
8017 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8018         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8019         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8020         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8023         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8024         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8025
8026         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8027         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8029         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8030
8031         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8032         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8033         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8035         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8036
8037         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8038         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8039         // can get our balance.
8040
8041         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8042         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8043         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8044         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8045         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8046         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8047         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8048         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8049
8050         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8051 }
8052
8053 #[test]
8054 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8055         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8056         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8057         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8058         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8059         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8060         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8061
8062         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8063
8064         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8065         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8066         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8067         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8068         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8069
8070         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8071         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8073         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8074
8075         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8077         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8078         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8079         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8080         match close_ev[0] {
8081                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8082                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8083                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8084                 },
8085                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8086         }
8087 }
8088
8089 #[test]
8090 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8091         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8092         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8094         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8095
8096         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8097         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8098         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8099
8100         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8101
8102         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8103         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8104         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8105         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8106 }
8107
8108 #[test]
8109 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8110         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8111         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8112         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8113         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8114         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8115         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8116
8117         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8118         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8119         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8120
8121         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8122         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8123         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8124 }
8125
8126 #[test]
8127 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8128         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8129         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8131         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8132         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8133         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8134
8135         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8136         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8137
8138         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8139
8140         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8141         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8142         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8143
8144         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8145         match events[0] {
8146                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8147                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 23).unwrap();
8148                 }
8149                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8150         }
8151
8152         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8153         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8154
8155         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8156                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8157                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8158                 }
8159                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8160         }
8161
8162         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id).unwrap();
8163
8164         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8165         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8166
8167         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8168         match events[0] {
8169                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8170                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8171                 }
8172                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8173         }
8174 }
8175
8176 #[test]
8177 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8178         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8179         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8183         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8184
8185         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8186         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8187
8188         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8189
8190         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8191         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8192         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8193
8194         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8195         match events[0] {
8196                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8197                         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8198                 }
8199                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8200         }
8201
8202         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8203         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8204
8205         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8206                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8207                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8208                 }
8209                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8210         }
8211         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8212 }
8213
8214 #[test]
8215 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8216         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8217         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8218         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8219         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8220         // and the channel should be closed.
8221         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8222         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8223         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8224         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8225         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8226         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8227
8228         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8229         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8230         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8231
8232         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8233
8234         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8235         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8236
8237         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8238         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8239
8240         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8241         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8242         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8243         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8244         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8245         {
8246                 let mut lock;
8247                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8248                 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8249                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8250         }
8251
8252         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8253
8254         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8255         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8256
8257         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8258         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8259
8260         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8261         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8262
8263         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8264         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8265                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8266                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8267                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8268                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8269                 }
8270                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8271         }
8272
8273         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8274 }
8275
8276 #[test]
8277 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8278         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8279         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8280         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8281         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8282         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8283         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8284
8285         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8286         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8287
8288         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8289
8290         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8291         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8292         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8293
8294         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8295         match events[0] {
8296                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8297                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0).unwrap();
8298                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0);
8299                         match api_res {
8300                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8301                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8302                                 },
8303                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8304                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8305                         }
8306                 }
8307                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8308         }
8309
8310         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8311         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8312         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8313
8314         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8315                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8316                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8317                 }
8318                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8319         }
8320 }
8321
8322 #[test]
8323 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8324         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8325         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8326         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8327         let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8328
8329         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8330         let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, 0);
8331         match api_res {
8332                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8333                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8334                 },
8335                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8336                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8337         }
8338 }
8339
8340 #[test]
8341 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8342         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8343         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8344         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8345         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8346         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8347
8348         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8349         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8350         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8351         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8352
8353         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8354         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8355         route.paths.push(path);
8356         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8357         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8358         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8359         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8360         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8361         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8362         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8363         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8364 }
8365
8366 #[test]
8367 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8368         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8369         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8372         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8373
8374         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8375
8376         {
8377                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8378                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8379                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8380                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8381                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8382                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8383                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8384                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8385         }
8386         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8387         // values from previous calls.
