typedef LDKC2TupleTempl_HTLCOutputInCommitment__Signature LDKC2Tuple_HTLCOutputInCommitmentSignatureZ;
+
+
+/**
+ * An Err type for failure to process messages.
+ */
+typedef struct MUST_USE_STRUCT LDKLightningError {
+ /**
+ * Nearly everywhere, inner must be non-null, however in places where
+ * the Rust equivalent takes an Option, it may be set to null to indicate None.
+ */
+ LDKnativeLightningError *inner;
+ bool is_owned;
+} LDKLightningError;
+
+typedef union LDKCResultPtr_u8__LightningError {
+ uint8_t *result;
+ LDKLightningError *err;
+} LDKCResultPtr_u8__LightningError;
+
+typedef struct LDKCResultTempl_u8__LightningError {
+ LDKCResultPtr_u8__LightningError contents;
+ bool result_ok;
+} LDKCResultTempl_u8__LightningError;
+
+typedef LDKCResultTempl_u8__LightningError LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ;
+
typedef struct LDKPublicKey {
uint8_t compressed_form[33];
} LDKPublicKey;
bool is_owned;
} LDKGossipTimestampFilter;
-
-
-/**
- * An Err type for failure to process messages.
- */
-typedef struct MUST_USE_STRUCT LDKLightningError {
- /**
- * Nearly everywhere, inner must be non-null, however in places where
- * the Rust equivalent takes an Option, it may be set to null to indicate None.
- */
- LDKnativeLightningError *inner;
- bool is_owned;
-} LDKLightningError;
-
typedef struct LDKCVecTempl_UpdateAddHTLC {
LDKUpdateAddHTLC *data;
uintptr_t datalen;
extern const void (*CResult_NoneChannelMonitorUpdateErrZ_free)(LDKCResult_NoneChannelMonitorUpdateErrZ);
+extern const LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ (*CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ_err)(LDKLightningError);
+
+extern const void (*CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ_free)(LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ);
+
extern const LDKCResult_NoneMonitorUpdateErrorZ (*CResult_NoneMonitorUpdateErrorZ_err)(LDKMonitorUpdateError);
extern const void (*CResult_NoneMonitorUpdateErrorZ_free)(LDKCResult_NoneMonitorUpdateErrorZ);
LDKC2Tuple_HTLCOutputInCommitmentSignatureZ C2Tuple_HTLCOutputInCommitmentSignatureZ_new(LDKHTLCOutputInCommitment a, LDKSignature b);
+LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ_ok(void);
+
void Event_free(LDKEvent this_ptr);
LDKEvent Event_clone(const LDKEvent *orig);
*/
MUST_USE_RES LDKNetworkGraph NetworkGraph_new(void);
+/**
+ * For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+ * given node announcement.
+ *
+ * You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ * RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ * routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ */
+MUST_USE_RES LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ NetworkGraph_update_node_from_announcement(LDKNetworkGraph *this_arg, const LDKNodeAnnouncement *msg);
+
+/**
+ * For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+ * given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
+ * given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
+ * peers.
+ */
+MUST_USE_RES LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ NetworkGraph_update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(LDKNetworkGraph *this_arg, const LDKUnsignedNodeAnnouncement *msg);
+
+/**
+ * Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
+ *
+ * You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ * RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ * routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ *
+ * If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+ * the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+ */
+MUST_USE_RES LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ NetworkGraph_update_channel_from_announcement(LDKNetworkGraph *this_arg, const LDKChannelAnnouncement *msg, LDKAccess *chain_access);
+
+/**
+ * Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
+ * signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
+ * channel announcement to any of our peers.
+ *
+ * If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+ * the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+ */
+MUST_USE_RES LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ NetworkGraph_update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement(LDKNetworkGraph *this_arg, const LDKUnsignedChannelAnnouncement *msg, LDKAccess *chain_access);
+
/**
* Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
* If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
*/
void NetworkGraph_close_channel_from_update(LDKNetworkGraph *this_arg, uint64_t short_channel_id, bool is_permanent);
+/**
+ * For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+ * of the channel.
+ *
+ * You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+ * RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+ * routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ */
+MUST_USE_RES LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ NetworkGraph_update_channel(LDKNetworkGraph *this_arg, const LDKChannelUpdate *msg);
+
+/**
+ * For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+ * of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
+ * associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
+ */
+MUST_USE_RES LDKCResult_NoneLightningErrorZ NetworkGraph_update_channel_unsigned(LDKNetworkGraph *this_arg, const LDKUnsignedChannelUpdate *msg);
+
/* Text to put at the end of the generated file */
crate::routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph { inner: Box::into_raw(Box::new(ret)), is_owned: true }
}
+/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+/// given node announcement.
