_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 //! The logic to monitor for on-chain transactions and create the relevant claim responses lives
   2 //! here.
   3 //!
   4 //! ChannelMonitor objects are generated by ChannelManager in response to relevant
   5 //! messages/actions, and MUST be persisted to disk (and, preferably, remotely) before progress can
   6 //! be made in responding to certain messages, see ManyChannelMonitor for more.
   7 //!
   8 //! Note that ChannelMonitors are an important part of the lightning trust model and a copy of the
   9 //! latest ChannelMonitor must always be actively monitoring for chain updates (and no out-of-date
  10 //! ChannelMonitors should do so). Thus, if you're building rust-lightning into an HSM or other
  11 //! security-domain-separated system design, you should consider having multiple paths for
  12 //! ChannelMonitors to get out of the HSM and onto monitoring devices.
  13
  14 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
  15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
  16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  17 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
  18 use bitcoin::network::serialize;
  19 use bitcoin::network::serialize::BitcoinHash;
  20 use bitcoin::network::encodable::{ConsensusDecodable, ConsensusEncodable};
  21 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
  22 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  23
  24 use crypto::digest::Digest;
  25
  26 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  27 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  28 use secp256k1;
  29
  30 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, HandleError};
  31 use ln::chan_utils;
  32 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  33 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
  34 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  35 use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
  36 use util::logger::Logger;
  37 use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, WriterWriteAdaptor, U48};
  38 use util::sha2::Sha256;
  39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
  40
  41 use std::collections::HashMap;
  42 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  43 use std::{hash,cmp, mem};
  44
  45 /// An error enum representing a failure to persist a channel monitor update.
  46 #[derive(Clone)]
  47 pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
  48         /// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
  49         /// to succeed at some point in the future).
  50         ///
  51         /// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
  52         /// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
  53         /// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
  54         /// the channel to an operational state.
  55         ///
  56         /// Note that continuing to operate when no copy of the updated ChannelMonitor could be
  57         /// persisted is unsafe - if you failed to store the update on your own local disk you should
  58         /// instead return PermanentFailure to force closure of the channel ASAP.
  59         ///
  60         /// Even when a channel has been "frozen" updates to the ChannelMonitor can continue to occur
  61         /// (eg if an inbound HTLC which we forwarded was claimed upstream resulting in us attempting
  62         /// to claim it on this channel) and those updates must be applied wherever they can be. At
  63         /// least one such updated ChannelMonitor must be persisted otherwise PermanentFailure should
  64         /// be returned to get things on-chain ASAP using only the in-memory copy. Obviously updates to
  65         /// the channel which would invalidate previous ChannelMonitors are not made when a channel has
  66         /// been "frozen".
  67         ///
  68         /// Note that even if updates made after TemporaryFailure succeed you must still call
  69         /// test_restore_channel_monitor to ensure you have the latest monitor and re-enable normal
  70         /// channel operation.
  71         TemporaryFailure,
  72         /// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
  73         /// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
  74         /// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
  75         PermanentFailure,
  76 }
  77
  78 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  79 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  80 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  81 /// server(s).
  82 ///
  83 /// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
  84 /// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
  85 /// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
  86 /// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
  87 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  88         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
  89         ///
  90         /// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
  91         /// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
  92         /// any spends of it.
  93         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
  94 }
  95
  96 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
  97 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
  98 ///
  99 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
 100 ///
 101 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
 102 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
 103 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
 104 ///
 105 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
 106 /// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
 107 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 108         #[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
 109         pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
 110         #[cfg(not(test))]
 111         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
 112         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
 113         broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
 114         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
 115         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 116 }
 117
 118 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 119         fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
 120                 let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
 121                 let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
 122                 {
 123                         let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 124                         for monitor in monitors.values_mut() {
 125                                 let (txn_outputs, spendable_outputs) = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &block_hash, &*self.broadcaster);
 126                                 if spendable_outputs.len() > 0 {
 127                                         new_events.push(events::Event::SpendableOutputs {
 128                                                 outputs: spendable_outputs,
 129                                         });
 130                                 }
 131                                 for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
 132                                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 133                                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
 134                                         }
 135                                 }
 136                         }
 137                 }
 138                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 139                 pending_events.append(&mut new_events);
 140         }
 141
 142         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
 143 }
 144
 145 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 146         /// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
 147         /// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
 148         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
 149                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
 150                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
 151                         chain_monitor,
 152                         broadcaster,
 153                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
 154                         logger,
 155                 });
 156                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
 157                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
 158                 res
 159         }
 160
 161         /// Adds or udpates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
 162         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 163                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
 164                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
 165                         Some(orig_monitor) => {
 166                                 log_trace!(self, "Updating Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_funding_option!(monitor.funding_txo));
 167                                 return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor);
 168                         },
 169                         None => {}
 170                 };
 171                 match &monitor.funding_txo {
 172                         &None => {
 173                                 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for no-funding-set channel (monitoring all txn!)");
 174                                 self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn()
 175                         },
 176                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 177                                 log_trace!(self, "Got new Channel Monitor for channel {}", log_bytes!(outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
 178                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
 179                                 self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
 180                         },
 181                 }
 182                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
 183                 Ok(())
 184         }
 185 }
 186
 187 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
 188         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
 189                 match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
 190                         Ok(_) => Ok(()),
 191                         Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
 192                 }
 193         }
 194 }
 195
 196 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
 197         fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
 198                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
 199                 let mut ret = Vec::new();
 200                 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
 201                 ret
 202         }
 203 }
 204
 205 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
 206 /// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
 207 const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
 208 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
 209 /// HTLC-Success transaction.
 210 /// In other words, this is an upper bound on how many blocks we think it can take us to get a
 211 /// transaction confirmed (and we use it in a few more, equivalent, places).
