//! claim outputs on-chain.
use chain;
-use chain::Listen;
-use chain::Watch;
+use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
use chain::channelmonitor;
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000);
- assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000);
+ let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
+ assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
+ assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
- assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000);
- assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000);
+ assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
+ assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
}
fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
{
- // B will rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here...just because
+ // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
+ // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
+ // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
+ // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
+ if node_txn.len() == 1 {
+ check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
+ } else {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
+ }
}
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
}
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], true, payment_hash_5);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
{
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
}
// Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
// received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
} else if messages_delivered == 3 {
// nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
} else if messages_delivered == 4 {
// nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
} else if messages_delivered == 5 {
// nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
} else if messages_delivered == 6 {
// Everything was delivered...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
}
let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
if messages_delivered < 2 {
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
if messages_delivered < 1 {
let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
}
} else if messages_delivered == 2 {
// nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
} else if messages_delivered == 3 {
// nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
} else if messages_delivered == 4 {
// nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
} else if messages_delivered == 5 {
// Everything was delivered...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
}
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
// Channel should still work fine...
let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
// as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
// nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
- reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
+ reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
//... and we can even still claim the payment!
claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
} else { panic!(); }
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
}
+
+fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
+ // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
+ // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
+ // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
+ // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
+ // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
+ // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
+ // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
+ // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
+ // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
+ // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
+ // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
+ // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
+ // until we learned about an additional block.
+ //
+ // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
+ // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+ let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
+ check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
+
+ let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
+ if !test_height_before_timelock {
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
+ }
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
+ &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
+ if test_height_before_timelock {
+ // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
+ // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
+ assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
+ } else {
+ // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
+ let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
+ assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
+ assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
+ check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
+ // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
+ // timelock is up).
+ let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
+ assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
+
+ // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
+ // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
+ // additional block built on top of the current chain.
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
+ &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false);
+ expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
+ }
+}
+#[test]
+fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
+ do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
+ do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
+}
projects / rust-lightning / blobdiff