if: "matrix.build-no-std && !matrix.coverage"
run: |
cd lightning
- cargo test --verbose --color always --features hashbrown
+ cargo test --verbose --color always --no-default-features --features no_std
+ # check if there is a conflict between no_std and the default std feature
+ cargo test --verbose --color always --features no_std
cd ..
- name: Test on no_std bullds Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }} and full code-linking for coverage generation
if: "matrix.build-no-std && matrix.coverage"
run: |
cd lightning
- RUSTFLAGS="-C link-dead-code" cargo test --verbose --color always --features hashbrown
+ RUSTFLAGS="-C link-dead-code" cargo test --verbose --color always --no-default-features --features no_std
cd ..
- name: Test on Rust ${{ matrix.toolchain }}
if: "! matrix.build-net-tokio"
-# 0.0.99 - WIP
+# 0.0.99 - 2021-07-09
+
+## API Updates
+
+ * `lightning_block_sync::poll::Validate` is now public, allowing you to
+ implement the `lightning_block_sync::poll::Poll` trait without
+ `lightning_block_sync::poll::ChainPoller` (#956).
+ * `lightning::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager` no longer requires that no calls
+ are made to referencing the same `SocketDescriptor` after
+ `disconnect_socket` returns. This makes the API significantly less
+ deadlock-prone and simplifies `SocketDescriptor` implementations
+ significantly. The relevant changes have been made to `lightning_net_tokio`
+ and `PeerManager` documentation has been substantially rewritten (#957).
+ * `lightning::util::message_signing`'s `sign` and `verify` methods now take
+ secret and public keys by reference instead of value (#974).
+ * Substantially more information is now exposed about channels in
+ `ChannelDetails`. See documentation for more info (#984 and #988).
+ * The latest best block seen is now exposed in
+ `ChannelManager::current_best_block` and
+ `ChannelMonitor::current_best_block` (#984).
+ * Feerates charged when forwarding payments over channels is now set in
+ `ChannelConfig::fee_base_msat` when the channel is opened. For existing
+ channels, the value is set to the value provided in
+ `ChannelManagerReadArgs::default_config::channel_options` the first time the
+ `ChannelManager` is loaded in 0.0.99 (#975).
+ * We now reject HTLCs which are received to be forwarded over private channels
+ unless `UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels` is set. Note that
+ `UserConfig` is never serialized and must be provided via
+ `ChannelManagerReadArgs::default_config` at each start (#975).
+
+## Bug Fixes
+
+ * We now forward gossip messages to peers instead of only relaying
+ locally-generated gossip or sending gossip messages during initial sync
+ (#948).
+ * Correctly send `channel_update` messages to direct peers on private channels
+ (#949). Without this, a private node connected to an LDK node over a private
+ channel cannot receive funds as it does not know which fees the LDK node
+ will charge.
+ * `lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager` no longer expects to be
+ persisted spuriously after we receive a `channel_update` message about any
+ channel in the routing gossip (#972).
+ * Asynchronous `ChannelMonitor` updates (using the
+ `ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure` return variant) no longer cause
+ spurious HTLC forwarding failures (#954).
+ * Transaction provided via `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed`
+ after `ChannelMonitor::best_block_updated` was called for a much later
+ block now trigger all relevant actions as of the later block. Previously
+ some transaction broadcasts or other responses required an additional
+ block be provided via `ChannelMonitor::best_block_updated` (#970).
+ * We no longer panic in rare cases when an invoice contained last-hop route
+ hints which were unusable (#958).
+
+## Node Compatibility
+
+ * We now accept spurious `funding_locked` messages sent prior to
+ `channel_reestablish` messages after reconnect. This is a
+ [known, long-standing bug in lnd](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006)
+ (#966).
+ * We now set the `first_blocknum` and `number_of_blocks` fields in
+ `reply_channel_range` messages to values which c-lightning versions prior to
+ 0.10 accepted. This avoids spurious force-closes from such nodes (#961).
## Serialization Compatibility
version 0.0.98 while an `Event::PaymentSent` is pending processing, the
`ChannelManager` will fail to deserialize both on version 0.0.98 and later
versions. If you have such a `ChannelManager` available, a simple patch will
- allow it to deserialize, please file an issue if you need assistance.
+ allow it to deserialize. Please file an issue if you need assistance (#973).
# 0.0.98 - 2021-06-11
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use lightning::chain;
-use lightning::chain::{chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
+use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, chainmonitor, channelmonitor, Confirm, Watch};
use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentSendFailure, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
use lightning::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use lightning::ln::msgs::{CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, UpdateAddHTLC, Init};
use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, INITIAL_REVOKED_COMMITMENT_NUMBER};
let monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone(), Arc::new(TestPersister{}), Arc::clone(&keys_manager)));
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
- config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
let network = Network::Bitcoin;
let params = ChainParameters {
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(TestChainMonitor::new(broadcast.clone(), logger.clone(), fee_est.clone(), Arc::new(TestPersister{}), Arc::clone(& $keys_manager)));
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
- config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
let mut monitors = HashMap::new();
events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => continue,
events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => continue,
events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => continue,
- _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
+ if Some(*node_id) == expect_drop_id { panic!("peer_disconnected should drop msgs bound for the disconnected peer"); }
+ *node_id == a_id
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
};
if push_a { ba_events.push(event); } else { bc_events.push(event); }
}
// Can be generated due to a payment forward being rejected due to a
// channel having previously failed a monitor update
},
- _ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
+ // When we reconnect we will resend a channel_update to make sure our
+ // counterparty has the latest parameters for receiving payments
+ // through us. We do, however, check that the message does not include
+ // the "disabled" bit, as we should never ever have a channel which is
+ // disabled when we send such an update (or it may indicate channel
+ // force-close which we should detect as an error).
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0);
+ },
+ _ => panic!("Unhandled message event {:?}", event),
}
if $limit_events != ProcessMessages::AllMessages {
break;
events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
+ },
_ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
}
}
events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { .. } => {},
events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => {},
events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => {},
+ events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref msg, .. } => {
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // The disable bit must never be set!
+ },
_ => panic!("Unhandled message event"),
}
}
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
use lightning::chain;
-use lightning::chain::{Confirm, Listen};
+use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm, Listen};
use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface};
use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager};
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager};
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor};
use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use lightning::routing::router::get_route;
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider { node_secret: our_network_key.clone(), counter: AtomicU64::new(0) });
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
- config.channel_options.fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
config.channel_options.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
let network = Network::Bitcoin;
let params = ChainParameters {
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
//
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- //
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
// 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4e00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
//
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- //
// - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 4b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
//
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
- //
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
// 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
// 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
//
// 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
// 02000000013a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800258020000000000002200204b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014c0000000000000160014280000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
- // 00fd - A feerate request (returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
+ //
// 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
// 0200000001730000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a701000000000000220020b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the HTLC timeout transaction
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
// - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
- super::do_test(&::hex::decode("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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
+ super::do_test(&::hex::decode("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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
use lightning::chain;
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use lightning::ln::channelmanager::ChannelDetails;
+use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, ChannelCounterparty};
use lightning::ln::features::InitFeatures;
use lightning::ln::msgs;
use lightning::routing::router::{get_route, RouteHint, RouteHintHop};
let rnid = node_pks.iter().skip(slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2))as usize % node_pks.len()).next().unwrap();
first_hops_vec.push(ChannelDetails {
channel_id: [0; 32],
+ counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
+ node_id: *rnid,
+ features: InitFeatures::known(),
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: 0,
+ forwarding_info: None,
+ },
funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
short_channel_id: Some(scid),
- remote_network_id: *rnid,
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::known(),
channel_value_satoshis: slice_to_be64(get_slice!(8)),
- user_id: 0,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_outbound: true,
- is_funding_locked: true,
- is_usable: true,
- is_public: true,
+ user_id: 0, inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
+ confirmations_required: None,
+ force_close_spend_delay: None,
+ is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
+ is_usable: true, is_public: true,
outbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
});
}
Some(&first_hops_vec[..])
[package]
name = "lightning-background-processor"
-version = "0.0.98"
+version = "0.0.99"
authors = ["Valentine Wallace <vwallace@protonmail.com>"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "http://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning"
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.26"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning", features = ["allow_wallclock_use"] }
-lightning-persister = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning-persister" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning", features = ["allow_wallclock_use"] }
+lightning-persister = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning-persister" }
[dev-dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
- use lightning::chain::Confirm;
- use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
+ use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, Confirm, chainmonitor};
use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ANTI_REORG_DELAY;
use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, KeysManager};
use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use lightning::get_event_msg;
- use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, SimpleArcChannelManager};
+ use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, SimpleArcChannelManager};
use lightning::ln::features::InitFeatures;
use lightning::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{PeerManager, MessageHandler, SocketDescriptor};
let mut nodes = Vec::new();
for i in 0..num_nodes {
let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
- let fee_estimator = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
+ let fee_estimator = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
let chain_source = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i)));
let persister = Arc::new(FilesystemPersister::new(format!("{}_persister_{}", persist_dir, i)));
// Confirm the funding transaction.
confirm_transaction(&mut nodes[0], &funding_tx);
+ let as_funding = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
confirm_transaction(&mut nodes[1], &funding_tx);
- nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
- nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ let bs_funding = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding);
+ let _as_channel_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding);
+ let _bs_channel_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(bg_processor.stop().is_ok());
[package]
name = "lightning-block-sync"
-version = "0.0.98"
+version = "0.0.99"
authors = ["Jeffrey Czyz", "Matt Corallo"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "http://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning"
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.26"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning" }
tokio = { version = "1.0", features = [ "io-util", "net", "time" ], optional = true }
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"], optional = true }
serde_json = { version = "1.0", optional = true }
[package]
name = "lightning-invoice"
description = "Data structures to parse and serialize BOLT11 lightning invoices"
-version = "0.6.0"
+version = "0.7.0"
authors = ["Sebastian Geisler <sgeisler@wh2.tu-dresden.de>"]
documentation = "https://docs.rs/lightning-invoice/"
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
[dependencies]
bech32 = "0.7"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning" }
secp256k1 = { version = "0.20", features = ["recovery"] }
num-traits = "0.2.8"
bitcoin_hashes = "0.9.4"
[dev-dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
Some(id) => id,
None => continue,
};
- let forwarding_info = match channel.counterparty_forwarding_info {
+ let forwarding_info = match channel.counterparty.forwarding_info {
Some(info) => info,
None => continue,
};
route_hints.push(RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
- src_node_id: channel.remote_network_id,
+ src_node_id: channel.counterparty.node_id,
short_channel_id,
fees: RoutingFees {
base_msat: forwarding_info.fee_base_msat,
[package]
name = "lightning-net-tokio"
-version = "0.0.98"
+version = "0.0.99"
authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning/"
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.26"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning" }
tokio = { version = "1.0", features = [ "io-util", "macros", "rt", "sync", "net", "time" ] }
[dev-dependencies]
[package]
name = "lightning-persister"
-version = "0.0.98"
+version = "0.0.99"
authors = ["Valentine Wallace", "Matt Corallo"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning/"
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.26"
-lightning = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning" }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning" }
libc = "0.2"
[target.'cfg(windows)'.dependencies]
winapi = { version = "0.3", features = ["winbase"] }
[dev-dependencies]
-lightning = { version = "0.0.98", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
+lightning = { version = "0.0.99", path = "../lightning", features = ["_test_utils"] }
[package]
name = "lightning"
-version = "0.0.98"
+version = "0.0.99"
authors = ["Matt Corallo"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning/"
# This is unsafe to use in production because it may result in the counterparty publishing taking our funds.
unsafe_revoked_tx_signing = []
unstable = []
+
no_std = ["hashbrown"]
+std = []
+
+default = ["std"]
[dependencies]
bitcoin = "0.26"
use util::events::EventHandler;
use prelude::*;
-use std::sync::RwLock;
+use sync::RwLock;
use core::ops::Deref;
/// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`] for monitoring channels.
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLCType, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction};
-use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
+use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use chain;
-use chain::WatchedOutput;
+use chain::{BestBlock, WatchedOutput};
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, StaticPaymentOutputDescriptor, DelayedPaymentOutputDescriptor, Sign, KeysInterface};
use core::{cmp, mem};
use std::io::Error;
use core::ops::Deref;
-use std::sync::Mutex;
+use sync::Mutex;
/// An update generated by the underlying Channel itself which contains some new information the
/// ChannelMonitor should be made aware of.
txids.dedup();
txids
}
+
+ /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
+ /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
+ pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
+ self.inner.lock().unwrap().best_block.clone()
+ }
}
impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use hex;
+ use chain::BestBlock;
use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use chain::package::{WEIGHT_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OFFERED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_RECEIVED_HTLC, WEIGHT_REVOKED_OUTPUT};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channelmanager::BestBlock;
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, ChannelPublicKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
use util::test_utils::{TestLogger, TestBroadcaster, TestFeeEstimator};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
use prelude::*;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
let broadcaster = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))});
- let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
+ let fee_estimator = Arc::new(TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) });
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
//! Structs and traits which allow other parts of rust-lightning to interact with the blockchain.
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
+use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
+use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, MonitorEvent};
use chain::keysinterface::Sign;
pub(crate) mod onchaintx;
pub(crate) mod package;
+/// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
+pub struct BestBlock {
+ block_hash: BlockHash,
+ height: u32,
+}
+
+impl BestBlock {
+ /// Constructs a `BestBlock` that represents the genesis block at height 0 of the given
+ /// network.
+ pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
+ BestBlock {
+ block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
+ height: 0,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a `BestBlock` as identified by the given block hash and height.
+ pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
+ BestBlock { block_hash, height }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the best block hash.
+ pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
+
+ /// Returns the best block height.
+ pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
+}
+
/// An error when accessing the chain via [`Access`].
#[derive(Clone)]
pub enum AccessError {
#[cfg(feature = "hashbrown")]
pub use self::hashbrown::{HashMap, HashSet, hash_map};
}
+
+#[cfg(feature = "std")]
+mod sync {
+ pub use ::std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, Condvar, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
+mod sync;
use util::test_utils;
use prelude::*;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
// If persister_fail is true, we have the persister return a PermanentFailure
// instead of the higher-level ChainMonitor.
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
+ .contents.flags & 2, 0); // The "disabled" bit should be unset as we just reconnected
+
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(bs_reestablish == get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
+ assert_eq!(
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
+ .contents.flags & 2, 0); // The "disabled" bit should be unset as we just reconnected
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
+ .contents.flags & 2, 0); // The "disabled" bit should be unset as we just reconnected
*nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Some(Ok(()));
let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&chan_1.2).unwrap().clone();
let bs_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reconnect);
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ let _as_channel_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// Now deliver a's reestablish, freeing the claim from the holding cell, but fail the monitor
// update.
*nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Some(Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure));
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reconnect);
- assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ let _bs_channel_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_string(), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
let bs_reconnect = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reconnect);
+ let _bs_channel_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reconnect);
+ let _as_channel_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
*nodes[1].chain_monitor.update_ret.lock().unwrap() = Some(Ok(()));
let (outpoint, latest_update) = nodes[1].chain_monitor.latest_monitor_update_id.lock().unwrap().get(&channel_id).unwrap().clone();
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
-use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
+use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
use ln::chan_utils;
+use chain::BestBlock;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use prelude::*;
use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
use core::ops::Deref;
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
-use std::sync::Mutex;
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
+use sync::Mutex;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
/// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
/// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
//get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
/// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
// get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
#[cfg(not(test))]
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
//implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
- minimum_depth: u32,
+ minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
}
pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
-const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
#[cfg(not(test))]
const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
- minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
+ minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
last_sent_closing_fee: None,
counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
- counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
- minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
+ minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
} else {
self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
};
- debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
+ debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
}
- /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
- /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
- /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
- fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
- chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
- }
-
/// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
/// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
/// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
}
+ if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
+ // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
+ // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
+ // channel.
+ return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
+ }
let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
+ self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
- self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
+ self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
/// corner case properly.
pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
// Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
- (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
- cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
+ (
+ cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
+ - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
+ - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64
+ - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
+ 0) as u64,
+ cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
+ - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64
+ - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
+ 0) as u64
+ )
+ }
+
+ pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
+ (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
+ self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
}
// Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
// Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
- if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
+ if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
}
}
let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
- let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
+ self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
+ &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
+
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
self.channel_id
}
+ pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
+ self.minimum_depth
+ }
+
/// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
/// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
&self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
}
- fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
- self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
+ pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
+ self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
+ .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
}
fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
}
pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
- self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
+ self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
}
pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
ChannelValueStat {
value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
- channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
+ channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
/// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
/// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
- pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
- where F::Target: FeeEstimator
- {
- // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
- // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
-
- // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
- let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
-
- if self.is_outbound() {
- // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
- res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
- }
-
- // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
- res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
-
- res as u32
+ pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
+ self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
}
/// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
}
- if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
return None;
}
// the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
// close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
// the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
- if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
+ if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
channel_id: self.channel_id(),
- data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
+ data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
});
}
}
max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
- minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
+ minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
// Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
// reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
- let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
+ let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
}
}
pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
- let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
- if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
+ if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
}
self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
}
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
self.user_id.write(writer)?;
- self.config.write(writer)?;
+
+ // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
+ // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
+ self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
+ self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
+ self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
+ self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
(self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
- self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
+
+ // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
+ self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
+
self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
- self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
+
+ // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
+ self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
Some(info) => {
self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
- write_tlv_fields!(writer, {(0, self.announcement_sigs, option)});
+ write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
+ (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
+ // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
+ // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
+ // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
+ // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
+ // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
+ // override that.
+ (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
+ (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
+ (5, self.config, required),
+ });
Ok(())
}
impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
- let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+ let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
+ if ver == 1 {
+ // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
+ config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ } else {
+ // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
+ let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ }
let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
+ if ver == 1 {
+ // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
+ counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ } else {
+ // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
+ let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ }
let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
- let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
+
+ let mut minimum_depth = None;
+ if ver == 1 {
+ // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
+ minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
+ } else {
+ // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
+ let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
+ }
let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
0 => None,
let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
let mut announcement_sigs = None;
- read_tlv_fields!(reader, {(0, announcement_sigs, option)});
+ read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
+ (0, announcement_sigs, option),
+ (1, minimum_depth, option),
+ (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
+ (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
+ });
let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
Ok(Channel {
user_id,
- config,
+ config: config.unwrap(),
channel_id,
channel_state,
secp_ctx,
feerate_per_kw,
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
- counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
+ counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
last_sent_closing_fee,
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use hex;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
- use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
+ use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
use ln::chan_utils;
use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
+ use chain::BestBlock;
use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
- use std::sync::Arc;
+ use sync::Arc;
use prelude::*;
struct TestFeeEstimator {
config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
+ chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
- let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
+ let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
+ chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
+ &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use chain;
-use chain::Confirm;
-use chain::Watch;
+use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator};
use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
use core::{cmp, mem};
use core::cell::RefCell;
use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
-use std::sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::time::Duration;
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
pub best_block: BestBlock,
}
-/// The best known block as identified by its hash and height.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
-pub struct BestBlock {
- block_hash: BlockHash,
- height: u32,
-}
-
-impl BestBlock {
- /// Returns the best block from the genesis of the given network.
- pub fn from_genesis(network: Network) -> Self {
- BestBlock {
- block_hash: genesis_block(network).header.block_hash(),
- height: 0,
- }
- }
-
- /// Returns the best block as identified by the given block hash and height.
- pub fn new(block_hash: BlockHash, height: u32) -> Self {
- BestBlock { block_hash, height }
- }
-
- /// Returns the best block hash.
- pub fn block_hash(&self) -> BlockHash { self.block_hash }
-
- /// Returns the best block height.
- pub fn height(&self) -> u32 { self.height }
-}
-
#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
enum NotifyOption {
DoPersist,
#[allow(dead_code)]
const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
+/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
+/// to better separate parameters.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
+ /// The node_id of our counterparty
+ pub node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
+ /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
+ /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
+ pub features: InitFeatures,
+ /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
+ /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+ /// claiming at least this value on chain.
+ ///
+ /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
+ ///
+ /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
+ pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
+ /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
+ /// payments to us through this channel.
+ pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
+}
+
/// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct ChannelDetails {
/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
/// lifetime of the channel.
pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
+ /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
+ pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
/// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
/// our counterparty already.
///
/// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
/// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
- /// The node_id of our counterparty
- pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
- /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
- /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
- /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
- pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
/// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
+ /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
+ /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
+ /// this value on chain.
+ ///
+ /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
+ ///
+ /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
+ pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
/// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
pub user_id: u64,
/// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
/// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
/// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
+ ///
+ /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
+ /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
+ /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
/// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
/// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
/// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
/// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
/// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
+ ///
+ /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
+ /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
+ /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
+ /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
+ /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
+ /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
+ ///
+ /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
+ pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
+ /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
+ /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
+ /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
+ /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
+ /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
+ ///
+ /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
+ pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
/// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
pub is_outbound: bool,
/// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
/// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
/// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
- /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations).
+ /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
+ /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
+ ///
+ /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
pub is_funding_locked: bool,
/// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
/// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
pub is_usable: bool,
/// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
pub is_public: bool,
- /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
- /// payments to us through this channel.
- pub counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
}
/// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
$short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
$short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
- (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&$channel).ok()))
+ (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
}
}
}
// splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
// given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
// retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
- let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&$chan).ok()));
+ let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
+ $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
(res, true)
},
ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
///
/// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
/// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
+ ///
+ /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
+ /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
+ /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
+ let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
+ channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
res.push(ChannelDetails {
channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
+ counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ features: InitFeatures::empty(),
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
+ forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
+ },
funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
- remote_network_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
inbound_capacity_msat,
outbound_capacity_msat,
user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
+ confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
+ force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
is_usable: channel.is_live(),
is_public: channel.should_announce(),
- counterparty_forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
});
}
}
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for chan in res.iter_mut() {
- if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
- chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
+ if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
+ chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
}
}
res
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
- Some(update)
- } else { None }
+ self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok()
} else { None };
if let Some(update) = chan_update {
};
log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
// short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
- let forwarding_id = match id_option {
- None => { // unknown_next_peer
- return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
- },
- Some(id) => id.clone(),
- };
if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
+ let forwarding_id = match id_option {
+ None => { // unknown_next_peer
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ },
+ Some(id) => id.clone(),
+ };
+
let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
+ if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
+ // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
+ // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
+ // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
+ break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+
// Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
// that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
// around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
// hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
// on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
- break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
- let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
+ let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
+ .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
+ .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
- break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
- break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
// Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
// packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
- break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
}
- // In theory, we would be safe against unitentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
- // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longuer delay.
+ // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
+ // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
- break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
+ break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
}
break None;
(pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
}
- /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
+ /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
+ /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
+ /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
+ ///
+ /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
+ fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ if !chan.should_announce() {
+ return Err(LightningError {
+ err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
+ action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
+ });
+ }
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
+ self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
+ }
+
+ /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
+ /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
+ /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
+ /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
/// May be called with channel_state already locked!
- fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
Some(id) => id,
cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
- fee_base_msat: chan.get_holder_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
+ fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
excess_data: Vec::new(),
};
if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
msg,
- update_msg: match self.get_channel_update(chan) {
+ update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
Ok(msg) => msg,
Err(_) => continue,
},
} else {
panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
}
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
));
if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
- Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
+ Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
},
ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
};
ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
},
ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
- if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(&chan_entry.get()) {
+ if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
(0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
} else {
(0x4000|10, Vec::new())
pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
- let (mut pending_failures, chan_restoration_res) = {
+ let chan_restoration_res;
+ let mut pending_failures = {
let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
}
let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
- (pending_failures, handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked))
+ let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
+ // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
+ // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
+ // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
+ // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
+ Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
+ })
+ } else { None };
+ chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
+ if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
+ }
+ pending_failures
};
post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
+ } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
+ msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
+ });
}
Ok(())
},
self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
}
if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
// want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
match pending_forward_info {
PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
- let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update(chan) {
+ let reason = if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
// TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
- update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
+ // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
+ // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
+ update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
});
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
}
- try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
+ if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
+ return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
+ } else {
+ try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
+ }
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
}
}
fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround, chan_restoration_res) = {
+ let chan_restoration_res;
+ let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
// add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
+ let mut channel_update = None;
if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
msg,
});
+ } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
+ // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
+ // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
+ // they have the latest channel parameters.
+ channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
+ });
}
let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
- (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround,
- handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked))
+ chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
+ if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
+ channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
+ }
+ (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
},
hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
}
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
let res = f(channel);
if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
- let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
+ let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
data: chan_update,
node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
msg: announcement_sigs,
});
+ } else if channel.is_usable() {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
+ pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
+ node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
+ msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
+ });
} else {
log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
}
// It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
// reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
*guard
}
+
+ /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
+ /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
+ pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
+ self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
+ }
}
impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
}
failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
- if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
+ if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
&events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
for chan in self.list_channels() {
- if chan.remote_network_id == *counterparty_node_id {
+ if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
// Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
- use std::sync::Arc;
+ use sync::Arc;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::thread;
use core::time::Duration;
use ln::features::InitFeatures;
use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
+ #[cfg(feature = "std")]
#[test]
fn test_wait_timeout() {
let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
// At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
+
+ // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
+ // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
+ // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
+ let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
+ let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
+ let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
+
+ // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
+ // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
+ assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
+
+ // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
+ // the channel info has updated.
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
+ assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
+ assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
}
}
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
- use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use test::Bencher;
let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
- let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+ let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
- node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
+ let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
+ match msg_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
+ node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
+ get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
+ },
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
+ match msg_events[1] {
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
+ _ => panic!(),
+ }
let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
set_shutdown_any_segwit_required);
#[cfg(test)]
- define_context!(TestingContext {
- required_features: [
- // Byte 0
- ,
- // Byte 1
- ,
- // Byte 2
- UnknownFeature,
- ],
- optional_features: [
- // Byte 0
- ,
- // Byte 1
- ,
- // Byte 2
- ,
- ],
- });
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- define_feature!(23, UnknownFeature, [TestingContext],
+ define_feature!(123456789, UnknownFeature, [NodeContext, ChannelContext, InvoiceContext],
"Feature flags for an unknown feature used in testing.", set_unknown_feature_optional,
set_unknown_feature_required);
}
/// Converts `Features<T>` to `Features<C>`. Only known `T` features relevant to context `C` are
/// included in the result.
fn to_context_internal<C: sealed::Context>(&self) -> Features<C> {
- let byte_count = C::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK.len();
+ let from_byte_count = T::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK.len();
+ let to_byte_count = C::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK.len();
let mut flags = Vec::new();
for (i, byte) in self.flags.iter().enumerate() {
- if i < byte_count {
- let known_source_features = T::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK[i];
- let known_target_features = C::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK[i];
- flags.push(byte & known_source_features & known_target_features);
+ if i < from_byte_count && i < to_byte_count {
+ let from_known_features = T::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK[i];
+ let to_known_features = C::KNOWN_FEATURE_MASK[i];
+ flags.push(byte & from_known_features & to_known_features);
}
}
Features::<C> { flags, mark: PhantomData, }
pub(crate) fn byte_count(&self) -> usize {
self.flags.len()
}
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn set_required_unknown_bits(&mut self) {
- <sealed::TestingContext as sealed::UnknownFeature>::set_required_bit(&mut self.flags);
- }
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn set_optional_unknown_bits(&mut self) {
- <sealed::TestingContext as sealed::UnknownFeature>::set_optional_bit(&mut self.flags);
- }
-
- #[cfg(test)]
- pub(crate) fn clear_unknown_bits(&mut self) {
- <sealed::TestingContext as sealed::UnknownFeature>::clear_bits(&mut self.flags);
- }
}
impl<T: sealed::DataLossProtect> Features<T> {
#[test]
fn sanity_test_unknown_bits() {
- let mut features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
+ let features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
assert!(!features.requires_unknown_bits());
assert!(!features.supports_unknown_bits());
- features.set_required_unknown_bits();
+ let features = ChannelFeatures::empty().set_unknown_feature_required();
assert!(features.requires_unknown_bits());
assert!(features.supports_unknown_bits());
- features.clear_unknown_bits();
- assert!(!features.requires_unknown_bits());
- assert!(!features.supports_unknown_bits());
-
- features.set_optional_unknown_bits();
+ let features = ChannelFeatures::empty().set_unknown_feature_optional();
assert!(!features.requires_unknown_bits());
assert!(features.supports_unknown_bits());
}
assert!(!init_features.supports_gossip_queries());
}
+ #[test]
+ fn convert_to_context_with_unknown_flags() {
+ // Ensure the `from` context has fewer known feature bytes than the `to` context.
+ assert!(InvoiceFeatures::known().byte_count() < NodeFeatures::known().byte_count());
+ let invoice_features = InvoiceFeatures::known().set_unknown_feature_optional();
+ assert!(invoice_features.supports_unknown_bits());
+ let node_features: NodeFeatures = invoice_features.to_context();
+ assert!(!node_features.supports_unknown_bits());
+ }
+
#[test]
fn set_feature_bits() {
let features = InvoiceFeatures::empty()
//! A bunch of useful utilities for building networks of nodes and exchanging messages between
//! nodes for functional tests.
-use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
+use chain::{BestBlock, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
use chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
-use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure};
+use ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure};
use routing::router::{Route, get_route};
use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use prelude::*;
use core::cell::RefCell;
use std::rc::Rc;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use core::mem;
pub const CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH: u32 = 10;
// Check that if we serialize and then deserialize all our channel monitors we get the
// same set of outputs to watch for on chain as we have now. Note that if we write
// tests that fully close channels and remove the monitors at some point this may break.