 212 pub(crate) const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
 213 /// Number of blocks by which point we expect our counterparty to have seen new blocks on the
 214 /// network and done a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance (+ we've updated all our
 215 /// copies of ChannelMonitors, including watchtowers).
 216 pub(crate) const HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
 217
 218 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 219 enum KeyStorage {
 220         PrivMode {
 221                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
 222                 htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
 223                 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey,
 224                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 225                 latest_per_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 226         },
 227         SigsMode {
 228                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
 229                 htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 230                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
 231         }
 232 }
 233
 234 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 235 struct LocalSignedTx {
 236         /// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
 237         txid: Sha256dHash,
 238         tx: Transaction,
 239         revocation_key: PublicKey,
 240         a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 241         b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 242         delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 243         feerate_per_kw: u64,
 244         htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
 245 }
 246
 247 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 248 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
 249
 250 /// A ChannelMonitor handles chain events (blocks connected and disconnected) and generates
 251 /// on-chain transactions to ensure no loss of funds occurs.
 252 ///
 253 /// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
 254 /// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
 255 #[derive(Clone)]
 256 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 257         funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
 258         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 259
 260         key_storage: KeyStorage,
 261         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 262         their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 263         // first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
 264         their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
 265
 266         our_to_self_delay: u16,
 267         their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
 268
 269         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 270         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
 271         /// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
 272         /// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
 273         /// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
 274         /// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
 275         /// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
 276         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap<Sha256dHash, (u64, Vec<Script>)>,
 277         /// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
 278         /// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
 279         /// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
 280         /// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
 281         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
 282
 283         // We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
 284         // some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
 285         // various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
 286         // transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
 287         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 288         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
 289
 290         // Used just for ChannelManager to make sure it has the latest channel data during
 291         // deserialization
 292         current_remote_commitment_number: u64,
 293
 294         payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
 295
 296         destination_script: Script,
 297
 298         // We simply modify last_block_hash in Channel's block_connected so that serialization is
 299         // consistent but hopefully the users' copy handles block_connected in a consistent way.
 300         // (we do *not*, however, update them in insert_combine to ensure any local user copies keep
 301         // their last_block_hash from its state and not based on updated copies that didn't run through
 302         // the full block_connected).
 303         pub(crate) last_block_hash: Sha256dHash,
 304         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 305         logger: Arc<Logger>,
 306 }
 307
 308 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 309 /// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
 310 /// underlying object
 311 impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
 312         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
 313                 if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
 314                         self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
 315                         self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
 316                         self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
 317                         self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
 318                         self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
 319                         self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
 320                         self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
 321                         self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
 322                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain != other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain ||
 323                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
 324                         self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 325                         self.current_remote_commitment_number != other.current_remote_commitment_number ||
 326                         self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
 327                         self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
 328                         self.destination_script != other.destination_script
 329                 {
 330                         false
 331                 } else {
 332                         for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
 333                                 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
 334                                         return false
 335                                 }
 336                         }
 337                         true
 338                 }
 339         }
 340 }
 341
 342 impl ChannelMonitor {
 343         pub(super) fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
 344                 ChannelMonitor {
 345                         funding_txo: None,
 346                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 347
 348                         key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 349                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 350                                 htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 351                                 delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 352                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: None,
 353                                 latest_per_commitment_point: None,
 354                         },
 355                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 356                         their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
 357                         their_cur_revocation_points: None,
 358
 359                         our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
 360                         their_to_self_delay: None,
 361
 362                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 363                         remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 364                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: HashMap::new(),
 365                         remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
 366
 367                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 368                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
 369                         current_remote_commitment_number: 1 << 48,
 370
 371                         payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
 372                         destination_script: destination_script,
 373
 374                         last_block_hash: Default::default(),
 375                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 376                         logger,
 377                 }
 378         }
 379
 380         #[inline]
 381         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 382                 for i in 0..48 {
 383                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 384                                 return i
 385                         }
 386                 }
 387                 48
 388         }
 389
 390         #[inline]
 391         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 392                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 393                 for i in 0..bits {
 394                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 395                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 396                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 397                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 398                                 sha.input(&res);
 399                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 400                         }
 401                 }
 402                 res
 403         }
 404
 405         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
 406         /// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
 407         /// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
 408         /// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
 409         /// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
 410         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 411                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 412                 for i in 0..pos {
 413                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 414                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 415                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
 416                         }
 417                 }
 418                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 419
 420                 if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
 421                         match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 422                                 Some(old_points) => {
 423                                         if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
 424                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 425                                         } else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
 426                                                 if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
 427                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
 428                                                 } else {
 429                                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 430                                                 }
 431                                         } else {
 432                                                 self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 433                                         }
 434                                 },
 435                                 None => {
 436                                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
 437                                 }
 438                         }
 439                 }
 440
 441                 if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
 442                         let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
 443                         let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
 444                         let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 445                         let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
 446
 447                         self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
 448                                 for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
 449                                         if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 450                                                 return true
 451                                         }
 452                                 }
 453                                 if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 454                                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 455                                                 if k == htlc.payment_hash {
 456                                                         return true
 457                                                 }
 458                                         }
 459                                 }
 460                                 let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
 461                                         if *cn < min_idx {
 462                                                 return true
 463                                         }
 464                                         true
 465                                 } else { false };
 466                                 if contains {
 467                                         remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
 468                                 }
 469                                 false
 470                         });
 471                 }
 472
 473                 Ok(())
 474         }
 475
 476         /// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
 477         /// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
 478         /// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
 479         /// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
 480         pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
 481                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 482                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 483                 // (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
 484                 // timeouts)
 485                 for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
 486                         self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
 487                 }
 488                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
 489                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = commitment_number;
 490         }
 491
 492         /// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
 493         /// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
 494         /// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
 495         /// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
 496         /// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
 497         /// Also update KeyStorage with latest local per_commitment_point to derive local_delayedkey in
 498         /// case of onchain HTLC tx
 499         pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
 500                 assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
 501                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
 502                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
 503                         txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
 504                         tx: signed_commitment_tx,
 505                         revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
 506                         a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
 507                         b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
 508                         delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
 509                         feerate_per_kw,
 510                         htlc_outputs,
 511                 });
 512                 self.key_storage = if let KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } = self.key_storage {
 513                         KeyStorage::PrivMode {
 514                                 revocation_base_key: *revocation_base_key,
 515                                 htlc_base_key: *htlc_base_key,
 516                                 delayed_payment_base_key: *delayed_payment_base_key,
 517                                 prev_latest_per_commitment_point: *latest_per_commitment_point,
 518                                 latest_per_commitment_point: Some(local_keys.per_commitment_point),
 519                         }
 520                 } else { unimplemented!(); };
 521         }
 522
 523         /// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
 524         /// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
 525         pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
 526                 self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
 527         }
 528
 529         /// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
 530         /// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
 531         /// chain for new blocks/transactions.
 532         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 533                 if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
 534                         // We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
 535                         // easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
 536                         if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
 537                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
 538                         }
 539                 } else {
 540                         self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
 541                 }
 542                 let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 543                 let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
 544                 if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
 545                         self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
 546                 }
 547                 // TODO: We should use current_remote_commitment_number and the commitment number out of
 548                 // local transactions to decide how to merge
 549                 if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
 550                         self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
 551                         for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
 552                                 self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
 553                         }
 554                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 555                                 self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 556                         }
 557                         if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 558                                 self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
 559                         }
 560                         self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
 561                 }
 562                 self.current_remote_commitment_number = cmp::min(self.current_remote_commitment_number, other.current_remote_commitment_number);
 563                 Ok(())
 564         }
 565
 566         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 567         pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 568                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 569                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 570         }
 571
 572         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 573         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 574         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 575         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 576         /// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
 577         /// value as key to add_update_monitor.
 578         pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
 579                 self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
 580         }
 581
 582         /// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
 583         pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 584                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 585                 self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
 586         }
 587
 588         pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
 589                 self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
 590         }
 591
 592         pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 593                 self.funding_txo = None;
 594         }
 595
 596         /// Gets the funding transaction outpoint of the channel this ChannelMonitor is monitoring for.
 597         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
 598                 match self.funding_txo {
 599                         Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
 600                         None => None
 601                 }
 602         }
 603
 604         /// Gets the sets of all outpoints which this ChannelMonitor expects to hear about spends of.
 605         /// Generally useful when deserializing as during normal operation the return values of
 606         /// block_connected are sufficient to ensure all relevant outpoints are being monitored (note
 607         /// that the get_funding_txo outpoint and transaction must also be monitored for!).
 608         pub fn get_monitored_outpoints(&self) -> Vec<(Sha256dHash, u32, &Script)> {
 609                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() * 2);
 610                 for (ref txid, &(_, ref outputs)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 611                         for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
 612                                 res.push(((*txid).clone(), idx as u32, output));
 613                         }
 614                 }
 615                 res
 616         }
 617
 618         /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
 619         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 620                 //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
 621                 //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
 622                 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 623                 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
 624
 625                 match &self.funding_txo {
 626                         &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
 627                                 writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
 628                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
 629                                 script.write(writer)?;
 630                         },
 631                         &None => {
 632                                 // We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
 633                                 // not much to give them.
 634                                 return Ok(());
 635                         },
 636                 }
 637
 638                 // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
 639                 U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
 640
 641                 match self.key_storage {
 642                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
 643                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 644                                 writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
 645                                 writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
 646                                 writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
 647                                 if let Some(ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point) = *prev_latest_per_commitment_point {
 648                                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 649                                         writer.write_all(&prev_latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
 650                                 } else {
 651                                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 652                                 }
 653                                 if let Some(ref latest_per_commitment_point) = *latest_per_commitment_point {
 654                                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 655                                         writer.write_all(&latest_per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
 656                                 } else {
 657                                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 658                                 }
 659
 660                         },
 661                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
 662                 }
 663
 664                 writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
 665                 writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
 666
 667                 match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
 668                         Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
 669                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
 670                                 writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
 671                                 match second_option {
 672                                         Some(second_pubkey) => {
 673                                                 writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
 674                                         },
 675                                         None => {
 676                                                 writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
 677                                         },
 678                                 }
 679                         },
 680                         None => {
 681                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 682                         },
 683                 }
 684
 685                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
 686                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
 687
 688                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 689                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 690                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 691                 }
 692
 693                 macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
 694                         ($htlc_output: expr) => {
 695                                 writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
 696                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
 697                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
 698                                 writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash)?;
 699                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index))?;
 700                         }
 701                 }
 702
 703                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
 704                 for (ref txid, ref htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
 705                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 706                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 707                         for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
 708                                 serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 709                         }
 710                 }
 711
 712                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
 713                 for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
 714                         writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
 715                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
 716                         (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
 717                         for script in txouts.iter() {
 718                                 script.write(writer)?;
 719                         }
 720                 }
 721
 722                 if for_local_storage {
 723                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
 724                         for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
 725                                 writer.write_all(*payment_hash)?;
 726                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
 727                         }
 728                 } else {
 729                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
 730                 }
 731
 732                 macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
 733                         ($local_tx: expr) => {
 734                                 if let Err(e) = $local_tx.tx.consensus_encode(&mut serialize::RawEncoder::new(WriterWriteAdaptor(writer))) {
 735                                         match e {
 736                                                 serialize::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 737                                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 738                                         }
 739                                 }
 740
 741                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
 742                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 743                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
 744                                 writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
 745
 746                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
 747                                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
 748                                 for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 749                                         serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
 750                                         writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
 751                                         writer.write_all(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx))?;
 752                                 }
 753                         }
 754                 }
 755
 756                 if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 757                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 758                         serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
 759                 } else {
 760                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 761                 }
 762
 763                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 764                         writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
 765                         serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
 766                 } else {
 767                         writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
 768                 }
 769
 770                 if for_local_storage {
 771                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
 772                 } else {
 773                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
 774                 }
 775
 776                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
 777                 for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
 778                         writer.write_all(payment_preimage)?;
 779                 }
 780
 781                 self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
 782                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
 783
 784                 Ok(())
 785         }
 786
 787         /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
 788         ///
 789         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
 790         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 791         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
 792         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
 793         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
 794         pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 795                 self.write(writer, true)
 796         }
 797
 798         /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
 799         ///
 800         /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
 801         /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
 802         /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
 803         /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
 804         /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
 805         pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 806                 self.write(writer, false)
 807         }
 808
 809         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 810         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 811
 812         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 813         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
 814                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 815                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 816                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 817                         }
 818                 }
 819                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 820                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
 821         }
 822
 823         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 824                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 825                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 826                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 827                         if idx < min {
 828                                 min = idx;
 829                         }
 830                 }
 831                 min
 832         }
 833
 834         pub(super) fn get_cur_remote_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 835                 self.current_remote_commitment_number
 836         }
 837
 838         pub(super) fn get_cur_local_commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
 839                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
 840                         0xffff_ffff_ffff - ((((local_tx.tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (local_tx.tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor)
 841                 } else { 0xffff_ffff_ffff }
 842         }
 843
 844         /// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
 845         /// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
 846         /// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
 847         /// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
 848         fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&mut self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>), Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
 849                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 850                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 851                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 852                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
 853                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
 854
 855                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
 856                 let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
 857
 858                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 859                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 860                                 match $thing {
 861                                         Ok(a) => a,
 862                                         Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
 863                                 }
 864                         };
 865                 }
 866
 867                 let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
 868                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 869                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 870                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 871                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
 872                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 873                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 874                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
 875                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
 876                                 },
 877                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
 878                                         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
 879                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
 880                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
 881                                 },
 882                         };
 883                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.unwrap()));
 884                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 885                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
 886                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 887                         };
 888
 889                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 890                         let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
 891
 892                         let mut total_value = 0;
 893                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 894                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
 895                         let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
 896
 897                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 898                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
 899                                         inputs.push(TxIn {
 900                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 901                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
 902                                                         vout: idx as u32,
 903                                                 },
 904                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 905                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 906                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 907                                         });
 908                                         htlc_idxs.push(None);
 909                                         values.push(outp.value);
 910                                         total_value += outp.value;
 911                                         break; // There can only be one of these
 912                                 }
 913                         }
 914
 915                         macro_rules! sign_input {
 916                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
 917                                         {
 918                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
 919                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 920                                                                 let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
 921                                                                         let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
 922                                                                         chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
 923                                                                 };
 924                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
 925                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 926                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
 927                                                         },
 928                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 929                                                                 unimplemented!();
 930                                                         }
 931                                                 };
 932                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 933                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 934                                                 if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
 935                                                         $input.witness.push(vec!(1));
 936                                                 } else {
 937                                                         $input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
 938                                                 }
 939                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
 940                                         }
 941                                 }
 942                         }
 943
 944                         if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
 945                                 inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
 946
 947                                 for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
 948                                         let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
 949                                         if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 950                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
 951                                                         tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 952                                                 return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 953                                         }
 954                                         let input = TxIn {
 955                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 956                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
 957                                                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 958                                                 },
 959                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 960                                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 961                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 962                                         };
 963                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 964                                                 inputs.push(input);
 965                                                 htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
 966                                                 values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
 967                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 968                                         } else {
 969                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
 970                                                         version: 2,
 971                                                         lock_time: 0,
 972                                                         input: vec![input],
 973                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
 974                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 975                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
 976                                                         }),
 977                                                 };
 978                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
 979                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
 980                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
 981                                         }
 982                                 }
 983                         }
 984
 985                         if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
 986                                 // We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
 987                                 watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
 988                                 self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
 989                         }
 990                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
 991
 992                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 993                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 994                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 995                         });
 996                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 997                                 version: 2,
 998                                 lock_time: 0,
 999                                 input: inputs,
1000                                 output: outputs,
1001                         };
1002
1003                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1004                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1005
1006                         for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
1007                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1008                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
1009                         }
1010
1011                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1012                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1013                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1014                         });
1015                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1016                 } else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
1017                         // While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
1018                         // revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
1019                         // confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
1020                         // upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
1021                         // already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
1022                         // not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
1023                         // insert it here.
1024                         watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
1025                         self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(commitment_txid, (commitment_number, tx.output.iter().map(|output| { output.script_pubkey.clone() }).collect()));
1026
1027                         if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
1028                                 let revocation_point_option =
1029                                         if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
1030                                         else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
1031                                                 if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
1032                                         } else { None };
1033                                 if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
1034                                         let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
1035                                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1036                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
1037                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
1038                                                 },
1039                                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1040                                                         (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
1041                                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
1042                                                 },
1043                                         };
1044                                         let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
1045                                                 None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs),
1046                                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
1047                                         };
1048
1049                                         let mut total_value = 0;
1050                                         let mut values = Vec::new();
1051                                         let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1052
1053                                         macro_rules! sign_input {
1054                                                 ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
1055                                                         {
1056                                                                 let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
1057                                                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
1058                                                                                 let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
1059                                                                                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
1060                                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
1061                                                                                 let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
1062                                                                                 (self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
1063                                                                         },
1064                                                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1065                                                                                 unimplemented!();
1066                                                                         }
1067                                                                 };
1068                                                                 $input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1069                                                                 $input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1070                                                                 $input.witness.push($preimage);
1071                                                                 $input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1072                                                         }
1073                                                 }
1074                                         }
1075
1076                                         for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
1077                                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1078                                                         let input = TxIn {
1079                                                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1080                                                                         txid: commitment_txid,
1081                                                                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
1082                                                                 },
1083                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1084                                                                 sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
1085                                                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1086                                                         };
1087                                                         if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
1088                                                                 inputs.push(input);
1089                                                                 values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
1090                                                                 total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
1091                                                         } else {
1092                                                                 let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
1093                                                                         version: 2,
1094                                                                         lock_time: 0,
1095                                                                         input: vec![input],
1096                                                                         output: vec!(TxOut {
1097                                                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1098                                                                                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
1099                                                                         }),
1100                                                                 };
1101                                                                 let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
1102                                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
1103                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1104                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1105                                                                         output: single_htlc_tx.output[0].clone(),
1106                                                                 });
1107                                                                 txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
1108                                                         }
1109                                                 }
1110                                         }
1111
1112                                         if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
1113
1114                                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1115                                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1116                                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
1117                                         });
1118                                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1119                                                 version: 2,
1120                                                 lock_time: 0,
1121                                                 input: inputs,
1122                                                 output: outputs,
1123                                         };
1124
1125                                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
1126                                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1127
1128                                         for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
1129                                                 let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
1130                                                 sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
1131                                         }
1132
1133                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
1134                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1135                                                 output: spend_tx.output[0].clone(),
1136                                         });
1137                                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
1138                                 }
1139                         }
1140                 }
1141
1142                 (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs), spendable_outputs)
1143         }
1144
1145         /// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
1146         fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> (Option<Transaction>, Option<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1147                 if tx.input.len() != 1 || tx.output.len() != 1 {
1148                         return (None, None)
1149                 }
1150
1151                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
1152                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
1153                                 match $thing {
1154                                         Ok(a) => a,
1155                                         Err(_) => return (None, None)
1156                                 }
1157                         };
1158                 }
1159
1160                 let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
1161                 let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
1162                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
1163                 let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
1164                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1165                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
1166                         },
1167                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1168                                 ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
1169                         },
1170                 };
1171                 let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
1172                         None => return (None, None),
1173                         Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
1174                 };
1175                 let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
1176                 let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1177                 let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
1178
1179                 let mut inputs = Vec::new();
1180                 let mut amount = 0;
1181
1182                 if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
1183                         inputs.push(TxIn {
1184                                 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
1185                                         txid: htlc_txid,
1186                                         vout: 0,
1187                                 },
1188                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1189                                 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
1190                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1191                         });
1192                         amount = tx.output[0].value;
1193                 }
1194
1195                 if !inputs.is_empty() {
1196                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
1197                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
1198                                 value: amount, //TODO: - fee
1199                         });
1200
1201                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
1202                                 version: 2,
1203                                 lock_time: 0,
1204                                 input: inputs,
1205                                 output: outputs,
1206                         };
1207
1208                         let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
1209
1210                         let sig = match self.key_storage {
1211                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
1212                                         let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
1213                                         let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
1214                                         self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
1215                                 }
1216                                 KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1217                                         unimplemented!();
1218                                 }
1219                         };
1220                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1221                         spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1222                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
1223                         spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
1224
1225                         let outpoint = BitcoinOutPoint { txid: spend_tx.txid(), vout: 0 };
1226                         let output = spend_tx.output[0].clone();
1227                         (Some(spend_tx), Some(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput { outpoint, output }))
1228                 } else { (None, None) }
1229         }
1230
1231         fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx, per_commitment_point: &Option<PublicKey>, delayed_payment_base_key: &Option<SecretKey>) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1232                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1233                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
1234
1235                 for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1236                         if htlc.offered {
1237                                 let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1238
1239                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1240
1241                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1242                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1243                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1244                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1245
1246                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1247                                 htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1248
1249                                 if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1250                                         if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1251                                                 if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1252                                                         spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1253                                                                 outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_timeout_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1254                                                                 local_delayedkey,
1255                                                                 witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1256                                                                 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1257                                                         });
1258                                                 }
1259                                         }
1260                                 }
1261                                 res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
1262                         } else {
1263                                 if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
1264                                         let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
1265
1266                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
1267
1268                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1269                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1270                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
1271                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
1272
1273                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
1274                                         htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
1275
1276                                         if let Some(ref per_commitment_point) = *per_commitment_point {
1277                                                 if let Some(ref delayed_payment_base_key) = *delayed_payment_base_key {
1278                                                         if let Ok(local_delayedkey) = chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base_key) {
1279                                                                 spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::DynamicOutput {
1280                                                                         outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: htlc_success_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
1281                                                                         local_delayedkey,
1282                                                                         witness_script: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&local_tx.revocation_key, self.our_to_self_delay, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key),
1283                                                                         to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay
1284                                                                 });
1285                                                         }
1286                                                 }
1287                                         }
1288                                         res.push(htlc_success_tx);
1289                                 }
1290                         }
1291                 }
1292
1293                 (res, spendable_outputs)
1294         }
1295
1296         /// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
1297         /// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
1298         /// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
1299         fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1300                 let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
1301                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1302                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1303                                 match self.key_storage {
1304                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1305                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1306                                         },
1307                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1308                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1309                                         }
1310                                 }
1311                         }
1312                 }
1313                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1314                         if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
1315                                 match self.key_storage {
1316                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1317                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1318                                         },
1319                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1320                                                 return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, &None, &None);
1321                                         }
1322                                 }
1323                         }
1324                 }
1325                 (Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1326         }
1327
1328         /// Used by ChannelManager deserialization to broadcast the latest local state if it's copy of
1329         /// the Channel was out-of-date.
