_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/monitor_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Further functional tests which test blockchain reorganizations.
  11
  12 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
  13 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ANTI_REORG_DELAY, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, Balance};
  14 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  15 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight};
  16 use crate::events::bump_transaction::{BumpTransactionEvent, WalletSource};
  17 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  18 use crate::ln::{channel, ChannelId};
  19 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields};
  20 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
  21 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  22 use crate::crypto::utils::sign;
  23 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
  24 use crate::util::scid_utils::block_from_scid;
  25 use crate::util::test_utils;
  26
  27 use bitcoin::{Amount, PublicKey, ScriptBuf, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  28 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  29 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  30 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  31 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
  32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
  33 use bitcoin::sighash::{SighashCache, EcdsaSighashType};
  34
  35 use crate::prelude::*;
  36
  37 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  38
  39 #[test]
  40 fn chanmon_fail_from_stale_commitment() {
  41         // If we forward an HTLC to our counterparty, but we force-closed the channel before our
  42         // counterparty provides us an updated commitment transaction, we'll end up with a commitment
  43         // transaction that does not contain the HTLC which we attempted to forward. In this case, we
  44         // need to wait `ANTI_REORG_DELAY` blocks and then fail back the HTLC as there is no way for us
  45         // to learn the preimage and the confirmed commitment transaction paid us the value of the
  46         // HTLC.
  47         //
  48         // However, previously, we did not do this, ignoring the HTLC entirely.
  49         //
  50         // This could lead to channel closure if the sender we received the HTLC from decides to go on
  51         // chain to get their HTLC back before it times out.
  52         //
  53         // Here, we check exactly this case, forwarding a payment from A, through B, to C, before B
  54         // broadcasts its latest commitment transaction, which should result in it eventually failing
  55         // the HTLC back off-chain to A.
  56         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
  57         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
  58         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
  59         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  60
  61         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
  62         let (update_a, _, chan_id_2, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
  63
  64         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1_000_000);
  65         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
  66                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
  67         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
  68
  69         let bs_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id_2);
  70
  71         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  72         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
  73         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
  74
  75         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
  76         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
  77         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  78
  79         // Don't bother delivering the new HTLC add/commits, instead confirming the pre-HTLC commitment
  80         // transaction for nodes[1].
  81         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_txn[0]);
  82         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  83         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
  84         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
  85         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
  86
  87         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
  88         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_id_2 }]);
  89         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
  90         let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
  91
  92         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
  93         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
  94         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, update_a.contents.short_channel_id, true);
  95 }
  96
  97 fn test_spendable_output<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd>(node: &'a Node<'b, 'c, 'd>, spendable_tx: &Transaction, has_anchors_htlc_event: bool) -> Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
  98         let mut spendable = node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
  99         assert_eq!(spendable.len(), if has_anchors_htlc_event { 2 } else { 1 });
 100         if has_anchors_htlc_event {
 101                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { .. }) = spendable.pop().unwrap() {}
 102                 else { panic!(); }
 103         }
 104         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = spendable.pop().unwrap() {
 105                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
 106                 let spend_tx = node.keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(),
 107                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new()).unwrap();
 108                 check_spends!(spend_tx, spendable_tx);
 109                 outputs
 110         } else { panic!(); }
 111 }
 112
 113 #[test]
 114 fn revoked_output_htlc_resolution_timing() {
 115         // Tests that HTLCs which were present in a broadcasted remote revoked commitment transaction
 116         // are resolved only after a spend of the HTLC output reaches six confirmations. Preivously
 117         // they would resolve after the revoked commitment transaction itself reaches six
 118         // confirmations.
 119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 122         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 123
 124         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 125
 126         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
 127
 128         // Get a commitment transaction which contains the HTLC we care about, but which we'll revoke
 129         // before forwarding.
 130         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
 131         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
 132
 133         // Route a dust payment to revoke the above commitment transaction
 134         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000);
 135
 136         // Confirm the revoked commitment transaction, closing the channel.
 137         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
 138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 139         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 140         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 141
 142         let bs_spend_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 143         assert_eq!(bs_spend_txn.len(), 1);
 144         check_spends!(bs_spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
 145
 146         // After the commitment transaction confirms, we should still wait on the HTLC spend
 147         // transaction to confirm before resolving the HTLC.
 148         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 149         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 150         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 151
 152         // Spend the HTLC output, generating a HTLC failure event after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
 153         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_spend_txn[0]);
 154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 155         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 156
 157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 158         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, false);
 159 }
 160
 161 fn do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(anchors: bool) {
 162         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` returns the correct values across a simple cooperative claim.
 163         // Specifically, this tests that the channel non-HTLC balances show up in
 164         // `get_claimable_balances` until the cooperative claims have confirmed and generated a
 165         // `SpendableOutputs` event, and no longer.
 166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 168         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 169         if anchors {
 170                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 171                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 172         }
 173         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 174         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 175
 176         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 177                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 178         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 179         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
 180
 181         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 182         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 183
 184         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate * channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000;
 185         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
 186         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 187                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value
 188                 }],
 189                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 190         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose { amount_satoshis: 1_000, }],
 191                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 192
 193         nodes[0].node.close_channel(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 194         let node_0_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_shutdown);
 196         let node_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_shutdown);
 198
 199         let node_0_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 200         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_closing_signed);
 201         let node_1_closing_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 202         nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_1_closing_signed);
 203         let (_, node_0_2nd_closing_signed) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 204         nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node_0_2nd_closing_signed.unwrap());
 205         let (_, node_1_none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(node_1_none.is_none());
 207
 208         let shutdown_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 209         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx, nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0));
 210         assert_eq!(shutdown_tx.len(), 1);
 211
 212         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 213         let shutdown_tx_conf_height_b = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0]));
 214
 215         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 216         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 217
 218         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 219         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 220
 221         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 222                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 1_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 223                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 224                 }],
 225                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 226         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 227                         amount_satoshis: 1000,
 228                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 229                 }],
 230                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 231
 232         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 233         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
 234
 235         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 236                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 237         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id)
 238                 .get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b).is_empty());
 239
 240         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 241         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
 242
 243         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 244                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 245         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 246                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 247
 248         let spendable_outputs_a = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 249         assert_eq!(
 250                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_a),
 251                 spendable_outputs_a
 252         );
 253
 254         let spendable_outputs_b = test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &shutdown_tx[0], false);
 255         assert_eq!(
 256                 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&shutdown_tx[0], shutdown_tx_conf_height_b),
 257                 spendable_outputs_b
 258         );
 259
 260         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 261         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 262 }
 263
 264 #[test]
 265 fn chanmon_claim_value_coop_close() {
 266         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(false);
 267         do_chanmon_claim_value_coop_close(true);
 268 }
 269
 270 fn sorted_vec<T: Ord>(mut v: Vec<T>) -> Vec<T> {
 271         v.sort_unstable();
 272         v
 273 }
 274
 275 /// Asserts that `a` and `b` are close, but maybe off by up to 5.
 276 /// This is useful when checking fees and weights on transactions as things may vary by a few based
 277 /// on signature size and signature size estimation being non-exact.
 278 fn fuzzy_assert_eq<V: core::convert::TryInto<u64>>(a: V, b: V) {
 279         let a_u64 = a.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 280         let b_u64 = b.try_into().map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
 281         eprintln!("Checking {} and {} for fuzzy equality", a_u64, b_u64);
 282         assert!(a_u64 >= b_u64 - 5);
 283         assert!(b_u64 >= a_u64 - 5);
 284 }
 285
 286 fn do_test_claim_value_force_close(anchors: bool, prev_commitment_tx: bool) {
 287         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` with an HTLC across a force-close.
 288         // We build a channel with an HTLC pending, then force close the channel and check that the
 289         // `get_claimable_balances` return value is correct as transactions confirm on-chain.
 290         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 291         if prev_commitment_tx {
 292                 // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
 293                 // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
 294                 // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
 295                 // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
 296                 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
 297         }
 298         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 299         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 300         if anchors {
 301                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 302                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 303         }
 304         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 305         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 306
 307         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 308                 version: 2,
 309                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
 310                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 311                 output: vec![
 312                         TxOut {
 313                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 314                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 315                         },
 316                         TxOut {
 317                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 318                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 319                         },
 320                 ],
 321         };
 322         if anchors {
 323                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 324                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 325         }
 326
 327         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
 328                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 1_000_000);
 329         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 330         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
 331
 332         // This HTLC is immediately claimed, giving node B the preimage
 333         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
 334         // This HTLC is allowed to time out, letting A claim it. However, in order to test claimable
 335         // balances more fully we also give B the preimage for this HTLC.
 336         let (timeout_payment_preimage, timeout_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 4_000_000);
 337         // This HTLC will be dust, and not be claimable at all:
 338         let (dust_payment_preimage, dust_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000);
 339
 340         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 341
 342         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 343         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 344
 345         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
 346         let sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 347                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 348                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 349                 payment_hash,
 350         };
 351         let sent_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 352                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 353                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 354                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 355         };
 356         let received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 357                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 358                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 359                 payment_hash,
 360         };
 361         let received_htlc_timeout_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 362                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 363                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 364                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 365         };
 366         let received_htlc_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 367                 amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 368                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 369                 payment_hash,
 370                 payment_preimage,
 371         };
 372         let received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance = Balance::ContentiousClaimable {
 373                 amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 374                 timeout_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 375                 payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
 376                 payment_preimage: timeout_payment_preimage,
 377         };
 378
 379         // Before B receives the payment preimage, it only suggests the push_msat value of 1_000 sats
 380         // as claimable. A lists both its to-self balance and the (possibly-claimable) HTLCs.
 381         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 382                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 383         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 384         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 385                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 386                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 387                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 388         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 389                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 390                 }, received_htlc_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 391                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 392
 393         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
 394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 395         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
 396
 397         let b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 398         // We claim the dust payment here as well, but it won't impact our claimable balances as its
 399         // dust and thus doesn't appear on chain at all.
 400         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(dust_payment_preimage);
 401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 402         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], dust_payment_hash, 3_000);
 403
 404         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(timeout_payment_preimage);
 405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 406         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, 4_000_000);
 407
 408         if prev_commitment_tx {
 409                 // To build a previous commitment transaction, deliver one round of commitment messages.
 410                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
 411                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
 412                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &b_htlc_msgs.commitment_signed);
 413                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 414                 let (as_raa, as_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 415                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
 416                 let _htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 417                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 418                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs);
 419                 let _bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 420                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 421         }
 422
 423         // Once B has received the payment preimage, it includes the value of the HTLC in its
 424         // "claimable if you were to close the channel" balance.
 425         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 426                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) +
 427                 if prev_commitment_tx { 1 } else { 2 } * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 428         let mut a_expected_balances = vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 429                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - // Channel funding value in satoshis
 430                                 4_000 - // The to-be-failed HTLC value in satoshis
 431                                 3_000 - // The claimed HTLC value in satoshis
 432                                 1_000 - // The push_msat value in satoshis
 433                                 3 - // The dust HTLC value in satoshis
 434                                 commitment_tx_fee - // The commitment transaction fee with two HTLC outputs
 435                                 anchor_outputs_value, // The anchor outputs value in satoshis
 436                 }, sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()];
 437         if !prev_commitment_tx {
 438                 a_expected_balances.push(sent_htlc_balance.clone());
 439         }
 440         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(a_expected_balances),
 441                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 442         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 443                         amount_satoshis: 1_000 + 3_000 + 4_000,
 444                 }],
 445                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 446
 447         // Broadcast the closing transaction (which has both pending HTLCs in it) and get B's
 448         // broadcasted HTLC claim transaction with preimage.
 449         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 450         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
 451         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
 452
 453         if anchors {
 454                 let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 455                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 456                 match events.pop().unwrap() {
 457                         Event::BumpTransaction(bump_event) => {
 458                                 let mut first_htlc_event = bump_event.clone();
 459                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut first_htlc_event {
 460                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(1);
 461                                 } else {
 462                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 463                                 }
 464                                 let mut second_htlc_event = bump_event;
 465                                 if let BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { ref mut htlc_descriptors, .. } = &mut second_htlc_event {
 466                                         htlc_descriptors.remove(0);
 467                                 } else {
 468                                         panic!("Unexpected event");
 469                                 }
 470                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&first_htlc_event);
 471                                 nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&second_htlc_event);
 472                         },
 473                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 474                 }
 475         }
 476
 477         let b_broadcast_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 478         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 479         // b_broadcast_txn should spend the HTLCs output of the commitment tx for 3_000 and 4_000 sats
 480         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 481         check_spends!(b_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
 482         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 483         assert_eq!(b_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
 484         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 485         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[b_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 486
 487         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 488         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 489         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 490         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 491         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
 492         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 494         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 495         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 496         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 497
 498         // Once the commitment transaction confirms, we will wait until ANTI_REORG_DELAY until we
 499         // generate any `SpendableOutputs` events. Thus, the same balances will still be listed
 500         // available in `get_claimable_balances`. However, both will swap from `ClaimableOnClose` to
 501         // other Balance variants, as close has already happened.
 502         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 503         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 504         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate as u64 *
 505                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 506         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 507                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 3_000 - 4_000 - 1_000 - 3 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 508                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 509                 }, sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 510                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 511         // The main non-HTLC balance is just awaiting confirmations, but the claimable height is the
 512         // CSV delay, not ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
 513         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 514                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 515                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 516                 },
 517                 // Both HTLC balances are "contentious" as our counterparty could claim them if we wait too
 518                 // long.
 519                 received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 520                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 521
 522         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 523         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_payment_hash, false);
 524         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 525
 526         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will consider its balance fully spendable and generate a
 527         // `SpendableOutputs` event. However, B still has to wait for the CSV delay.
 528         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 529                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 530         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 531                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 532                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 533                 }, received_htlc_claiming_balance.clone(), received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 534                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 535
 536         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0], false);
 537         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 538
 539         // After broadcasting the HTLC claim transaction, node A will still consider the HTLC
 540         // possibly-claimable up to ANTI_REORG_DELAY, at which point it will drop it.
 541         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 542         if prev_commitment_tx {
 543                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
 544         } else {
 545                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, true, false);
 546         }
 547         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![sent_htlc_balance.clone(), sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()]),
 548                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 549         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 550         assert_eq!(vec![sent_htlc_timeout_balance.clone()],
 551                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 552
 553         // When the HTLC timeout output is spendable in the next block, A should broadcast it
 554         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 555         let a_broadcast_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 556         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn.len(), 2);
 557         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
 558         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
 559         assert_eq!(a_broadcast_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
 560         check_spends!(a_broadcast_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
 561         assert_ne!(a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout,
 562                    a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
 563         // a_broadcast_txn [0] and [1] should spend the HTLC outputs of the commitment tx
 564         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 3_000);
 565         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[a_broadcast_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 4_000);
 566
 567         // Once the HTLC-Timeout transaction confirms, A will no longer consider the HTLC
 568         // "MaybeClaimable", but instead move it to "AwaitingConfirmations".
 569         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 570         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 571         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 572                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
 573                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
 574                 }],
 575                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 576         // After ANTI_REORG_DELAY, A will generate a SpendableOutputs event and drop the claimable
 577         // balance entry.
 578         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 579         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 580                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 581         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], timeout_payment_hash, false);
 582
 583         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &a_broadcast_txn[1], false);
 584
 585         // Node B will no longer consider the HTLC "contentious" after the HTLC claim transaction
 586         // confirms, and consider it simply "awaiting confirmations". Note that it has to wait for the
 587         // standard revocable transaction CSV delay before receiving a `SpendableOutputs`.
 588         let node_b_htlc_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 589         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0]);
 590
 591         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 592                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
 593                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 594                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 595                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 596                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 597                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 598                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 599
 600         // After reaching the commitment output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutputs event for it and have
 601         // only the HTLCs claimable on node B.
 602         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_commitment_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 603         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0], anchors);
 604
 605         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 606                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
 607                         confirmation_height: node_b_htlc_claimable,
 608                 }, received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()]),
 609                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 610
 611         // After reaching the claimed HTLC output CSV, we'll get a SpendableOutptus event for it and
 612         // have only one HTLC output left spendable.
 613         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_b_htlc_claimable - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
 614         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &b_broadcast_txn[0], anchors);
 615
 616         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 617                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 618
 619         // Finally, mine the HTLC timeout transaction that A broadcasted (even though B should be able
 620         // to claim this HTLC with the preimage it knows!). It will remain listed as a claimable HTLC
 621         // until ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations on the spend.
 622         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &a_broadcast_txn[1]);
 623         assert_eq!(vec![received_htlc_timeout_claiming_balance.clone()],
 624                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 625         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 626         assert_eq!(Vec::<Balance>::new(),
 627                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 628
 629         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 630         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 631         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 632         for node in nodes.iter() {
 633                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 634                 connect_blocks(node, 6);
 635                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 636                 assert!(node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 637         }
 638 }
 639
 640 #[test]
 641 fn test_claim_value_force_close() {
 642         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, true);
 643         do_test_claim_value_force_close(false, false);
 644         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, true);
 645         do_test_claim_value_force_close(true, false);
 646 }
 647
 648 fn do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(anchors: bool) {
 649         // Previously, when handling the broadcast of a local commitment transactions (with associated
 650         // CSV delays prior to spendability), we incorrectly handled the CSV delays on HTLC
 651         // transactions. This caused us to miss spendable outputs for HTLCs which were awaiting a CSV
 652         // delay prior to spendability.
 653         //
 654         // Further, because of this, we could hit an assertion as `get_claimable_balances` asserted
 655         // that HTLCs were resolved after the funding spend was resolved, which was not true if the
 656         // HTLC did not have a CSV delay attached (due to the above bug or due to it being an HTLC
 657         // claim by our counterparty).
 658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 660         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
 661         if anchors {
 662                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
 663                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
 664         }
 665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
 666         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 667
 668         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
 669                 version: 2,
 670                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
 671                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
 672                 output: vec![
 673                         TxOut {
 674                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 675                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 676                         },
 677                         TxOut {
 678                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
 679                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
 680                         },
 681                 ],
 682         };
 683         if anchors {
 684                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
 685                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
 686         }
 687
 688         // Create a single channel with two pending HTLCs from nodes[0] to nodes[1], one which nodes[1]
 689         // knows the preimage for, one which it does not.
 690         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
 691         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 692
 693         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000_000);
 694         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 695         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
 696                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 698
 699         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 700         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 701         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 702
 703         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 704         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000_000);
 705
 706         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 20_000_000);
 707         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
 708                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
 709         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 710
 711         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 712         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 713         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false);
 714
 715         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
 716         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 20_000_000);
 717         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
 718         get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 719         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 720         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000_000);
 721
 722         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 723         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 724
 725         // First confirm the commitment transaction on nodes[0], which should leave us with three
 726         // claimable balances.
 727         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 728         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
 729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 730         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 731         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 732         let commitment_tx = {
 733                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 734                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 735                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
 736                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
 737                 commitment_tx
 738         };
 739         let commitment_tx_conf_height_a = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx));
 740         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
 741                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
 742                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
 743                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
 744         }
 745
 746         let htlc_balance_known_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 747                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 748                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 749                 payment_hash,
 750         };
 751         let htlc_balance_unknown_preimage = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 752                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 753                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 754                 payment_hash: payment_hash_2,
 755         };
 756
 757         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
 758                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 759         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { 2 * channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI } else { 0 };
 760         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 761                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 762                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 763                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 764                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 765
 766         // Get nodes[1]'s HTLC claim tx for the second HTLC
 767         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
 768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 769         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 770         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 771         let bs_htlc_claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 772         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_claim_txn.len(), 1);
 773         check_spends!(bs_htlc_claim_txn[0], commitment_tx);
 774
 775         // Connect blocks until the HTLCs expire, allowing us to (validly) broadcast the HTLC-Timeout
 776         // transaction.
 777         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 778         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 779                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 780                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 781                 }, htlc_balance_known_preimage.clone(), htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 782                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 783         if anchors {
 784                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 2);
 785         }
 786         let timeout_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
 787         assert_eq!(timeout_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
 788         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[0], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 789         check_spends!(timeout_htlc_txn[1], commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
 790
 791         // Now confirm nodes[0]'s HTLC-Timeout transaction, which changes the claimable balance to an
 792         // "awaiting confirmations" one.
 793         let node_a_htlc_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 794         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0]);
 795         // Note that prior to the fix in the commit which introduced this test, this (and the next
 796         // balance) check failed. With this check removed, the code panicked in the `connect_blocks`
 797         // call, as described, two hunks down.
 798         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 799                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 800                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 801                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 802                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 803                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 804                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 805                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 806
 807         // Now confirm nodes[1]'s HTLC claim, giving nodes[0] the preimage. Note that the "maybe
 808         // claimable" balance remains until we see ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks.
 809         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_claim_txn[0]);
 810         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, true, false);
 811         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 812                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 813                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 814                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 815                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 816                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 817                 }, htlc_balance_unknown_preimage.clone()]),
 818                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 819
 820         // Finally make the HTLC transactions have ANTI_REORG_DELAY blocks. This call previously
 821         // panicked as described in the test introduction. This will remove the "maybe claimable"
 822         // spendable output as nodes[1] has fully claimed the second HTLC.
 823         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 824         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
 825
 826         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 827                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 10_000 - 20_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
 828                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 829                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 830                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 831                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 832                 }]),
 833                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 834
 835         // Connect blocks until the commitment transaction's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 836         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 837         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
 838         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id)
 839                 .get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a).is_empty());
 840         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 841         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 842                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 843                         confirmation_height: node_a_htlc_claimable,
 844                 }],
 845                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
 846         let to_self_spendable_output = test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
 847         assert_eq!(
 848                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height_a),
 849                 to_self_spendable_output
 850         );
 851
 852         // Connect blocks until the HTLC-Timeout's CSV expires, providing us the relevant
 853         // `SpendableOutputs` event and removing the claimable balance entry.
 854         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_htlc_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
 855         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 856         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &timeout_htlc_txn[0], false);
 857
 858         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
 859         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
 860         // monitor events or claimable balances.
 861         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 862         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
 863         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 864         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
 865 }
 866
 867 #[test]
 868 fn test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs() {
 869         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(false);
 870         do_test_balances_on_local_commitment_htlcs(true);
 871 }
 872
 873 #[test]
 874 fn test_no_preimage_inbound_htlc_balances() {
 875         // Tests that MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC are generated for inbound HTLCs for which we do not
 876         // have a preimage.
 877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 880         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 881
 882         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
 883         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
 884
 885         // Send two HTLCs, one from A to B, and one from B to A.
 886         let to_b_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000).1;
 887         let to_a_failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 20_000_000).1;
 888         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
 889
 890         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
 891         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
 892
 893         let a_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 894                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 895                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 896                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 897         };
 898         let a_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 899                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 900                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 901                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 902         };
 903         let b_received_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybePreimageClaimableHTLC {
 904                 amount_satoshis: 10_000,
 905                 expiry_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 906                 payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash,
 907         };
 908         let b_sent_htlc_balance = Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
 909                 amount_satoshis: 20_000,
 910                 claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
 911                 payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash,
 912         };
 913
 914         // Both A and B will have an HTLC that's claimable on timeout and one that's claimable if they
 915         // receive the preimage. These will remain the same through the channel closure and until the
 916         // HTLC output is spent.
 917
 918         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 919                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 920                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 921                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 922                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 923
 924         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
 925                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 926                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]),
 927                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 928
 929         // Get nodes[0]'s commitment transaction and HTLC-Timeout transaction
 930         let as_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
 931         assert_eq!(as_txn.len(), 2);
 932         check_spends!(as_txn[1], as_txn[0]);
 933         check_spends!(as_txn[0], funding_tx);
 934
 935         // Now close the channel by confirming A's commitment transaction on both nodes, checking the
 936         // claimable balances remain the same except for the non-HTLC balance changing variant.
 937         let node_a_commitment_claimable = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32;
 938         let as_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 939                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
 940                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
 941                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
 942                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), a_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 943
 944         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0]);
 945         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 947         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
 948         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 949
 950         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 951                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 952
 953         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0]);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 955         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 956         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
 957
 958         let node_b_commitment_claimable = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
 959         let mut bs_pre_spend_claims = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
 960                         amount_satoshis: 500_000 - 20_000,
 961                         confirmation_height: node_b_commitment_claimable,
 962                 }, b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), b_sent_htlc_balance.clone()]);
 963         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
 964                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 965
 966         // We'll broadcast the HTLC-Timeout transaction one block prior to the htlc's expiration (as it
 967         // is confirmable in the next block), but will still include the same claimable balances as no
 968         // HTLC has been spent, even after the HTLC expires. We'll also fail the inbound HTLC, but it
 969         // won't do anything as the channel is already closed.
 970
 971         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
 972         let as_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 973         assert_eq!(as_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 974         check_spends!(as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 975         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[0],
 976                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_a_failed_payment_hash }]);
 977
 978         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 979                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 980
 981         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
 982         assert_eq!(as_pre_spend_claims,
 983                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
 984
 985         // For node B, we'll get the non-HTLC funds claimable after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations
 986         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
 987         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_txn[0], false);
 988         bs_pre_spend_claims.retain(|e| if let Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { .. } = e { false } else { true });
 989
 990         // The next few blocks for B look the same as for A, though for the opposite HTLC
 991         nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
 992         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - (ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1));
 993         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions!(nodes[1],
 994                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: to_b_failed_payment_hash }]);
 995         let bs_htlc_timeout_claim = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
 996         assert_eq!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim.len(), 1);
 997         check_spends!(bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], as_txn[0]);
 998
 999         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1000                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1001
1002         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1003         assert_eq!(bs_pre_spend_claims,
1004                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1005
1006         // Now confirm the two HTLC timeout transactions for A, checking that the inbound HTLC resolves
1007         // after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations and the other takes BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT confirmations.
1008         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1009         let as_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + (BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32) - 1;
1010         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1011                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1012                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1013                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1014                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1015                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1016                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1017                 }]),
1018                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1019
1020         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1021         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1022                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1023                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1024                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1025                 }, a_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1026                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1027                         confirmation_height: as_timeout_claimable_height,
1028                 }]),
1029                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1030
1031         // Once as_htlc_timeout_claim[0] reaches ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations, we should get a
1032         // payment failure event.
1033         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1034         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], to_b_failed_payment_hash, false);
1035
1036         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1037         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1038                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 500_000 - 10_000 - chan_feerate *
1039                                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000,
1040                         confirmation_height: node_a_commitment_claimable,
1041                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1042                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1043                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1044                 }]),
1045                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1046
1047         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_a_commitment_claimable - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1048         assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1049                         amount_satoshis: 10_000,
1050                         confirmation_height: core::cmp::max(as_timeout_claimable_height, htlc_cltv_timeout),
1051                 }],
1052                 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1053         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_txn[0], false);
1054
1055         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], as_timeout_claimable_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1056         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1057         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1058
1059         // The process for B should be completely identical as well, noting that the non-HTLC-balance
1060         // was already claimed.
1061         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1062         let bs_timeout_claimable_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1063         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1064                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1065                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1066                 }]),
1067                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1068
1069         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_htlc_timeout_claim[0]);
1070         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone(), Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1071                         amount_satoshis: 20_000,
1072                         confirmation_height: bs_timeout_claimable_height,
1073                 }]),
1074                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1075
1076         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1077         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], to_a_failed_payment_hash, false);
1078
1079         assert_eq!(vec![b_received_htlc_balance.clone()],
1080                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1081         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &bs_htlc_timeout_claim[0], false);
1082
1083         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1084         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1085
1086         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1087         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1088         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1089         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1090         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1091         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1092         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1093 }
1094
1095 fn sorted_vec_with_additions<T: Ord + Clone>(v_orig: &Vec<T>, extra_ts: &[&T]) -> Vec<T> {
1096         let mut v = v_orig.clone();
1097         for t in extra_ts {
1098                 v.push((*t).clone());
1099         }
1100         v.sort_unstable();
1101         v
1102 }
1103
1104 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(anchors: bool, confirm_htlc_spend_first: bool) {
1105         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions.
1106         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1107         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1108         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1109         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1110         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1111         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1112         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1113         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1114         if anchors {
1115                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1116                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1117         }
1118         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1119         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1120
1121         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1122                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1123         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1124         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1125
1126         // We create five HTLCs for B to claim against A's revoked commitment transaction:
1127         //
1128         // (1) one for which A is the originator and B knows the preimage
1129         // (2) one for which B is the originator where the HTLC has since timed-out
1130         // (3) one for which B is the originator but where the HTLC has not yet timed-out
1131         // (4) one dust HTLC which is lost in the channel closure
1132         // (5) one that actually isn't in the revoked commitment transaction at all, but was added in
1133         //     later commitment transaction updates
1134         //
1135         // Though they could all be claimed in a single claim transaction, due to CLTV timeouts they
1136         // are all currently claimed in separate transactions, which helps us test as we can claim
1137         // HTLCs individually.
1138
1139         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
1140         let timeout_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1141         let dust_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000).1;
1142
1143         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1144
1145         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 10);
1146         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 10);
1147
1148         let live_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1149         let live_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 5_000_000).1;
1150
1151         // Get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1152         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1153         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1154
1155         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1156
1157         let missing_htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1158         let missing_htlc_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000).1;
1159
1160         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1161         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1163         let _b_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1164
1165         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1166         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1168
1169         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1170         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
1171         let mut failed_payments: HashSet<_> =
1172                 [timeout_payment_hash, dust_payment_hash, live_payment_hash, missing_htlc_payment_hash]
1173                 .iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
1174         events.retain(|ev| {
1175                 match ev {
1176                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id, channel_id }, .. } => {
1177                                 assert_eq!(*channel_id, chan_id);
1178                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, Some(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
1179                                 false
1180                         },
1181                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { failed_next_destination: HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }, .. } => {
1182                                 assert!(failed_payments.remove(payment_hash));
1183                                 false
1184                         },
1185                         _ => true,
1186                 }
1187         });
1188         assert!(failed_payments.is_empty());
1189         if let Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
1190         match &events[1] {
1191                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, .. } => {},
1192                 _ => panic!(),
1193         }
1194
1195         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], htlc_cltv_timeout + 1 - 10);
1196         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1198         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1199
1200         // Prior to channel closure, B considers the preimage HTLC as its own, and otherwise only
1201         // lists the two on-chain timeout-able HTLCs as claimable balances.
1202         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1203                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3 - 2_000 + 3_000,
1204                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1205                         amount_satoshis: 2_000,
1206                         claimable_height: missing_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1207                         payment_hash: missing_htlc_payment_hash,
1208                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1209                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1210                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1211                         payment_hash: timeout_payment_hash,
1212                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1213                         amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1214                         claimable_height: live_htlc_cltv_timeout,
1215                         payment_hash: live_payment_hash,
1216                 }]),
1217                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1218
1219         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1220         let mut claim_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..).filter(|tx| tx.input.iter().any(|inp| inp.previous_output.txid == as_revoked_txn[0].txid())).collect();
1221         // Currently the revoked commitment is claimed in four transactions as the HTLCs all expire
1222         // quite soon.
1223         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 4);
1224         claim_txn.sort_unstable_by_key(|tx| tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>());
1225
1226         // The following constants were determined experimentally
1227         const BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT: u64 = 483;
1228         let outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 574 } else { 571 };
1229         let inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight: u64 = if anchors { 582 } else { 578 };
1230
1231         // Check that the weight is close to the expected weight. Note that signature sizes vary
1232         // somewhat so it may not always be exact.
1233         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[0].weight().to_wu(), outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1234         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[1].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1235         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[2].weight().to_wu(), inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight);
1236         fuzzy_assert_eq(claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu(), BS_TO_SELF_CLAIM_EXP_WEIGHT);
1237
1238         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1239                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 3 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1240         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1241         let inbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * inbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1242         let outbound_htlc_claim_fee = chan_feerate * outbound_htlc_claim_exp_weight / 1000;
1243         let to_self_claim_fee = chan_feerate * claim_txn[3].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1244
1245         // The expected balance for the next three checks, with the largest-HTLC and to_self output
1246         // claim balances separated out.
1247         let expected_balance = vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1248                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1249                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1250                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1251                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1252                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1253                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1254                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1255                 }];
1256
1257         let to_self_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1258                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1259         };
1260         let to_self_claimed_avail_height;
1261         let largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance = Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1262                 amount_satoshis: 5_000,
1263         };
1264         let largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height;
1265
1266         // Once the channel has been closed by A, B now considers all of the commitment transactions'
1267         // outputs as `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable`.
1268         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1269                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1270
1271         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1272                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1273                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1274                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1275         } else {
1276                 // Connect the to_self output claim, taking all of A's non-HTLC funds
1277                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1278                 to_self_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5;
1279                 largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 6; // will be claimed in the next block
1280         }
1281
1282         let largest_htlc_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1283                 amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1284                 confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1285         };
1286         let to_self_claimed_balance = Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1287                 amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1288                 confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1289         };
1290
1291         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1292                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_unclaimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1293                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1294         } else {
1295                 assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_unclaimed_balance]),
1296                         sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1297         }
1298
1299         if confirm_htlc_spend_first {
1300                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[3]);
1301         } else {
1302                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[2]);
1303         }
1304         assert_eq!(sorted_vec_with_additions(&expected_balance, &[&to_self_claimed_balance, &largest_htlc_claimed_balance]),
1305                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1306
1307         // Finally, connect the last two remaining HTLC spends and check that they move to
1308         // `ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations`
1309         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0]);
1310         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1]);
1311
1312         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1313                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1314                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 5_000 - 4_000 - 3,
1315                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1,
1316                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1317                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value - to_self_claim_fee,
1318                         confirmation_height: to_self_claimed_avail_height,
1319                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1320                         amount_satoshis: 3_000 - outbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1321                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 4,
1322                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1323                         amount_satoshis: 4_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1324                         confirmation_height: nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 5,
1325                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1326                         amount_satoshis: 5_000 - inbound_htlc_claim_fee,
1327                         confirmation_height: largest_htlc_claimed_avail_height,
1328                 }]),
1329                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1330
1331         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1332         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1333
1334         let mut payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1335         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[..2].to_vec(),
1336                 missing_htlc_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1337         expect_payment_failed_conditions_event(payment_failed_events[2..].to_vec(),
1338                 dust_payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
1339
1340         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1341         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 2 } else { 3 }], false);
1342         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1343         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[if confirm_htlc_spend_first { 3 } else { 2 }], false);
1344         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], live_payment_hash, false);
1345         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1346         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[0], false);
1347         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
1348         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn[1], false);
1349         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], timeout_payment_hash, false);
1350         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1351
1352         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1353         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1354         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1355         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1356         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1357         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1358         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1359 }
1360
1361 #[test]
1362 fn test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances() {
1363         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, true);
1364         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(false, false);
1365         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, true);
1366         do_test_revoked_counterparty_commitment_balances(true, false);
1367 }
1368
1369 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(anchors: bool) {
1370         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revocation spends of HTLC transactions.
1371         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1372         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1373         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1374         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1375         if anchors {
1376                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1377                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1378         }
1379         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1380         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1381
1382         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1383                 version: 2,
1384                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1385                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1386                 output: vec![
1387                         TxOut {
1388                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1389                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1390                         },
1391                         TxOut {
1392                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1393                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1394                         },
1395                 ],
1396         };
1397         if anchors {
1398                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1399                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 1 }, coinbase_tx.output[1].value);
1400         }
1401
1402         // Create some initial channels
1403         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1404                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 12_000_000);
1405         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1406         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1407
1408         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
1409         let failed_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000).1;
1410         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_id);
1411         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1412         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
1413         if anchors {
1414                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[4].value, 11000); // to_self output
1415         } else {
1416                 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[2].value, 11000); // to_self output
1417         }
1418
1419         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have two HTLCs, an output for each side, and an
1420         // anchor output for each side if enabled.
1421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if anchors { 6 } else { 4 });
1422
1423         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
1424
1425         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1426         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1427
1428         // B will generate an HTLC-Success from its revoked commitment tx
1429         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1430         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1431         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1432         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1433         if anchors {
1434                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 1);
1435         }
1436         let revoked_htlc_success = {
1437                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1438                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1439                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1440                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, if anchors { 3 } else { 1 });
1441                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(),
1442                         if anchors { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS } else { ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT });
1443                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1444                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1445         };
1446         let revoked_htlc_success_fee = chan_feerate * revoked_htlc_success.weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1447
1448         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1449         if anchors {
1450                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[1], 2);
1451         }
1452         let revoked_htlc_timeout = {
1453                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
1454                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
1455                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output {
1456                         txn.remove(1)
1457                 } else {
1458                         txn.remove(0)
1459                 }
1460         };
1461         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_timeout, revoked_local_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1462         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_success.input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_timeout.input[0].previous_output);
1463         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_success.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1464         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
1465
1466         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
1467         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
1468         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
1469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1470         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1471         let to_remote_conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1472
1473         let revoked_to_self_claim = {
1474                 let mut as_commitment_claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1475                 assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1476                 if anchors {
1477                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1478                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 4); // Separate to_remote claim
1479                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1480                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1481                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1482                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1483                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1484                         Some(as_commitment_claim_txn.remove(0))
1485                 } else {
1486                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1487                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1488                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1489                         assert_eq!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1490                         check_spends!(as_commitment_claim_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1491                         None
1492                 }
1493         };
1494
1495         // The next two checks have the same balance set for A - even though we confirm a revoked HTLC
1496         // transaction our balance tracking doesn't use the on-chain value so the
1497         // `CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable` entry doesn't change.
1498         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1499                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1500         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1501         let as_balances = sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1502                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1503                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1504                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1505                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1506                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1507                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1508                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1509                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1510                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1511                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1512                 }]);
1513         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1514                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1515
1516         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_success);
1517         let as_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1518         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx.len(), 2);
1519         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1520         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_success);
1521         // A has to generate a new claim for the remaining revoked outputs (which no longer includes the
1522         // spent HTLC output)
1523         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1524         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1525         if !anchors {
1526                 assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1527         }
1528         check_spends!(as_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1529
1530         assert_eq!(as_balances,
1531                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1532
1533         assert_eq!(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output.len(), 1);
1534         let as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee = chan_feerate * as_htlc_claim_tx[0].weight().to_wu() / 1000;
1535         if anchors {
1536                 // With anchors, B can pay for revoked_htlc_success's fee with additional inputs, rather
1537                 // than with the HTLC itself.
1538                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1539                         3_000 - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1540         } else {
1541                 fuzzy_assert_eq(as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1542                         3_000 - revoked_htlc_success_fee - as_revoked_htlc_success_claim_fee);
1543         }
1544
1545         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0]);
1546         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1547                         // to_remote output in B's revoked commitment
1548                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 12_000 - 3_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1549                         confirmation_height: to_remote_conf_height,
1550                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1551                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1552                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1553                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1554                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1555                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1556                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1557                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1558                 }]),
1559                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1560
1561         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 3);
1562         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], false);
1563         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1564                         // to_self output to B
1565                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1566                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1567                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1568                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1569                         amount_satoshis: as_htlc_claim_tx[0].output[0].value,
1570                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 2,
1571                 }]),
1572                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1573
1574         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2);
1575         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &as_htlc_claim_tx[0], false);
1576         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1577                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1578                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1579                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1580                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1581                 }]),
1582                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1583
1584         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], revoked_htlc_timeout.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
1585         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(&nodes[0],
1586                 [HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
1587         // As time goes on A may split its revocation claim transaction into multiple.
1588         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1589         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1590                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1591         }
1592
1593         // Connect a number of additional blocks to ensure we don't forget the HTLC output needs
1594         // claiming.
1595         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1596         let as_fewer_input_rbf = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
1597         for tx in as_fewer_input_rbf.iter() {
1598                 check_spends!(tx, revoked_local_txn[0]);
1599         }
1600
1601         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout);
1602         let (revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, revoked_to_self_claim) = {
1603                 let mut as_second_htlc_claim_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1604                 assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1605                 if anchors {
1606                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1607                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1608                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1609                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), revoked_to_self_claim.unwrap())
1610                 } else {
1611                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
1612                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1613                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[0], revoked_htlc_timeout);
1614                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input.len(), 1);
1615                         assert_eq!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1616                         check_spends!(as_second_htlc_claim_tx[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
1617                         (as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0), as_second_htlc_claim_tx.remove(0))
1618                 }
1619         };
1620
1621         // Connect blocks to finalize the HTLC resolution with the HTLC-Timeout transaction. In a
1622         // previous iteration of the revoked balance handling this would result in us "forgetting" that
1623         // the revoked HTLC output still needed to be claimed.
1624         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1625         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1626                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1627                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1628                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1629                         amount_satoshis: 1_000,
1630                 }]),
1631                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1632
1633         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim);
1634         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1635                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1636                         amount_satoshis: 11_000,
1637                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1638                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1639                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1640                 }]),
1641                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1642
1643         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim);
1644         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1645                         // to_self output in B's revoked commitment
1646                         amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.output[0].value,
1647                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1,
1648                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1649                         amount_satoshis: revoked_htlc_timeout_claim.output[0].value,
1650                         confirmation_height: nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2,
1651                 }]),
1652                 sorted_vec(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1653
1654         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
1655         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_htlc_timeout_claim, false);
1656         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
1657         test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &revoked_to_self_claim, false);
1658
1659         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances(), Vec::new());
1660
1661         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1662         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1663         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1664         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1665         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
1666         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1667         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1668 }
1669
1670 #[test]
1671 fn test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances() {
1672         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(false);
1673         do_test_revoked_counterparty_htlc_tx_balances(true);
1674 }
1675
1676 fn do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(anchors: bool) {
1677         // Tests `get_claimable_balances` for revoked counterparty commitment transactions when
1678         // claiming with an aggregated claim transaction.
1679         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1680         // We broadcast a second-to-latest commitment transaction, without providing the revocation
1681         // secret to the counterparty. However, because we always immediately take the revocation
1682         // secret from the keys_manager, we would panic at broadcast as we're trying to sign a
1683         // transaction which, from the point of view of our keys_manager, is revoked.
1684         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
1685         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1686         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
1687         if anchors {
1688                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
1689                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
1690         }
1691         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
1692         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1693
1694         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
1695                 version: 2,
1696                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
1697                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
1698                 output: vec![TxOut {
1699                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
1700                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
1701                 }],
1702         };
1703         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
1704
1705         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) =
1706                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 100_000_000);
1707         let funding_outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
1708         assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint), chan_id);
1709
1710         // We create two HTLCs, one which we will give A the preimage to to generate an HTLC-Success
1711         // transaction, and one which we will not, allowing B to claim the HTLC output in an aggregated
1712         // revocation-claim transaction.
1713
1714         let (claimed_payment_preimage, claimed_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
1715         let revoked_payment_hash = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 4_000_000).1;
1716
1717         let htlc_cltv_timeout = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1; // Note ChannelManager adds one to CLTV timeouts for safety
1718
1719         // Cheat by giving A's ChannelMonitor the preimage to the to-be-claimed HTLC so that we have an
1720         // HTLC-claim transaction on the to-be-revoked state.
1721         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(&claimed_payment_hash, &claimed_payment_preimage,
1722                 &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger);
1723
1724         // Now get the latest commitment transaction from A and then update the fee to revoke it
1725         let as_revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_id);
1726
1727         assert_eq!(as_revoked_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 } else { 2 });
1728         check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[0], funding_tx);
1729         if !anchors {
1730                 check_spends!(as_revoked_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]); // The HTLC-Claim transaction
1731         }
1732
1733         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id);
1734         let chan_feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_id) as u64;
1735
1736         {
1737                 let mut feerate = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1738                 *feerate += 1;
1739         }
1740         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
1741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1742
1743         let fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1744         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fee_update.update_fee.unwrap());
1745         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], fee_update.commitment_signed, false);
1746
1747         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(claimed_payment_preimage);
1748         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], claimed_payment_hash, 3_000_000);
1749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1750         let _a_htlc_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(&nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1751
1752         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableOnChannelClose {
1753                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1754                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1755                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1756                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1757                         payment_hash: revoked_payment_hash,
1758                 }, Balance::MaybeTimeoutClaimableHTLC {
1759                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1760                         claimable_height: htlc_cltv_timeout,
1761                         payment_hash: claimed_payment_hash,
1762                 }]),
1763                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1764
1765         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1766         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
1767         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
1768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1769
1770         let mut claim_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1771         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), if anchors { 2 } else { 1 });
1772         let revoked_to_self_claim = if anchors {
1773                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1774                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 5); // Separate to_remote claim
1775                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1776                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
1777                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
1778                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 3);
1779                 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1780                 Some(claim_txn.remove(0))
1781         } else {
1782                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
1783                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1784                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.vout, 0);
1785                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[2].previous_output.vout, 1);
1786                 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1787                 None
1788         };
1789
1790         let to_remote_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1791
1792         let commitment_tx_fee = chan_feerate *
1793                 (channel::commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 2 * channel::COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1794         let anchor_outputs_value = if anchors { channel::ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 };
1795         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1796                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1797                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1798                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1799                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1800                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1801                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1802                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1803                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1804                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1805                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1806                 }]),
1807                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1808
1809         // Confirm A's HTLC-Success transaction which presumably raced B's claim, causing B to create a
1810         // new claim.
1811         if anchors {
1812                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_revoked_txn[0]);
1813                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1814                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1815                 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
1816                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
1817         }
1818         let htlc_success_claim = if anchors {
1819                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1820                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1821                 check_spends!(txn[0], as_revoked_txn[0], coinbase_tx);
1822                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1823         } else {
1824                 as_revoked_txn[1].clone()
1825         };
1826         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_claim);
1827         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[1], claimed_payment_preimage, None, true, false);
1828
1829         let mut claim_txn_2 = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1830         // Once B sees the HTLC-Success transaction it splits its claim transaction into two, though in
1831         // theory it could re-aggregate the claims as well.
1832         assert_eq!(claim_txn_2.len(), 2);
1833         if anchors {
1834                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1835                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1836                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], &htlc_success_claim);
1837                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 1);
1838                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1839                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1840         } else {
1841                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input.len(), 1);
1842                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, 0);
1843                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[0], as_revoked_txn[1]);
1844                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input.len(), 2);
1845                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
1846                 assert_eq!(claim_txn_2[1].input[1].previous_output.vout, 1);
1847                 check_spends!(claim_txn_2[1], as_revoked_txn[0]);
1848         }
1849
1850         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1851                         // to_remote output in A's revoked commitment
1852                         amount_satoshis: 100_000 - 4_000 - 3_000,
1853                         confirmation_height: to_remote_maturity,
1854                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1855                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1856                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1857                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1858                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1859                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1860                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1861                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1862                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1863                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1864                 }]),
1865                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1866
1867         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1868         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &as_revoked_txn[0], false);
1869
1870         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1871                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1872                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1873                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1874                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1875                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 2
1876                         // The amount here is a bit of a misnomer, really its been reduced by the HTLC
1877                         // transaction fee, but the claimable amount is always a bit of an overshoot for HTLCs
1878                         // anyway, so its not a big change.
1879                         amount_satoshis: 3_000,
1880                 }]),
1881                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1882
1883         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0]);
1884         let htlc_2_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1885
1886         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1887                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1888                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1889                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1890                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1891                 }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { // HTLC 2
1892                         amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[0].output[0].value,
1893                         confirmation_height: htlc_2_claim_maturity,
1894                 }]),
1895                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1896
1897         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1898         test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[0], false);
1899
1900         assert_eq!(sorted_vec(vec![Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable {
1901                         // to_self output in A's revoked commitment
1902                         amount_satoshis: 1_000_000 - 100_000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value,
1903                 }, Balance::CounterpartyRevokedOutputClaimable { // HTLC 1
1904                         amount_satoshis: 4_000,
1905                 }]),
1906                 sorted_vec(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances()));
1907
1908         if anchors {
1909                 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&claim_txn_2[1], revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap()]);
1910         } else {
1911                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1]);
1912         }
1913         let rest_claim_maturity = nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1;
1914
1915         if anchors {
1916                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1917                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1918                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1919                         }, Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1920                                 amount_satoshis: revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap().output[0].value,
1921                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1922                         }],
1923                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1924         } else {
1925                 assert_eq!(vec![Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations {
1926                                 amount_satoshis: claim_txn_2[1].output[0].value,
1927                                 confirmation_height: rest_claim_maturity,
1928                         }],
1929                         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances());
1930         }
1931
1932         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty()); // We shouldn't fail the payment until we spend the output
1933
1934         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
1935         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], revoked_payment_hash, false);
1936         if anchors {
1937                 let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1938                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1939                 for (i, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
1940                         if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, .. } = event {
1941                                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
1942                                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
1943                                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
1944                                         253, None, &Secp256k1::new()
1945                                 ).unwrap();
1946                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, if i == 0 { &claim_txn_2[1] } else { revoked_to_self_claim.as_ref().unwrap() });
1947                         } else { panic!(); }
1948                 }
1949         } else {
1950                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &claim_txn_2[1], false);
1951         }
1952         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1953
1954         // Ensure that even if we connect more blocks, potentially replaying the entire chain if we're
1955         // using `ConnectStyle::HighlyRedundantTransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks`, we don't get new
1956         // monitor events or claimable balances.
1957         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1958         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 6);
1959         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1960         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(funding_outpoint).unwrap().get_claimable_balances().is_empty());
1961 }
1962
1963 #[test]
1964 fn test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims() {
1965         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(false);
1966         do_test_revoked_counterparty_aggregated_claims(true);
1967 }
1968
1969 fn do_test_restored_packages_retry(check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade: bool) {
1970         // Tests that we'll retry packages that were previously timelocked after we've restored them.
1971         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1972         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1973         let persister;
1974         let new_chain_monitor;
1975
1976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1977         let node_deserialized;
1978
1979         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1980
1981         // Open a channel, lock in an HTLC, and immediately broadcast the commitment transaction. This
1982         // ensures that the HTLC timeout package is held until we reach its expiration height.
1983         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
1984         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10_000_000);
1985
1986         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
1987         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
1988         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
1989         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
1990                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1991
1992         let commitment_tx = {
1993                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
1994                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
1995                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 3);
1996                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
1997                 txn.pop().unwrap()
1998         };
1999
2000         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2001         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2002                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2003                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2004                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), commitment_tx.txid());
2005         }
2006
2007         // Connect blocks until the HTLC's expiration is met, expecting a transaction broadcast.
2008         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2009         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2010                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2011                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2012                 check_spends!(txn[0], commitment_tx);
2013                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2014         };
2015
2016         // Check that we can still rebroadcast these packages/transactions if we're upgrading from an
2017         // old `ChannelMonitor` that did not exercise said rebroadcasting logic.
2018         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2019                 let serialized_monitor = <Vec<u8>>::from_hex(
2020                         "0101fffffffffffffffff9550f22c95100160014d5a9aa98b89acc215fc3d23d6fec0ad59ca3665f00002200204c5f18e5e95b184f34d02ba6de8a2a4e36ae3d4ec87299ad81f3284dc7195c6302d7dde8e10a5a22c9bd0d7ef5494d85683ac050253b917615d4f97af633f0a8e2035f5e9d58b4328566223c107d86cf853e6b9fae1d26ff6d969be0178d1423c4ea0016001467822698d782e8421ebdf96d010de99382b7ec2300160014caf6d80fe2bab80473b021f57588a9c384bf23170000000000000000000000004d49e5da0000000000000000000000000000002a0270b20ad0f2c2bb30a55590fc77778495bc1b38c96476901145dda57491237f0f74c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e00000022002034c0cc0ad0dd5fe61dcf7ef58f995e3d34f8dbd24aa2a6fae68fefe102bf025c21391732ce658e1fe167300bb689a81e7db5399b9ee4095e217b0e997e8dd3d17a0000000000000000004a002103adde8029d3ee281a32e9db929b39f503ff9d7e93cd308eb157955344dc6def84022103205087e2dc1f6b9937e887dfa712c5bdfa950b01dbda3ebac4c85efdde48ee6a04020090004752210307a78def56cba9fc4db22a25928181de538ee59ba1a475ae113af7790acd0db32103c21e841cbc0b48197d060c71e116c185fa0ac281b7d0aa5924f535154437ca3b52ae00000000000186a0ffffffffffff0291e7c0a3232fb8650a6b4089568a81062b48a768780e5a74bb4a4a74e33aec2c029d5760248ec86c4a76d9df8308555785a06a65472fb995f5b392d520bbd000650090c1c94b11625690c9d84c5daa67b6ad19fcc7f9f23e194384140b08fcab9e8e810000ffffffffffff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000000000000000000000000002167c86cc0e598a6b541f7c9bf9ef17222e4a76f636e2d22185aeadd2b02d029c0000000000000000391732ce658e1fe167300bb689a81e7db5399b9ee4095e217b0e997e8dd3d17a00000000000000010000000000009896800000005166687aadf862bd776c8fc18b8e9f8e20089714856ee233b3902a591d0d5f29250500000000a0009d00202d704fbfe342a9ff6eaca14d80a24aaed0e680bbbdd36157b6f2798c61d906910120f9fe5e552aa0fc45020f0505efde432a4e373e5d393863973a6899f8c26d33d102080000000000989680044d4c00210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c2302090007000000000241000408000001000000000006020000080800000000009896800a04000000460000000000000000000000000000000166687aadf862bd776c8fc18b8e9f8e20089714856ee233b3902a591d0d5f2925fffffffffffe01e3002004f8eda5676356f539169a8e9a1e86c7f125283328d6f4bded1b939b52a6a7e30108000000000000c299022103a1f98e85886df54add6908b4fc1ff515e44aedefe9eb9c02879c89994298fa79042103a650bf03971df0176c7b412247390ef717853e8bd487b204dccc2fe2078bb75206210390bbbcebe9f70ba5dfd98866a79f72f75e0a6ea550ef73b202dd87cd6477350a08210284152d57908488e666e872716a286eb670b3d06cbeebf3f2e4ad350e01ec5e5b0a2102295e2de39eb3dcc2882f8cc266df7882a8b6d2c32aa08799f49b693aad3be28e0c04000000fd0e00fd0202002045cfd42d0989e55b953f516ac7fd152bd90ec4438a2fc636f97ddd32a0c8fe0d01080000000000009b5e0221035f5e9d58b4328566223c107d86cf853e6b9fae1d26ff6d969be0178d1423c4ea04210230fde9c031f487db95ff55b7c0acbe0c7c26a8d82615e9184416bd350101616706210225afb4e88eac8b47b67adeaf085f5eb5d37d936f56138f0848de3d104edf113208210208e4687a95c172b86b920c3bc5dbd5f023094ec2cb0abdb74f9b624f45740df90a2102d7dde8e10a5a22c9bd0d7ef5494d85683ac050253b917615d4f97af633f0a8e20c04000000fd0efd011d3b00010102080000000000989680040400000051062066687aadf862bd776c8fc18b8e9f8e20089714856ee233b3902a591d0d5f2925080400000000417e2650c201383711eed2a7cb8652c3e77ee6a395e81849c5c222217ed68b333c0ca9f1e900662ae68a7359efa7ef9d90613f2a62f7c3ff90f8c25e2cc974c9d3a0009d00202d704fbfe342a9ff6eaca14d80a24aaed0e680bbbdd36157b6f2798c61d906910120f9fe5e552aa0fc45020f0505efde432a4e373e5d393863973a6899f8c26d33d102080000000000989680044d4c00210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c2302090007000000000241000408000001000000000006020000080800000000009896800a0400000046fffffffffffefffffffffffe000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f1600ef6ea657b8d411d553516ae35cedfe86b0cd48d1f91b32772facbae757d0000000b0000000000000002fd01da002045cfd42d0989e55b953f516ac7fd152bd90ec4438a2fc636f97ddd32a0c8fe0d01fd01840200000000010174c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e00000000000f55f9800310270000000000002200208309b406e3b96e76cde414fbb8f5159f5b25b24075656c6382cec797854d53495e9b0000000000002200204c5f18e5e95b184f34d02ba6de8a2a4e36ae3d4ec87299ad81f3284dc7195c6350c300000000000016001425df8ec4a074f80579fed67d4707d5ec8ed7e8d304004730440220671c9badf26bd3a1ebd2d17020c6be20587d7822530daacc52c28839875eaec602204b575a21729ed27311f6d79fdf6fe8702b0a798f7d842e39ede1b56f249a613401473044022016a0da36f70cbf5d889586af88f238982889dc161462c56557125c7acfcb69e9022036ae10c6cc8cbc3b27d9e9ef6babb556086585bc819f252208bd175286699fdd014752210307a78def56cba9fc4db22a25928181de538ee59ba1a475ae113af7790acd0db32103c21e841cbc0b48197d060c71e116c185fa0ac281b7d0aa5924f535154437ca3b52ae50c9222002040000000b0320f1600ef6ea657b8d411d553516ae35cedfe86b0cd48d1f91b32772facbae757d0406030400020090fd02a1002045cfd42d0989e55b953f516ac7fd152bd90ec4438a2fc636f97ddd32a0c8fe0d01fd01840200000000010174c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e00000000000f55f9800310270000000000002200208309b406e3b96e76cde414fbb8f5159f5b25b24075656c6382cec797854d53495e9b0000000000002200204c5f18e5e95b184f34d02ba6de8a2a4e36ae3d4ec87299ad81f3284dc7195c6350c300000000000016001425df8ec4a074f80579fed67d4707d5ec8ed7e8d304004730440220671c9badf26bd3a1ebd2d17020c6be20587d7822530daacc52c28839875eaec602204b575a21729ed27311f6d79fdf6fe8702b0a798f7d842e39ede1b56f249a613401473044022016a0da36f70cbf5d889586af88f238982889dc161462c56557125c7acfcb69e9022036ae10c6cc8cbc3b27d9e9ef6babb556086585bc819f252208bd175286699fdd014752210307a78def56cba9fc4db22a25928181de538ee59ba1a475ae113af7790acd0db32103c21e841cbc0b48197d060c71e116c185fa0ac281b7d0aa5924f535154437ca3b52ae50c9222002040000000b0320f1600ef6ea657b8d411d553516ae35cedfe86b0cd48d1f91b32772facbae757d04cd01cb00c901c7002245cfd42d0989e55b953f516ac7fd152bd90ec4438a2fc636f97ddd32a0c8fe0d0001022102d7dde8e10a5a22c9bd0d7ef5494d85683ac050253b917615d4f97af633f0a8e204020090062b5e9b0000000000002200204c5f18e5e95b184f34d02ba6de8a2a4e36ae3d4ec87299ad81f3284dc7195c630821035f5e9d58b4328566223c107d86cf853e6b9fae1d26ff6d969be0178d1423c4ea0a200000000000000000000000004d49e5da0000000000000000000000000000002a0c0800000000000186a0000000000000000274c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e0000000000000001000000000022002034c0cc0ad0dd5fe61dcf7ef58f995e3d34f8dbd24aa2a6fae68fefe102bf025c45cfd42d0989e55b953f516ac7fd152bd90ec4438a2fc636f97ddd32a0c8fe0d000000000000000100000000002200208309b406e3b96e76cde414fbb8f5159f5b25b24075656c6382cec797854d5349010100160014d5a9aa98b89acc215fc3d23d6fec0ad59ca3665ffd027100fd01e6fd01e300080000fffffffffffe02080000000000009b5e0408000000000000c3500604000000fd08b0af002102d7dde8e10a5a22c9bd0d7ef5494d85683ac050253b917615d4f97af633f0a8e20221035f5e9d58b4328566223c107d86cf853e6b9fae1d26ff6d969be0178d1423c4ea04210230fde9c031f487db95ff55b7c0acbe0c7c26a8d82615e9184416bd350101616706210225afb4e88eac8b47b67adeaf085f5eb5d37d936f56138f0848de3d104edf113208210208e4687a95c172b86b920c3bc5dbd5f023094ec2cb0abdb74f9b624f45740df90acdcc00a8020000000174c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e00000000000f55f9800310270000000000002200208309b406e3b96e76cde414fbb8f5159f5b25b24075656c6382cec797854d53495e9b0000000000002200204c5f18e5e95b184f34d02ba6de8a2a4e36ae3d4ec87299ad81f3284dc7195c6350c300000000000016001425df8ec4a074f80579fed67d4707d5ec8ed7e8d350c92220022045cfd42d0989e55b953f516ac7fd152bd90ec4438a2fc636f97ddd32a0c8fe0d0c3c3b00010102080000000000989680040400000051062066687aadf862bd776c8fc18b8e9f8e20089714856ee233b3902a591d0d5f29250804000000000240671c9badf26bd3a1ebd2d17020c6be20587d7822530daacc52c28839875eaec64b575a21729ed27311f6d79fdf6fe8702b0a798f7d842e39ede1b56f249a613404010006407e2650c201383711eed2a7cb8652c3e77ee6a395e81849c5c222217ed68b333c0ca9f1e900662ae68a7359efa7ef9d90613f2a62f7c3ff90f8c25e2cc974c9d3010000000000000001010000000000000000090b2a953d93a124c600ecb1a0ccfed420169cdd37f538ad94a3e4e6318c93c14adf59cdfbb40bdd40950c9f8dd547d29d75a173e1376a7850743394c46dea2dfd01cefd01ca00fd017ffd017c00080000ffffffffffff0208000000000000c2990408000000000000c3500604000000fd08b0af002102295e2de39eb3dcc2882f8cc266df7882a8b6d2c32aa08799f49b693aad3be28e022103a1f98e85886df54add6908b4fc1ff515e44aedefe9eb9c02879c89994298fa79042103a650bf03971df0176c7b412247390ef717853e8bd487b204dccc2fe2078bb75206210390bbbcebe9f70ba5dfd98866a79f72f75e0a6ea550ef73b202dd87cd6477350a08210284152d57908488e666e872716a286eb670b3d06cbeebf3f2e4ad350e01ec5e5b0aa2a1007d020000000174c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e00000000000f55f9800299c2000000000000220020740e108cfbc93967b6ab242a351ebee7de51814cf78d366adefd78b10281f17e50c300000000000016001425df8ec4a074f80579fed67d4707d5ec8ed7e8d351c92220022004f8eda5676356f539169a8e9a1e86c7f125283328d6f4bded1b939b52a6a7e30c00024045cb2485594bb1ec08e7bb6af4f89c912bd53f006d7876ea956773e04a4aad4a40e2b8d4fc612102f0b54061b3c1239fb78783053e8e6f9d92b1b99f81ae9ec2040100060000fd019600b0af002103c21e841cbc0b48197d060c71e116c185fa0ac281b7d0aa5924f535154437ca3b02210270b20ad0f2c2bb30a55590fc77778495bc1b38c96476901145dda57491237f0f042103b4e59df102747edc3a3e2283b42b88a8c8218ffd0dcfb52f2524b371d64cadaa062103d902b7b8b3434076d2b210e912c76645048b71e28995aad227a465a65ccd817608210301e9a52f923c157941de4a7692e601f758660969dcf5abdb67817efe84cce2ef0202009004010106b7b600b0af00210307a78def56cba9fc4db22a25928181de538ee59ba1a475ae113af7790acd0db30221034d0f817cb19b4a3bd144b615459bd06cbab3b4bdc96d73e18549a992cee80e8104210380542b59a9679890cba529fe155a9508ef57dac7416d035b23666e3fb98c3814062103adde8029d3ee281a32e9db929b39f503ff9d7e93cd308eb157955344dc6def84082103205087e2dc1f6b9937e887dfa712c5bdfa950b01dbda3ebac4c85efdde48ee6a02020090082274c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e000000000287010108d30df34e3a1e00ecdd03a2c843db062479a81752c4dfd0cc4baef0f81e7bc7ef8820990daf8d8e8d30a3b4b08af12c9f5cd71e45c7238103e0c80ca13850862e4fd2c56b69b7195312518de1bfe9aed63c80bb7760d70b2a870d542d815895fd12423d11e2adb0cdf55d776dac8f487c9b3b7ea12f1b150eb15889cf41333ade465692bf1cdc360b9c2a19bf8c1ca4fed7639d8bc953d36c10d8c6c9a8c0a57608788979bcf145e61b308006896e21d03e92084f93bd78740c20639134a7a8fd019afd019600b0af002103c21e841cbc0b48197d060c71e116c185fa0ac281b7d0aa5924f535154437ca3b02210270b20ad0f2c2bb30a55590fc77778495bc1b38c96476901145dda57491237f0f042103b4e59df102747edc3a3e2283b42b88a8c8218ffd0dcfb52f2524b371d64cadaa062103d902b7b8b3434076d2b210e912c76645048b71e28995aad227a465a65ccd817608210301e9a52f923c157941de4a7692e601f758660969dcf5abdb67817efe84cce2ef0202009004010106b7b600b0af00210307a78def56cba9fc4db22a25928181de538ee59ba1a475ae113af7790acd0db30221034d0f817cb19b4a3bd144b615459bd06cbab3b4bdc96d73e18549a992cee80e8104210380542b59a9679890cba529fe155a9508ef57dac7416d035b23666e3fb98c3814062103adde8029d3ee281a32e9db929b39f503ff9d7e93cd308eb157955344dc6def84082103205087e2dc1f6b9937e887dfa712c5bdfa950b01dbda3ebac4c85efdde48ee6a02020090082274c52ab4f11296d62b66a6dba9513b04a3e7fb5a09a30cee22fce7294ab55b7e000000000000000186a00000000000000000000000004d49e5da0000000000000000000000000000002a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001000000510000000000000001000000000000000145cfd42d0989e55b953f516ac7fd152bd90ec4438a2fc636f97ddd32a0c8fe0d00000000041000080000000000989680020400000051160004000000510208000000000000000004040000000b0000000000000000000101300300050007010109210355f8d2238a322d16b602bd0ceaad5b01019fb055971eaadcc9b29226a4da6c230d000f020000",
2021                 ).unwrap();
2022                 reload_node!(nodes[0], &nodes[0].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, new_chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2023         }
2024
2025         // Connecting more blocks should result in the HTLC transactions being rebroadcast.
2026         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 6);
2027         if check_old_monitor_retries_after_upgrade {
2028                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2029         }
2030         {
2031                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2032                 if !nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2033                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 6);
2034                 } else {
2035                         assert!(txn.len() < 6);
2036                 }
2037                 for tx in txn {
2038                         assert_eq!(tx.input.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.input.len());
2039                         assert_eq!(tx.output.len(), htlc_timeout_tx.output.len());
2040                         assert_eq!(tx.input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
2041                         assert_eq!(tx.output[0], htlc_timeout_tx.output[0]);
2042                 }
2043         }
2044 }
2045
2046 #[test]
2047 fn test_restored_packages_retry() {
2048         do_test_restored_packages_retry(false);
2049         do_test_restored_packages_retry(true);
2050 }
2051
2052 fn do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(anchors: bool) {
2053         // Test that we will retry broadcasting pending claims for a force-closed channel on every
2054         // `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` call.
2055         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2056         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2057         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
2058         if anchors {
2059                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2060                 config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2061         }
2062         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config)]);
2063         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2064
2065         let (_, _, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2066                 &nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2067         );
2068         const HTLC_AMT_MSAT: u64 = 1_000_000;
2069         const HTLC_AMT_SAT: u64 = HTLC_AMT_MSAT / 1000;
2070         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_AMT_MSAT);
2071
2072         let htlc_expiry = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1;
2073
2074         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(&nodes[0], &chan_id);
2075         assert_eq!(commitment_txn.len(), if anchors { 1 /* commitment tx only */} else { 2 /* commitment and htlc timeout tx */ });
2076         check_spends!(&commitment_txn[0], &funding_tx);
2077         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_txn[0]);
2078         check_closed_broadcast!(&nodes[0], true);
2079         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed,
2080                  false, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
2081         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2082
2083         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2084                 version: 2,
2085                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2086                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2087                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx` on anchors
2088                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2089                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2090                 }],
2091         };
2092         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2093
2094         // Set up a helper closure we'll use throughout our test. We should only expect retries without
2095         // bumps if fees have not increased after a block has been connected (assuming the height timer
2096         // re-evaluates at every block) or after `ChainMonitor::rebroadcast_pending_claims` is called.
2097         let mut prev_htlc_tx_feerate = None;
2098         let mut check_htlc_retry = |should_retry: bool, should_bump: bool| -> Option<Transaction> {
2099                 let (htlc_tx, htlc_tx_feerate) = if anchors {
2100                         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2101                         let events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2102                         assert_eq!(events.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2103                         if !should_retry {
2104                                 return None;
2105                         }
2106                         match &events[0] {
2107                                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2108                                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2109                                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2110                                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2111                                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2112                                         check_spends!(&htlc_tx, &commitment_txn[0], &coinbase_tx);
2113                                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT + coinbase_tx.output[0].value -
2114                                                 htlc_tx.output.iter().map(|output| output.value).sum::<u64>();
2115                                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2116                                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2117                                 }
2118                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2119                         }
2120                 } else {
2121                         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2122                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2123                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), if should_retry { 1 } else { 0 });
2124                         if !should_retry {
2125                                 return None;
2126                         }
2127                         let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2128                         check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_txn[0]);
2129                         let htlc_tx_fee = HTLC_AMT_SAT - htlc_tx.output[0].value;
2130                         let htlc_tx_weight = htlc_tx.weight().to_wu();
2131                         (htlc_tx, compute_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(htlc_tx_fee, htlc_tx_weight))
2132                 };
2133                 if should_bump {
2134                         assert!(htlc_tx_feerate > prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take().unwrap());
2135                 } else if let Some(prev_feerate) = prev_htlc_tx_feerate.take() {
2136                         assert_eq!(htlc_tx_feerate, prev_feerate);
2137                 }
2138                 prev_htlc_tx_feerate = Some(htlc_tx_feerate);
2139                 Some(htlc_tx)
2140         };
2141
2142         // Connect blocks up to one before the HTLC expires. This should not result in a claim/retry.
2143         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], htlc_expiry - nodes[0].best_block_info().1 - 1);
2144         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2145
2146         // Connect one more block, producing our first claim.
2147         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2148         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2149
2150         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2151         // transactions pre-anchors.
2152         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2153         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2154
2155         // Trigger a call and we should have another retry, but without a bump.
2156         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2157         check_htlc_retry(true, false);
2158
2159         // Double the feerate and trigger a call, expecting a fee-bumped retry.
2160         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2161         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2162         check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2163
2164         // Connect one more block, expecting a retry with a fee bump. Unfortunately, we cannot bump HTLC
2165         // transactions pre-anchors.
2166         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2167         let htlc_tx = check_htlc_retry(true, anchors).unwrap();
2168
2169         // Mine the HTLC transaction to ensure we don't retry claims while they're confirmed.
2170         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_tx);
2171         // If we have a `ConnectStyle` that advertises the new block first without the transactions,
2172         // we'll receive an extra bumped claim.
2173         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2174                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2175                 nodes[0].wallet_source.remove_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 1 });
2176                 check_htlc_retry(true, anchors);
2177         }
2178         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2179         check_htlc_retry(false, false);
2180 }
2181
2182 #[test]
2183 fn test_monitor_timer_based_claim() {
2184         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(false);
2185         do_test_monitor_rebroadcast_pending_claims(true);
2186 }
2187
2188 #[test]
2189 fn test_yield_anchors_events() {
2190         // Tests that two parties supporting anchor outputs can open a channel, route payments over
2191         // it, and finalize its resolution uncooperatively. Once the HTLCs are locked in, one side will
2192         // force close once the HTLCs expire. The force close should stem from an event emitted by LDK,
2193         // allowing the consumer to provide additional fees to the commitment transaction to be
2194         // broadcast. Once the commitment transaction confirms, events for the HTLC resolution should be
2195         // emitted by LDK, such that the consumer can attach fees to the zero fee HTLC transactions.
2196         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2197         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2198         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2199         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2200         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2201         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2202         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2203         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2204
2205         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(
2206                 &nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000
2207         );
2208         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2209         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 2_000_000);
2210
2211         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2212         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2213
2214         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2215
2216         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2217         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().is_empty());
2218
2219         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2220         {
2221                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2222                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2223                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2224         }
2225
2226         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2227                 &payment_hash_2, &payment_preimage_2, &node_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster,
2228                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator), &nodes[0].logger
2229         );
2230         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).provide_payment_preimage(
2231                 &payment_hash_1, &payment_preimage_1, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2232                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2233         );
2234
2235         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2236         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 1);
2237         let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = match holder_events.pop().unwrap() {
2238                 Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2239                         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2240                                 version: 2,
2241                                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2242                                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2243                                 output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2244                                         value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2245                                         script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2246                                 }],
2247                         };
2248                         nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2249                         nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2250                         let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2251                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2252                         let anchor_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2253                         let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2254                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2255                         check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2256                         (commitment_tx, anchor_tx)
2257                 },
2258                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2259         };
2260
2261         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[2].value, 1_000); // HTLC A -> B
2262         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output[3].value, 2_000); // HTLC B -> A
2263
2264         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2266         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&commitment_tx, &anchor_tx]);
2267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2268
2269         {
2270                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2271                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
2272
2273                 let htlc_preimage_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2274                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
2275                 assert_eq!(htlc_preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 3);
2276                 check_spends!(htlc_preimage_tx, commitment_tx);
2277
2278                 let htlc_timeout_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2279                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
2280                 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, 2);
2281                 check_spends!(htlc_timeout_tx, commitment_tx);
2282
2283                 if let Some(commitment_tx) = txn.pop() {
2284                         check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
2285                 }
2286         }
2287
2288         let mut holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2289         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2290         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2291         if nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2292                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2293                 if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = holder_events.remove(0) {}
2294                 else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2295         } else {
2296                 assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 2);
2297         }
2298         let mut htlc_txs = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2299         for event in holder_events {
2300                 match event {
2301                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => {
2302                                 nodes[0].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event);
2303                                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2304                                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2305                                 let htlc_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2306                                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx, anchor_tx);
2307                                 htlc_txs.push(htlc_tx);
2308                         },
2309                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2310                 }
2311         }
2312
2313         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&htlc_txs[0], &htlc_txs[1]]);
2314         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2315
2316         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2317
2318         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
2319
2320         let holder_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2321         assert_eq!(holder_events.len(), 3);
2322         for event in holder_events {
2323                 match event {
2324                         Event::SpendableOutputs { .. } => {},
2325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326                 }
2327         }
2328
2329         // Clear the remaining events as they're not relevant to what we're testing.
2330         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2331         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2332         nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2333         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2334 }
2335
2336 #[test]
2337 fn test_anchors_aggregated_revoked_htlc_tx() {
2338         // Test that `ChannelMonitor`s can properly detect and claim funds from a counterparty claiming
2339         // multiple HTLCs from multiple channels in a single transaction via the success path from a
2340         // revoked commitment.
2341         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2342         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2343         // Required to sign a revoked commitment transaction
2344         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2345         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2346         let bob_persister;
2347         let bob_chain_monitor;
2348
2349         let mut anchors_config = UserConfig::default();
2350         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2351         anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2352         anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2353         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config), Some(anchors_config)]);
2354         let bob_deserialized;
2355
2356         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2357
2358         let chan_a = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2359         let chan_b = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 20_000_000);
2360
2361         // Serialize Bob with the initial state of both channels, which we'll use later.
2362         let bob_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
2363
2364         // Route two payments for each channel from Alice to Bob to lock in the HTLCs.
2365         let payment_a = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2366         let payment_b = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2367         let payment_c = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2368         let payment_d = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 50_000_000);
2369
2370         // Serialize Bob's monitors with the HTLCs locked in. We'll restart Bob later on with the state
2371         // at this point such that he broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction with the HTLCs
2372         // present.
2373         let bob_serialized_monitor_a = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_a.2).encode();
2374         let bob_serialized_monitor_b = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_b.2).encode();
2375
2376         // Bob claims all the HTLCs...
2377         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_a.0);
2378         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_b.0);
2379         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_c.0);
2380         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_d.0);
2381
2382         // ...and sends one back through each channel such that he has a motive to broadcast his
2383         // revoked state.
2384         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2385         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 30_000_000);
2386
2387         // Restart Bob with the revoked state and provide the HTLC preimages he claimed.
2388         reload_node!(
2389                 nodes[1], anchors_config, bob_serialized, &[&bob_serialized_monitor_a, &bob_serialized_monitor_b],
2390                 bob_persister, bob_chain_monitor, bob_deserialized
2391         );
2392         for chan_id in [chan_a.2, chan_b.2].iter() {
2393                 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id);
2394                 for payment in [payment_a, payment_b, payment_c, payment_d].iter() {
2395                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(
2396                                 &payment.1, &payment.0, &node_cfgs[1].tx_broadcaster,
2397                                 &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator), &nodes[1].logger
2398                         );
2399                 }
2400         }
2401
2402         // Bob force closes by restarting with the outdated state, prompting the ChannelMonitors to
2403         // broadcast the latest commitment transaction known to them, which in our case is the one with
2404         // the HTLCs still pending.
2405         *nodes[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
2406         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
2407         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 2);
2408         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 2, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2409
2410         // Bob should now receive two events to bump his revoked commitment transaction fees.
2411         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2412         let events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2413         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2414         let mut revoked_commitment_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2415         let mut anchor_txs = Vec::with_capacity(events.len());
2416         for (idx, event) in events.into_iter().enumerate() {
2417                 let utxo_value = Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat() * (idx + 1) as u64;
2418                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2419                         version: 2,
2420                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2421                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2422                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `anchor_tx`
2423                                 value: utxo_value,
2424                                 script_pubkey: nodes[1].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2425                         }],
2426                 };
2427                 nodes[1].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, utxo_value);
2428                 match event {
2429                         Event::BumpTransaction(event) => nodes[1].bump_tx_handler.handle_event(&event),
2430                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2431                 };
2432                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2433                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2434                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 6); // 2 HTLC outputs + 1 to_self output + 1 to_remote output + 2 anchor outputs
2435                 if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == chan_a.3.txid() {
2436                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_a.3);
2437                 } else {
2438                         check_spends!(&txn[0], &chan_b.3);
2439                 }
2440                 let (commitment_tx, anchor_tx) = (&txn[0], &txn[1]);
2441                 check_spends!(anchor_tx, coinbase_tx, commitment_tx);
2442
2443                 revoked_commitment_txs.push(commitment_tx.clone());
2444                 anchor_txs.push(anchor_tx.clone());
2445         };
2446
2447         for node in &nodes {
2448                 mine_transactions(node, &[&revoked_commitment_txs[0], &anchor_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1], &anchor_txs[1]]);
2449         }
2450         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 2);
2451         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 2, true);
2452         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 1000000);
2453
2454         // Alice should detect the confirmed revoked commitments, and attempt to claim all of the
2455         // revoked outputs.
2456         {
2457                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2458                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 4);
2459
2460                 let (revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_htlc_claim_b) = if txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_commitment_txs[0].txid() {
2461                         (if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] }, if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] })
2462                 } else {
2463                         (if txn[2].input.len() == 2 { &txn[2] } else { &txn[3] }, if txn[0].input.len() == 2 { &txn[0] } else { &txn[1] })
2464                 };
2465
2466                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2467                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_a.output.len(), 1);
2468                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_a, revoked_commitment_txs[0]);
2469                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.input.len(), 2); // Spends both HTLC outputs
2470                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claim_b.output.len(), 1);
2471                 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim_b, revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2472         }
2473
2474         // Since Bob was able to confirm his revoked commitment, he'll now try to claim the HTLCs
2475         // through the success path.
2476         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2477         let mut events = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2478         // Certain block `ConnectStyle`s cause an extra `ChannelClose` event to be emitted since the
2479         // best block is updated before the confirmed transactions are notified.
2480         match *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() {
2481                 ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstReorgsOnlyTip|ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks => {
2482                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
2483                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(0) {}
2484                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2485                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::ChannelClose { .. }) = events.remove(1) {}
2486                         else { panic!("unexpected event"); }
2487
2488                 },
2489                 _ => assert_eq!(events.len(), 2),
2490         };
2491         let htlc_tx = {
2492                 let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap();
2493                 let public_key = PublicKey::new(secret_key.public_key(&secp));
2494                 let fee_utxo_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&public_key.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2495                 let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2496                         version: 2,
2497                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2498                         input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2499                         output: vec![TxOut { // UTXO to attach fees to `htlc_tx`
2500                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2501                                 script_pubkey: fee_utxo_script.clone(),
2502                         }],
2503                 };
2504                 let mut htlc_tx = Transaction {
2505                         version: 2,
2506                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2507                         input: vec![TxIn { // Fee input
2508                                 previous_output: bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
2509                                 ..Default::default()
2510                         }],
2511                         output: vec![TxOut { // Fee input change
2512                                 value: coinbase_tx.output[0].value / 2 ,
2513                                 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]),
2514                         }],
2515                 };
2516                 let mut descriptors = Vec::with_capacity(4);
2517                 for event in events {
2518                         // We don't use the `BumpTransactionEventHandler` here because it does not support
2519                         // creating one transaction from multiple `HTLCResolution` events.
2520                         if let Event::BumpTransaction(BumpTransactionEvent::HTLCResolution { mut htlc_descriptors, tx_lock_time, .. }) = event {
2521                                 assert_eq!(htlc_descriptors.len(), 2);
2522                                 for htlc_descriptor in &htlc_descriptors {
2523                                         assert!(!htlc_descriptor.htlc.offered);
2524                                         htlc_tx.input.push(htlc_descriptor.unsigned_tx_input());
2525                                         htlc_tx.output.push(htlc_descriptor.tx_output(&secp));
2526                                 }
2527                                 descriptors.append(&mut htlc_descriptors);
2528                                 htlc_tx.lock_time = tx_lock_time;
2529                         } else {
2530                                 panic!("Unexpected event");
2531                         }
2532                 }
2533                 for (idx, htlc_descriptor) in descriptors.into_iter().enumerate() {
2534                         let htlc_input_idx = idx + 1;
2535                         let signer = htlc_descriptor.derive_channel_signer(&nodes[1].keys_manager);
2536                         let our_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, htlc_input_idx, &htlc_descriptor, &secp).unwrap();
2537                         let witness_script = htlc_descriptor.witness_script(&secp);
2538                         htlc_tx.input[htlc_input_idx].witness = htlc_descriptor.tx_input_witness(&our_sig, &witness_script);
2539                 }
2540                 let fee_utxo_sig = {
2541                         let witness_script = ScriptBuf::new_p2pkh(&public_key.pubkey_hash());
2542                         let sighash = hash_to_message!(&SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(
2543                                 0, &witness_script, coinbase_tx.output[0].value, EcdsaSighashType::All
2544                         ).unwrap()[..]);
2545                         let sig = sign(&secp, &sighash, &secret_key);
2546                         let mut sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
2547                         sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
2548                         sig
2549                 };
2550                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = Witness::from_slice(&[fee_utxo_sig, public_key.to_bytes()]);
2551                 check_spends!(htlc_tx, coinbase_tx, revoked_commitment_txs[0], revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2552                 htlc_tx
2553         };
2554
2555         for node in &nodes {
2556                 mine_transaction(node, &htlc_tx);
2557         }
2558
2559         // Alice should see that Bob is trying to claim to HTLCs, so she should now try to claim them at
2560         // the second level instead.
2561         let revoked_claim_transactions = {
2562                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2563                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
2564
2565                 let revoked_htlc_claims = txn.iter().filter(|tx|
2566                         tx.input.len() == 2 &&
2567                         tx.output.len() == 1 &&
2568                         tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == htlc_tx.txid()
2569                 ).collect::<Vec<_>>();
2570                 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_claims.len(), 2);
2571                 for revoked_htlc_claim in revoked_htlc_claims {
2572                         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_claim, htlc_tx);
2573                 }
2574
2575                 let mut revoked_claim_transaction_map = new_hash_map();
2576                 for current_tx in txn.into_iter() {
2577                         revoked_claim_transaction_map.insert(current_tx.txid(), current_tx);
2578                 }
2579                 revoked_claim_transaction_map
2580         };
2581         for node in &nodes {
2582                 mine_transactions(node, &revoked_claim_transactions.values().collect::<Vec<_>>());
2583         }
2584
2585
2586         // Connect one block to make sure the HTLC events are not yielded while ANTI_REORG_DELAY has not
2587         // been reached.
2588         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
2589         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
2590
2591         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2592         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2593
2594         // Connect the remaining blocks to reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
2595         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2596         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 2);
2597
2598         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2599         let spendable_output_events = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2600         assert_eq!(spendable_output_events.len(), 4);
2601         for event in spendable_output_events {
2602                 if let Event::SpendableOutputs { outputs, channel_id } = event {
2603                         assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2604                         assert!(vec![chan_b.2, chan_a.2].contains(&channel_id.unwrap()));
2605                         let spend_tx = nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2606                                 &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), ScriptBuf::new_op_return(&[]), 253, None, &Secp256k1::new(),
2607                         ).unwrap();
2608
2609                         if let SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticPaymentOutput(_) = &outputs[0] {
2610                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &revoked_commitment_txs[0], &revoked_commitment_txs[1]);
2611                         } else {
2612                                 check_spends!(spend_tx, revoked_claim_transactions.get(&spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid).unwrap());
2613                         }
2614                 } else {
2615                         panic!("unexpected event");
2616                 }
2617         }
2618
2619         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2620         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
2621         // On the Alice side, the individual to_self_claim are still pending confirmation.
2622         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 2);
2623         // TODO: From Bob's PoV, he still thinks he can claim the outputs from his revoked commitment.
2624         // This needs to be fixed before we enable pruning `ChannelMonitor`s once they don't have any
2625         // balances to claim.
2626         //
2627         // The 6 claimable balances correspond to his `to_self` outputs and the 2 HTLC outputs in each
2628         // revoked commitment which Bob has the preimage for.
2629         assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_claimable_balances(&[]).len(), 6);
2630 }
2631
2632 fn do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(confirm_commitment_before_reload: bool) {
2633         // Tests that we'll fix a ChannelMonitor's `counterparty_payment_script` for an anchor outputs
2634         // channel upon deserialization.
2635         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2637         let persister;
2638         let chain_monitor;
2639         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2640         user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2641         user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2642         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2643         let node_deserialized;
2644         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2645
2646         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 50_000_000);
2647
2648         // Set the monitor's `counterparty_payment_script` to a dummy P2WPKH script.
2649         let secp = Secp256k1::new();
2650         let privkey = bitcoin::PrivateKey::from_slice(&[1; 32], bitcoin::Network::Testnet).unwrap();
2651         let pubkey = bitcoin::PublicKey::from_private_key(&secp, &privkey);
2652         let p2wpkh_script = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wpkh(&pubkey.wpubkey_hash().unwrap());
2653         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).set_counterparty_payment_script(p2wpkh_script.clone());
2654         assert_eq!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script(), p2wpkh_script);
2655
2656         // Confirm the counterparty's commitment and reload the monitor (either before or after) such
2657         // that we arrive at the correct `counterparty_payment_script` after the reload.
2658         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2659         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
2660         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
2661         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
2662                  [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2663
2664         let commitment_tx = {
2665                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2666                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2667                 assert_eq!(txn[0].output.len(), 4);
2668                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2669                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2670         };
2671
2672         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx);
2673         let commitment_tx_conf_height = if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2674                 // We should expect our round trip serialization check to fail as we're writing the monitor
2675                 // with the incorrect P2WPKH script but reading it with the correct P2WSH script.
2676                 *nodes[1].chain_monitor.expect_monitor_round_trip_fail.lock().unwrap() = Some(chan_id);
2677                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2678                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2679                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2680                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2681         } else {
2682                 let serialized_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).encode();
2683                 reload_node!(nodes[1], user_config, &nodes[1].node.encode(), &[&serialized_monitor], persister, chain_monitor, node_deserialized);
2684                 let commitment_tx_conf_height = block_from_scid(mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx));
2685                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2686                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
2687                 commitment_tx_conf_height
2688         };
2689         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2690                  [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2691         assert!(get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_counterparty_payment_script().is_v0_p2wsh());
2692
2693         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2694         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2695
2696         if confirm_commitment_before_reload {
2697                 // If we saw the commitment before our `counterparty_payment_script` was fixed, we'll never
2698                 // get the spendable output event for the `to_remote` output, so we'll need to get it
2699                 // manually via `get_spendable_outputs`.
2700                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
2701                 let outputs = get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id).get_spendable_outputs(&commitment_tx, commitment_tx_conf_height);
2702                 assert_eq!(outputs.len(), 1);
2703                 let spend_tx = nodes[1].keys_manager.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(
2704                         &[&outputs[0]], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(),
2705                         253, None, &secp
2706                 ).unwrap();
2707                 check_spends!(spend_tx, &commitment_tx);
2708         } else {
2709                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx, false);
2710         }
2711 }
2712
2713 #[test]
2714 fn test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload() {
2715         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(false);
2716         do_test_anchors_monitor_fixes_counterparty_payment_script_on_reload(true);
2717 }
2718
2719 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2720 fn do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(anchors: bool, confirm_counterparty_commitment: bool) {
2721         // Tests that our monitor claims will always use fresh random signatures (ensuring a unique
2722         // wtxid) to prevent certain classes of transaction replacement at the bitcoin P2P layer.
2723         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2724         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2725         let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
2726         if anchors {
2727                 user_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
2728                 user_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
2729         }
2730         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
2731         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2732
2733         let coinbase_tx = Transaction {
2734                 version: 2,
2735                 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
2736                 input: vec![TxIn { ..Default::default() }],
2737                 output: vec![
2738                         TxOut {
2739                                 value: Amount::ONE_BTC.to_sat(),
2740                                 script_pubkey: nodes[0].wallet_source.get_change_script().unwrap(),
2741                         },
2742                 ],
2743         };
2744         if anchors {
2745                 nodes[0].wallet_source.add_utxo(bitcoin::OutPoint { txid: coinbase_tx.txid(), vout: 0 }, coinbase_tx.output[0].value);
2746         }
2747
2748         // Open a channel and route a payment. We'll let it timeout to claim it.
2749         let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
2750         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
2751
2752         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2753                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
2754         } else {
2755                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
2756         };
2757
2758         get_monitor!(closing_node, chan_id).broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(
2759                 &closing_node.tx_broadcaster, &closing_node.fee_estimator, &closing_node.logger
2760         );
2761
2762         // The commitment transaction comes first.
2763         let commitment_tx = {
2764                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
2765                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2766                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
2767                 txn.pop().unwrap()
2768         };
2769
2770         mine_transaction(closing_node, &commitment_tx);
2771         check_added_monitors!(closing_node, 1);
2772         check_closed_broadcast!(closing_node, true);
2773         check_closed_event!(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2774
2775         mine_transaction(other_node, &commitment_tx);
2776         check_added_monitors!(other_node, 1);
2777         check_closed_broadcast!(other_node, true);
2778         check_closed_event!(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
2779
2780         // If we update the best block to the new height before providing the confirmed transactions,
2781         // we'll see another broadcast of the commitment transaction.
2782         if !confirm_counterparty_commitment && nodes[0].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2783                 let _ = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2784         }
2785
2786         // Then comes the HTLC timeout transaction.
2787         if confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2788                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 5);
2789                 test_spendable_output(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx, false);
2790                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 5);
2791         } else {
2792                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
2793         }
2794         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2795                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2796         }
2797         let htlc_timeout_tx = {
2798                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2799                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2800                 let tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
2801                 check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx, coinbase_tx);
2802                 tx
2803         };
2804
2805         // Check we rebroadcast it with a different wtxid.
2806         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.rebroadcast_pending_claims();
2807         if anchors && !confirm_counterparty_commitment {
2808                 handle_bump_htlc_event(&nodes[0], 1);
2809         }
2810         {
2811                 let mut txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2812                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2813                 assert_eq!(txn[0].txid(), htlc_timeout_tx.txid());
2814                 assert_ne!(txn[0].wtxid(), htlc_timeout_tx.wtxid());
2815         }
2816 }
2817
2818 #[cfg(not(feature = "_test_vectors"))]
2819 #[test]
2820 fn test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures() {
2821         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, false);
2822         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(false, true);
2823         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, false);
2824         do_test_monitor_claims_with_random_signatures(true, true);
2825 }