1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
18 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
19 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
20 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
21 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
23 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
24 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
25 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
26 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
28 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
29 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
32 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
34 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
35 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
36 use ln::channel::{ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT};
37 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
38 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
39 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
42 use util::{byte_utils, events};
44 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map};
45 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
46 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
48 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
50 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
51 /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower or remote backup of
52 /// our state failed, but is expected to succeed at some point in the future).
54 /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
55 /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
56 /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
57 /// the channel to an operational state.
59 /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
60 /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
61 /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
63 /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
64 /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
65 /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
66 /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
67 /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
68 /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
71 /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
72 /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
73 /// channel operation.
75 /// For deployments where a copy of ChannelMonitors and other local state are backed up in a
76 /// remote location (with local copies persisted immediately), it is anticipated that all
77 /// updates will return TemporaryFailure until the remote copies could be updated.
79 /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
80 /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
81 /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
83 /// Should also be used to indicate a failure to update the local copy of the channel monitor.
87 /// General Err type for ChannelMonitor actions. Generally, this implies that the data provided is
88 /// inconsistent with the ChannelMonitor being called. eg for ChannelMonitor::insert_combine this
89 /// means you tried to merge two monitors for different channels or for a channel which was
90 /// restored from a backup and then generated new commitment updates.
91 /// Contains a human-readable error message.
93 pub struct MonitorUpdateError(pub &'static str);
95 /// Simple structure send back by ManyChannelMonitor in case of HTLC detected onchain from a
96 /// forward channel and from which info are needed to update HTLC in a backward channel.
97 pub struct HTLCUpdate {
98 pub(super) payment_hash: PaymentHash,
99 pub(super) payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
100 pub(super) source: HTLCSource
103 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
104 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
105 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
108 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
109 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
110 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
111 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
112 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
113 /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
115 /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
116 /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
117 /// any spends of it.
118 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
120 /// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
121 /// with success or failure backward
122 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate>;
125 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
126 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
128 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
130 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
131 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
132 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
134 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
135 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
136 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
137 #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
138 pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
140 monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
141 chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
142 broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
143 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
144 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>)>>>,
146 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
149 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
150 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
151 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
152 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
153 let mut htlc_updated_infos = Vec::new();
155 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
156 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
157 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs, mut htlc_updated) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster, &*self.fee_estimator);
158 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
159 new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
160 outputs: spendable_outputs,
164 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
165 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
166 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
169 htlc_updated_infos.append(&mut htlc_updated);
173 // ChannelManager will just need to fetch pending_htlc_updated and pass state backward
174 let mut pending_htlc_updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
175 for htlc in htlc_updated_infos.drain(..) {
176 match pending_htlc_updated.entry(htlc.2) {
177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => {
178 // In case of reorg we may have htlc outputs solved in a different way so
179 // we prefer to keep claims but don't store duplicate updates for a given
180 // (payment_hash, HTLCSource) pair.
181 let mut existing_claim = false;
182 e.get_mut().retain(|htlc_data| {
183 if htlc.0 == htlc_data.0 {
184 if htlc_data.1.is_some() {
185 existing_claim = true;
191 e.get_mut().push((htlc.0, htlc.1));
194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
195 e.insert(vec![(htlc.0, htlc.1)]);
200 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
201 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
204 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, disconnected_height: u32) {
205 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
206 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
207 for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
208 monitor.block_disconnected(disconnected_height, &block_hash);
213 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
214 /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
215 /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
216 pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
217 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
218 monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
221 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
222 pending_htlc_updated: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
224 fee_estimator: feeest,
226 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
227 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
231 /// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
232 pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
233 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
234 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
235 Some(orig_monitor) => {
236 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_info!(monitor.key_storage));
237 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
241 match monitor.key_storage {
242 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
245 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to update a useless monitor without funding_txo !"));
247 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
248 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
249 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
250 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
254 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
255 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn();
258 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
263 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
264 fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
265 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
267 Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
271 fn fetch_pending_htlc_updated(&self) -> Vec<HTLCUpdate> {
272 let mut updated = self.pending_htlc_updated.lock().unwrap();
273 let mut pending_htlcs_updated = Vec::with_capacity(updated.len());
274 for (k, v) in updated.drain() {
276 pending_htlcs_updated.push(HTLCUpdate {
278 payment_preimage: htlc_data.1,
283 pending_htlcs_updated
287 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
288 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
289 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
290 let mut ret = Vec::new();
291 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
296 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
297 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
298 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
299 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
300 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
301 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
302 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
303 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
304 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
305 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
306 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers). We could enforce the contract by failing
307 /// at CLTV expiration height but giving a grace period to our peer may be profitable for us if he
308 /// can provide an over-late preimage. Nevertheless, grace period has to be accounted in our
309 /// CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA to be secure. Following this policy we may decrease the rate of channel failures
310 /// due to expiration but increase the cost of funds being locked longuer in case of failure.
311 /// This delay also cover a low-power peer being slow to process blocks and so being behind us on
312 /// accurate block height.
313 /// In case of onchain failure to be pass backward we may see the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY
314 /// with at worst this delay, so we are not only using this value as a mercy for them but also
315 /// us as a safeguard to delay with enough time.
316 pub(crate) const LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
317 /// Number of blocks we wait on seeing a HTLC output being solved before we fail corresponding inbound
318 /// HTLCs. This prevents us from failing backwards and then getting a reorg resulting in us losing money.
319 /// We use also this delay to be sure we can remove our in-flight claim txn from bump candidates buffer.
320 /// It may cause spurrious generation of bumped claim txn but that's allright given the outpoint is already
321 /// solved by a previous claim tx. What we want to avoid is reorg evicting our claim tx and us not
322 /// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
323 pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
325 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
328 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
329 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
330 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
331 payment_base_key: SecretKey,
332 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
333 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
334 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
335 funding_info: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
336 current_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
337 prev_remote_commitment_txid: Option<Sha256dHash>,
340 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
341 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
345 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
346 struct LocalSignedTx {
347 /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
350 revocation_key: PublicKey,
351 a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
352 b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
353 delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
355 htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>,
359 enum InputDescriptors {
364 RevokedOutput, // either a revoked to_local output on commitment tx, a revoked HTLC-Timeout output or a revoked HTLC-Success output
367 /// When ChannelMonitor discovers an onchain outpoint being a step of a channel and that it needs
368 /// to generate a tx to push channel state forward, we cache outpoint-solving tx material to build
369 /// a new bumped one in case of lenghty confirmation delay
370 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
374 pubkey: Option<PublicKey>,
382 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
387 sigs: (Signature, Signature),
388 preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
393 /// Upon discovering of some classes of onchain tx by ChannelMonitor, we may have to take actions on it
394 /// once they mature to enough confirmations (ANTI_REORG_DELAY)
395 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
397 /// Outpoint under claim process by our own tx, once this one get enough confirmations, we remove it from
398 /// bump-txn candidate buffer.
400 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint,
402 /// HTLC output getting solved by a timeout, at maturation we pass upstream payment source information to solve
403 /// inbound HTLC in backward channel. Note, in case of preimage, we pass info to upstream without delay as we can
404 /// only win from it, so it's never an OnchainEvent
406 htlc_update: (HTLCSource, PaymentHash),
410 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
411 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
413 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
414 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
416 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
417 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
419 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
420 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
422 key_storage: Storage,
423 their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
424 their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
425 // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
426 their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
428 our_to_self_delay: u16,
429 their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
431 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
432 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>>,
433 /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
434 /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
435 /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
436 /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
437 /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
438 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
439 /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
440 /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
441 /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
442 /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
443 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<PaymentHash, u64>,
445 // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
446 // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
447 // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
448 // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
449 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
450 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
452 // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
454 current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
456 payment_preimages: HashMap<PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage>,
458 destination_script: Script,
460 // Used to track outpoint in the process of being claimed by our transactions. We need to scan all transactions
461 // for inputs spending this. If height timer (u32) is expired and claim tx hasn't reached enough confirmations
462 // before, use TxMaterial to regenerate a new claim tx with a satoshis-per-1000-weight-units higher than last
463 // one (u64), if timelock expiration (u32) is near, decrease height timer, the in-between bumps delay.
464 // Last field cached (u32) is height of outpoint confirmation, which is needed to flush this tracker
465 // in case of reorgs, given block timer are scaled on timer expiration we can't deduce from it original height.
466 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32)>,
468 // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which
469 // we have to take actions once they reach enough confs. Key is a block height timer, i.e we enforce
470 // actions when we receive a block with given height. Actions depend on OnchainEvent type.
471 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap<u32, Vec<OnchainEvent>>,
473 // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
474 // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
475 // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
476 // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
477 // the full block_connected).
478 pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
479 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
483 macro_rules! subtract_high_prio_fee {
484 ($self: ident, $fee_estimator: expr, $value: expr, $predicted_weight: expr, $spent_txid: expr, $used_feerate: expr) => {
486 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
487 let mut fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
489 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
490 fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
492 $used_feerate = $fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
493 fee = $used_feerate * $predicted_weight / 1000;
495 log_error!($self, "Failed to generate an on-chain punishment tx spending {} as even low priority fee ({} sat) was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
496 $spent_txid, fee, $value);
499 log_warn!($self, "Used low priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
500 $spent_txid, $value);
505 log_warn!($self, "Used medium priority fee for on-chain punishment tx spending {} as high priority fee was more than the entire claim balance ({} sat)",
506 $spent_txid, $value);
518 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
519 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
520 /// underlying object
521 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
522 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
523 if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
524 self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
525 self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
526 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
527 self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
528 self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
529 self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
530 self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
531 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
532 self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
533 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
534 self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
535 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
536 self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
537 self.destination_script != other.destination_script ||
538 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf != other.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf ||
539 self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf != other.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf
543 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
544 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
553 impl ChannelMonitor {
554 pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
556 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
558 key_storage: Storage::Local {
559 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
560 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
561 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
562 payment_base_key: payment_base_key.clone(),
563 shutdown_pubkey: shutdown_pubkey.clone(),
564 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
565 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
567 current_remote_commitment_txid: None,
568 prev_remote_commitment_txid: None,
570 their_htlc_base_key: None,
571 their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
572 their_cur_revocation_points: None,
574 our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
575 their_to_self_delay: None,
577 old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
578 remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
579 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
580 remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
582 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
583 current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
584 current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
586 payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
587 destination_script: destination_script,
589 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf: HashMap::new(),
591 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf: HashMap::new(),
593 last_block_hash: Default::default(),
594 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
599 fn get_witnesses_weight(inputs: &[InputDescriptors]) -> u64 {
600 let mut tx_weight = 2; // count segwit flags
602 // We use expected weight (and not actual) as signatures and time lock delays may vary
603 tx_weight += match inp {
604 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
605 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC => {
606 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 133
608 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
609 &InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC => {
610 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 33 + 1 + 139
612 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + remotehtlc_sig + preimage_length + preimage + witness_script_length + witness_script
613 &InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC => {
614 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 32 + 1 + 133
616 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + pubkey_length + revocationpubkey + witness_script_length + witness_script
617 &InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC => {
618 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 139
620 // number_of_witness_elements + sig_length + revocation_sig + true_length + op_true + witness_script_length + witness_script
621 &InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput => {
622 1 + 1 + 73 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 77
629 fn get_height_timer(current_height: u32, timelock_expiration: u32) -> u32 {
630 if timelock_expiration <= current_height || timelock_expiration - current_height <= 3 {
631 return current_height + 1
632 } else if timelock_expiration - current_height <= 15 {
633 return current_height + 3
639 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
641 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
649 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
650 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
652 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
653 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
654 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
655 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
661 /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
662 /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
663 /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
664 pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
665 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
667 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
668 if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
669 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
672 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
675 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
677 // Prune HTLCs from the previous remote commitment tx so we don't generate failure/fulfill
678 // events for now-revoked/fulfilled HTLCs.
679 // TODO: We should probably consider whether we're really getting the next secret here.
680 if let Storage::Local { ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
681 if let Some(txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid.take() {
682 for &mut (_, ref mut source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get_mut(&txid).unwrap() {
688 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
689 let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
690 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
691 let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
692 let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
694 self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
695 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
696 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
700 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
701 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
702 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
707 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
714 remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
723 /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
724 /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
725 /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
726 /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
727 pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)>, commitment_number: u64, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
728 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
729 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
730 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
732 for &(ref htlc, _) in &htlc_outputs {
733 self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
736 let new_txid = unsigned_commitment_tx.txid();
737 log_trace!(self, "Tracking new remote commitment transaction with txid {} at commitment number {} with {} HTLC outputs", new_txid, commitment_number, htlc_outputs.len());
738 log_trace!(self, "New potential remote commitment transaction: {}", encode::serialize_hex(unsigned_commitment_tx));
739 if let Storage::Local { ref mut current_remote_commitment_txid, ref mut prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
740 *prev_remote_commitment_txid = current_remote_commitment_txid.take();
741 *current_remote_commitment_txid = Some(new_txid);
743 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(new_txid, htlc_outputs);
744 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
745 //TODO: Merge this into the other per-remote-transaction output storage stuff
746 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
747 Some(old_points) => {
748 if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 {
749 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(their_revocation_point)));
750 } else if old_points.0 == commitment_number + 2 {
751 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
752 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(their_revocation_point)));
754 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
757 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
761 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((commitment_number, their_revocation_point, None));
766 pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
769 /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
770 /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
771 /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
772 /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
773 /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
774 /// Also update Storage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
775 /// case of onchain HTLC tx
776 pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<(Signature, Signature)>, Option<HTLCSource>)>) {
777 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
778 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
779 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
780 txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
781 tx: signed_commitment_tx,
782 revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
783 a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
784 b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
785 delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
790 if let Storage::Local { ref mut latest_per_commitment_point, .. } = self.key_storage {
791 *latest_per_commitment_point = Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point);
793 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
797 /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
798 /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
799 pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_preimage: &PaymentPreimage) {
800 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
803 /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
804 /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
805 /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
806 pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
807 match self.key_storage {
808 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
809 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
810 let our_funding_info = funding_info;
811 if let Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } = other.key_storage {
812 if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
813 // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget it's trivially
814 // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
815 if funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 != our_funding_info.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
816 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Funding transaction outputs are not identical!"));
819 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor with a Watchtower one !"));
822 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
823 if let Storage::Watchtower { .. } = other.key_storage {
826 return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Watchtower monitor with a Local one !"));
830 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
831 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
832 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
833 self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap())?;
835 if let Some(ref local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
836 if let Some(ref other_local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
837 let our_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
838 let other_commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((other_local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (other_local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
839 if our_commitment_number >= other_commitment_number {
840 self.key_storage = other.key_storage;
844 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
845 // local transactions to decide how to merge
846 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
847 self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
848 for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
849 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
851 if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
852 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
854 if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
855 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
857 self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
860 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
864 /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
865 pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
866 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
867 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
870 /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
871 /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
872 /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
873 /// provides slightly better privacy.
874 /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
875 /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
876 pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, new_funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
877 match self.key_storage {
878 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
879 *funding_info = Some(new_funding_info);
881 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
882 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
887 /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
888 pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
889 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
890 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
893 pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
894 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
897 pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
898 match self.key_storage {
899 Storage::Local { ref mut funding_info, .. } => {
900 *funding_info = None;
902 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
903 panic!("Channel somehow ended up with its internal ChannelMonitor being in Watchtower mode?");
908 /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
909 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
910 match self.key_storage {
911 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
913 &Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
917 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
923 /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
924 /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
925 /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
926 /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
927 pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
928 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
929 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
930 for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
931 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
937 /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
938 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
939 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
940 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
941 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
942 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
944 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
945 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
947 macro_rules! write_option {
954 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
959 match self.key_storage {
960 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
961 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
962 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
963 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
964 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
965 writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
966 writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
967 prev_latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
968 latest_per_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
970 &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
971 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
972 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
973 script.write(writer)?;
976 debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
979 current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
980 prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
982 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
985 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
986 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
988 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
989 Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
990 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
991 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
992 match second_option {
993 Some(second_pubkey) => {
994 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
997 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
1002 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1006 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
1007 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
1009 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1010 writer.write_all(secret)?;
1011 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
1014 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
1015 ($htlc_output: expr) => {
1016 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
1017 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
1018 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
1019 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
1020 $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
1024 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
1025 for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
1026 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1027 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
1028 for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
1029 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1030 write_option!(htlc_source);
1034 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
1035 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
1036 writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
1037 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
1038 (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
1039 for script in txouts.iter() {
1040 script.write(writer)?;
1044 if for_local_storage {
1045 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
1046 for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
1047 writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
1048 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
1051 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
1054 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
1055 ($local_tx: expr) => {
1056 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
1058 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
1059 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
1063 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
1064 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1065 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
1066 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
1068 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
1069 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
1070 for &(ref htlc_output, ref sigs, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1071 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
1072 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1074 writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1075 writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact())?;
1079 write_option!(htlc_source);
1084 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1085 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1086 serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
1088 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1091 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1092 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1093 serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
1095 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1098 if for_local_storage {
1099 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
1101 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
1104 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
1105 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
1106 writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
1109 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
1110 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
1112 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.len() as u64))?;
1113 for (ref outpoint, claim_tx_data) in self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.iter() {
1114 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1115 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.0))?;
1116 match claim_tx_data.1 {
1117 TxMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref pubkey, ref key, ref is_htlc, ref amount} => {
1118 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1119 script.write(writer)?;
1120 pubkey.write(writer)?;
1121 writer.write_all(&key[..])?;
1123 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1125 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1127 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1129 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { ref script, ref key, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1130 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1131 script.write(writer)?;
1133 preimage.write(writer)?;
1134 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1136 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { ref script, ref sigs, ref preimage, ref amount } => {
1137 writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
1138 script.write(writer)?;
1139 sigs.0.write(writer)?;
1140 sigs.1.write(writer)?;
1141 preimage.write(writer)?;
1142 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*amount))?;
1145 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(claim_tx_data.2))?;
1146 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.3))?;
1147 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(claim_tx_data.4))?;
1150 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
1151 for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
1152 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
1153 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
1154 for ev in events.iter() {
1156 OnchainEvent::Claim { ref outpoint } => {
1157 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
1158 outpoint.write(writer)?;
1160 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1161 writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
1162 htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
1163 htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
1172 /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
1174 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1175 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1176 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1177 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1178 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1179 pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1180 self.write(writer, true)
1183 /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
1185 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
1186 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
1187 /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
1188 /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
1189 /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
1190 pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
1191 self.write(writer, false)
1194 /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
1195 pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
1196 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
1197 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
1198 return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
1201 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
1205 pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
1206 //TODO This can be optimized?
1207 let mut min = 1 << 48;
1208 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
1216 pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1217 self.current_remote_commitment_number
1220 pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1221 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1222 0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
1223 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
1226 /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
1227 /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
1228 /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
1229 /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
1230 /// Return updates for HTLC pending in the channel and failed automatically by the broadcast of
1231 /// revoked remote commitment tx
1232 fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1233 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
1234 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
1235 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
1236 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1237 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1239 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1240 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
1242 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1243 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1246 Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1251 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
1252 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
1253 let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
1254 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1255 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
1256 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1257 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1258 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1259 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
1260 Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
1262 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1263 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1264 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1265 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)),
1269 let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
1270 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1271 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1272 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
1275 let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1276 let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1278 let local_payment_p2wpkh = if let Some(payment_key) = local_payment_key {
1279 // Note that the Network here is ignored as we immediately drop the address for the
1280 // script_pubkey version.
1281 let payment_hash160 = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_key).serialize());
1282 Some(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&payment_hash160[..]).into_script())
1285 let mut total_value = 0;
1286 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1287 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1288 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1290 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1291 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1293 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1294 txid: commitment_txid,
1297 script_sig: Script::new(),
1298 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1299 witness: Vec::new(),
1301 inputs_desc.push(InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput);
1302 inputs_info.push((None, outp.value, self.our_to_self_delay as u32));
1303 total_value += outp.value;
1304 } else if Some(&outp.script_pubkey) == local_payment_p2wpkh.as_ref() {
1305 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1306 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1307 key: local_payment_key.unwrap(),
1308 output: outp.clone(),
1313 macro_rules! sign_input {
1314 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
1316 let (sig, redeemscript, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1317 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1318 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
1319 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()].0;
1320 chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
1322 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1323 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1324 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript, revocation_key)
1326 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1330 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1331 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1332 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
1333 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
1335 $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
1337 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1338 (redeemscript, revocation_key)
1343 if let Some(ref per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1344 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
1346 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1347 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1348 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1349 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1350 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1351 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1352 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1355 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1356 txid: commitment_txid,
1357 vout: transaction_output_index,
1359 script_sig: Script::new(),
1360 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1361 witness: Vec::new(),
1363 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1365 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC });
1366 inputs_info.push((Some(idx), tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1367 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1369 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1373 output: vec!(TxOut {
1374 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1375 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1378 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC }]);
1379 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1380 let mut used_feerate;
1381 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1382 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1383 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
1384 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1385 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1387 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: Some(revocation_pubkey), key: revocation_key, is_htlc: true, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1389 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1396 if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() || per_commitment_option.is_some() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
1397 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
1398 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, generating general spend tx with {} inputs and {} other txn to broadcast", inputs.len(), txn_to_broadcast.len());
1399 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1400 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1402 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1403 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => {
1404 if let Some(ref outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1405 for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in outpoints.iter() {
1406 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1407 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of revoked remote commitment transaction, waiting for confirmation (at height {})", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1408 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1410 let e = entry.get_mut();
1411 e.retain(|ref event| {
1413 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1414 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1419 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1421 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1422 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1430 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1431 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1432 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current");
1434 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1435 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "remote");
1438 // No need to check local commitment txn, symmetric HTLCSource must be present as per-htlc data on remote commitment tx
1440 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1442 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1443 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1446 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1453 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1455 let mut used_feerate;
1456 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1457 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1460 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1462 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1463 let (redeemscript, revocation_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.0, info.1);
1464 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1465 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1466 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1467 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: if info.0.is_some() { Some(revocation_pubkey) } else { None }, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: if info.0.is_some() { true } else { false }, amount: info.1 }, used_feerate, if !info.0.is_some() { height + info.2 } else { info.2 }, height)); }
1470 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1472 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1473 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1474 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1476 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1477 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1478 // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1479 // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1480 // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1481 // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1482 // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1483 // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1485 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1486 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1488 log_trace!(self, "Got broadcast of non-revoked remote commitment transaction {}", commitment_txid);
1490 macro_rules! check_htlc_fails {
1491 ($txid: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $id: tt) => {
1492 if let Some(ref latest_outpoints) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get($txid) {
1493 $id: for &(ref htlc, ref source_option) in latest_outpoints.iter() {
1494 if let &Some(ref source) = source_option {
1495 // Check if the HTLC is present in the commitment transaction that was
1496 // broadcast, but not if it was below the dust limit, which we should
1497 // fail backwards immediately as there is no way for us to learn the
1498 // payment_preimage.
1499 // Note that if the dust limit were allowed to change between
1500 // commitment transactions we'd want to be check whether *any*
1501 // broadcastable commitment transaction has the HTLC in it, but it
1502 // cannot currently change after channel initialization, so we don't
1504 for &(ref broadcast_htlc, ref broadcast_source) in per_commitment_data.iter() {
1505 if broadcast_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() && Some(source) == broadcast_source.as_ref() {
1509 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} remote commitment tx due to broadcast of remote commitment transaction", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx);
1510 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1511 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1512 let e = entry.get_mut();
1513 e.retain(|ref event| {
1515 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1516 return htlc_update.0 != **source
1521 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())});
1523 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1524 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ((**source).clone(), htlc.payment_hash.clone())}]);
1532 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
1533 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
1534 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "current", 'current_loop);
1536 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
1537 check_htlc_fails!(txid, "previous", 'prev_loop);
1541 if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1542 let revocation_point_option =
1543 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1544 else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1545 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1547 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1548 let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1549 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1550 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1551 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1553 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1554 (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1555 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1558 let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1559 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1560 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1563 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1564 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1565 match self.key_storage {
1566 Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
1567 if let Ok(local_key) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_point, &payment_base_key) {
1568 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WPKH {
1569 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: commitment_txid, vout: idx as u32 },
1571 output: outp.clone(),
1575 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {}
1577 break; // Only to_remote ouput is claimable
1581 let mut total_value = 0;
1582 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1583 let mut inputs_desc = Vec::new();
1584 let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
1586 macro_rules! sign_input {
1587 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1589 let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1590 Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1591 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
1592 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1593 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
1594 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1595 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript, htlc_key)
1597 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1601 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1602 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1603 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1604 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1605 (redeemscript, htlc_key)
1610 for (idx, &(ref htlc, _)) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1611 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1612 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1613 if transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
1614 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
1615 tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
1616 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
1618 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1620 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1621 txid: commitment_txid,
1622 vout: transaction_output_index,
1624 script_sig: Script::new(),
1625 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1626 witness: Vec::new(),
1628 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1630 inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
1631 inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
1632 total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
1634 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1638 output: vec!(TxOut {
1639 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1640 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1643 let predicted_weight = single_htlc_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC }]);
1644 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1645 let mut used_feerate;
1646 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1647 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1648 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1649 assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
1650 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1651 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1652 output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1654 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(single_htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1655 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1656 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1658 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1663 // TODO: If the HTLC has already expired, potentially merge it with the
1664 // rest of the claim transaction, as above.
1666 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1667 txid: commitment_txid,
1668 vout: transaction_output_index,
1670 script_sig: Script::new(),
1671 sequence: idx as u32,
1672 witness: Vec::new(),
1674 let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
1676 lock_time: htlc.cltv_expiry,
1678 output: vec!(TxOut {
1679 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1680 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1683 let predicted_weight = timeout_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC]);
1684 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1685 let mut used_feerate;
1686 if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1687 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
1688 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
1689 assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
1690 //TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
1691 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1692 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1693 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script : redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 }, used_feerate, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)); }
1696 txn_to_broadcast.push(timeout_tx);
1701 if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1703 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1704 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1707 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1714 let mut predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_desc[..]);
1716 let mut used_feerate;
1717 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1718 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs);
1721 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1723 for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
1724 let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
1725 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, info.2);
1726 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(input.previous_output.clone()) {
1727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1728 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1}, used_feerate, info.2, height)); }
1731 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1732 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1733 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1734 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1736 txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1741 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1744 /// Attempts to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout's outputs using the revocation key
1745 fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64, height: u32, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1746 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1750 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1751 ( $thing : expr ) => {
1754 Err(_) => return (None, None)
1759 let secret = if let Some(secret) = self.get_secret(commitment_number) { secret } else { return (None, None); };
1760 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
1761 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1762 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1763 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1764 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1766 Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1767 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1770 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1771 None => return (None, None),
1772 Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1774 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
1775 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1776 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1778 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1781 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1783 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1787 script_sig: Script::new(),
1788 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1789 witness: Vec::new(),
1791 amount = tx.output[0].value;
1794 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1795 let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1796 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1800 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1806 let predicted_weight = spend_tx.get_weight() + Self::get_witnesses_weight(&[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput]);
1807 let mut used_feerate;
1808 if !subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, spend_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, tx.txid(), used_feerate) {
1809 return (None, None);
1812 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1814 let (sig, revocation_key) = match self.key_storage {
1815 Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1816 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]);
1817 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1818 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), revocation_key)
1820 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1824 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1825 spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1826 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1827 spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.clone().into_bytes());
1829 assert!(predicted_weight >= spend_tx.get_weight());
1830 let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1831 let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1832 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap() as u32); // We can safely unwrap given we are past channel opening
1833 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(spend_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone()) {
1834 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1835 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert((height_timer, TxMaterial::Revoked { script: redeemscript, pubkey: None, key: revocation_key, is_htlc: false, amount: tx.output[0].value }, used_feerate, height + self.our_to_self_delay as u32, height)); }
1837 (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1838 } else { (None, None) }
1841 fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<TxOut>, Vec<(BitcoinOutPoint, (u32, TxMaterial, u64, u32, u32))>) {
1842 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1843 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1844 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1845 let mut pending_claims = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1847 macro_rules! add_dynamic_output {
1848 ($father_tx: expr, $vout: expr) => {
1849 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1850 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1851 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1852 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutputP2WSH {
1853 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: $father_tx.txid(), vout: $vout },
1854 key: local_delayedkey,
1855 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1856 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
1857 output: $father_tx.output[$vout as usize].clone(),
1866 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &local_tx.delayed_payment_key);
1867 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1868 for (idx, output) in local_tx.tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
1869 if output.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
1870 add_dynamic_output!(local_tx.tx, idx as u32);
1875 for &(ref htlc, ref sigs, _) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1876 if let Some(transaction_output_index) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1877 if let &Some((ref their_sig, ref our_sig)) = sigs {
1879 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Timeout transaction against local commitment transactions");
1880 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1882 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1884 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1885 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1886 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1887 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1889 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1890 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1891 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1893 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_timeout_tx, 0);
1894 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1895 pending_claims.push((htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: None, amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1896 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1898 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1899 log_trace!(self, "Broadcasting HTLC-Success transaction against local commitment transactions");
1900 let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1902 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1904 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1905 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1906 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
1907 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1909 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
1910 let htlc_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1911 htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_script.clone().into_bytes());
1913 add_dynamic_output!(htlc_success_tx, 0);
1914 let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, htlc.cltv_expiry);
1915 pending_claims.push((htlc_success_tx.input[0].previous_output.clone(), (height_timer, TxMaterial::LocalHTLC { script: htlc_script, sigs: (*their_sig, *our_sig), preimage: Some(*payment_preimage), amount: htlc.amount_msat / 1000}, 0, htlc.cltv_expiry, height)));
1916 res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1919 watch_outputs.push(local_tx.tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].clone());
1920 } else { panic!("Should have sigs for non-dust local tx outputs!") }
1924 (res, spendable_outputs, watch_outputs, pending_claims)
1927 /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1928 /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1929 /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1930 fn check_spend_local_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
1931 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1932 let mut local_txn = Vec::new();
1933 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1934 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1936 macro_rules! wait_threshold_conf {
1937 ($height: expr, $source: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
1938 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} from {} local commitment tx due to broadcast of transaction, waiting confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!($payment_hash.0), $commitment_tx, height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
1939 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry($height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
1940 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1941 let e = entry.get_mut();
1942 e.retain(|ref event| {
1944 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
1945 return htlc_update.0 != $source
1950 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)});
1952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1953 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: ($source, $payment_hash)}]);
1959 macro_rules! append_onchain_update {
1960 ($updates: expr) => {
1961 local_txn.append(&mut $updates.0);
1962 spendable_outputs.append(&mut $updates.1);
1963 watch_outputs.append(&mut $updates.2);
1964 for claim in $updates.3 {
1965 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
1966 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
1967 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
1973 // HTLCs set may differ between last and previous local commitment txn, in case of one them hitting chain, ensure we cancel all HTLCs backward
1974 let mut is_local_tx = false;
1976 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1977 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1979 log_trace!(self, "Got latest local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1980 match self.key_storage {
1981 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1982 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
1984 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1985 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
1990 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1991 if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1993 log_trace!(self, "Got previous local commitment tx broadcast, searching for available HTLCs to claim");
1994 match self.key_storage {
1995 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1996 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height));
1998 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
1999 append_onchain_update!(self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None, height));
2005 macro_rules! fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf {
2006 ($local_tx: expr) => {
2007 for &(ref htlc, _, ref source) in &$local_tx.htlc_outputs {
2008 if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() {
2009 if let &Some(ref source) = source {
2010 wait_threshold_conf!(height, source.clone(), "lastest", htlc.payment_hash.clone());
2018 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2019 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2021 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2022 fail_dust_htlcs_after_threshold_conf!(local_tx);
2026 (local_txn, spendable_outputs, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
2029 /// Generate a spendable output event when closing_transaction get registered onchain.
2030 fn check_spend_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) -> Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor> {
2031 if tx.input[0].sequence == 0xFFFFFFFF && !tx.input[0].witness.is_empty() && tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len() == 71 {
2032 match self.key_storage {
2033 Storage::Local { ref shutdown_pubkey, .. } => {
2034 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
2035 let shutdown_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script();
2036 for (idx, output) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2037 if shutdown_script == output.script_pubkey {
2038 return Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
2039 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), vout: idx as u32 },
2040 output: output.clone(),
2045 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2046 //TODO: we need to ensure an offline client will generate the event when it
2047 // comes back online after only the watchtower saw the transaction
2054 /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if its copy of
2055 /// the Channel was out-of-date. You may use it to get a broadcastable local toxic tx in case of
2056 /// fallen-behind, i.e when receiving a channel_reestablish with a proof that our remote side knows
2057 /// a higher revocation secret than the local commitment number we are aware of. Broadcasting these
2058 /// transactions are UNSAFE, as they allow remote side to punish you. Nevertheless you may want to
2059 /// broadcast them if remote don't close channel with his higher commitment transaction after a
2060 /// substantial amount of time (a month or even a year) to get back funds. Best may be to contact
2061 /// out-of-band the other node operator to coordinate with him if option is available to you.
2062 /// In any-case, choice is up to the user.
2063 pub fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
2064 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2065 let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
2066 match self.key_storage {
2067 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2068 res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), 0).0);
2069 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
2070 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_local_transaction if we get a confirmation.