- let feeest = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+ let feeest = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let mut deserialized_monitors = Vec::new();
{
let old_monitors = self.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
<(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(w.0), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: *self.node.get_current_default_configuration(),
keys_manager: self.keys_manager,
- fee_estimator: &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 },
+ fee_estimator: &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
chain_monitor: self.chain_monitor,
tx_broadcaster: &test_utils::TestBroadcaster {
txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(self.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone()),
pub fn route_payment<'a, 'b, 'c>(origin_node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>, expected_route: &[&Node<'a, 'b, 'c>], recv_value: u64) -> (PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
let net_graph_msg_handler = &origin_node.net_graph_msg_handler;
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- let route = get_route(&origin_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
+ let route = get_route(&origin_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(),
+ &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
+ Some(&origin_node.node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[],
+ recv_value, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), expected_route.len());
for (node, hop) in expected_route.iter().zip(route.paths[0].iter()) {
txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(vec![(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header, 0)])),
};
- let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+ let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", i));
let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
nodes
}
+pub fn test_default_channel_config() -> UserConfig {
+ let mut default_config = UserConfig::default();
+ // Set cltv_expiry_delta slightly lower to keep the final CLTV values inside one byte in our
+ // tests so that our script-length checks don't fail (see ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT).
+ default_config.channel_options.cltv_expiry_delta = 6*6;
+ default_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ default_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ // When most of our tests were written, the default HTLC minimum was fixed at 1000.
+ // It now defaults to 1, so we simply set it to the expected value here.
+ default_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 1000;
+ default_config
+}
+
pub fn create_node_chanmgrs<'a, 'b>(node_count: usize, cfgs: &'a Vec<NodeCfg<'b>>, node_config: &[Option<UserConfig>]) -> Vec<ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &'a TestChainMonitor<'b>, &'b test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &'b test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'b test_utils::TestLogger>> {
let mut chanmgrs = Vec::new();
for i in 0..node_count {
- let mut default_config = UserConfig::default();
- // Set cltv_expiry_delta slightly lower to keep the final CLTV values inside one byte in our
- // tests so that our script-length checks don't fail (see ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT).
- default_config.channel_options.cltv_expiry_delta = 6*6;
- default_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
- default_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
- default_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 1000; // sanitization being done by the sender, to exerce receiver logic we need to lift of limit
let network = Network::Testnet;
let params = ChainParameters {
network,
best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
};
- let node = ChannelManager::new(cfgs[i].fee_estimator, &cfgs[i].chain_monitor, cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, cfgs[i].logger, cfgs[i].keys_manager, if node_config[i].is_some() { node_config[i].clone().unwrap() } else { default_config }, params);
+ let node = ChannelManager::new(cfgs[i].fee_estimator, &cfgs[i].chain_monitor, cfgs[i].tx_broadcaster, cfgs[i].logger, cfgs[i].keys_manager,
+ if node_config[i].is_some() { node_config[i].clone().unwrap() } else { test_default_channel_config() }, params);
chanmgrs.push(node);
}
let mut revoke_and_ack = None;
let mut commitment_update = None;
let order = if let Some(ev) = msg_events.get(idx) {
- idx += 1;
match ev {
&MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
+ idx += 1;
RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst
},
&MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
+ idx += 1;
RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst
},
+ &MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
} else {
assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(revoke_and_ack.is_none());
revoke_and_ack = Some(msg.clone());
+ idx += 1;
},
&MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(commitment_update.is_none());
commitment_update = Some(updates.clone());
+ idx += 1;
},
+ &MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
+ if let Some(&MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg }) = msg_events.get(idx) {
+ assert_eq!(*node_id, $dst_node.node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 0); // "disabled" flag must not be set as we just reconnected.
+ }
+
(funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order)
}
}
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
-use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, get_route};
+use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, get_route};
+use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler,RoutingMessageHandler,HTLCFailChannelUpdate, ErrorAction};
use prelude::*;
use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
use core::default::Default;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown);
node_0_2nd_shutdown
} else {
- assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
+ let node_0_chan_update = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.flags & 2, 0); // "disabled" flag must not be set as we just reconnected.
nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &node_1_2nd_shutdown);
get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
};
// sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
// In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
// this situation.
- chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 6000 };
- chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 6000 };
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
// up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
// the update_add_htlc.
- chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 6000 };
- chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 6000 };
+ chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
+ chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000);
- assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000);
+ let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
+ assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
+ assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
- assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000);
- assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000);
+ assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
+ assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
}
fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
+ // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
}}
}
- let feemsat = 239; // somehow we know?
+ let feemsat = 239; // set above
let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+ fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
- fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+ fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap().iter().next().unwrap().1.write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+ fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
}
logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
- fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+ fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
// we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
+ // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
+ // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
+ &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
// And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
+ // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
+ // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
+ &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
+ // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
match error {
APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config) {
match error {
ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
- if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
+ if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config) {
match error {
ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
- fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 };
+ fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
node_state_0 = {
}
}
+#[test]
+fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
+ // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
+ // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
+ // to forward through that channel.
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
+ no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
+ no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
+ let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
+ let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
+ let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
+
+ // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
+ // not send for private channels.
+ nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
+ let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
+ let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
+
+ let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
+ nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
+
+ let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
+ confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
+ confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
+ connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
+ let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
+ assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
+ assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
+
+ // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
+ // channel:
+ send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
+
+ // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
+ // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
+ let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
+ let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(),
+ &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None,
+ &[&RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
+ src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
+ fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
+ cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
+ htlc_minimum_msat: None,
+ htlc_maximum_msat: None,
+ }])], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
+
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
+ nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
+
+ let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
+ assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
+ assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
+
+ nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
+ commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
+ expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
+ expect_payment_failure_chan_update!(nodes[0], nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
+
+ // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
+ // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
+
+ let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
+ let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
+ {
+ let mons = nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.monitors.read().unwrap();
+ let mut mon_iter = mons.iter();
+ mon_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
+ mon_iter.next().unwrap().1.write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
+ }
+
+ persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
+ let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
+ new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
+ nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
+
+ let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
+ let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
+ let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
+ let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
+ assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
+ assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
+
+ no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
+
+ let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
+ let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
+ let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
+ channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
+ channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
+ <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
+ default_config: no_announce_cfg,
+ keys_manager,
+ fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
+ chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
+ tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
+ logger: nodes[1].logger,
+ channel_monitors,
+ }).unwrap()
+ };
+ assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
+ nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
+
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
+ nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
+ let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
+ nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
+ let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
+ nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
// In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
use chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
-use ln::channelmanager::HTLCForwardInfo;
+use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCForwardInfo, CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY};
use ln::onion_utils;
use routing::router::{Route, get_route};
use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
-use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, HTLCFailChannelUpdate, OptionalField};
+use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate, OptionalField};
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
+use bitcoin::secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::SecretKey;
}
}
+const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
+const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
+const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
+const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+
#[test]
-fn test_onion_failure() {
- use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
- use ln::channelmanager::CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1;
+fn test_fee_failures() {
+ // Tests that the fee required when forwarding remains consistent over time. This was
+ // previously broken, with forwarding fees floating based on the fee estimator at the time of
+ // forwarding.
+ //
+ // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
+ // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config), Some(config)]);
+ let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let channels = [create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()), create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known())];
+ let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
+ let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 40_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
+
+ // positive case
+ let (payment_preimage_success, payment_hash_success, payment_secret_success) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_success, &Some(payment_secret_success)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 40_000, payment_hash_success, payment_secret_success);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_success);
+
+ let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
+ run_onion_failure_test("fee_insufficient", 0, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, &payment_secret, |msg| {
+ msg.amount_msat -= 1;
+ }, || {}, true, Some(UPDATE|12), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id: channels[0].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
- const BADONION: u16 = 0x8000;
- const PERM: u16 = 0x4000;
- const NODE: u16 = 0x2000;
- const UPDATE: u16 = 0x1000;
+ // In an earlier version, we spuriously failed to forward payments if the expected feerate
+ // changed between the channel open and the payment.
+ {
+ let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
+ *feerate_lock *= 2;
+ }
+ let (payment_preimage_success, payment_hash_success, payment_secret_success) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_success, &Some(payment_secret_success)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 40_000, payment_hash_success, payment_secret_success);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_success);
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn test_onion_failure() {
// When we check for amount_below_minimum below, we want to test that we're using the *right*
// amount, thus we need different htlc_minimum_msat values. We set node[2]'s htlc_minimum_msat
// to 2000, which is above the default value of 1000 set in create_node_chanmgrs.
node_2_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
node_2_cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
+ // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
+ let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
+ config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
+
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
- let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, Some(node_2_cfg)]);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config), Some(node_2_cfg)]);
let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
for node in nodes.iter() {
*node.keys_manager.override_session_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([3; 32]);
use prelude::*;
use alloc::collections::LinkedList;
use alloc::fmt::Debug;
-use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::{cmp, hash, fmt, mem};
use core::ops::Deref;
self.forward_broadcast_msg(peers, &wire::Message::ChannelUpdate(msg), None);
}
},
+ MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
+ log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling SendChannelUpdate event in peer_handler for node {} for channel {}",
+ log_pubkey!(node_id), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
+ let peer = get_peer_for_forwarding!(node_id);
+ peer.pending_outbound_buffer.push_back(peer.channel_encryptor.encrypt_message(&encode_msg!(msg)));
+ },
MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { ref update } => {
self.message_handler.route_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(update);
},
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
use prelude::*;
- use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+ use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
#[derive(Clone)]
use prelude::*;
use alloc::collections::{BTreeMap, btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry};
use core::{cmp, fmt};
-use std::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
+use sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
-use std::sync::Mutex;
+use sync::Mutex;
use core::ops::Deref;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
let batch_count = batches.len();
+ let mut prev_batch_endblock = msg.first_blocknum;
for (batch_index, batch) in batches.into_iter().enumerate() {
- // Per spec, the initial first_blocknum needs to be <= the query's first_blocknum and subsequent
- // must be >= the prior reply. We'll simplify this by using zero since its still spec compliant and
- // sequence completion is now explicitly.
- let first_blocknum = 0;
-
- // Per spec, the final end_blocknum needs to be >= the query's end_blocknum, so we'll use the
- // query's value. Prior batches must use the number of blocks that fit into the message. We'll
- // base this off the last SCID in the batch since we've somewhat abusing first_blocknum.
- let number_of_blocks = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
- msg.end_blocknum()
- } else {
- block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) + 1
+ // Per spec, the initial `first_blocknum` needs to be <= the query's `first_blocknum`
+ // and subsequent `first_blocknum`s must be >= the prior reply's `first_blocknum`.
+ //
+ // Additionally, c-lightning versions < 0.10 require that the `first_blocknum` of each
+ // reply is >= the previous reply's `first_blocknum` and either exactly the previous
+ // reply's `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks` or exactly one greater. This is a
+ // significant diversion from the requirements set by the spec, and, in case of blocks
+ // with no channel opens (e.g. empty blocks), requires that we use the previous value
+ // and *not* derive the first_blocknum from the actual first block of the reply.
+ let first_blocknum = prev_batch_endblock;
+
+ // Each message carries the number of blocks (from the `first_blocknum`) its contents
+ // fit in. Though there is no requirement that we use exactly the number of blocks its
+ // contents are from, except for the bogus requirements c-lightning enforces, above.
+ //
+ // Per spec, the last end block (ie `first_blocknum + number_of_blocks`) needs to be
+ // >= the query's end block. Thus, for the last reply, we calculate the difference
+ // between the query's end block and the start of the reply.
+ //
+ // Overflow safe since end_blocknum=msg.first_block_num+msg.number_of_blocks and
+ // first_blocknum will be either msg.first_blocknum or a higher block height.
+ let (sync_complete, number_of_blocks) = if batch_index == batch_count-1 {
+ (true, msg.end_blocknum() - first_blocknum)
+ }
+ // Prior replies should use the number of blocks that fit into the reply. Overflow
+ // safe since first_blocknum is always <= last SCID's block.
+ else {
+ (false, block_from_scid(batch.last().unwrap()) - first_blocknum)
};
- // Only true for the last message in a sequence
- let sync_complete = batch_index == batch_count - 1;
+ prev_batch_endblock = first_blocknum + number_of_blocks;
pending_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange {
node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
use prelude::*;
- use std::sync::Arc;
+ use sync::Arc;
fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
vec![
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 0x01000000,
+ first_blocknum: 0xffffff,
+ number_of_blocks: 1,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![]
},
vec![
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 2000,
+ first_blocknum: 1000,
+ number_of_blocks: 1000,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![],
}
vec![
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff,
+ first_blocknum: 0xfe0000,
+ number_of_blocks: 0xffffffff - 0xfe0000,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![
0xfffffe_ffffff_ffff, // max
vec![
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 108000,
+ first_blocknum: 100000,
+ number_of_blocks: 8000,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
.map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
vec![
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 108000,
+ first_blocknum: 100000,
+ number_of_blocks: 7999,
sync_complete: false,
short_channel_ids: (100000..=107999)
.map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
},
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 108001,
+ first_blocknum: 107999,
+ number_of_blocks: 2,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![
scid_from_parts(108000, 0, 0).unwrap(),
vec![
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 108002,
+ first_blocknum: 100002,
+ number_of_blocks: 7999,
sync_complete: false,
short_channel_ids: (100002..=108001)
.map(|block| scid_from_parts(block, 0, 0).unwrap())
},
ReplyChannelRange {
chain_hash: chain_hash.clone(),
- first_blocknum: 0,
- number_of_blocks: 108002,
+ first_blocknum: 108001,
+ number_of_blocks: 1,
sync_complete: true,
short_channel_ids: vec![
scid_from_parts(108001, 1, 0).unwrap(),
expected_ok: bool,
expected_replies: Vec<ReplyChannelRange>
) {
+ let mut max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_sub(1);
+ let mut c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = max_firstblocknum;
+ let query_end_blocknum = msg.end_blocknum();
let result = net_graph_msg_handler.handle_query_channel_range(test_node_id, msg);
if expected_ok {
assert_eq!(msg.number_of_blocks, expected_reply.number_of_blocks);
assert_eq!(msg.sync_complete, expected_reply.sync_complete);
assert_eq!(msg.short_channel_ids, expected_reply.short_channel_ids);
+
+ // Enforce exactly the sequencing requirements present on c-lightning v0.9.3
+ assert!(msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum || msg.first_blocknum == c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum.saturating_add(1));
+ assert!(msg.first_blocknum >= max_firstblocknum);
+ max_firstblocknum = msg.first_blocknum;
+ c_lightning_0_9_prev_end_blocknum = msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks);
+
+ // Check that the last block count is >= the query's end_blocknum
+ if i == events.len() - 1 {
+ assert!(msg.first_blocknum.saturating_add(msg.number_of_blocks) >= query_end_blocknum);
+ }
},
_ => panic!("expected MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange"),
}
if let Some(hops) = first_hops {
for chan in hops {
let short_channel_id = chan.short_channel_id.expect("first_hops should be filled in with usable channels, not pending ones");
- if chan.remote_network_id == *our_node_id {
+ if chan.counterparty.node_id == *our_node_id {
return Err(LightningError{err: "First hop cannot have our_node_id as a destination.".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
}
- first_hop_targets.insert(chan.remote_network_id, (short_channel_id, chan.counterparty_features.to_context(), chan.outbound_capacity_msat, chan.counterparty_features.to_context()));
+ first_hop_targets.insert(chan.counterparty.node_id, (short_channel_id, chan.counterparty.features.to_context(), chan.outbound_capacity_msat, chan.counterparty.features.to_context()));
}
if first_hop_targets.is_empty() {
return Err(LightningError{err: "Cannot route when there are no outbound routes away from us".to_owned(), action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, All};
use prelude::*;
- use std::sync::Arc;
+ use sync::{self, Arc};
+
+ fn get_channel_details(short_channel_id: Option<u64>, node_id: PublicKey,
+ features: InitFeatures, outbound_capacity_msat: u64) -> channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
+ channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
+ channel_id: [0; 32],
+ counterparty: channelmanager::ChannelCounterparty {
+ features,
+ node_id,
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: 0,
+ forwarding_info: None,
+ },
+ funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
+ short_channel_id,
+ channel_value_satoshis: 0,
+ user_id: 0,
+ outbound_capacity_msat,
+ inbound_capacity_msat: 42,
+ unspendable_punishment_reserve: None,
+ confirmations_required: None,
+ force_close_spend_delay: None,
+ is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
+ is_usable: true, is_public: true,
+ }
+ }
// Using the same keys for LN and BTC ids
fn add_channel(net_graph_msg_handler: &NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, node_1_privkey: &SecretKey,
}
}
- fn build_graph() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<std::sync::Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, std::sync::Arc<crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger>>, std::sync::Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, std::sync::Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>) {
+ fn build_graph() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<sync::Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, sync::Arc<crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger>>, sync::Arc<test_utils::TestChainSource>, sync::Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>) {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet));
// Simple route to 2 via 1
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
- short_channel_id: Some(2),
- remote_network_id: our_id,
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
- channel_value_satoshis: 100000,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 100000,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 100000,
- is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
- is_usable: true, is_public: true,
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
- }];
+ let our_chans = vec![get_channel_details(Some(2), our_id, InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 100000)];
if let Err(LightningError{err, action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}) = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], None, Some(&our_chans.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)) {
assert_eq!(err, "First hop cannot have our_node_id as a destination.");
} else { panic!(); }
// If we specify a channel to node7, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
- short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: nodes[7].clone(),
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
- channel_value_satoshis: 0,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 250_000_000,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
- is_usable: true, is_public: true,
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
- }];
+ let our_chans = vec![get_channel_details(Some(42), nodes[7].clone(), InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 250_000_000)];
let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], None, Some(&our_chans.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
let (_, our_id, privkeys, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
// Disable nodes 1, 2, and 8 by requiring unknown feature bits
- let mut unknown_features = NodeFeatures::known();
- unknown_features.set_required_unknown_bits();
+ let unknown_features = NodeFeatures::known().set_unknown_feature_required();
add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[0], unknown_features.clone(), 1);
add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[1], unknown_features.clone(), 1);
add_or_update_node(&net_graph_msg_handler, &secp_ctx, &privkeys[7], unknown_features.clone(), 1);
} else { panic!(); }
// If we specify a channel to node7, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
- short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: nodes[7].clone(),
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
- channel_value_satoshis: 0,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 250_000_000,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
- is_usable: true, is_public: true,
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
- }];
+ let our_chans = vec![get_channel_details(Some(42), nodes[7].clone(), InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 250_000_000)];
let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], None, Some(&our_chans.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
assert_eq!(route.paths[0][2].channel_features.le_flags(), &id_to_feature_flags(3));
// If we specify a channel to node7, that overrides our local channel view and that gets used
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
- short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: nodes[7].clone(),
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
- channel_value_satoshis: 0,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 250_000_000,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
- is_usable: true, is_public: true,
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
- }];
+ let our_chans = vec![get_channel_details(Some(42), nodes[7].clone(), InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 250_000_000)];
let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[2], None, Some(&our_chans.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &Vec::new(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
let (_, our_id, _, nodes) = get_nodes(&secp_ctx);
// Simple test with outbound channel to 4 to test that last_hops and first_hops connect
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
- short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: nodes[3].clone(),
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
- channel_value_satoshis: 0,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 250_000_000,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
- is_usable: true, is_public: true,
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
- }];
+ let our_chans = vec![get_channel_details(Some(42), nodes[3].clone(), InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 250_000_000)];
let mut last_hops = last_hops(&nodes);
let route = get_route(&our_id, &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap(), &nodes[6], None, Some(&our_chans.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &last_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>(), 100, 42, Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(route.paths[0].len(), 2);
htlc_minimum_msat: None,
htlc_maximum_msat: last_hop_htlc_max,
}]);
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
- short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: middle_node_id,
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
- channel_value_satoshis: 100000,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 100000,
- is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
- is_usable: true, is_public: true,
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
- }];
+ let our_chans = vec![get_channel_details(Some(42), middle_node_id, InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), outbound_capacity_msat)];
get_route(&source_node_id, &NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash()), &target_node_id, None, Some(&our_chans.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![&last_hops], route_val, 42, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()))
}
});
// Now, limit the first_hop by the outbound_capacity_msat of 200_000 sats.
- let our_chans = vec![channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
- channel_id: [0; 32],
- funding_txo: Some(OutPoint { txid: bitcoin::Txid::from_slice(&[0; 32]).unwrap(), index: 0 }),
- short_channel_id: Some(42),
- remote_network_id: nodes[0].clone(),
- counterparty_features: InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]),
- channel_value_satoshis: 0,
- user_id: 0,
- outbound_capacity_msat: 200_000_000,
- inbound_capacity_msat: 0,
- is_outbound: true, is_funding_locked: true,
- is_usable: true, is_public: true,
- counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
- }];
+ let our_chans = vec![get_channel_details(Some(42), nodes[0].clone(), InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(vec![0b11]), 200_000_000)];
{
// Attempt to route more than available results in a failure.
--- /dev/null
+pub use ::alloc::sync::Arc;
+use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
+use core::time::Duration;
+use core::cell::{RefCell, Ref, RefMut};
+
+pub type LockResult<Guard> = Result<Guard, ()>;
+
+pub struct Condvar {}
+
+impl Condvar {
+ pub fn new() -> Condvar {
+ Condvar { }
+ }
+
+ pub fn wait<'a, T>(&'a self, guard: MutexGuard<'a, T>) -> LockResult<MutexGuard<'a, T>> {
+ Ok(guard)
+ }
+
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ pub fn wait_timeout<'a, T>(&'a self, guard: MutexGuard<'a, T>, _dur: Duration) -> LockResult<(MutexGuard<'a, T>, ())> {
+ Ok((guard, ()))
+ }
+
+ pub fn notify_all(&self) {}
+}
+
+pub struct Mutex<T: ?Sized> {
+ inner: RefCell<T>
+}
+
+#[must_use = "if unused the Mutex will immediately unlock"]
+pub struct MutexGuard<'a, T: ?Sized + 'a> {
+ lock: RefMut<'a, T>,
+}
+
+impl<T: ?Sized> Deref for MutexGuard<'_, T> {
+ type Target = T;
+
+ fn deref(&self) -> &T {
+ &self.lock.deref()
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T: ?Sized> DerefMut for MutexGuard<'_, T> {
+ fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T {
+ self.lock.deref_mut()
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T> Mutex<T> {
+ pub fn new(inner: T) -> Mutex<T> {
+ Mutex { inner: RefCell::new(inner) }
+ }
+
+ pub fn lock<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<MutexGuard<'a, T>> {
+ Ok(MutexGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow_mut() })
+ }
+
+ pub fn try_lock<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<MutexGuard<'a, T>> {
+ Ok(MutexGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow_mut() })
+ }
+}
+
+pub struct RwLock<T: ?Sized> {
+ inner: RefCell<T>
+}
+
+pub struct RwLockReadGuard<'a, T: ?Sized + 'a> {
+ lock: Ref<'a, T>,
+}
+
+pub struct RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T: ?Sized + 'a> {
+ lock: RefMut<'a, T>,
+}
+
+impl<T: ?Sized> Deref for RwLockReadGuard<'_, T> {
+ type Target = T;
+
+ fn deref(&self) -> &T {
+ &self.lock.deref()
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T: ?Sized> Deref for RwLockWriteGuard<'_, T> {
+ type Target = T;
+
+ fn deref(&self) -> &T {
+ &self.lock.deref()
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T: ?Sized> DerefMut for RwLockWriteGuard<'_, T> {
+ fn deref_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T {
+ self.lock.deref_mut()
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T> RwLock<T> {
+ pub fn new(inner: T) -> RwLock<T> {
+ RwLock { inner: RefCell::new(inner) }
+ }
+
+ pub fn read<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<RwLockReadGuard<'a, T>> {
+ Ok(RwLockReadGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow() })
+ }
+
+ pub fn write<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>> {
+ Ok(RwLockWriteGuard { lock: self.inner.borrow_mut() })
+ }
+
+ pub fn try_write<'a>(&'a self) -> LockResult<RwLockWriteGuard<'a, T>> {
+ // There is no try, grasshopper - only used for tests and expected to fail
+ Err(())
+ }
+}
///
/// Default value: 144, or roughly one day and only applies to outbound channels.
pub max_minimum_depth: u32,
- /// Set to force the incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
- /// ChannelConfig.
+ /// Set to force an incoming channel to match our announced channel preference in
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`].
///
- /// Default value: true, to make the default that no announced channels are possible (which is
- /// appropriate for any nodes which are not online very reliably).
+ /// For a node which is not online reliably, this should be set to true and
+ /// [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] set to false, ensuring that no announced (aka public)
+ /// channels will ever be opened.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: true.
pub force_announced_channel_preference: bool,
/// Set to the amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us.
///
/// with our counterparty.
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug)]
pub struct ChannelConfig {
- /// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
+ /// Amount (in millionths of a satoshi) charged per satoshi for payments forwarded outbound
+ /// over the channel.
/// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
/// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
///
/// Default value: 0.
- pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ pub forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+ /// Amount (in milli-satoshi) charged for payments forwarded outbound over the channel, in
+ /// excess of [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`].
+ /// This may be allowed to change at runtime in a later update, however doing so must result in
+ /// update messages sent to notify all nodes of our updated relay fee.
+ ///
+ /// The default value of a single satoshi roughly matches the market rate on many routing nodes
+ /// as of July 2021. Adjusting it upwards or downwards may change whether nodes route through
+ /// this node.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: 1000.
+ ///
+ /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
+ pub forwarding_fee_base_msat: u32,
/// The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
/// the channel this config applies to.
///
/// This should only be set to true for nodes which expect to be online reliably.
///
/// As the node which funds a channel picks this value this will only apply for new outbound
- /// channels unless ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preferences is set.
+ /// channels unless [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`] is set.
///
/// This cannot be changed after the initial channel handshake.
///
/// Provides sane defaults for most configurations (but with zero relay fees!).
fn default() -> Self {
ChannelConfig {
- fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
+ forwarding_fee_base_msat: 1000,
cltv_expiry_delta: 6 * 12, // 6 blocks/hour * 12 hours
announced_channel: false,
commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: true,
}
}
-//Add write and readable traits to channelconfig
-impl_writeable!(ChannelConfig, 4+2+1+1, {
- fee_proportional_millionths,
- cltv_expiry_delta,
- announced_channel,
- commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey
+impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelConfig, {
+ (0, forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, required),
+ (2, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
+ (4, announced_channel, required),
+ (6, commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey, required),
+ (8, forwarding_fee_base_msat, required),
});
/// Top-level config which holds ChannelHandshakeLimits and ChannelConfig.
pub peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits,
/// Channel config which affects behavior during channel lifetime.
pub channel_options: ChannelConfig,
+ /// If this is set to false, we will reject any HTLCs which were to be forwarded over private
+ /// channels. This prevents us from taking on HTLC-forwarding risk when we intend to run as a
+ /// node which is not online reliably.
+ ///
+ /// For nodes which are not online reliably, you should set all channels to *not* be announced
+ /// (using [`ChannelConfig::announced_channel`] and
+ /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::force_announced_channel_preference`]) and set this to false to
+ /// ensure you are not exposed to any forwarding risk.
+ ///
+ /// Note that because you cannot change a channel's announced state after creation, there is no
+ /// way to disable forwarding on public channels retroactively. Thus, in order to change a node
+ /// from a publicly-announced forwarding node to a private non-forwarding node you must close
+ /// all your channels and open new ones. For privacy, you should also change your node_id
+ /// (swapping all private and public key material for new ones) at that time.
+ ///
+ /// Default value: false.
+ pub accept_forwards_to_priv_channels: bool,
}
impl Default for UserConfig {
own_channel_config: ChannelHandshakeConfig::default(),
peer_channel_config_limits: ChannelHandshakeLimits::default(),
channel_options: ChannelConfig::default(),
+ accept_forwards_to_priv_channels: false,
}
}
}
use prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
-use std::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
+use sync::{Mutex, Arc};
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, SigHashType};
use bitcoin::util::bip143;
/// The channel_update which should be sent.
msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate,
},
+ /// Used to indicate that a channel_update should be sent to a single peer.
+ /// In contrast to [`Self::BroadcastChannelUpdate`], this is used when the channel is a
+ /// private channel and we shouldn't be informing all of our peers of channel parameters.
+ SendChannelUpdate {
+ /// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
+ node_id: PublicKey,
+ /// The channel_update which should be sent.
+ msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate,
+ },
/// Broadcast an error downstream to be handled
HandleError {
/// The node_id of the node which should receive this message
mod tests {
use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
use util::test_utils::TestLogger;
- use std::sync::Arc;
+ use sync::Arc;
#[test]
fn test_level_show() {
}
fn sigrec_decode(sig_rec: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, Error> {
+ // Signature must be 64 + 1 bytes long (compact signature + recovery id)
+ if sig_rec.len() != 65 {
+ return Err(Error::InvalidSignature);
+ }
+
let rsig = &sig_rec[1..];
let rid = sig_rec[0] as i32 - 31;
use prelude::*;
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use core::hash::Hash;
-use std::sync::Mutex;
+use sync::Mutex;
use core::cmp;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Signature;
last_seen_type = Some(typ.0);
// Finally, read the length and value itself:
- let length: ser::BigSize = Readable::read($stream)?;
+ let length: ser::BigSize = ser::Readable::read($stream)?;
let mut s = ser::FixedLengthReader::new($stream, length.0);
match typ.0 {
$($type => {
use prelude::*;
use std::io::Cursor;
use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
- use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, HighZeroBytesDroppedVarInt, VecWriter};
+ use util::ser::{Writeable, HighZeroBytesDroppedVarInt, VecWriter};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
// The BOLT TLV test cases don't include any tests which use our "required-value" logic since
use prelude::*;
use core::time::Duration;
-use std::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
+use sync::{Mutex, Arc};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use core::{cmp, mem};
use chain::keysinterface::InMemorySigner;
}
pub struct TestFeeEstimator {
- pub sat_per_kw: u32,
+ pub sat_per_kw: Mutex<u32>,
}
impl chaininterface::FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
- self.sat_per_kw
+ *self.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap()
}
}
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff