Add test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps

Extend test visibility of claim-tracking maps to do so.

Cover both "If 2 claimable-outpoint-spending txn are in 1 block,
clean up properly" and "Clean up claimable_outpoints when
pending_claim_requests is cleaned" fix commits in same patchset.

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
index 154d8ccf70d29ccd641c85f9105b54b9783c707e..d83171bd1ec981a96500a1356ea531034d4b359f 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channelmonitor.rs
@@ -513,7 +513,7 @@ enum OnchainEvent {
 
 /// Higher-level cache structure needed to re-generate bumped claim txn if needed
 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
+pub struct ClaimTxBumpMaterial {
        // At every block tick, used to check if pending claiming tx is taking too
        // much time for confirmation and we need to bump it.
        height_timer: u32,
@@ -621,6 +621,9 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
        // Key is identifier of the pending claim request, i.e the txid of the initial claiming transaction generated by
        // us and is immutable until all outpoint of the claimable set are post-anti-reorg-delay solved.
        // Entry is cache of elements need to generate a bumped claiming transaction (see ClaimTxBumpMaterial)
+       #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
+       pub pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
+       #[cfg(not(test))]
        pending_claim_requests: HashMap<Sha256dHash, ClaimTxBumpMaterial>,
 
        // Used to link outpoints claimed in a connected block to a pending claim request.
@@ -629,6 +632,9 @@ pub struct ChannelMonitor {
        // is txid of the initial claiming transaction and is immutable until outpoint is
        // post-anti-reorg-delay solved, confirmaiton_block is used to erase entry if
        // block with output gets disconnected.
+       #[cfg(test)] // Used in functional_test to verify sanitization
+       pub claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
+       #[cfg(not(test))]
        claimable_outpoints: HashMap<BitcoinOutPoint, (Sha256dHash, u32)>,
 
        // Used to track onchain events, i.e transactions parts of channels confirmed on chain, on which

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
index 65fdb2192603caa198d16daf80e52b0017d93341..3be08a372bf739526b67451259f382f5e72144bd 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
@@ -6762,3 +6762,49 @@ fn test_set_outpoints_partial_claiming() {
                node_txn.clear();
        }
 }
+
+#[test]
+fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
+       // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
+       // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
+
+       let nodes = create_network(2, &[None, None]);
+
+       let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, LocalFeatures::new(), LocalFeatures::new());
+       // Lock HTLC in both directions
+       let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
+       route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
+
+       let revoked_local_txn = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().last_local_commitment_txn.clone();
+       assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
+       assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
+
+       // Revoke local commitment tx
+       claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage, 9_000_000);
+
+       // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
+       let header_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 128, 0,  false, Default::default());
+       let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+       nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 129);
+       check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0]);
+       let penalty_txn = {
+               let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+               assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+               check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+               check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+               check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
+               let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
+               node_txn.clear();
+               penalty_txn
+       };
+       let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.bitcoin_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+       nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn }, 130);
+       connect_blocks(&nodes[0].block_notifier, 5, 130,  false, header_130.bitcoin_hash());
+       {
+               let monitors = nodes[0].chan_monitor.simple_monitor.monitors.lock().unwrap();
+               if let Some(monitor) = monitors.get(&OutPoint::new(chan.3.txid(), 0)) {
+                       assert!(monitor.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
+                       assert!(monitor.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
+               }
+       }
+}