8388         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8389         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8390         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8391         match events[0] {
8392                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8393                         match &purpose {
8394                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8395                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8396                                 },
8397                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8398                         }
8399                 },
8400                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8401         }
8402 }
8403
8404 #[test]
8405 #[allow(deprecated)]
8406 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8407         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8408         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8409         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8410         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8411         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8412         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8413
8414         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8415
8416         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8417
8418         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8419         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8420         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8421                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8422         } else { panic!(); }
8423         let mut block = {
8424                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8425                 Block {
8426                         header: BlockHeader {
8427                                 version: 0x2000000,
8428                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8429                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8430                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8431                         txdata: vec![],
8432                 }
8433         };
8434         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8435         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8436                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8437         } else { panic!(); }
8438
8439         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8440         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8441         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8442         block.header.time += 1;
8443         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8444         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8445         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8446
8447         {
8448                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8449                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8450                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8451                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8452                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8453                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8454                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8455         }
8456         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8457         // values from previous calls.
8458         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8459         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8460         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8461         match events[0] {
8462                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8463                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8464                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8465                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8466                 },
8467                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8468         }
8469 }
8470
8471 #[test]
8472 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8473         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8474         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8477         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8478
8479         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8480
8481         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8482         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8483         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8484         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8485
8486         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8487         // resulting events.
8488         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8489                 () => {
8490                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8491                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8492                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8493                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8494                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8495
8496                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8497                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8498                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8499                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8500                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8501
8502                         // We should fail the payment back
8503                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8504                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8505                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8506                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8507                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8508                                 },
8509                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8510                         }
8511                 }
8512         }
8513
8514         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8515         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8516         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8517
8518         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8519         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8520         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8521         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8522
8523         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8524         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8525         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8526         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8527
8528         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8529         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8530         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8531         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8532 }
8533
8534 #[test]
8535 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8536         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8537         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8538         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8539         //
8540         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8541         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8542         // commitment at same time.
8543
8544         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8545         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8546         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8547         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8548
8549         // Create some initial channel
8550         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8551         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8552
8553         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8554         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8555
8556         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8557         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8558
8559         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8560         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8561         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8562         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8563         let watchtower = {
8564                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8565                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8566                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8567                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8568                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8569                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8570                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8571                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8572                 watchtower
8573         };
8574         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8575         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8576         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8577         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8578         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8579
8580         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8581         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8583         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8584         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8585         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8586         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8587                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8588                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8589                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8590                 } else { assert!(false); }
8591         } else { assert!(false); };
8592         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8593         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8594         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8595         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8596 }
8597
8598 #[test]
8599 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8600         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8601         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8602         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8603         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8604
8605         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8606         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8607         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8608         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8609
8610         // Create some initial channel
8611         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8612         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8613
8614         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8615         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8616
8617         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8618         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8619
8620         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8621         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8622         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8623         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8624         let watchtower_alice = {
8625                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8626                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8627                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8628                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8629                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8630                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8631                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8632                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8633                 watchtower
8634         };
8635         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8636         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8637         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8638         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8639         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8640
8641         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8642         {
8643                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8644                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8645                 txn.clear();
8646         }
8647
8648         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8649         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8650         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8651         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8652         let watchtower_bob = {
8653                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8654                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8655                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8656                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8657                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8658                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8659                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8660                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8661                 watchtower
8662         };
8663         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8664         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8665
8666         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8667         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8668         {
8669                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8670         }
8671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8672
8673         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8674         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8675         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8676         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8677                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8678                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8679                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8680                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8681                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8682                 } else { assert!(false); }
8683         } else { assert!(false); };
8684         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8686
8687         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8688         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8689         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8690
8691         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8692         let bob_state_y;
8693         {
8694                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8695                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8696                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8697                 txn.clear();
8698         };
8699
8700         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8701         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8702         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8703         {
8704                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8705                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8706                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8707                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8708                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8709                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8710         }
8711 }
8712
8713 #[test]
8714 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8715         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8716         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8717         // message).
8718         //
8719         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8720         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8721         //
8722         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8723         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8724         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8725         // before receiving funding_signed.
8726         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8728         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8729         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8730
8731         // Create an initial channel
8732         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8733         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8734         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8735         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8736         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8737
8738         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8739         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8740
8741         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8743
8744         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8745         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8746         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8747         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8748         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8749 }
8750
8751 #[test]
8752 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8753         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8754         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8755         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8756         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8757         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8758         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8759
8760         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8761         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8762         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8763         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8764
8765         // Create some initial channels
8766         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8767
8768         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8769         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8770         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8771         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8772         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8773         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8774
8775         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8776         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8777         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8778         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8779         // this test before #653 fix.
8780         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8781         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8782         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8783         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8784         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8785
8786         let htlc_timeout = {
8787                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8788                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8789                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8790                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8791                 node_txn[1].clone()
8792         };
8793
8794         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8795         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8796         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8797         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8798 }
8799
8800 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8801         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8802         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8803         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8804         //
8805         // Steps of the test:
8806         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8807         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8808         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8809         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8810         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8811         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8812         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8813         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8814         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8815         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8816         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8817         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8818
8819         // Create some initial channels
8820         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8821         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8822
8823         // Steps (1) and (2):
8824         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8825         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8826
8827         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8828         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8829         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8830         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8831         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8832         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8833         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8834
8835         // Steps (3) and (4):
8836         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8837         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8838         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8839         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8840         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8841         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8842         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8843         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8844         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8845                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8846                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8847                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8848                 };
8849                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8850                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8851                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8852                 if broadcast_alice {
8853                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8854                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8855                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8856                 }
8857                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8858                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8859         }
8860
8861         // Step (5):
8862         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8863         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8864         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8866         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8867         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8868         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8869         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8870         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8871         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8872
8873         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8874         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8875         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8876         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8877                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8878                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8879                 match events[0] {
8880                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8881                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8882                         },
8883                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8884                 };
8885         }
8886         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8887         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8888         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8890
8891         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8893         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8894                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8895                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8896                         (*msg).clone()
8897                 },
8898                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8899         };
8900         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8901                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8902                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8903                         (*updates).clone()
8904                 },
8905                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8906         };
8907
8908         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8910         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8912
8913         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8914         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8915         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8916                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8917                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8918                         (*msg).clone()
8919                 },
8920                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8921         };
8922         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8924
8925         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8926         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8927         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8928         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8929         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8930                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8931                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8932                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8933                 if broadcast_alice {
8934                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8935                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8936                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8937                 }
8938                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8939                 if broadcast_alice {
8940                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8941                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8942                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8943                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8944                         // broadcasted.
8945                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8946                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8947                 } else {
8948                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8949                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8950                 }
8951         }
8952
8953         // Step (6):
8954         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8955         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8956         {
8957                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8958                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8959                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8960                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8961                 }
8962                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8963                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8964                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8965                 };
8966                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8967                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8968                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8969                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8970                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8971                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8972                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8973                 } else {
8974                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8975                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8976                 }
8977         }
8978 }
8979
8980 #[test]
8981 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8982         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8983         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8984         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8985         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8986 }
8987
8988 #[test]
8989 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8990         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8991         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8992         //
8993         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8994         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8995         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8996         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8997         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8998         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8999         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9000         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9001
9002         // Create an initial channel
9003         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9004         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9005         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9006         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9007
9008         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9009         // that it is rejected.
9010         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9011         {
9012                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9013                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9014                 match events[0] {
9015                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9016                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9017                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9018                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9019                                 // move forward with it.
9020                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9021                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9022                         },
9023                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9024                 }
9025         }
9026
9027         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9028         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
9029
9030         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9032
9033         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9034         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9035         {
9036                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9037                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9038                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9039                 added_monitors.clear();
9040         }
9041         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9042
9043         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9044         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9045
9046         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9047         // temporary one).
9048
9049         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9050         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9051         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9052         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9053         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9054         {
9055                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9056                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9057                 match events[0] {
9058                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9059                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9060                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9061                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9062                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9063                         },
9064                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9065                 }
9066         }
9067
9068         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9069         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9070         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9071         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9072         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9073         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9074
9075         let funding_created = {
9076                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9077                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9078                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9079                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9080         };
9081         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9082         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9083         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9084         // still needs to be cleared here.
9085         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9086
9087         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9088         {
9089                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9090                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9091                 match events[0] {
9092                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9093                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9094                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9095                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9096                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9097                         },
9098                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9099                 }
9100         }
9101
9102         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9103         // everything is functional.
9104         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9105         {
9106                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9107                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9108                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9109                 added_monitors.clear();
9110         }
9111
9112         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9113         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9114         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9115         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9116
9117         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9118         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9119         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9120         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9121 }
9122
9123 #[test]
9124 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9125         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9126         //
9127         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9128         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9129         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9131         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9132         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9133         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9134
9135         // Create some initial channels
9136         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9137         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9138         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9139
9140         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9141         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9142         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9143
9144         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9145         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9146         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9147
9148         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9149         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9151         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9152         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9153         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9154         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9155         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9156         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9157
9158         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9159         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9160         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9162         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9163         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9164         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9165         match events[0] {
9166                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9167                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9168                 },
9169                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9170         }
9171         match events[1] {
9172                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9173                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9174                 },
9175                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9176         }
9177         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9178         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9179         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9180         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9181         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9182         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9183
9184         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9185         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9186         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9187 }
9188
9189 #[test]
9190 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9191         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9192         //
9193         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9194         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9195         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9196         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9197         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9198         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9199         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9200         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9201
9202         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9203         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9204         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9205
9206         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9207         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9208                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9209                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9210         }
9211
9212         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9213         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9214         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9215
9216         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9218
9219         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9220         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9221
9222         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9223         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9224         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9225
9226         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9227         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9228         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9229         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9230         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9231         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9232         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9233                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9234                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9235                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9236                 } else { panic!(); }
9237         } else { panic!(); }
9238         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9239 }
9240
9241 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9242         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9243         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9244         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9245         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9246         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9247         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9248         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9249         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9250         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9251         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9252         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9253         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9254         // until we learned about an additional block.
9255         //
9256         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9257         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9258         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9259         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9260         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9261         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9262         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9263
9264         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9265         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9266         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9267         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9268         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9269
9270         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9271         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9272         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9273         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9274         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9275         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9276
9277         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9278         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9279                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9280         }
9281         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9282                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9283         if test_height_before_timelock {
9284                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9285                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9286                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9287                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9288         } else {
9289                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9290                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9291                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9292                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9293                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9294                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9295                 // timelock is up).
9296                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9297                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9298
9299                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9300                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9301                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9302                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9303                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9304                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9305                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9306
9307                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9308                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9309                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9310                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9311                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9312                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9313                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9314                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9315                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9316         }
9317 }
9318
9319 #[test]
9320 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9321         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9322         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9323 }
9324
9325 #[test]
9326 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9327         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9328         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9329         // HTLCs.
9330         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9331
9332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9335         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9336         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9337         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9338         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9339         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9340         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9341
9342         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9343         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9344         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9346
9347         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9348         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9349         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9350         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9351         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9352
9353         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9354
9355         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9356         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9357         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9359
9360         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9361         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9362         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9363         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9364         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9365
9366         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9367         // generated
9368         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9369
9370         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9371         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9372         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9373
9374         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9375         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9376         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9377         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9378         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9379
9380         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9381         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9382         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9383         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9384
9385         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9386         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9387                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9388         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9389         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9390         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9391                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9392         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9393
9394         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9395         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9396                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9397                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9398                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9399                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9400                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9401                         keys_manager,
9402                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9403                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9404                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9405                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9406                         channel_monitors,
9407                 }).unwrap()
9408         };
9409         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9410         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9411
9412         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9413         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9414         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9416
9417         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9418         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9419         // the commitment state.
9420         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9421
9422         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9423
9424         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9425         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9427
9428         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9429         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9430         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9431         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9432         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9433         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9434         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9435
9436         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9437         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9438 }
9439
9440 #[test]
9441 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9442         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9443         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9444         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9445         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9446         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9448         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9449         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9450
9451         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9452
9453         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9454                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9455         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9456         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9457         let route = get_route(
9458                 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
9459                 Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9460                 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9461
9462         let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9463
9464         {
9465                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9466                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9467                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9468                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9469                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9470                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9471                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9472         }
9473         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9474         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9475
9476         {
9477                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9478                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9479                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9480                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9481                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9482                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9483                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9484                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9485                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9486                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9487                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9488         }
9489
9490         // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9491         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9492         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9493         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9494
9495         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9496         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9497
9498         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9499         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9500         assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9501
9502         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9503         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9504         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9505
9506         let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9507         assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9508         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9509         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9510 }
9511
9512 #[test]
9513 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9514         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9517         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9518
9519         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9520         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9521         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9522         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9523         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9524                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9525                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9526                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9527         };
9528         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9529         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9530         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9531
9532         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9533         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9535         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9536         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9537         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9538         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9539         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9540         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9541 }
9542
9543 #[test]
9544 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9548         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9549
9550         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9551         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9552         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9553         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9554
9555         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9556         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9557                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9558                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9559                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9560         };
9561         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9562         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9563         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9564         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9565         let route = find_route(
9566                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9567                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9568         ).unwrap();
9569
9570         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9571         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9572         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9573         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9574         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9575         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9576         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9577         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9578         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9579 }
9580
9581 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9582 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9583 enum ExposureEvent {
9584         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9585         AtHTLCForward,
9586         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9587         AtHTLCReception,
9588         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9589         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9590 }
9591
9592 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9593         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9594         // policy.
9595         //
9596         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9597         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9598         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9599         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9600         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9601         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9602         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9603         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9604
9605         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9606         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9607         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9608         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9609         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9610         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9611
9612         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9613         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9614         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9615         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9616         if on_holder_tx {
9617                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9618         }
9619         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9620         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9621         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9622
9623         let opt_anchors = false;
9624
9625         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9626
9627         if on_holder_tx {
9628                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9629                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9630                 }
9631         }
9632
9633         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9634         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9635         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9636
9637         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9638         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9639
9640         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9641         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9642         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9643
9644         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9645                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9646                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9647                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9648         };
9649         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9650         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9651
9652         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9653         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9654
9655         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9656         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9657
9658         if on_holder_tx {
9659                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9660                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9661                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9662                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9663                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9664                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9665                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9666                         }
9667                 } else {
9668                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9669                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9670                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9671                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9672                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9673                         }
9674                 }
9675         } else {
9676                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9677                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9678                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9679                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9680                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9681                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9682                         }
9683                 } else {
9684                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9685                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9686                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9687                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9688                         }
9689                 }
9690         }
9691
9692         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9693         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9694                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9695                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9696                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9697                 if on_holder_tx {
9698                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9699                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9700                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9701                 } else {
9702                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9703                 }
9704         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9705                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9706                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9707                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9708                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9709                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9710                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9711                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9712                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9713                 if on_holder_tx {
9714                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9715                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9716                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9717                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9718                 } else {
9719                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9720                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9721                 }
9722         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9723                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9724                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9725                 {
9726                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9727                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9728                 }
9729                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9730                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9731                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9732         }
9733
9734         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9735         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9736         added_monitors.clear();
9737 }
9738
9739 #[test]
9740 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9741         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9742         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9743         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9744         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9745         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9746         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9747         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9748         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9749         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9750         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9751         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9752         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9753 }