+///
+/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+#[must_use]
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn NetworkGraph_update_node_from_announcement(this_arg: &mut NetworkGraph, msg: &crate::ln::msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ {
+ let mut ret = unsafe { &mut (*(this_arg.inner as *mut nativeNetworkGraph)) }.update_node_from_announcement(unsafe { &*msg.inner }, &bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1::new());
+ let mut local_ret = match ret { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { 0u8 /*o*/ }), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::ln::msgs::LightningError { inner: Box::into_raw(Box::new(e)), is_owned: true } }) };
+ local_ret
+}
+
+/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+/// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
+/// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
+/// peers.
+#[must_use]
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn NetworkGraph_update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(this_arg: &mut NetworkGraph, msg: &crate::ln::msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ {
+ let mut ret = unsafe { &mut (*(this_arg.inner as *mut nativeNetworkGraph)) }.update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(unsafe { &*msg.inner });
+ let mut local_ret = match ret { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { 0u8 /*o*/ }), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::ln::msgs::LightningError { inner: Box::into_raw(Box::new(e)), is_owned: true } }) };
+ local_ret
+}
+
+/// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement.
+///
+/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+///
+/// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+/// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+#[must_use]
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn NetworkGraph_update_channel_from_announcement(this_arg: &mut NetworkGraph, msg: &crate::ln::msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: *mut crate::chain::Access) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ {
+ let mut local_chain_access = if chain_access == std::ptr::null_mut() { None } else { Some( { unsafe { *Box::from_raw(chain_access) } }) };
+ let mut ret = unsafe { &mut (*(this_arg.inner as *mut nativeNetworkGraph)) }.update_channel_from_announcement(unsafe { &*msg.inner }, &local_chain_access, &bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1::new());
+ let mut local_ret = match ret { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { 0u8 /*o*/ }), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::ln::msgs::LightningError { inner: Box::into_raw(Box::new(e)), is_owned: true } }) };
+ local_ret
+}
+
+/// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
+/// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
+/// channel announcement to any of our peers.
+///
+/// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+/// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+#[must_use]
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn NetworkGraph_update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement(this_arg: &mut NetworkGraph, msg: &crate::ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: *mut crate::chain::Access) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ {
+ let mut local_chain_access = if chain_access == std::ptr::null_mut() { None } else { Some( { unsafe { *Box::from_raw(chain_access) } }) };
+ let mut ret = unsafe { &mut (*(this_arg.inner as *mut nativeNetworkGraph)) }.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement(unsafe { &*msg.inner }, &local_chain_access);
+ let mut local_ret = match ret { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { 0u8 /*o*/ }), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::ln::msgs::LightningError { inner: Box::into_raw(Box::new(e)), is_owned: true } }) };
+ local_ret
+}
+
/// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
/// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
/// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
unsafe { &mut (*(this_arg.inner as *mut nativeNetworkGraph)) }.close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent)
}
+/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+/// of the channel.
+///
+/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
+/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
+/// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+#[must_use]
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn NetworkGraph_update_channel(this_arg: &mut NetworkGraph, msg: &crate::ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ {
+ let mut ret = unsafe { &mut (*(this_arg.inner as *mut nativeNetworkGraph)) }.update_channel(unsafe { &*msg.inner }, &bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1::new());
+ let mut local_ret = match ret { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { 0u8 /*o*/ }), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::ln::msgs::LightningError { inner: Box::into_raw(Box::new(e)), is_owned: true } }) };
+ local_ret
+}
+
+/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+/// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
+/// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
+#[must_use]
+#[no_mangle]
+pub extern "C" fn NetworkGraph_update_channel_unsigned(this_arg: &mut NetworkGraph, msg: &crate::ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> crate::c_types::derived::CResult_NoneLightningErrorZ {
+ let mut ret = unsafe { &mut (*(this_arg.inner as *mut nativeNetworkGraph)) }.update_channel_unsigned(unsafe { &*msg.inner });
+ let mut local_ret = match ret { Ok(mut o) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::ok( { 0u8 /*o*/ }), Err(mut e) => crate::c_types::CResultTempl::err( { crate::ln::msgs::LightningError { inner: Box::into_raw(Box::new(e)), is_owned: true } }) };
+ local_ret
+}
+
impl<C: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: chain::Access, L::Target: Logger {
fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
+ self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty())
}
fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- }
-
- let utxo_value = match &self.chain_access {
- &None => {
- // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
- None
- },
- &Some(ref chain_access) => {
- match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
- Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
- let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
- .push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
- .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
- if script_pubkey != expected_script {
- return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- }
- //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
- //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
- Some(value)
- },
- Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
- return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.contents.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- },
- Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- },
- }
- },
- };
- let result = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, utxo_value, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
+ self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, &self.chain_access, &self.secp_ctx)?;
log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
- result
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
}
fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
match update {
&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
- let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
+ let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx);
},
&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id, is_permanent } => {
self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, is_permanent);
}
fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
+ self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, &self.secp_ctx)?;
+ Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
}
fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(ChannelAnnouncement, Option<ChannelUpdate>, Option<ChannelUpdate>)> {
}
}
- /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a given node announcement.
+ /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+ /// given node announcement.
///
/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
- /// routing messages without checking their signatures.
- ///
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<T>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
- }
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ pub fn update_node_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
+ self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg))
+ }
+
+ /// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a
+ /// given node announcement without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't
+ /// given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the node announcement to any of our
+ /// peers.
+ pub fn update_node_from_unsigned_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_node_from_announcement_intern(msg, None)
+ }
- match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.contents.node_id) {
+ fn update_node_from_announcement_intern(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::NodeAnnouncement>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.node_id) {
None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(node) => {
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
- if node_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
+ if node_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
}
- let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty();
+ let should_relay = msg.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.excess_address_data.is_empty();
node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
- features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
- last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
- rgb: msg.contents.rgb,
- alias: msg.contents.alias,
- addresses: msg.contents.addresses.clone(),
- announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
+ features: msg.features.clone(),
+ last_update: msg.timestamp,
+ rgb: msg.rgb,
+ alias: msg.alias,
+ addresses: msg.addresses.clone(),
+ announcement_message: if should_relay { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
});
- Ok(should_relay)
+ Ok(())
}
}
}
///
/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
- /// routing messages without checking their signatures.
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
///
- /// If the channel has been confirmed to exist on chain (with correctly-formatted scripts on
- /// chain), set utxo_value to the value of the output on chain, otherwise leave it as None.
- /// The UTXO value is then used in routing calculation if we have no better information on the
- /// maximum HTLC value that can be sent over the channel.
- ///
- /// Further, setting utxo_value to Some indicates that the announcement message is genuine,
- /// allowing us to update existing channel data in the case of reorgs or to replace bogus
- /// channel data generated by a DoS attacker.
+ /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+ /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+ pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification, C: Deref>
+ (&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>)
+ -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where C::Target: chain::Access {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
+ secp_verify_sig!(secp_ctx, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
+ self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(&msg.contents, Some(msg), chain_access)
+ }
+
+ /// Store or update channel info from a channel announcement without verifying the associated
+ /// signatures. Because we aren't given the associated signatures here we cannot relay the
+ /// channel announcement to any of our peers.
///
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- pub fn update_channel_from_announcement<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, utxo_value: Option<u64>, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<T>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
- if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
- return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
- }
+ /// If a `chain::Access` object is provided via `chain_access`, it will be called to verify
+ /// the corresponding UTXO exists on chain and is correctly-formatted.
+ pub fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement<C: Deref>
+ (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, chain_access: &Option<C>)
+ -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where C::Target: chain::Access {
+ self.update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern(msg, None, chain_access)
+ }
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
+ fn update_channel_from_unsigned_announcement_intern<C: Deref>
+ (&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>, chain_access: &Option<C>)
+ -> Result<(), LightningError>
+ where C::Target: chain::Access {
+ if msg.node_id_1 == msg.node_id_2 || msg.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.bitcoin_key_2 {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty();
+ let utxo_value = match &chain_access {
+ &None => {
+ // Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
+ None
+ },
+ &Some(ref chain_access) => {
+ match chain_access.get_utxo(&msg.chain_hash, msg.short_channel_id) {
+ Ok(TxOut { value, script_pubkey }) => {
+ let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
+ .push_slice(&msg.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
+ .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
+ if script_pubkey != expected_script {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announcement key ({}) didn't match on-chain script ({})", script_pubkey.to_hex(), expected_script.to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ }
+ //TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
+ //to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
+ Some(value)
+ },
+ Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownChain) => {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: format!("Channel announced on an unknown chain ({})", msg.chain_hash.encode().to_hex()), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ },
+ Err(chain::AccessError::UnknownTx) => {
+ return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ };
let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
- features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
- node_one: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(),
+ features: msg.features.clone(),
+ node_one: msg.node_id_1.clone(),
one_to_two: None,
- node_two: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(),
+ node_two: msg.node_id_2.clone(),
two_to_one: None,
capacity_sats: utxo_value,
- announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
+ announcement_message: if msg.excess_data.is_empty() { full_msg.cloned() } else { None },
};
- match self.channels.entry(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ match self.channels.entry(msg.short_channel_id) {
BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
//TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
//in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
// b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
// get reorg'd out.
