When simulating a bad actor that broadcasts a revoked tx, the policy check would otherwise panic.
(0, 0),
);
let revoked_commitment = self.make_revoked_commitment_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
- EnforcingChannelKeys::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment)
+ EnforcingChannelKeys::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, false)
}
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
inner,
last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(last_commitment_number)),
revoked_commitment,
+ disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
})
}
}
pub persister: test_utils::TestPersister,
pub logger: test_utils::TestLogger,
pub keys_manager: test_utils::TestKeysInterface,
-
}
pub struct NodeCfg<'a> {
bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
#[test]
fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
// Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
#[test]
fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
// Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
#[test]
fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
// HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let fee_estimator;
let tx_broadcaster;
let chain_source;
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
+ // during signing due to revoked tx
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
let monitor;
let node_state_0;
// In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
// we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
- let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
/// Initial value for revoked commitment downward counter
pub const INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 1 << 48;
-/// An implementation of ChannelKeys that enforces some policy checks.
+/// An implementation of ChannelKeys that enforces some policy checks. The current checks
+/// are an incomplete set. They include:
+///
+/// - When signing, the holder transaction has not been revoked
+/// - When revoking, the holder transaction has not been signed
+/// - The holder commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
+/// - The counterparty commitment number is monotonic and without gaps
+/// - The pre-derived keys and pre-built transaction in CommitmentTransaction were correctly built
///
/// Eventually we will probably want to expose a variant of this which would essentially
/// be what you'd want to run on a hardware wallet.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct EnforcingChannelKeys {
pub inner: InMemoryChannelKeys,
+ /// The last counterparty commitment number we signed, backwards counting
pub last_commitment_number: Arc<Mutex<Option<u64>>>,
+ /// The last holder commitment number we revoked, backwards counting
pub revoked_commitment: Arc<Mutex<u64>>,
+ pub disable_revocation_policy_check: bool,
}
impl EnforcingChannelKeys {
+ /// Construct an EnforcingChannelKeys
pub fn new(inner: InMemoryChannelKeys) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
- revoked_commitment: Arc::new(Mutex::new(INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER))
+ revoked_commitment: Arc::new(Mutex::new(INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER)),
+ disable_revocation_policy_check: false
}
}
- pub fn new_with_revoked(inner: InMemoryChannelKeys, revoked_commitment: Arc<Mutex<u64>>) -> Self {
+ /// Construct an EnforcingChannelKeys with externally managed storage
+ ///
+ /// Since there are multiple copies of this struct for each channel, some coordination is needed
+ /// so that all copies are aware of revocations. A pointer to this state is provided here, usually
+ /// by an implementation of KeysInterface.
+ pub fn new_with_revoked(inner: InMemoryChannelKeys, revoked_commitment: Arc<Mutex<u64>>, disable_revocation_policy_check: bool) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
- revoked_commitment
+ revoked_commitment,
+ disable_revocation_policy_check
}
}
}
}
fn release_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
- println!("XXX revoke {} for {}", idx, self.inner.commitment_seed[0]);
-
{
let mut revoked = self.revoked_commitment.lock().unwrap();
assert!(idx == *revoked || idx == *revoked - 1, "can only revoke the current or next unrevoked commitment - trying {}, revoked {}", idx, *revoked);
let revoked = self.revoked_commitment.lock().unwrap();
let commitment_number = trusted_tx.commitment_number();
- println!("XXX sign {} for {}", commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0]);
if *revoked - 1 != commitment_number && *revoked - 2 != commitment_number {
- println!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
- *revoked, commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0]);
- return Err(());
+ if !self.disable_revocation_policy_check {
+ panic!("can only sign the next two unrevoked commitment numbers, revoked={} vs requested={} for {}",
+ *revoked, commitment_number, self.inner.commitment_seed[0])
+ }
}
for (this_htlc, sig) in trusted_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs) {
secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, sig, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
}
- // TODO: enforce the ChannelKeys contract - error if this commitment was already revoked
- // TODO: need the commitment number
Ok(self.inner.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(commitment_tx, secp_ctx).unwrap())
}
impl Readable for EnforcingChannelKeys {
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let inner: InMemoryChannelKeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let inner = Readable::read(reader)?;
let last_commitment_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
Ok(EnforcingChannelKeys {
inner,
last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(last_commitment_number)),
revoked_commitment: Arc::new(Mutex::new(INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER)),
+ disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
})
}
}
backing: keysinterface::KeysManager,
pub override_session_priv: Mutex<Option<[u8; 32]>>,
pub override_channel_id_priv: Mutex<Option<[u8; 32]>>,
+ pub disable_revocation_policy_check: bool,
revoked_commitments: Mutex<HashMap<[u8;32], Arc<Mutex<u64>>>>,
}
fn get_channel_keys(&self, inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> EnforcingChannelKeys {
let keys = self.backing.get_channel_keys(inbound, channel_value_satoshis);
let revoked_commitment = self.make_revoked_commitment_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
- EnforcingChannelKeys::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment)
+ EnforcingChannelKeys::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, self.disable_revocation_policy_check)
}
fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
inner,
last_commitment_number: Arc::new(Mutex::new(last_commitment_number)),
revoked_commitment,
+ disable_revocation_policy_check: self.disable_revocation_policy_check,
})
}
}
backing: keysinterface::KeysManager::new(seed, network, now.as_secs(), now.subsec_nanos()),
override_session_priv: Mutex::new(None),
override_channel_id_priv: Mutex::new(None),
+ disable_revocation_policy_check: false,
revoked_commitments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
}
}
pub fn derive_channel_keys(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, user_id_1: u64, user_id_2: u64) -> EnforcingChannelKeys {
let keys = self.backing.derive_channel_keys(channel_value_satoshis, user_id_1, user_id_2);
let revoked_commitment = self.make_revoked_commitment_cell(keys.commitment_seed);
- EnforcingChannelKeys::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment)
+ EnforcingChannelKeys::new_with_revoked(keys, revoked_commitment, self.disable_revocation_policy_check)
}
fn make_revoked_commitment_cell(&self, commitment_seed: [u8; 32]) -> Arc<Mutex<u64>> {
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff