_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - src/ln/channelmonitor.rs

   1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
   2 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
   3 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
   4 use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
   5 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
   6
   7 use crypto::sha2::Sha256;
   8 use crypto::digest::Digest;
   9
  10 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
  11 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
  12
  13 use ln::msgs::HandleError;
  14 use ln::chan_utils;
  15 use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
  16 use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener,ChainWatchInterface};
  17
  18 use std::collections::HashMap;
  19 use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
  20 use std::{hash,cmp};
  21
  22 /// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
  23 /// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
  24 /// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
  25 /// server(s).
  26 pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
  27         /// Adds or updates a monitor for the given funding_txid+funding_output_index.
  28         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError>;
  29 }
  30
  31 /// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
  32 /// watchtower or watch our own channels.
  33 /// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
  34 /// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
  35 /// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
  36 /// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
  37 /// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
  38 /// (Sha256dHash, u16) as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
  39 pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  40         monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
  41         chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
  42 }
  43
  44 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  45         fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
  46                 let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  47                 for monitor in monitors.values() {
  48                         monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.chain_monitor);
  49                 }
  50         }
  51
  52         fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
  53 }
  54
  55 impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
  56         pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
  57                 let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
  58                         monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
  59                         chain_monitor: chain_monitor,
  60                 });
  61                 let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
  62                 res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
  63                 res
  64         }
  65
  66         pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
  67                 let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
  68                 match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
  69                         Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
  70                         None => {}
  71                 };
  72                 match monitor.funding_txo {
  73                         None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
  74                         Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index)) => self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((funding_txid, funding_output_index as u32)),
  75                 }
  76                 monitors.insert(key, monitor);
  77                 Ok(())
  78         }
  79 }
  80
  81 impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
  82         fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: (Sha256dHash, u16), monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
  83                 self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor)
  84         }
  85 }
  86
  87 /// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it directly, instead broadcast
  88 /// the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction and claim the revocation from that.
  89 const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
  90
  91 #[derive(Clone)]
  92 enum RevocationStorage {
  93         PrivMode {
  94                 revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
  95         },
  96         SigsMode {
  97                 revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
  98                 sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
  99         }
 100 }
 101
 102 #[derive(Clone)]
 103 struct PerCommitmentTransactionData {
 104         revoked_output_index: u32,
 105         htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>,
 106 }
 107
 108 #[derive(Clone)]
 109 pub struct ChannelMonitor {
 110         funding_txo: Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)>,
 111         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
 112
 113         revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage,
 114         delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
 115         htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
 116         their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
 117         to_self_delay: u16,
 118
 119         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
 120         claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, PerCommitmentTransactionData>,
 121         payment_preimages: Vec<[u8; 32]>,
 122
 123         destination_script: Script,
 124         secp_ctx: Secp256k1, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
 125 }
 126
 127 impl ChannelMonitor {
 128         pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
 129                 ChannelMonitor {
 130                         funding_txo: None,
 131                         commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
 132
 133                         revocation_base_key: RevocationStorage::PrivMode {
 134                                 revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
 135                         },
 136                         delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
 137                         htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
 138                         their_htlc_base_key: None,
 139                         to_self_delay: to_self_delay,
 140
 141                         old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
 142                         claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
 143                         payment_preimages: Vec::new(),
 144
 145                         destination_script: destination_script,
 146                         secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
 147                 }
 148         }
 149
 150         #[inline]
 151         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 152                 for i in 0..48 {
 153                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 154                                 return i
 155                         }
 156                 }
 157                 48
 158         }
 159
 160         #[inline]
 161         fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 162                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 163                 for i in 0..bits {
 164                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 165                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 166                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 167                                 let mut sha = Sha256::new();
 168                                 sha.input(&res);
 169                                 sha.result(&mut res);
 170                         }
 171                 }
 172                 res
 173         }
 174
 175         /// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Requires the revocation_base_key of
 176         /// the node which we are monitoring the channel on behalf of in order to generate signatures
 177         /// over revocation-claim transactions.
 178         pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 179                 let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
 180                 for i in 0..pos {
 181                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 182                         if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 183                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", msg: None})
 184                         }
 185                 }
 186                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 187                 Ok(())
 188         }
 189
 190         /// Informs this watcher of the set of HTLC outputs in a commitment transaction which our
 191         /// counterparty may broadcast. This allows us to reconstruct the commitment transaction's
 192         /// outputs fully, claiming revoked, unexpired HTLC outputs as well as revoked refund outputs.
 193         /// TODO: Doc new params!
 194         /// TODO: This seems to be wrong...we should be calling this from commitment_signed, but we
 195         /// should be calling this about remote transactions, ie ones that they can revoke_and_ack...
 196         pub fn provide_tx_info(&mut self, commitment_tx: &Transaction, revokeable_out_index: u32, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature)>) {
 197                 // TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
 198                 // so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
 199                 self.claimable_outpoints.insert(commitment_tx.txid(), PerCommitmentTransactionData{
 200                         revoked_output_index: revokeable_out_index,
 201                         htlcs: htlc_outputs
 202                 });
 203         }
 204
 205         pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
 206                 match self.funding_txo {
 207                         Some(txo) => if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.unwrap() != txo {
 208                                 return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", msg: None});
 209                         },
 210                         None => if other.funding_txo.is_some() {
 211                                 self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo;
 212                         }
 213                 }
 214                 let other_max_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
 215                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() > other_max_secret {
 216                         self.provide_secret(other_max_secret, other.get_secret(other_max_secret).unwrap())
 217                 } else { Ok(()) }
 218         }
 219
 220         /// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
 221         pub fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
 222                 assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
 223                 self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 224         }
 225
 226         /// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
 227         /// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
 228         /// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
 229         /// provides slightly better privacy.
 230         pub fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_txid: Sha256dHash, funding_output_index: u16) {
 231                 self.funding_txo = Some((funding_txid, funding_output_index));
 232         }
 233
 234         pub fn set_their_htlc_base_key(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey) {
 235                 self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
 236         }
 237
 238         pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
 239                 self.funding_txo = None;
 240         }
 241
 242         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<(Sha256dHash, u16)> {
 243                 self.funding_txo
 244         }
 245
 246         //TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
 247         //we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
 248
 249         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 250         pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
 251                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 252                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 253                                 return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 254                         }
 255                 }
 256                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 257                 Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", msg: None})
 258         }
 259
 260         pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 261                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 262                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 263                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 264                         if idx < min {
 265                                 min = idx;
 266                         }
 267                 }
 268                 min
 269         }
 270
 271         #[inline]
 272         fn check_spend_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
 273                 // Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
 274                 // a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
 275                 macro_rules! ignore_error {
 276                         ( $thing : expr ) => {
 277                                 match $thing {
 278                                         Ok(a) => a,
 279                                         Err(_) => return Vec::new()
 280                                 }
 281                         };
 282                 }
 283
 284                 let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
 285
 286                 let commitment_number = (((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
 287                 if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
 288                         let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
 289                         let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
 290                         let revocation_pubkey = match self.revocation_base_key {
 291                                 RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
 292                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))))
 293                                 },
 294                                 RevocationStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
 295                                         ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &revocation_base_key))
 296                                 },
 297                         };
 298                         let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
 299                         let a_htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &self.htlc_base_key));
 300                         let b_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
 301                                 None => return Vec::new(),
 302                                 Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &ignore_error!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key)), &their_htlc_base_key)),
 303                         };
 304
 305                         let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
 306
 307                         let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
 308
 309                         let mut total_value = 0;
 310                         let mut values = Vec::new();
 311                         let inputs = match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
 312                                 Some(per_commitment_data) => {
 313                                         let mut inp = Vec::with_capacity(per_commitment_data.htlcs.len() + 1);
 314
 315                                         if per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 316                                                 return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, not much we can do
 317                                         }
 318
 319                                         inp.push(TxIn {
 320                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 321                                                 prev_index: per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index,
 322                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 323                                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
 324                                         });
 325                                         values.push(tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value);
 326                                         total_value += tx.output[per_commitment_data.revoked_output_index as usize].value;
 327
 328                                         for &(ref htlc, ref _next_tx_sig) in per_commitment_data.htlcs.iter() {
 329                                                 let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey, htlc.offered);
 330                                                 if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
 331                                                                 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
 332                                                                 tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 333                                                         return Vec::new(); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
 334                                                 }
 335                                                 if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
 336                                                         inp.push(TxIn {
 337                                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 338                                                                 prev_index: htlc.transaction_output_index,
 339                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 340                                                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
 341                                                         });
 342                                                         values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
 343                                                         total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
 344                                                 } else {
 345                                                         //TODO: Mark as "bad"
 346                                                         //then broadcast using next_tx_sig
 347                                                 }
 348                                         }
 349                                         inp
 350                                 }, None => {
 351                                         let mut inp = Vec::new(); // This is unlikely to succeed
 352                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
 353                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh() {
 354                                                         inp.push(TxIn {
 355                                                                 prev_hash: commitment_txid,
 356                                                                 prev_index: idx as u32,
 357                                                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 358                                                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
 359                                                         });
 360                                                         values.push(outp.value);
 361                                                         total_value += outp.value;
 362                                                         break; // There can only be one of these
 363                                                 }
 364                                         }
 365                                         if inp.is_empty() { return Vec::new(); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive
 366                                         inp
 367                                 }
 368                         };
 369
 370                         let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
 371                                 script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
 372                                 value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
 373                         });
 374                         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 375                                 version: 2,
 376                                 lock_time: 0,
 377                                 input: inputs,
 378                                 output: outputs,
 379                                 witness: Vec::new(),
 380                         };
 381
 382                         let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
 383
 384                         // First input is the generic revokeable_redeemscript
 385                         // TODO: Make one SighashComponents and use that throughout instead of re-building it
 386                         // each time.
 387                         {
 388                                 let sig = match self.revocation_base_key {
 389                                         RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
 390                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx, 0, &revokeable_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..]));
 391                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 392                                                 ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
 393                                         },
 394                                         RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 395                                                 unimplemented!();
 396                                         }
 397                                 };
 398
 399                                 spend_tx.witness.push(Vec::new());
 400                                 spend_tx.witness[0].push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 401                                 spend_tx.witness[0][0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 402                                 spend_tx.witness[0].push(vec!(1)); // First if branch is revocation_key
 403                         }
 404
 405                         match self.claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid) {
 406                                 None => {},
 407                                 Some(per_commitment_data) => {
 408                                         let mut htlc_idx = 0;
 409                                         for (idx, _) in spend_tx.input.iter().enumerate() {
 410                                                 if idx == 0 { continue; } // We already signed the first input
 411
 412                                                 let mut htlc;
 413                                                 while {
 414                                                         htlc = &per_commitment_data.htlcs[htlc_idx].0;
 415                                                         htlc_idx += 1;
 416                                                         htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER
 417                                                 } {}
 418
 419                                                 let sig = match self.revocation_base_key {
 420                                                         RevocationStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key } => {
 421                                                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey, htlc.offered);
 422                                                                 let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx).sighash_all(&spend_tx, idx, &htlc_redeemscript, values_drain.next().unwrap())[..]));
 423
 424                                                                 let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
 425                                                                 ignore_error!(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key))
 426                                                         },
 427                                                         RevocationStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
 428                                                                 unimplemented!();
 429                                                         }
 430                                                 };
 431
 432                                                 spend_tx.witness.push(Vec::new());
 433                                                 spend_tx.witness[0].push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec()); // First if branch is revocation_key
 434                                                 spend_tx.witness[0].push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
 435                                                 spend_tx.witness[0][0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 436                                         }
 437                                 }
 438                         }
 439
 440                         txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
 441                 }
 442
 443                 txn_to_broadcast
 444         }
 445
 446         fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, chain_monitor: &ChainWatchInterface) {
 447                 for tx in txn_matched {
 448                         if tx.input.len() != 1 {
 449                                 // We currently only ever sign something spending a commitment or HTLC
 450                                 // transaction with 1 input, so we can skip most transactions trivially.
 451                                 continue;
 452                         }
 453
 454                         for txin in tx.input.iter() {
 455                                 if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (txin.prev_hash == self.funding_txo.unwrap().0 && txin.prev_index == self.funding_txo.unwrap().1 as u32) {
 456                                         for tx in self.check_spend_transaction(tx, height).iter() {
 457                                                 chain_monitor.broadcast_transaction(tx);
 458                                         }
 459                                 }
 460                         }
 461                 }
 462         }
 463 }
 464
 465 #[cfg(test)]
 466 mod tests {
 467         use bitcoin::util::misc::hex_bytes;
 468         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
 469         use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
 470         use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
 471         use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
 472
 473         #[test]
 474         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 475                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 476                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 477                 let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
 478                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 479
 480                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 481                         () => {
 482                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 483                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 484                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 485                                         idx -= 1;
 486                                 }
 487                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 488                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
 489                         };
 490                 }
 491
 492                 {
 493                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 494                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 495                         secrets.clear();
 496
 497                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 498                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 499                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 500                         test_secrets!();
 501
 502                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 503                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 504                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 505                         test_secrets!();
 506
 507                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 508                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 509                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 510                         test_secrets!();
 511
 512                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 513                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 514                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 515                         test_secrets!();
 516
 517                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 518                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 519                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 520                         test_secrets!();
 521
 522                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 523                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 524                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 525                         test_secrets!();
 526
 527                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 528                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 529                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 530                         test_secrets!();
 531
 532                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 533                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 534                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 535                         test_secrets!();
 536                 }
 537
 538                 {
 539                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 540                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 541                         secrets.clear();
 542
 543                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 544                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 545                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 546                         test_secrets!();
 547
 548                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 549                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 550                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 551                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 552                 }
 553
 554                 {
 555                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 556                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 557                         secrets.clear();
 558
 559                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 560                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 561                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 562                         test_secrets!();
 563
 564                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 565                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 566                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 567                         test_secrets!();
 568
 569                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 570                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 571                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 572                         test_secrets!();
 573
 574                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 575                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 576                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 577                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 578                 }
 579
 580                 {
 581                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 582                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 583                         secrets.clear();
 584
 585                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 586                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 587                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 588                         test_secrets!();
 589
 590                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 591                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 592                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 593                         test_secrets!();
 594
 595                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 596                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 597                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 598                         test_secrets!();
 599
 600                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 601                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 602                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 603                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 604                 }
 605
 606                 {
 607                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 608                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 609                         secrets.clear();
 610
 611                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 612                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 613                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 614                         test_secrets!();
 615
 616                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 617                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 618                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 619                         test_secrets!();
 620
 621                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 622                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 623                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 624                         test_secrets!();
 625
 626                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 627                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 628                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 629                         test_secrets!();
 630
 631                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 632                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 633                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 634                         test_secrets!();
 635
 636                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 637                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 638                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 639                         test_secrets!();
 640
 641                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 642                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 643                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 644                         test_secrets!();
 645
 646                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 647                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 648                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 649                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 650                 }
 651
 652                 {
 653                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 654                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 655                         secrets.clear();
 656
 657                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 658                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 659                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 660                         test_secrets!();
 661
 662                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 663                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 664                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 665                         test_secrets!();
 666
 667                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 668                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 669                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 670                         test_secrets!();
 671
 672                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 673                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 674                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 675                         test_secrets!();
 676
 677                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 678                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 679                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 680                         test_secrets!();
 681
 682                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 683                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 684                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 685                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 686                 }
 687
 688                 {
 689                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
 690                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 691                         secrets.clear();
 692
 693                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 694                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 695                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 696                         test_secrets!();
 697
 698                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 699                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 700                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 701                         test_secrets!();
 702
 703                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 704                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 705                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 706                         test_secrets!();
 707
 708                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 709                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 710                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 711                         test_secrets!();
 712
 713                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 714                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 715                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 716                         test_secrets!();
 717
 718                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 719                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
 720                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 721                         test_secrets!();
 722
 723                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 724                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 725                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 726                         test_secrets!();
 727
 728                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 729                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 730                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 731                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 732                 }
 733
 734                 {
 735                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
 736                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 737                         secrets.clear();
 738
 739                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 740                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 741                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 742                         test_secrets!();
 743
 744                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 745                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 746                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 747                         test_secrets!();
 748
 749                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 750                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 751                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 752                         test_secrets!();
 753
 754                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 755                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 756                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 757                         test_secrets!();
 758
 759                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 760                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 761                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 762                         test_secrets!();
 763
 764                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 765                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 766                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 767                         test_secrets!();
 768
 769                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 770                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
 771                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 772                         test_secrets!();
 773
 774                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 775                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 776                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 777                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 778                 }
 779
 780                 {
 781                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
 782                         monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::new(), &PublicKey::new(), 0, Script::new());
 783                         secrets.clear();
 784
 785                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 786                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 787                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 788                         test_secrets!();
 789
 790                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 791                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 792                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 793                         test_secrets!();
 794
 795                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 796                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 797                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 798                         test_secrets!();
 799
 800                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 801                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 802                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 803                         test_secrets!();
 804
 805                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 806                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 807                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 808                         test_secrets!();
 809
 810                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 811                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 812                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 813                         test_secrets!();
 814
 815                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 816                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 817                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 818                         test_secrets!();
 819
 820                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 821                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex_bytes("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
 822                         assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap_err().err,
 823                                         "Previous secret did not match new one");
 824                 }
 825         }
 826 }