// c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
- Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.short_channel_id);
*entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
} else {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
( $node_id: expr ) => {
match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
- node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.short_channel_id);
},
BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
- channels: vec!(msg.contents.short_channel_id),
+ channels: vec!(msg.short_channel_id),
lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
announcement_info: None,
});
};
}
- add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_1);
- add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_2);
+ add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_1);
+ add_channel_to_node!(msg.node_id_2);
- Ok(should_relay)
+ Ok(())
}
/// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
}
}
- /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions of a channel.
+ /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+ /// of the channel.
///
/// You probably don't want to call this directly, instead relying on a NetGraphMsgHandler's
/// RoutingMessageHandler implementation to call it indirectly. This may be useful to accept
- /// routing messages without checking their signatures.
- ///
- /// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
- pub fn update_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
+ /// routing messages from a source using a protocol other than the lightning P2P protocol.
+ pub fn update_channel<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_channel_intern(&msg.contents, Some(&msg), Some((&msg.signature, secp_ctx)))
+ }
+
+ /// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions
+ /// of the channel without verifying the associated signatures. Because we aren't given the
+ /// associated signatures here we cannot relay the channel update to any of our peers.
+ pub fn update_channel_unsigned(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
+ self.update_channel_intern(msg, None, None::<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>)>)
+ }
+
+ fn update_channel_intern<T: secp256k1::Verification>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate, full_msg: Option<&msgs::ChannelUpdate>, sig_info: Option<(&secp256k1::Signature, &Secp256k1<T>)>) -> Result<(), LightningError> {
let dest_node_id;
- let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
+ let chan_enabled = msg.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
let chan_was_enabled;
- match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
+ match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.short_channel_id) {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(channel) => {
- if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.contents.htlc_maximum_msat {
+ if let OptionalField::Present(htlc_maximum_msat) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat {
if htlc_maximum_msat > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
return Err(LightningError{err: "htlc_maximum_msat is larger than maximum possible msats".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
- if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
+ if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.timestamp {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
chan_was_enabled = false;
}
- let last_update_message = if msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() {
- Some(msg.clone())
- } else {
- None
- };
+ let last_update_message = if msg.excess_data.is_empty() { full_msg.cloned() } else { None };
let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
enabled: chan_enabled,
- last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
- cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
- htlc_minimum_msat: msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
- htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.contents.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
+ last_update: msg.timestamp,
+ cltv_expiry_delta: msg.cltv_expiry_delta,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: if let OptionalField::Present(max_value) = msg.htlc_maximum_msat { Some(max_value) } else { None },
fees: RoutingFees {
- base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
- proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
+ base_msat: msg.fee_base_msat,
+ proportional_millionths: msg.fee_proportional_millionths,
},
last_update_message
};
}
}
- let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
- if msg.contents.flags & 1 == 1 {
+ let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]);
+ if msg.flags & 1 == 1 {
dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_two);
+ if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
+ secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_two);
}
maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
} else {
dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
- if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
- secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_one);
+ if let Some((sig, ctx)) = sig_info {
+ secp_verify_sig!(ctx, &msg_hash, &sig, &channel.node_one);
}
maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
}
if chan_enabled {
let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
- let mut base_msat = msg.contents.fee_base_msat;
- let mut proportional_millionths = msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths;
+ let mut base_msat = msg.fee_base_msat;
+ let mut proportional_millionths = msg.fee_proportional_millionths;
if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
}
- Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
+ Ok(())
}
fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
- node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
- node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
+ node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
+ node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff