1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
12 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
13 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
14 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
19 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
25 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
26 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, ErrorAction, Init, LightningError, RoutingMessageHandler, NetAddress, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
27 use ln::msgs::{ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelUpdate, NodeAnnouncement, OptionalField};
28 use ln::msgs::{QueryChannelRange, ReplyChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd};
30 use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
31 use util::logger::Logger;
32 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
33 use util::scid_utils::{block_from_scid, scid_from_parts, MAX_SCID_BLOCK};
36 use std::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
37 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
39 use std::collections::BTreeMap;
40 use std::collections::btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry;
42 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
44 /// The maximum number of extra bytes which we do not understand in a gossip message before we will
45 /// refuse to relay the message.
46 const MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY: usize = 1024;
48 /// Maximum number of short_channel_ids that will be encoded in one gossip reply message.
49 /// This value ensures a reply fits within the 65k payload limit and is consistent with other implementations.
50 const MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY: usize = 8000;
52 /// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
53 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
54 pub struct NetworkGraph {
55 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
56 channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
57 nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
60 /// A simple newtype for RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>.
61 /// This exists only to make accessing a RwLock<NetworkGraph> possible from
62 /// the C bindings, as it can be done directly in Rust code.
63 pub struct LockedNetworkGraph<'a>(pub RwLockReadGuard<'a, NetworkGraph>);
65 /// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
66 /// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
67 /// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
68 /// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
69 /// serving historical announcements.
70 pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
71 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
72 /// Representation of the payment channel network
73 pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
74 chain_access: Option<C>,
75 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
76 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
80 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
81 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
82 /// assuming a fresh network graph.
83 /// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
84 /// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
85 /// channel owners' keys.
86 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash, chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L) -> Self {
88 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
89 network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash)),
90 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
92 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
97 /// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
98 /// assuming an existing Network Graph.
99 pub fn from_net_graph(chain_access: Option<C>, logger: L, network_graph: NetworkGraph) -> Self {
101 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
102 network_graph: RwLock::new(network_graph),
103 full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
105 pending_events: Mutex::new(vec![]),
110 /// Adds a provider used to check new announcements. Does not affect
111 /// existing announcements unless they are updated.
112 /// Add, update or remove the provider would replace the current one.
113 pub fn add_chain_access(&mut self, chain_access: Option<C>) {
114 self.chain_access = chain_access;
117 /// Take a read lock on the network_graph and return it in the C-bindings
118 /// newtype helper. This is likely only useful when called via the C
119 /// bindings as you can call `self.network_graph.read().unwrap()` in Rust
121 pub fn read_locked_graph<'a>(&'a self) -> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
122 LockedNetworkGraph(self.network_graph.read().unwrap())
125 /// Returns true when a full routing table sync should be performed with a peer.
126 fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
127 //TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
128 const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
129 if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
130 self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
138 impl<'a> LockedNetworkGraph<'a> {
139 /// Get a reference to the NetworkGraph which this read-lock contains.
140 pub fn graph(&self) -> &NetworkGraph {
146 macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
147 ( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
148 match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
150 Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
155 impl<C: Deref , L: Deref > RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
156 fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
157 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
158 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
159 msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
160 msg.contents.excess_data.len() + msg.contents.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
163 fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
164 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
165 log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
166 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
169 fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
171 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
172 let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
174 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
175 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
177 &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, is_permanent } => {
178 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().fail_node(node_id, is_permanent);
183 fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
184 self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
185 Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY)
188 fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
189 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
190 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
191 let mut iter = network_graph.get_channels().range(starting_point..);
192 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
193 if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
194 if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
195 let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
196 let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
197 let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
198 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
199 one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
201 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
202 two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
204 result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
206 // TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
207 // initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
216 fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<NodeAnnouncement> {
217 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
218 let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
219 let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
220 let mut iter = network_graph.get_nodes().range((*pubkey)..);
224 network_graph.get_nodes().range(..)
226 while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
227 if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
228 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
229 if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
230 result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
240 /// Initiates a stateless sync of routing gossip information with a peer
241 /// using gossip_queries. The default strategy used by this implementation
242 /// is to sync the full block range with several peers.
244 /// We should expect one or more reply_channel_range messages in response
245 /// to our query_channel_range. Each reply will enqueue a query_scid message
246 /// to request gossip messages for each channel. The sync is considered complete
247 /// when the final reply_scids_end message is received, though we are not
248 /// tracking this directly.
249 fn sync_routing_table(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &Init) {
251 // We will only perform a sync with peers that support gossip_queries.
252 if !init_msg.features.supports_gossip_queries() {
256 // Check if we need to perform a full synchronization with this peer
257 if !self.should_request_full_sync(their_node_id) {
261 let first_blocknum = 0;
262 let number_of_blocks = 0xffffffff;
263 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), first_blocknum, number_of_blocks);
264 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
265 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery {
266 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
267 msg: QueryChannelRange {
268 chain_hash: self.network_graph.read().unwrap().genesis_hash,
275 /// Statelessly processes a reply to a channel range query by immediately
276 /// sending an SCID query with SCIDs in the reply. To keep this handler
277 /// stateless, it does not validate the sequencing of replies for multi-
278 /// reply ranges. It does not validate whether the reply(ies) cover the
279 /// queried range. It also does not filter SCIDs to only those in the
280 /// original query range. We also do not validate that the chain_hash
281 /// matches the chain_hash of the NetworkGraph. Any chan_ann message that
282 /// does not match our chain_hash will be rejected when the announcement is
284 fn handle_reply_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
285 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}, sync_complete={}, scids={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks, msg.sync_complete, msg.short_channel_ids.len(),);
287 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending query_short_channel_ids peer={}, batch_size={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.short_channel_ids.len());
288 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
289 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery {
290 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
291 msg: QueryShortChannelIds {
292 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash,
293 short_channel_ids: msg.short_channel_ids,
300 /// When an SCID query is initiated the remote peer will begin streaming
301 /// gossip messages. In the event of a failure, we may have received
302 /// some channel information. Before trying with another peer, the
303 /// caller should update its set of SCIDs that need to be queried.
304 fn handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
305 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling reply_short_channel_ids_end peer={}, full_information={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.full_information);
307 // If the remote node does not have up-to-date information for the
308 // chain_hash they will set full_information=false. We can fail
309 // the result and try again with a different peer.
310 if !msg.full_information {
311 return Err(LightningError {
312 err: String::from("Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information"),
313 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError
320 /// Processes a query from a peer by finding announced/public channels whose funding UTXOs
321 /// are in the specified block range. Due to message size limits, large range
322 /// queries may result in several reply messages. This implementation enqueues
323 /// all reply messages into pending events. Each message will allocate just under 65KiB. A full
324 /// sync of the public routing table with 128k channels will generated 16 messages and allocate ~1MB.
325 /// Logic can be changed to reduce allocation if/when a full sync of the routing table impacts
326 /// memory constrained systems.
327 fn handle_query_channel_range(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: QueryChannelRange) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
328 log_debug!(self.logger, "Handling query_channel_range peer={}, first_blocknum={}, number_of_blocks={}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id), msg.first_blocknum, msg.number_of_blocks);
330 let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
332 let inclusive_start_scid = scid_from_parts(msg.first_blocknum as u64, 0, 0);
334 // We might receive valid queries with end_blocknum that would overflow SCID conversion.
335 // If so, we manually cap the ending block to avoid this overflow.
336 let exclusive_end_scid = scid_from_parts(cmp::min(msg.end_blocknum() as u64, MAX_SCID_BLOCK), 0, 0);
338 // Per spec, we must reply to a query. Send an empty message when things are invalid.
339 if msg.chain_hash != network_graph.genesis_hash || inclusive_start_scid.is_err() || exclusive_end_scid.is_err() || msg.number_of_blocks == 0 {
340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
341 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
342 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
343 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
344 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
345 first_blocknum: msg.first_blocknum,
346 number_of_blocks: msg.number_of_blocks,
348 short_channel_ids: vec![],
351 return Err(LightningError {
352 err: String::from("query_channel_range could not be processed"),
353 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
357 // Creates channel batches. We are not checking if the channel is routable
358 // (has at least one update). A peer may still want to know the channel
359 // exists even if its not yet routable.
360 let mut batches: Vec<Vec<u64>> = vec![Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY)];
361 for (_, ref chan) in network_graph.get_channels().range(inclusive_start_scid.unwrap()..exclusive_end_scid.unwrap()) {
362 if let Some(chan_announcement) = &chan.announcement_message {
363 // Construct a new batch if last one is full
364 if batches.last().unwrap().len() == batches.last().unwrap().capacity() {
365 batches.push(Vec::with_capacity(MAX_SCIDS_PER_REPLY));
368 let batch = batches.last_mut().unwrap();
369 batch.push(chan_announcement.contents.short_channel_id);
374 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
375 let batch_count = batches.len();
376 for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
377 // Per spec, the initial first_blocknum needs to be <= the query's first_blocknum and subsequent
378 // must be >= the prior reply. We'll simplify this by using zero since its still spec compliant and
379 // sequence completion is now explicitly.
380 let first_blocknum = 0;
382 // Per spec, the final end_blocknum needs to be >= the query's end_blocknum, so we'll use the
383 // query's value. Prior batches must use the number of blocks that fit into the message. We'll
384 // base this off the last SCID in the batch since we've somewhat abusing first_blocknum.
385 let number_of_blocks = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
388 block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) + 1
391 // Only true for the last message in a sequence
392 let sync_complete = batch_index == batch_count - 1;
394 pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
395 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
396 msg: ReplyChannelRange {
397 chain_hash: msg.chain_hash.clone(),
401 short_channel_ids: batch,
409 fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
412 err: String::from("Not implemented"),
413 action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
418 impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L>
420 C::Target: chain::Access,
423 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
424 let mut ret = Vec::new();
425 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
426 core::mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut pending_events);
431 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
432 /// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
433 /// within a channel update.
434 pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
435 /// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
436 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
437 pub last_update: u32,
438 /// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
440 /// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
441 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
442 /// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
443 pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
444 /// The maximum value which may be relayed to the next hop via the channel.
445 pub htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
447 pub fees: RoutingFees,
448 /// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
449 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
450 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
451 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
452 pub last_update_message: Option<ChannelUpdate>,
455 impl fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
456 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
457 write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
462 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(DirectionalChannelInfo, {
465 (4, cltv_expiry_delta),
466 (6, htlc_minimum_msat),
467 (8, htlc_maximum_msat),
469 (12, last_update_message),
472 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
473 /// Details about a channel (both directions).
474 /// Received within a channel announcement.
475 pub struct ChannelInfo {
476 /// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
477 pub features: ChannelFeatures,
478 /// Source node of the first direction of a channel
479 pub node_one: PublicKey,
480 /// Details about the first direction of a channel
481 pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
482 /// Source node of the second direction of a channel
483 pub node_two: PublicKey,
484 /// Details about the second direction of a channel
485 pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
486 /// The channel capacity as seen on-chain, if chain lookup is available.
487 pub capacity_sats: Option<u64>,
488 /// An initial announcement of the channel
489 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
490 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
491 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
492 pub announcement_message: Option<ChannelAnnouncement>,
495 impl fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
496 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
497 write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
498 log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_pubkey!(self.node_one), self.one_to_two, log_pubkey!(self.node_two), self.two_to_one)?;
503 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelInfo, {
510 (12, announcement_message),
514 /// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
515 #[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug)]
516 pub struct RoutingFees {
517 /// Flat routing fee in satoshis
519 /// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
520 /// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
521 pub proportional_millionths: u32,
524 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(RoutingFees, {(0, base_msat), (2, proportional_millionths)}, {}, {});
526 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
527 /// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
528 pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
529 /// Protocol features the node announced support for
530 pub features: NodeFeatures,
531 /// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
532 /// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
533 pub last_update: u32,
534 /// Color assigned to the node
536 /// Moniker assigned to the node.
537 /// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
538 /// should not be exposed to the user.
540 /// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
541 pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
542 /// An initial announcement of the node
543 /// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
544 /// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
545 /// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
546 pub announcement_message: Option<NodeAnnouncement>
549 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeAnnouncementInfo, {
555 (8, announcement_message),
560 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
561 /// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
562 pub struct NodeInfo {
563 /// All valid channels a node has announced
564 pub channels: Vec<u64>,
565 /// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
566 /// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
567 /// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
568 pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
569 /// More information about a node from node_announcement.
570 /// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
571 /// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
572 pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
575 impl fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
576 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
577 write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
578 self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
583 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(NodeInfo, {}, {
584 (0, lowest_inbound_channel_fees),
585 (2, announcement_info),
590 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
591 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
593 impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
594 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
595 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
597 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
598 (self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
599 for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
600 (*chan_id).write(writer)?;
601 chan_info.write(writer)?;
603 (self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
604 for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
605 node_id.write(writer)?;
606 node_info.write(writer)?;
609 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {});
614 impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
615 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
616 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
618 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
619 let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
620 let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
621 for _ in 0..channels_count {
622 let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
623 let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
624 channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
626 let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
627 let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
628 for _ in 0..nodes_count {
629 let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
630 let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
631 nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
633 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {});
643 impl fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
644 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
645 writeln!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]")?;
646 for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
647 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", key, val)?;
649 writeln!(f, "[Nodes]")?;
650 for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
651 writeln!(f, " {}: {}", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
658 /// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
660 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
661 pub fn get_channels<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> { &self.channels }
662 /// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
664 /// (C-not exported) because we have no mapping for `BTreeMap`s
665 pub fn get_nodes<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo> { &self.nodes }
667 /// Get network addresses by node id.
668 /// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
669 /// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
671 /// (C-not exported) as there is no practical way to track lifetimes of returned values.
672 pub fn get_addresses<'a>(&'a self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<&'a Vec<NetAddress>> {
673 if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(pubkey) {
674 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
675 return Some(&node_info.addresses)
681 /// Creates a new, empty, network graph.
682 pub fn new(genesis_hash: BlockHash) -> NetworkGraph {
685 channels: BTreeMap::new(),
686 nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
690 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
691 /// given node announcement.
693 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
694 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
695 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
696 pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
697 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
698 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
699 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
702 /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
703 /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
704 /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
706 pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
707 self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
710 fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
711 match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
712 None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
714 if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
715 if node_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
716 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
721 msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
722 msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY &&
723 msg.excess_data.len() + msg.excess_address_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY;
724 node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
725 features: msg.features.clone(),
726 last_update: msg.timestamp,
729 addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
730 announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
738 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
740 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
741 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
742 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
744 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
745 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
746 pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>
747 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>)
748 -> Result<(), LightningError>
749 where C::Target: chain::Access {
750 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
751 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
752 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
753 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
754 secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
755 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
758 /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
759 /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
760 /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
762 /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
763 /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
764 pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>
765 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>)
766 -> Result<(), LightningError>
767 where C::Target: chain::Access {
768 self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
771 fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>
772 (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>)
773 -> Result<(), LightningError>
774 where C::Target: chain::Access {
775 if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
776 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
779 let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
781 // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
784 &Some(ref chain_access) => {
785 match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
786 Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
787 let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
788 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
789 .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
790 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
791 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
792 if script_pubkey != expected_script {
793 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
795 //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
796 //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
799 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
800 return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
802 Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
803 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
809 let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
810 features: msg.features.clone(),
811 node_one: msg.node_id_1.clone(),
813 node_two: msg.node_id_2.clone(),
815 capacity_sats: utxo_value,
816 announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
817 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
820 match self.channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
821 BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
822 //TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
823 //in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
825 if utxo_value.is_some() {
826 // Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
827 // only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
828 // that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
830 // a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
831 // b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
833 // c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
834 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
835 *entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
837 return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
840 BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
841 entry.insert(chan_info);
845 macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
846 ( $node_id: expr ) => {
847 match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
848 BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
849 node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
851 BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
852 node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
853 channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
854 lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
855 announcement_info: None,
862 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_1);
863 add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_2);
868 /// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
869 /// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
870 /// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
871 /// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
872 pub fn close_channel_from_update(&mut self, short_channel_id: u64, is_permanent: bool) {
874 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.remove(&short_channel_id) {
875 Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &chan, short_channel_id);
878 if let Some(chan) = self.channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
879 if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
880 one_to_two.enabled = false;
882 if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
883 two_to_one.enabled = false;
889 fn fail_node(&mut self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: bool) {
891 // TODO: Wholly remove the node
893 // TODO: downgrade the node
897 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
900 /// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
901 /// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
902 /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
903 pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
904 self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
907 /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
908 /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
909 /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
910 pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
911 self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
914 fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
916 let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
917 let chan_was_enabled;
919 match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
920 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
922 if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
923 if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
924 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
927 if let Some(capacity_sats) = channel.capacity_sats {
928 // It's possible channel capacity is available now, although it wasn't available at announcement (so the field is None).
929 // Don't query UTXO set here to reduce DoS risks.
930 if capacity_sats > MAX_VALUE_MSAT / 1000 || htlc_maximum_msat > capacity_sats * 1000 {
931 return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
935 macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
936 ( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
937 if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
938 if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
939 return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
941 chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
943 chan_was_enabled = false;
946 let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.len() <= MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY
947 { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
949 let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
950 enabled: chan_enabled,
951 last_update: msg.timestamp,
952 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
953 htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
954 htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
956 base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
957 proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
961 $target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
965 let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
966 if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
967 dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
968 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
969 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_two);
971 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
973 dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
974 if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
975 secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_one);
977 maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
983 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
984 let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
985 let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
986 if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
987 base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
988 proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
990 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
992 proportional_millionths
994 } else if chan_was_enabled {
995 let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
996 let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
998 for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
999 let chan = self.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
1001 if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
1002 chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
1004 chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
1006 if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
1007 if chan_info.enabled {
1008 let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
1009 base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
1010 fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
1011 fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
1016 node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
1022 fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
1023 macro_rules! remove_from_node {
1024 ($node_id: expr) => {
1025 if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
1026 entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
1027 short_channel_id != *chan_id
1029 if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
1030 entry.remove_entry();
1033 panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
1038 remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
1039 remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
1046 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
1047 use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph, MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY};
1048 use ln::msgs::{Init, OptionalField, RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
1049 UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate,
1050 ReplyChannelRange, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd, QueryChannelRange, QueryShortChannelIds, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
1051 use util::test_utils;
1052 use util::logger::Logger;
1053 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
1054 use util::events::{MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
1055 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
1057 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
1058 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1059 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1060 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
1061 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
1062 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::TxOut;
1063 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
1067 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
1068 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
1072 fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
1073 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1074 let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1075 let genesis_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1076 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_hash, None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1077 (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
1081 fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
1082 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1083 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
1085 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1086 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1087 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1088 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1089 assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1090 assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
1094 fn handling_node_announcements() {
1095 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1097 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1098 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1099 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1100 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1101 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1102 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1103 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1104 let first_announcement_time = 500;
1106 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1107 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1108 timestamp: first_announcement_time,
1112 addresses: Vec::new(),
1113 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1114 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1116 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1117 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1118 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1119 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1122 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1124 Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
1128 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1129 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1130 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1131 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1132 short_channel_id: 0,
1135 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1136 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1137 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1140 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1141 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1142 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1143 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1144 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1145 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1146 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1148 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1149 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1154 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1155 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1159 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1160 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
1162 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1163 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1166 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1169 unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
1170 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1171 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1172 let announcement_with_data = NodeAnnouncement {
1173 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1174 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1176 // Return false because contains excess data.
1177 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
1178 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1181 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1183 // Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1184 // so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
1185 unsigned_announcement.timestamp -= 10;
1186 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1187 let outdated_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1188 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1189 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1191 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
1193 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1198 fn handling_channel_announcements() {
1199 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1200 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1202 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1203 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1204 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1205 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1206 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1207 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1209 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1210 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1211 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1212 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1213 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1216 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1217 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1218 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1219 short_channel_id: 0,
1222 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1223 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1224 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1227 let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1228 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1229 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1230 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1231 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1232 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1233 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1236 // Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
1237 let mut net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), None, Arc::clone(&logger));
1238 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1239 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1244 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1245 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1251 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
1252 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1253 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1255 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
1258 // Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
1259 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1260 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1261 net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_source.clone().genesis_hash, Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1262 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1264 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1265 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1266 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1267 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1268 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1269 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1270 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1273 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1275 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1278 // Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
1279 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1280 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1282 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1283 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1284 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1285 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1286 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1287 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1288 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1290 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1291 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1296 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1297 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1303 // If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
1304 // drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
1305 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx);
1306 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1308 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
1311 // But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
1312 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: 0, script_pubkey: good_script });
1313 unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
1314 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1315 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1316 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1317 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1318 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1319 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1320 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1322 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1323 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1327 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1328 match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
1329 Some(channel_entry) => {
1330 assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
1336 // Don't relay valid channels with excess data
1337 unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
1338 unsigned_announcement.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1339 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1340 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1341 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1342 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1343 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1344 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1345 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1347 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1348 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1352 unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
1353 let invalid_sig_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1354 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1355 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1356 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1357 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1358 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1360 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
1362 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1365 unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1366 msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1367 let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1368 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1369 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1370 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1371 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1372 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1374 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
1376 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
1381 fn handling_channel_update() {
1382 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383 let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
1384 let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
1385 let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(), Some(chain_source.clone()), Arc::clone(&logger));
1387 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1388 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1389 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1390 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1391 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1392 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1394 let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
1395 let short_channel_id = 0;
1396 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1397 let amount_sats = 1000_000;
1400 // Announce a channel we will update
1401 let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1402 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
1403 .push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
1404 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
1405 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
1406 *chain_source.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok(TxOut { value: amount_sats, script_pubkey: good_script.clone() });
1407 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1408 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1413 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1414 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1415 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1418 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1419 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1420 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1421 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1422 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1423 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1424 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1426 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1433 let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1438 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1439 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1440 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1441 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1442 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1443 excess_data: Vec::new()
1445 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1446 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1447 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1448 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1451 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1452 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1457 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1458 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1460 Some(channel_info) => {
1461 assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
1462 assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
1467 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
1468 unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.resize(MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1, 0);
1469 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1470 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1471 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1472 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1474 // Return false because contains excess data
1475 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1476 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1479 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 10;
1481 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
1482 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1483 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1484 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1485 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1488 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1490 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
1492 unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
1494 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(MAX_VALUE_MSAT + 1);
1495 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1496 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1497 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1498 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1501 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1503 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats")
1505 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1507 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Present(amount_sats * 1000 + 1);
1508 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1509 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1510 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1511 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1514 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1516 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than channel capacity or capacity is bogus")
1518 unsigned_channel_update.htlc_maximum_msat = OptionalField::Absent;
1520 // Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
1521 // so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
1522 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp -= 10;
1523 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1524 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1525 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1526 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1529 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1531 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
1533 unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
1535 let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
1536 let invalid_sig_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1537 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
1538 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1541 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
1543 Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
1549 fn handling_htlc_fail_channel_update() {
1550 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1551 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1552 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1553 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1554 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1555 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1556 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1558 let short_channel_id = 0;
1559 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1562 // There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
1563 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1564 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1568 // Announce a channel we will update
1569 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1570 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1575 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1576 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1577 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1580 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1581 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1582 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1583 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1584 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1585 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1586 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1588 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1593 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1598 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1599 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1600 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1601 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1602 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1603 excess_data: Vec::new()
1605 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1606 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1607 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1608 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1611 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1612 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1617 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1619 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1620 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1622 Some(channel_info) => {
1623 assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.is_some());
1628 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1633 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1635 // Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
1637 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1638 match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
1640 Some(channel_info) => {
1641 assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
1646 let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
1651 net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
1653 // Permanent closing deletes a channel
1655 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
1656 assert_eq!(network.get_channels().len(), 0);
1657 // Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
1658 assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
1660 // TODO: Test HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
1664 fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
1665 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1666 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1667 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1668 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1669 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1670 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1671 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1673 let short_channel_id = 1;
1674 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1676 // Channels were not announced yet.
1677 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
1678 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1681 // Announce a channel we will update
1682 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1683 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1688 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1689 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1690 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1693 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1694 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1695 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1696 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1697 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1698 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1699 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1701 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1707 // Contains initial channel announcement now.
1708 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1709 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1710 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1711 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1712 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1713 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1720 // Valid channel update
1721 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1726 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1727 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1728 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1729 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1730 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1731 excess_data: Vec::new()
1733 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1734 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1735 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1736 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1738 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1744 // Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
1745 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1746 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1747 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1748 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1749 assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
1750 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1757 // Channel update with excess data.
1758 let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1763 cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
1764 htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
1765 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
1766 fee_base_msat: 10000,
1767 fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
1768 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec()
1770 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
1771 let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
1772 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1773 contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
1775 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
1781 // Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
1782 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
1783 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
1784 if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
1785 let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
1786 assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
1787 assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
1792 // Further starting point have no channels after it
1793 let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
1794 assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
1798 fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
1799 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1800 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1801 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1802 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1803 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1804 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1805 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1807 let short_channel_id = 1;
1808 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1811 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
1812 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1815 // Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
1816 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1817 features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1822 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1823 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1824 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1827 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1828 let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1829 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1830 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1831 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1832 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1833 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1835 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
1842 // Nodes were never announced
1843 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1844 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1847 let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1848 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1853 addresses: Vec::new(),
1854 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1855 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1857 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1858 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1859 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1860 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1862 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1867 unsigned_announcement.node_id = node_id_2;
1868 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1869 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1870 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1871 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1874 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1880 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
1881 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
1883 // Skip the first node.
1884 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1885 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
1888 // Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
1889 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1890 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1895 addresses: Vec::new(),
1896 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1897 excess_data: [1; MAX_EXCESS_BYTES_FOR_RELAY + 1].to_vec(),
1899 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1900 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1901 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1902 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1904 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1905 Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
1910 let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
1911 assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
1915 fn network_graph_serialization() {
1916 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1918 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1919 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
1920 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
1921 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
1923 // Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
1924 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1925 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
1926 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
1927 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1928 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash(),
1929 short_channel_id: 0,
1932 bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
1933 bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
1934 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1937 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1938 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
1939 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1940 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
1941 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
1942 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
1943 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
1945 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1946 Ok(res) => assert!(res),
1951 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
1952 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1953 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1958 addresses: Vec::new(),
1959 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1960 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1962 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1963 let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
1964 signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
1965 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
1968 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
1973 let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.write().unwrap();
1974 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
1975 assert!(!network.get_nodes().is_empty());
1976 assert!(!network.get_channels().is_empty());
1977 network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
1978 assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
1982 fn calling_sync_routing_table() {
1983 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
1984 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1985 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
1987 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
1988 let first_blocknum = 0;
1989 let number_of_blocks = 0xffff_ffff;
1991 // It should ignore if gossip_queries feature is not enabled
1993 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known().clear_gossip_queries() };
1994 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
1995 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1996 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1999 // It should send a query_channel_message with the correct information
2001 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2002 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id_1, &init_msg);
2003 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2006 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery{ node_id, msg } => {
2007 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2008 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2009 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, first_blocknum);
2010 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, number_of_blocks);
2012 _ => panic!("Expected MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery")
2016 // It should not enqueue a query when should_request_full_sync return false.
2017 // The initial implementation allows syncing with the first 5 peers after
2018 // which should_request_full_sync will return false
2020 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2021 let init_msg = Init { features: InitFeatures::known() };
2023 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[n; 32]).unwrap();
2024 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2025 net_graph_msg_handler.sync_routing_table(&node_id, &init_msg);
2026 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2030 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2038 fn handling_reply_channel_range() {
2039 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2040 let node_privkey_1 = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2041 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey_1);
2043 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2045 // Test receipt of a single reply that should enqueue an SCID query
2046 // matching the SCIDs in the reply
2048 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_channel_range(&node_id_1, ReplyChannelRange {
2050 sync_complete: true,
2052 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2053 short_channel_ids: vec![
2054 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2055 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2056 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2057 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2058 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2059 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2062 assert!(result.is_ok());
2064 // We expect to emit a query_short_channel_ids message with the received scids
2065 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2066 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2068 MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { node_id, msg } => {
2069 assert_eq!(node_id, &node_id_1);
2070 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, chain_hash);
2071 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, vec![
2072 0x0003e0_000000_0000, // 992x0x0
2073 0x0003e8_000000_0000, // 1000x0x0
2074 0x0003e9_000000_0000, // 1001x0x0
2075 0x0003f0_000000_0000, // 1008x0x0
2076 0x00044c_000000_0000, // 1100x0x0
2077 0x0006e0_000000_0000, // 1760x0x0
2080 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery"),
2086 fn handling_reply_short_channel_ids() {
2087 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2088 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2089 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2091 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2093 // Test receipt of a successful reply
2095 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2097 full_information: true,
2099 assert!(result.is_ok());
2102 // Test receipt of a reply that indicates the peer does not maintain up-to-date information
2103 // for the chain_hash requested in the query.
2105 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_reply_short_channel_ids_end(&node_id, ReplyShortChannelIdsEnd {
2107 full_information: false,
2109 assert!(result.is_err());
2110 assert_eq!(result.err().unwrap().err, "Received reply_short_channel_ids_end with no information");
2115 fn handling_query_channel_range() {
2116 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2118 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2119 let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
2120 let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2121 let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
2122 let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
2123 let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
2124 let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
2125 let bitcoin_key_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey);
2126 let bitcoin_key_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey);
2128 let mut scids: Vec<u64> = vec![
2129 scid_from_parts(0xfffffe, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // max
2130 scid_from_parts(0xffffff, 0xffffff, 0xffff).unwrap(), // never
2133 // used for testing multipart reply across blocks
2134 for block in 100000..=108001 {
2135 scids.push(scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap());
2138 // used for testing resumption on same block
2139 scids.push(scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap());
2142 let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
2143 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
2144 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2145 short_channel_id: scid,
2150 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2153 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2154 let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
2155 node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
2156 node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
2157 bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
2158 bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
2159 contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
2161 match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
2167 // Error when number_of_blocks=0
2168 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2169 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2172 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2174 number_of_blocks: 0,
2177 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2178 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2180 number_of_blocks: 0,
2181 sync_complete: true,
2182 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2186 // Error when wrong chain
2187 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2188 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2191 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2193 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2196 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2197 chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).header.block_hash(),
2199 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2200 sync_complete: true,
2201 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2205 // Error when first_blocknum > 0xffffff
2206 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2207 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2210 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2211 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2212 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2215 vec![ReplyChannelRange {
2216 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2217 first_blocknum: 0x01000000,
2218 number_of_blocks: 0xffff_ffff,
2219 sync_complete: true,
2220 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2224 // Empty reply when max valid SCID block num
2225 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2226 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2229 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2230 first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
2231 number_of_blocks: 1,
2236 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2238 number_of_blocks: 0x01000000,
2239 sync_complete: true,
2240 short_channel_ids: vec![]
2245 // No results in valid query range
2246 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2247 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2250 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2251 first_blocknum: 1000,
2252 number_of_blocks: 1000,
2257 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2259 number_of_blocks: 2000,
2260 sync_complete: true,
2261 short_channel_ids: vec![],
2266 // Overflow first_blocknum + number_of_blocks
2267 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2268 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2271 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2272 first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
2273 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2278 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2280 number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
2281 sync_complete: true,
2282 short_channel_ids: vec![
2283 0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
2289 // Single block exactly full
2290 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2291 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2294 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2295 first_blocknum: 100000,
2296 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2301 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2303 number_of_blocks: 108000,
2304 sync_complete: true,
2305 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2306 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2312 // Multiple split on new block
2313 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2314 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2317 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2318 first_blocknum: 100000,
2319 number_of_blocks: 8001,
2324 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2326 number_of_blocks: 108000,
2327 sync_complete: false,
2328 short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
2329 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2333 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2335 number_of_blocks: 108001,
2336 sync_complete: true,
2337 short_channel_ids: vec![
2338 scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
2344 // Multiple split on same block
2345 do_handling_query_channel_range(
2346 &net_graph_msg_handler,
2349 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2350 first_blocknum: 100002,
2351 number_of_blocks: 8000,
2356 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2358 number_of_blocks: 108002,
2359 sync_complete: false,
2360 short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
2361 .map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
2365 chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
2367 number_of_blocks: 108002,
2368 sync_complete: true,
2369 short_channel_ids: vec![
2370 scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
2377 fn do_handling_query_channel_range(
2378 net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>,
2379 test_node_id: &PublicKey,
2380 msg: QueryChannelRange,
2382 expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
2384 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
2387 assert!(result.is_ok());
2389 assert!(result.is_err());
2392 let events = net_graph_msg_handler.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2393 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_replies.len());
2395 for i in 0..events.len() {
2396 let expected_reply = &expected_replies[i];
2398 MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { node_id, msg } => {
2399 assert_eq!(node_id, test_node_id);
2400 assert_eq!(msg.chain_hash, expected_reply.chain_hash);
2401 assert_eq!(msg.first_blocknum, expected_reply.first_blocknum);
2402 assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
2403 assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
2404 assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
2406 _ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
2412 fn handling_query_short_channel_ids() {
2413 let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
2414 let node_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
2415 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_privkey);
2417 let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
2419 let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_short_channel_ids(&node_id, QueryShortChannelIds {
2421 short_channel_ids: vec![0x0003e8_000000_0000],
2423 assert!(result.is_err());