2072 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
2080 fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
2081 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
2082 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
2083 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2084 for tx in txn_matched {
2085 if tx.input.len() == 1 {
2086 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
2087 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
2088 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
2090 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
2091 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
2092 let funding_txo = match self.key_storage {
2093 Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
2094 funding_info.clone()
2096 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2100 if funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
2101 let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height, fee_estimator);
2103 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2104 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2105 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2108 let (local_txn, mut spendable_output, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
2109 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2111 if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
2112 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
2115 if !funding_txo.is_none() && txn.is_empty() {
2116 if let Some(spendable_output) = self.check_spend_closing_transaction(tx) {
2117 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2121 if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
2122 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number, height, fee_estimator);
2123 if let Some(tx) = tx {
2126 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
2127 spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
2131 for tx in txn.iter() {
2132 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
2135 // While all commitment/HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions have one input, HTLCs
2136 // can also be resolved in a few other ways which can have more than one output. Thus,
2137 // we call is_resolving_htlc_output here outside of the tx.input.len() == 1 check.
2138 let mut updated = self.is_resolving_htlc_output(tx, height);
2139 if updated.len() > 0 {
2140 htlc_updated.append(&mut updated);
2142 for inp in &tx.input {
2143 if self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.contains_key(&inp.previous_output) {
2144 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2145 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2146 let e = entry.get_mut();
2147 e.retain(|ref event| {
2149 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2150 return outpoint != inp.previous_output
2155 e.push(OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()});
2157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2158 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint: inp.previous_output.clone()}]);
2164 let mut pending_claims = Vec::new();
2165 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2166 if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2167 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
2168 match self.key_storage {
2169 Storage::Local { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
2170 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key), height);
2171 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2172 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2173 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2174 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2177 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2180 Storage::Watchtower { .. } => {
2181 let (txs, mut spendable_output, new_outputs, mut pending_txn) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None, height);
2182 spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
2183 pending_claims.append(&mut pending_txn);
2184 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
2185 watch_outputs.push((cur_local_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
2188 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
2194 for claim in pending_claims {
2195 match self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.entry(claim.0) {
2196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {},
2197 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(claim.1); }
2200 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
2203 OnchainEvent::Claim { outpoint } => {
2204 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.remove(&outpoint);
2206 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update } => {
2207 log_trace!(self, "HTLC {} failure update has got enough confirmations to be passed upstream", log_bytes!((htlc_update.1).0));
2208 htlc_updated.push((htlc_update.0, None, htlc_update.1));
2213 //TODO: iter on buffered TxMaterial in our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf, if block timer is expired generate a bumped claim tx (RBF or CPFP accordingly)
2214 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2215 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs, htlc_updated)
2218 fn block_disconnected(&mut self, height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash) {
2219 if let Some(_) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1)) {
2221 //- htlc update there as failure-trigger tx (revoked commitment tx, non-revoked commitment tx, HTLC-timeout tx) has been disconnected
2222 //- our claim tx on a commitment tx output
2224 self.our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.retain(|_, ref mut v| if v.3 == height { false } else { true });
2225 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
2228 pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
2229 // We need to consider all HTLCs which are:
2230 // * in any unrevoked remote commitment transaction, as they could broadcast said
2231 // transactions and we'd end up in a race, or
2232 // * are in our latest local commitment transaction, as this is the thing we will
2233 // broadcast if we go on-chain.
2234 // Note that we consider HTLCs which were below dust threshold here - while they don't
2235 // strictly imply that we need to fail the channel, we need to go ahead and fail them back
2236 // to the source, and if we don't fail the channel we will have to ensure that the next
2237 // updates that peer sends us are update_fails, failing the channel if not. It's probably
2238 // easier to just fail the channel as this case should be rare enough anyway.
2239 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2240 ($htlcs: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2241 for ref htlc in $htlcs {
2242 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
2243 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
2244 // time out the HTLC first.
2245 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
2246 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
2247 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
2248 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
2249 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
2250 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
2251 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
2252 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
2253 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
2254 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
2255 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
2256 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
2257 // aka outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2258 // inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2259 // outbound_cltv + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
2260 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
2261 // CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv (by check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion)
2262 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
2263 // The final, above, condition is checked for statically in channelmanager
2264 // with CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2.
2265 let htlc_outbound = $local_tx == htlc.offered;
2266 if ( htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS <= height) ||
2267 (!htlc_outbound && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
2268 log_info!(self, "Force-closing channel due to {} HTLC timeout, HTLC expiry is {}", if htlc_outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound "}, htlc.cltv_expiry);
2275 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2276 scan_commitment!(cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, _)| a), true);
2279 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2280 if let &Some(ref txid) = current_remote_commitment_txid {
2281 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2282 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2285 if let &Some(ref txid) = prev_remote_commitment_txid {
2286 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(txid) {
2287 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _)| a), false);
2295 /// Check if any transaction broadcasted is resolving HTLC output by a success or timeout on a local
2296 /// or remote commitment tx, if so send back the source, preimage if found and payment_hash of resolved HTLC
2297 fn is_resolving_htlc_output(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)> {
2298 let mut htlc_updated = Vec::new();
2300 'outer_loop: for input in &tx.input {
2301 let mut payment_data = None;
2302 let revocation_sig_claim = (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33)
2303 || (input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT && input.witness[1].len() == 33);
2304 let accepted_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 5 && input.witness[4].len() == ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2305 let offered_preimage_claim = input.witness.len() == 3 && input.witness[2].len() == OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT;
2307 macro_rules! log_claim {
2308 ($tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr, $htlc: expr, $source_avail: expr) => {
2309 // We found the output in question, but aren't failing it backwards
2310 // as we have no corresponding source and no valid remote commitment txid
2311 // to try a weak source binding with same-hash, same-value still-valid offered HTLC.
2312 // This implies either it is an inbound HTLC or an outbound HTLC on a revoked transaction.
2313 let outbound_htlc = $local_tx == $htlc.offered;
2314 if ($local_tx && revocation_sig_claim) ||
2315 (outbound_htlc && !$source_avail && (accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim)) {
2316 log_error!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}!",
2317 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2318 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2319 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else { "preimage claim after we'd passed the HTLC resolution back" });
2321 log_info!(self, "Input spending {} ({}:{}) in {} resolves {} HTLC with payment hash {} with {}",
2322 $tx_info, input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, tx.txid(),
2323 if outbound_htlc { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0),
2324 if revocation_sig_claim { "revocation sig" } else if accepted_preimage_claim || offered_preimage_claim { "preimage" } else { "timeout" });
2329 macro_rules! check_htlc_valid_remote {
2330 ($remote_txid: expr, $htlc_output: expr) => {
2331 if let &Some(txid) = $remote_txid {
2332 for &(ref pending_htlc, ref pending_source) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&txid).unwrap() {
2333 if pending_htlc.payment_hash == $htlc_output.payment_hash && pending_htlc.amount_msat == $htlc_output.amount_msat {
2334 if let &Some(ref source) = pending_source {
2335 log_claim!("revoked remote commitment tx", false, pending_htlc, true);
2336 payment_data = Some(((**source).clone(), $htlc_output.payment_hash));
2345 macro_rules! scan_commitment {
2346 ($htlcs: expr, $tx_info: expr, $local_tx: expr) => {
2347 for (ref htlc_output, source_option) in $htlcs {
2348 if Some(input.previous_output.vout) == htlc_output.transaction_output_index {
2349 if let Some(ref source) = source_option {
2350 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, true);
2351 // We have a resolution of an HTLC either from one of our latest
2352 // local commitment transactions or an unrevoked remote commitment
2353 // transaction. This implies we either learned a preimage, the HTLC
2354 // has timed out, or we screwed up. In any case, we should now
2355 // resolve the source HTLC with the original sender.
2356 payment_data = Some(((*source).clone(), htlc_output.payment_hash));
2357 } else if !$local_tx {
2358 if let Storage::Local { ref current_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2359 check_htlc_valid_remote!(current_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2361 if payment_data.is_none() {
2362 if let Storage::Local { ref prev_remote_commitment_txid, .. } = self.key_storage {
2363 check_htlc_valid_remote!(prev_remote_commitment_txid, htlc_output);
2367 if payment_data.is_none() {
2368 log_claim!($tx_info, $local_tx, htlc_output, false);
2369 continue 'outer_loop;
2376 if let Some(ref current_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2377 if input.previous_output.txid == current_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2378 scan_commitment!(current_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2379 "our latest local commitment tx", true);
2382 if let Some(ref prev_local_signed_commitment_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
2383 if input.previous_output.txid == prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.txid {
2384 scan_commitment!(prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, _, ref b)| (a, b.as_ref())),
2385 "our previous local commitment tx", true);
2388 if let Some(ref htlc_outputs) = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&input.previous_output.txid) {
2389 scan_commitment!(htlc_outputs.iter().map(|&(ref a, ref b)| (a, (b.as_ref().clone()).map(|boxed| &**boxed))),
2390 "remote commitment tx", false);
2393 // Check that scan_commitment, above, decided there is some source worth relaying an
2394 // HTLC resolution backwards to and figure out whether we learned a preimage from it.
2395 if let Some((source, payment_hash)) = payment_data {
2396 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
2397 if accepted_preimage_claim {
2398 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[3]);
2399 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2400 } else if offered_preimage_claim {
2401 payment_preimage.0.copy_from_slice(&input.witness[1]);
2402 htlc_updated.push((source, Some(payment_preimage), payment_hash));
2404 log_info!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} timeout by a spend tx, waiting for confirmation (at height{})", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2405 match self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.entry(height + ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1) {
2406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2407 let e = entry.get_mut();
2408 e.retain(|ref event| {
2410 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
2411 return htlc_update.0 != source
2416 e.push(OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)});
2418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2419 entry.insert(vec![OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { htlc_update: (source, payment_hash)}]);
2429 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
2431 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
2432 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
2433 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2434 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
2438 Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2443 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2444 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2445 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
2446 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
2449 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2451 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2453 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2454 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2455 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2456 let payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2457 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2458 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2459 let latest_per_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2460 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
2461 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
2462 let outpoint = OutPoint {
2463 txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
2464 index: Readable::read(reader)?,
2466 let funding_info = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
2467 let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2468 let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
2470 revocation_base_key,
2472 delayed_payment_base_key,
2475 prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
2476 latest_per_commitment_point,
2478 current_remote_commitment_txid,
2479 prev_remote_commitment_txid,
2482 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2485 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2486 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2488 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
2489 let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2493 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
2494 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
2495 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
2496 Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
2498 Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&second_point_slice)))))
2503 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2504 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
2506 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
2507 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
2508 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
2509 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
2512 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
2515 let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
2516 let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2517 let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2518 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2519 let transaction_output_index: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
2521 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2522 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
2528 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2529 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
2530 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
2531 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2532 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2533 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2534 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
2535 htlcs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), <Option<HTLCSource> as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.map(|o: HTLCSource| Box::new(o))));
2537 if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs) {
2538 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2542 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2543 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2544 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
2545 let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2546 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2547 let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
2548 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
2549 for _ in 0..outputs_count {
2550 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
2552 if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
2553 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2557 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2558 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2559 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
2560 let payment_hash: PaymentHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2561 let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2562 if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(payment_hash, commitment_number) {
2563 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2567 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
2570 let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
2573 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
2574 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2578 if tx.input.is_empty() {
2579 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
2580 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2583 let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2584 let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2585 let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2586 let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2587 let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2589 let htlcs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2590 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2591 for _ in 0..htlcs_len {
2592 let htlc = read_htlc_in_commitment!();
2593 let sigs = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2595 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
2596 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2598 htlcs.push((htlc, sigs, Readable::read(reader)?));
2603 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw,
2610 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2613 Some(read_local_tx!())
2615 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2618 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2621 Some(read_local_tx!())
2623 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2626 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
2628 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2629 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
2630 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
2631 let preimage: PaymentPreimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2632 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2633 if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
2634 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
2638 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2639 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2641 let our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2642 let mut our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2643 for _ in 0..our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf_len {
2644 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2645 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2646 let tx_material = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2648 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2649 let pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
2650 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2651 let is_htlc = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2654 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2656 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2657 TxMaterial::Revoked {
2666 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2667 let key = Readable::read(reader)?;
2668 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2669 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2670 TxMaterial::RemoteHTLC {
2678 let script = Readable::read(reader)?;
2679 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2680 let our_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
2681 let preimage = Readable::read(reader)?;
2682 let amount = Readable::read(reader)?;
2683 TxMaterial::LocalHTLC {
2685 sigs: (their_sig, our_sig),
2690 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2692 let last_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
2693 let timelock_expiration = Readable::read(reader)?;
2694 let height = Readable::read(reader)?;
2695 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf.insert(outpoint, (height_target, tx_material, last_fee, timelock_expiration, height));
2698 let waiting_threshold_conf_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2699 let mut onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(waiting_threshold_conf_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2700 for _ in 0..waiting_threshold_conf_len {
2701 let height_target = Readable::read(reader)?;
2702 let events_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
2703 let mut events = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(events_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
2704 for _ in 0..events_len {
2705 let ev = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
2707 let outpoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
2708 OnchainEvent::Claim {
2713 let htlc_source = Readable::read(reader)?;
2714 let hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
2715 OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate {
2716 htlc_update: (htlc_source, hash)
2719 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
2723 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.insert(height_target, events);
2726 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
2727 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
2730 their_htlc_base_key,
2731 their_delayed_payment_base_key,
2732 their_cur_revocation_points,
2735 their_to_self_delay,
2738 remote_claimable_outpoints,
2739 remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
2740 remote_hash_commitment_number,
2742 prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2743 current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
2744 current_remote_commitment_number,
2750 our_claim_txn_waiting_first_conf,
2752 onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf,
2764 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
2765 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
2766 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, SigHashType};
2767 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
2768 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
2769 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
2770 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
2771 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
2772 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
2774 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
2775 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, InputDescriptors};
2777 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
2778 use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
2779 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
2780 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
2781 use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
2785 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
2786 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
2787 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
2788 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
2789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2790 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2792 macro_rules! test_secrets {
2794 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
2795 for secret in secrets.iter() {
2796 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
2799 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
2800 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
2805 // insert_secret correct sequence
2806 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2809 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2810 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2811 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2814 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2815 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2816 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2819 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2820 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2821 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2824 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2825 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2826 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2829 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2830 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2831 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2834 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2835 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2836 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2839 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2840 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2841 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2844 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2845 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2846 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2851 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
2852 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2855 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2856 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2857 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2862 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2863 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2867 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
2868 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2871 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2872 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2873 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2876 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2877 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2878 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2881 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2882 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2883 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2886 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2887 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2888 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2889 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2893 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
2894 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2897 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2898 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2899 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2902 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2903 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2904 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2907 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2908 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2909 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2912 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2913 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2914 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2915 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2919 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
2920 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2923 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2924 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
2925 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2928 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2929 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
2930 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2933 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2934 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
2935 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2938 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2939 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
2940 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2943 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2944 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2945 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2948 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2949 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2950 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2953 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2954 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2955 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2958 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2959 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2960 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2961 "Previous secret did not match new one");
2965 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
2966 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2969 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2970 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2971 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2974 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2975 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2976 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2979 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2980 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2981 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2984 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2985 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2986 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2989 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2990 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
2991 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
2994 secrets.push([0; 32]);
2995 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2996 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
2997 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3001 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
3002 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3005 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3006 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3007 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3010 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3011 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3012 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3015 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3016 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3017 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3020 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3021 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3022 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3025 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3026 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
3027 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3030 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3031 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
3032 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3035 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3036 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3037 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3040 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3041 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3042 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3043 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3047 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
3048 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3051 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3052 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3053 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3056 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3057 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3058 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3061 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3062 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3063 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3066 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3067 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3068 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3071 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3072 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3073 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3076 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3077 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3078 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3081 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3082 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
3083 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3086 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3087 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
3088 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3089 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3093 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
3094 monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3097 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3098 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3099 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3102 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3103 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3104 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3107 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3108 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3109 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3112 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3113 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3114 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3117 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3118 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
3119 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3122 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3123 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
3124 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3127 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3128 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
3129 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
3132 secrets.push([0; 32]);
3133 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
3134 assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().0,
3135 "Previous secret did not match new one");
3140 fn test_prune_preimages() {
3141 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3142 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
3144 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
3145 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
3149 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
3150 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3151 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3152 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3153 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3154 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
3159 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3161 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
3163 let mut rng = thread_rng();
3165 let mut preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
3166 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage.0[..]);
3167 let hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3168 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
3172 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
3173 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3175 let mut res = Vec::new();
3176 for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
3177 res.push((HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3181 payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
3182 transaction_output_index: Some(idx as u32),
3189 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
3190 ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
3192 let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
3193 let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e.0, None, e.1) }).collect();
3199 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
3200 ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
3201 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
3202 assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
3207 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
3209 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
3210 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
3212 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
3213 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655, dummy_key);
3214 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654, dummy_key);
3215 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653, dummy_key);
3216 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652, dummy_key);
3217 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
3218 monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
3221 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
3222 let mut secret = [0; 32];
3223 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
3224 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3225 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
3226 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3227 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
3229 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
3230 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
3231 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3232 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
3233 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3234 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
3236 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
3237 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
3238 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
3239 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
3240 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3241 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
3242 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
3243 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
3245 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
3246 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
3247 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
3248 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone()).unwrap();
3249 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
3250 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
3254 fn test_claim_txn_weight_computation() {
3255 // We test Claim txn weight, knowing that we want expected weigth and
3256 // not actual case to avoid sigs and time-lock delays hell variances.
3258 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3259 let privkey = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
3260 let pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &privkey);
3261 let mut sum_actual_sigs: u64 = 0;
3263 macro_rules! sign_input {
3264 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $idx: expr, $amount: expr, $input_type: expr, $sum_actual_sigs: expr) => {
3265 let htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
3266 offered: if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC { true } else { false },
3268 cltv_expiry: 2 << 16,
3269 payment_hash: PaymentHash([1; 32]),
3270 transaction_output_index: Some($idx),
3272 let redeem_script = if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput { chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&pubkey, 256, &pubkey) } else { chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &pubkey, &pubkey, &pubkey) };
3273 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeem_script, $amount)[..]);
3274 let sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &privkey);
3275 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3276 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3277 sum_actual_sigs += $input.witness[0].len() as u64;
3278 if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput {
3279 $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
3280 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC || *$input_type == InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC {
3281 $input.witness.push(pubkey.clone().serialize().to_vec());
3282 } else if *$input_type == InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC {
3283 $input.witness.push(vec![0]);
3285 $input.witness.push(PaymentPreimage([1; 32]).0.to_vec());
3287 $input.witness.push(redeem_script.into_bytes());
3288 println!("witness[0] {}", $input.witness[0].len());
3289 println!("witness[1] {}", $input.witness[1].len());
3290 println!("witness[2] {}", $input.witness[2].len());
3294 let script_pubkey = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script();
3295 let txid = Sha256dHash::from_hex("56944c5d3f98413ef45cf54545538103cc9f298e0575820ad3591376e2e0f65d").unwrap();
3297 // Justice tx with 1 to_local, 2 revoked offered HTLCs, 1 revoked received HTLCs
3298 let mut claim_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
3300 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3301 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3305 script_sig: Script::new(),
3306 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3307 witness: Vec::new(),
3310 claim_tx.output.push(TxOut {
3311 script_pubkey: script_pubkey.clone(),
3314 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3315 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3316 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC];
3317 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3318 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3320 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3322 // Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
3323 claim_tx.input.clear();
3324 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3326 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3327 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3331 script_sig: Script::new(),
3332 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3333 witness: Vec::new(),
3336 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3337 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3338 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC, InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC];
3339 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3340 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3342 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3344 // Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
3345 claim_tx.input.clear();
3346 sum_actual_sigs = 0;
3347 claim_tx.input.push(TxIn {
3348 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
3352 script_sig: Script::new(),
3353 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
3354 witness: Vec::new(),
3356 let base_weight = claim_tx.get_weight();
3357 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&claim_tx);
3358 let inputs_des = vec![InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput];
3359 for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
3360 sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
3362 assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() as u64 - sum_actual_sigs));
3365 // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.