1330         pub(super) fn get_latest_local_commitment_txn(&self) -> Vec<Transaction> {
1331                 if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1332                         let mut res = vec![local_tx.tx.clone()];
1333                         match self.key_storage {
1334                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref prev_latest_per_commitment_point, .. } => {
1335                                         res.append(&mut self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx, prev_latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key)).0);
1336                                 },
1337                                 _ => panic!("Can only broadcast by local channelmonitor"),
1338                         };
1339                         res
1340                 } else {
1341                         Vec::new()
1342                 }
1343         }
1344
1345         fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>) {
1346                 let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
1347                 let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
1348                 for tx in txn_matched {
1349                         if tx.input.len() == 1 {
1350                                 // Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
1351                                 // commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
1352                                 // which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
1353                                 // filters.
1354                                 let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
1355                                 let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
1356                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
1357                                         let (remote_txn, new_outputs, mut spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
1358                                         txn = remote_txn;
1359                                         spendable_outputs.append(&mut spendable_output);
1360                                         if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
1361                                                 watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
1362                                         }
1363                                         if txn.is_empty() {
1364                                                 let (remote_txn, mut outputs) = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
1365                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1366                                                 txn = remote_txn;
1367                                         }
1368                                 } else {
1369                                         if let Some(&(commitment_number, _)) = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
1370                                                 let (tx, spendable_output) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, commitment_number);
1371                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx {
1372                                                         txn.push(tx);
1373                                                 }
1374                                                 if let Some(spendable_output) = spendable_output {
1375                                                         spendable_outputs.push(spendable_output);
1376                                                 }
1377                                         }
1378                                 }
1379                                 for tx in txn.iter() {
1380                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
1381                                 }
1382                         }
1383                 }
1384                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1385                         if self.would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
1386                                 broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
1387                                 match self.key_storage {
1388                                         KeyStorage::PrivMode { revocation_base_key: _, htlc_base_key: _, ref delayed_payment_base_key, prev_latest_per_commitment_point: _, ref latest_per_commitment_point } => {
1389                                                 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, latest_per_commitment_point, &Some(*delayed_payment_base_key));
1390                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1391                                                 for tx in txs {
1392                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1393                                                 }
1394                                         },
1395                                         KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
1396                                                 let (txs, mut outputs) = self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx, &None, &None);
1397                                                 spendable_outputs.append(&mut outputs);
1398                                                 for tx in txs {
1399                                                         broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1400                                                 }
1401                                         }
1402                                 }
1403                         }
1404                 }
1405                 self.last_block_hash = block_hash.clone();
1406                 (watch_outputs, spendable_outputs)
1407         }
1408
1409         pub(super) fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
1410                 if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
1411                         for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
1412                                 // For inbound HTLCs which we know the preimage for, we have to ensure we hit the
1413                                 // chain with enough room to claim the HTLC without our counterparty being able to
1414                                 // time out the HTLC first.
1415                                 // For outbound HTLCs which our counterparty hasn't failed/claimed, our primary
1416                                 // concern is being able to claim the corresponding inbound HTLC (on another
1417                                 // channel) before it expires. In fact, we don't even really care if our
1418                                 // counterparty here claims such an outbound HTLC after it expired as long as we
1419                                 // can still claim the corresponding HTLC. Thus, to avoid needlessly hitting the
1420                                 // chain when our counterparty is waiting for expiration to off-chain fail an HTLC
1421                                 // we give ourselves a few blocks of headroom after expiration before going
1422                                 // on-chain for an expired HTLC.
1423                                 // Note that, to avoid a potential attack whereby a node delays claiming an HTLC
1424                                 // from us until we've reached the point where we go on-chain with the
1425                                 // corresponding inbound HTLC, we must ensure that outbound HTLCs go on chain at
1426                                 // least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER blocks prior to the inbound HTLC.
1427                                 //  aka outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS == height - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1428                                 //      inbound_cltv == height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1429                                 //      outbound_cltv + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
1430                                 //      HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= inbound_cltv - outbound_cltv
1431                                 //      HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS + 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFER <= CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA
1432                                 if ( htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry + HTLC_FAIL_TIMEOUT_BLOCKS <= height) ||
1433                                    (!htlc.offered && htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER && self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash)) {
1434                                         return true;
1435                                 }
1436                         }
1437                 }
1438                 false
1439         }
1440 }
1441
1442 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
1443
1444 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
1445         fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
1446                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1447                 macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
1448                         ($key: expr) => {
1449                                 match $key {
1450                                         Ok(res) => res,
1451                                         Err(_) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1452                                 }
1453                         }
1454                 }
1455
1456                 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1457                 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1458                 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
1459                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
1460                 }
1461
1462                 // Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
1463                 // barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
1464                 let outpoint = OutPoint {
1465                         txid: Readable::read(reader)?,
1466                         index: Readable::read(reader)?,
1467                 };
1468                 let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Readable::read(reader)?));
1469                 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1470
1471                 let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1472                         0 => {
1473                                 let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1474                                 let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1475                                 let delayed_payment_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1476                                 let prev_latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1477                                         0 => None,
1478                                         1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1479                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1480                                 };
1481                                 let latest_per_commitment_point = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1482                                         0 => None,
1483                                         1 => Some(Readable::read(reader)?),
1484                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1485                                 };
1486                                 KeyStorage::PrivMode {
1487                                         revocation_base_key,
1488                                         htlc_base_key,
1489                                         delayed_payment_base_key,
1490                                         prev_latest_per_commitment_point,
1491                                         latest_per_commitment_point,
1492                                 }
1493                         },
1494                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1495                 };
1496
1497                 let their_htlc_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1498                 let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1499
1500                 let their_cur_revocation_points = {
1501                         let first_idx = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1502                         if first_idx == 0 {
1503                                 None
1504                         } else {
1505                                 let first_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
1506                                 let second_point_slice: [u8; 33] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1507                                 if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
1508                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
1509                                 } else {
1510                                         Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &second_point_slice)))))
1511                                 }
1512                         }
1513                 };
1514
1515                 let our_to_self_delay: u16 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1516                 let their_to_self_delay: Option<u16> = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
1517
1518                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
1519                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
1520                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
1521                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
1522                 }
1523
1524                 macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
1525                         () => {
1526                                 {
1527                                         let offered: bool = Readable::read(reader)?;
1528                                         let amount_msat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1529                                         let cltv_expiry: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1530                                         let payment_hash: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1531                                         let transaction_output_index: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1532
1533                                         HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1534                                                 offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
1535                                         }
1536                                 }
1537                         }
1538                 }
1539
1540                 let remote_claimable_outpoints_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1541                 let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 64));
1542                 for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
1543                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1544                         let outputs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1545                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1546                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1547                                 outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
1548                         }
1549                         if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
1550                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1551                         }
1552                 }
1553
1554                 let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1555                 let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1556                 for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
1557                         let txid: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1558                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1559                         let outputs_count = <u64 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?;
1560                         let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(outputs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8));
1561                         for _ in 0..outputs_count {
1562                                 outputs.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
1563                         }
1564                         if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, (commitment_number, outputs)) {
1565                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1566                         }
1567                 }
1568
1569                 let remote_hash_commitment_number_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1570                 let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1571                 for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
1572                         let txid: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1573                         let commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1574                         if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
1575                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1576                         }
1577                 }
1578
1579                 macro_rules! read_local_tx {
1580                         () => {
1581                                 {
1582                                         let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(&mut serialize::RawDecoder::new(reader.by_ref())) {
1583                                                 Ok(tx) => tx,
1584                                                 Err(e) => match e {
1585                                                         serialize::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
1586                                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1587                                                 },
1588                                         };
1589
1590                                         if tx.input.is_empty() {
1591                                                 // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
1592                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1593                                         }
1594
1595                                         let revocation_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1596                                         let a_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1597                                         let b_htlc_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1598                                         let delayed_payment_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
1599                                         let feerate_per_kw: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1600
1601                                         let htlc_outputs_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1602                                         let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlc_outputs_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 128));
1603                                         for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
1604                                                 htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(), Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
1605                                         }
1606
1607                                         LocalSignedTx {
1608                                                 txid: tx.txid(),
1609                                                 tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
1610                                         }
1611                                 }
1612                         }
1613                 }
1614
1615                 let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1616                         0 => None,
1617                         1 => {
1618                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
1619                         },
1620                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1621                 };
1622
1623                 let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
1624                         0 => None,
1625                         1 => {
1626                                 Some(read_local_tx!())
1627                         },
1628                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
1629                 };
1630
1631                 let current_remote_commitment_number = <U48 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)?.0;
1632
1633                 let payment_preimages_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
1634                 let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(payment_preimages_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 32));
1635                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
1636                 for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
1637                         let preimage: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(reader)?;
1638                         sha.reset();
1639                         sha.input(&preimage);
1640                         let mut hash = [0; 32];
1641                         sha.result(&mut hash);
1642                         if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
1643                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
1644                         }
1645                 }
1646
1647                 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
1648                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
1649
1650                 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), ChannelMonitor {
1651                         funding_txo,
1652                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
1653
1654                         key_storage,
1655                         their_htlc_base_key,
1656                         their_delayed_payment_base_key,
1657                         their_cur_revocation_points,
1658
1659                         our_to_self_delay,
1660                         their_to_self_delay,
1661
1662                         old_secrets,
1663                         remote_claimable_outpoints,
1664                         remote_commitment_txn_on_chain,
1665                         remote_hash_commitment_number,
1666
1667                         prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1668                         current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
1669                         current_remote_commitment_number,
1670
1671                         payment_preimages,
1672
1673                         destination_script,
1674                         last_block_hash,
1675                         secp_ctx,
1676                         logger,
1677                 }))
1678         }
1679
1680 }
1681
1682 #[cfg(test)]
1683 mod tests {
1684         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
1685         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
1686         use crypto::digest::Digest;
1687         use hex;
1688         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1689         use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
1690         use util::sha2::Sha256;
1691         use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
1692         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
1693         use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
1694         use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
1695         use std::sync::Arc;
1696
1697         #[test]
1698         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1699                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1700                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1701                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
1702                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1703                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
1704
1705                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1706                         () => {
1707                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1708                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1709                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1710                                         idx -= 1;
1711                                 }
1712                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1713                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
1714                         };
1715                 }
1716
1717                 {
1718                         // insert_secret correct sequence
1719                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1720                         secrets.clear();
1721
1722                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1723                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1724                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1725                         test_secrets!();
1726
1727                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1728                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1729                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1730                         test_secrets!();
1731
1732                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1733                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1734                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1735                         test_secrets!();
1736
1737                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1738                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1739                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1740                         test_secrets!();
1741
1742                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1743                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1744                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1745                         test_secrets!();
1746
1747                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1748                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1749                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1750                         test_secrets!();
1751
1752                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1753                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1754                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1755                         test_secrets!();
1756
1757                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1758                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1759                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1760                         test_secrets!();
1761                 }
1762
1763                 {
1764                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1765                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1766                         secrets.clear();
1767
1768                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1769                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1770                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1771                         test_secrets!();
1772
1773                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1774                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1775                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1776                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1777                 }
1778
1779                 {
1780                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1781                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1782                         secrets.clear();
1783
1784                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1785                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1786                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1787                         test_secrets!();
1788
1789                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1790                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1791                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1792                         test_secrets!();
1793
1794                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1795                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1796                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1797                         test_secrets!();
1798
1799                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1800                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1801                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1802                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1803                 }
1804
1805                 {
1806                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1807                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1808                         secrets.clear();
1809
1810                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1811                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1812                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1813                         test_secrets!();
1814
1815                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1816                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1817                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1818                         test_secrets!();
1819
1820                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1821                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1822                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1823                         test_secrets!();
1824
1825                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1826                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1827                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1828                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1829                 }
1830
1831                 {
1832                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1833                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1834                         secrets.clear();
1835
1836                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1837                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1838                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1839                         test_secrets!();
1840
1841                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1842                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1843                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1844                         test_secrets!();
1845
1846                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1847                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1848                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1849                         test_secrets!();
1850
1851                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1852                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1853                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1854                         test_secrets!();
1855
1856                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1857                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1858                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1859                         test_secrets!();
1860
1861                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1862                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1863                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1864                         test_secrets!();
1865
1866                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1867                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1868                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1869                         test_secrets!();
1870
1871                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1872                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1873                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1874                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1875                 }
1876
1877                 {
1878                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1879                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1880                         secrets.clear();
1881
1882                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1883                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1884                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1885                         test_secrets!();
1886
1887                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1888                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1889                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1890                         test_secrets!();
1891
1892                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1893                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1894                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1895                         test_secrets!();
1896
1897                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1898                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1899                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1900                         test_secrets!();
1901
1902                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1903                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1904                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1905                         test_secrets!();
1906
1907                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1908                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1909                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1910                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1911                 }
1912
1913                 {
1914                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1915                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1916                         secrets.clear();
1917
1918                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1919                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1920                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1921                         test_secrets!();
1922
1923                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1924                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1925                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1926                         test_secrets!();
1927
1928                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1929                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1930                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1931                         test_secrets!();
1932
1933                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1934                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1935                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1936                         test_secrets!();
1937
1938                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1939                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1940                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1941                         test_secrets!();
1942
1943                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1944                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1945                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1946                         test_secrets!();
1947
1948                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1949                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1950                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1951                         test_secrets!();
1952
1953                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1954                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1955                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
1956                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
1957                 }
1958
1959                 {
1960                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1961                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
1962                         secrets.clear();
1963
1964                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1965                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1966                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1967                         test_secrets!();
1968
1969                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1970                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1971                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1972                         test_secrets!();
1973
1974                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1975                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1976                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1977                         test_secrets!();
1978
1979                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1980                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1981                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1982                         test_secrets!();
1983
1984                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1985                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1986                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1987                         test_secrets!();
1988
1989                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1990                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1991                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1992                         test_secrets!();
1993
1994                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1995                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1996                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
1997                         test_secrets!();
1998
1999                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2000                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
2001                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
2002                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2003                 }
2004
2005                 {
2006                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
2007                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2008                         secrets.clear();
2009
2010                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2011                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2012                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2013                         test_secrets!();
2014
2015                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2016                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2017                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2018                         test_secrets!();
2019
2020                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2021                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2022                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2023                         test_secrets!();
2024
2025                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2026                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2027                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2028                         test_secrets!();
2029
2030                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2031                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
2032                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2033                         test_secrets!();
2034
2035                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2036                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
2037                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2038                         test_secrets!();
2039
2040                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2041                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
2042                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
2043                         test_secrets!();
2044
2045                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
2046                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
2047                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
2048                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
2049                 }
2050         }
2051
2052         #[test]
2053         fn test_prune_preimages() {
2054                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2055                 let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
2056                 let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
2057
2058                 macro_rules! dummy_keys {
2059                         () => {
2060                                 {
2061                                         let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
2062                                         TxCreationKeys {
2063                                                 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
2064                                                 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2065                                                 a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2066                                                 b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2067                                                 a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2068                                                 b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
2069                                         }
2070                                 }
2071                         }
2072                 }
2073                 let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
2074
2075                 let mut preimages = Vec::new();
2076                 {
2077                         let mut rng  = thread_rng();
2078                         for _ in 0..20 {
2079                                 let mut preimage = [0; 32];
2080                                 rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
2081                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
2082                                 sha.input(&preimage);
2083                                 let mut hash = [0; 32];
2084                                 sha.result(&mut hash);
2085                                 preimages.push((preimage, hash));
2086                         }
2087                 }
2088
2089                 macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
2090                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2091                                 {
2092                                         let mut res = Vec::new();
2093                                         for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
2094                                                 res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2095                                                         offered: true,
2096                                                         amount_msat: 0,
2097                                                         cltv_expiry: 0,
2098                                                         payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
2099                                                         transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
2100                                                 });
2101                                         }
2102                                         res
2103                                 }
2104                         }
2105                 }
2106                 macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
2107                         ($preimages_slice: expr) => {
2108                                 {
2109                                         let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
2110                                         let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
2111                                         res
2112                                 }
2113                         }
2114                 }
2115
2116                 macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
2117                         ($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
2118                                 for preimage in $preimages_slice {
2119                                         assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
2120                                 }
2121                         }
2122                 }
2123
2124                 // Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
2125                 // old state.
2126                 let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[44; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
2127                 monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
2128
2129                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
2130                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
2131                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
2132                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
2133                 monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
2134                 for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
2135                         monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
2136                 }
2137
2138                 // Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
2139                 let mut secret = [0; 32];
2140                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
2141                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2142                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
2143                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2144                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
2145
2146                 // Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
2147                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
2148                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2149                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
2150                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2151                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
2152
2153                 // Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
2154                 // previous commitment tx's preimages too
2155                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
2156                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
2157                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2158                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
2159                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
2160                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
2161
2162                 // But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
2163                 monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
2164                 secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
2165                 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
2166                 assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
2167                 test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
2168         }
2169
2170         // Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
2171 }