Fix blinded recipient fail on onion decode failure
authorValentine Wallace <vwallace@protonmail.com>
Tue, 24 Oct 2023 18:13:13 +0000 (14:13 -0400)
committerValentine Wallace <vwallace@protonmail.com>
Tue, 12 Dec 2023 23:38:59 +0000 (18:38 -0500)
If a recipient behind a multihop blinded path fails to decode their onion
payload, they should fail backwards with error code INVALID_ONION_BLINDING and
a zeroed out onion hash per BOLT 4.

lightning/src/ln/blinded_payment_tests.rs
lightning/src/ln/onion_payment.rs

index c8b835debaf7fd426f6ea8710580e89c2cb0e406..2ac66d5e8261237390424815c538893b89eba535 100644 (file)
@@ -459,12 +459,28 @@ fn two_hop_blinded_path_success() {
        claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
 }
 
+enum ReceiveCheckFail {
+       // The recipient fails the payment upon `PaymentClaimable`.
+       RecipientFail,
+       // Failure to decode the recipient's onion payload.
+       OnionDecodeFail,
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn multi_hop_receiver_fail() {
+       do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(ReceiveCheckFail::RecipientFail);
+       do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(ReceiveCheckFail::OnionDecodeFail);
+}
+
+fn do_multi_hop_receiver_fail(check: ReceiveCheckFail) {
+       // Test that the receiver to a multihop blinded path fails back correctly.
        let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
        let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
        let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
        let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+       // We need the session priv to construct an invalid onion packet later.
+       let session_priv = [3; 32];
+       *nodes[0].keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some(session_priv);
        create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0);
        let chan_upd_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1_000_000, 0).0.contents;
 
@@ -478,14 +494,68 @@ fn multi_hop_receiver_fail() {
        node_cfgs[0].router.expect_find_route(route_params.clone(), Ok(route.clone()));
        nodes[0].node.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
        check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
-       pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], amt_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret);
 
-       nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
-       expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(
-               nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]
-       );
-       nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
-       check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+       let mut payment_event_0_1 = {
+               let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+               assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+               let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
+               SendEvent::from_event(ev)
+       };
+       nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_0_1.msgs[0]);
+       check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
+       do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[1], &nodes[0], &payment_event_0_1.commitment_msg, false, false);
+       expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
+       check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
+
+       let mut payment_event_1_2 = {
+               let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+               assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+               let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
+               SendEvent::from_event(ev)
+       };
+
+       match check {
+               ReceiveCheckFail::RecipientFail => {
+                       nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1_2.msgs[0]);
+                       check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
+                       do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &payment_event_1_2.commitment_msg, true, true);
+                       expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
+                       check_payment_claimable(
+                               &nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events()[0], payment_hash, payment_secret, amt_msat,
+                               None, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()
+                       );
+                       nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
+                       expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(
+                               nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]
+                       );
+                       nodes[2].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
+                       check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+               },
+               ReceiveCheckFail::OnionDecodeFail => {
+                       let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
+                       let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
+                       let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
+                       let (mut onion_payloads, ..) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
+                               &route.paths[0], amt_msat, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
+
+                       let update_add = &mut payment_event_1_2.msgs[0];
+                       onion_payloads.last_mut().map(|p| {
+                               if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { ref mut intro_node_blinding_point, .. } = p {
+                                       // The receiver should error if both the update_add blinding_point and the
+                                       // intro_node_blinding_point are set.
+                                       assert!(intro_node_blinding_point.is_none() && update_add.blinding_point.is_some());
+                                       *intro_node_blinding_point = Some(PublicKey::from_slice(&[2; 33]).unwrap());
+                               } else { panic!() }
+                       });
+                       update_add.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(
+                               vec![onion_payloads.pop().unwrap()], vec![onion_keys.pop().unwrap()], [0; 32],
+                               &payment_hash
+                       ).unwrap();
+                       nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_add);
+                       check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
+                       do_commitment_signed_dance(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &payment_event_1_2.commitment_msg, true, true);
+               }
+       }
 
        let updates_2_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
        assert_eq!(updates_2_1.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
index f2488570542ccb26da9dad072fe5b052a8f98657..c92c8fd24cd670c1fa5e82c73ca130568b5a1542 100644 (file)
@@ -360,6 +360,10 @@ where
        macro_rules! return_err {
                ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
                        {
+                               if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+                                       return_malformed_err!($msg, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING)
+                               }
+
                                log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
                                return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
                                        channel_id: msg.channel_id,