use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface, FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, MIN_RELAY_FEE_SAT_PER_1000_WEIGHT};
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::SpendableOutputDescriptor;
+use chain::keysinterface::{SpendableOutputDescriptor, ChannelKeys};
use util::logger::Logger;
use util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Readable, Writer, Writeable, U48};
use util::{byte_utils, events};
/// than calling these methods directly, the user should register implementors as listeners to the
/// BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify
/// all registered listeners in one go.
-pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
+pub trait ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys>: Send + Sync {
/// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
///
/// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
/// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
/// any spends of it.
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
/// Used by ChannelManager to get list of HTLC resolved onchain and which needed to be updated
/// with success or failure backward
///
/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
-pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
#[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
- pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
+ pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
#[cfg(not(test))]
- monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
+ monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>>,
chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>,
pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>
}
-impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+impl<'a, Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
let block_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
let mut new_events: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(0);
}
}
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
/// Creates a new object which can be used to monitor several channels given the chain
/// interface with which to register to receive notifications.
- pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+ pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>, logger: Arc<Logger>, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>) -> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
let res = SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
chain_monitor,
}
/// Adds or updates the monitor which monitors the channel referred to by the given key.
- pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
Some(orig_monitor) => {
}
}
-impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
- fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint, ChanSigner> {
+ fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
}
}
-impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
+impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> events::EventsProvider for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key, ChanSigner> {
fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
let mut ret = Vec::new();
/// keeping bumping another claim tx to solve the outpoint.
pub(crate) const ANTI_REORG_DELAY: u32 = 6;
-#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
-enum Storage {
+#[derive(Clone)]
+enum Storage<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
Local {
+ keys: ChanSigner,
funding_key: SecretKey,
revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
}
}
+#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for Storage<ChanSigner> {
+ fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
+ match *self {
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
+ let k = keys;
+ match *other {
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => keys.pubkeys() == k.pubkeys(),
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => false,
+ }
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} => {
+ let (rbk, hbk) = (revocation_base_key, htlc_base_key);
+ match *other {
+ Storage::Local { .. } => false,
+ Storage::Watchtower {ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key} =>
+ revocation_base_key == rbk && htlc_base_key == hbk,
+ }
+ },
+ }
+ }
+}
+
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
struct LocalSignedTx {
/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
/// You MUST ensure that no ChannelMonitors for a given channel anywhere contain out-of-date
/// information and are actively monitoring the chain.
#[derive(Clone)]
-pub struct ChannelMonitor {
+pub struct ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
- key_storage: Storage,
+ key_storage: Storage<ChanSigner>,
their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
funding_redeemscript: Option<Script>,
#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
/// underlying object
-impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> PartialEq for ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
if self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
}
}
-impl ChannelMonitor {
- pub(super) fn new(funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor {
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+ /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
+ //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
+ writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
+
+ // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
+ U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
+
+ macro_rules! write_option {
+ ($thing: expr) => {
+ match $thing {
+ &Some(ref t) => {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ t.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ match self.key_storage {
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ keys.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
+ match funding_info {
+ &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
+ writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ &None => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
+ },
+ }
+ current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+ prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
+ self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
+ self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
+
+ match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
+ Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
+ writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
+ match second_option {
+ Some(second_pubkey) => {
+ writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
+ },
+ None => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
+ },
+ }
+ },
+ None => {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+ },
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
+
+ for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(secret)?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
+ ($htlc_output: expr) => {
+ writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
+ writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
+ $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
+ }
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
+ (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
+ for script in txouts.iter() {
+ script.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if for_local_storage {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
+ }
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
+ }
+
+ macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
+ ($local_tx: expr) => {
+ $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
+ writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
+ for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
+ serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
+ if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
+ 1u8.write(writer)?;
+ writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
+ } else {
+ 0u8.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ write_option!(htlc_source);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ if for_local_storage {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
+ for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
+ writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
+ }
+
+ self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
+ self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
+ if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
+ local_key.write(writer)?;
+ } else {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
+ ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
+ claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
+ outp.write(writer)?;
+ claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
+ claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
+ }
+
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
+ for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
+ writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
+ for ev in events.iter() {
+ match *ev {
+ OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
+ claim_request.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
+ htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
+ htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
+ },
+ OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
+ writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
+ outpoint.write(writer)?;
+ input_material.write(writer)?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+ /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+ /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
+ pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.write(writer, true)
+ }
+
+ /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
+ ///
+ /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
+ /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
+ /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
+ /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
+ /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
+ pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
+ self.write(writer, false)
+ }
+}
+
+impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
+ pub(super) fn new(keys: ChanSigner, funding_key: &SecretKey, revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, payment_base_key: &SecretKey, shutdown_pubkey: &PublicKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
ChannelMonitor {
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
key_storage: Storage::Local {
+ keys,
funding_key: funding_key.clone(),
revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
- let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
+ let pos = ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::place_secret(idx);
for i in 0..pos {
let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
- if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
+ if ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Previous secret did not match new one"));
}
}
pub(super) fn provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, their_revocation_point: PublicKey) {
match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
- if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &payment_base_key)) {
+ Storage::Local { ref payment_base_key, ref keys, .. } => {
+ if let Ok(payment_key) = chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &their_revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().payment_basepoint) {
let to_remote_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
.push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&payment_key.serialize())[..])
.into_script();
/// Combines this ChannelMonitor with the information contained in the other ChannelMonitor.
/// After a successful call this ChannelMonitor is up-to-date and is safe to use to monitor the
/// chain for new blocks/transactions.
- pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
+ pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) -> Result<(), MonitorUpdateError> {
match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref funding_info, .. } => {
if funding_info.is_none() { return Err(MonitorUpdateError("Try to combine a Local monitor without funding_info")); }
res
}
- /// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
- fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W, for_local_storage: bool) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- //TODO: We still write out all the serialization here manually instead of using the fancy
- //serialization framework we have, we should migrate things over to it.
- writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
-
- // Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
- U48(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor).write(writer)?;
-
- macro_rules! write_option {
- ($thing: expr) => {
- match $thing {
- &Some(ref t) => {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- t.write(writer)?;
- },
- &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
- }
- }
- }
-
- match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref funding_key, ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref delayed_payment_base_key, ref payment_base_key, ref shutdown_pubkey, ref funding_info, ref current_remote_commitment_txid, ref prev_remote_commitment_txid } => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&funding_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&revocation_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&htlc_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&delayed_payment_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&payment_base_key[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&shutdown_pubkey.serialize())?;
- match funding_info {
- &Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
- writer.write_all(&outpoint.txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index))?;
- script.write(writer)?;
- },
- &None => {
- debug_assert!(false, "Try to serialize a useless Local monitor !");
- },
- }
- current_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- prev_remote_commitment_txid.write(writer)?;
- },
- Storage::Watchtower { .. } => unimplemented!(),
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize())?;
- self.funding_redeemscript.as_ref().unwrap().write(writer)?;
- self.channel_value_satoshis.unwrap().write(writer)?;
-
- match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
- Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx))?;
- writer.write_all(&pubkey.serialize())?;
- match second_option {
- Some(second_pubkey) => {
- writer.write_all(&second_pubkey.serialize())?;
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 33])?;
- },
- }
- },
- None => {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
- },
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()))?;
-
- for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
- writer.write_all(secret)?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
- ($htlc_output: expr) => {
- writer.write_all(&[$htlc_output.offered as u8; 1])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry))?;
- writer.write_all(&$htlc_output.payment_hash.0[..])?;
- $htlc_output.transaction_output_index.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, ref htlc_infos) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_infos.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref htlc_source) in htlc_infos.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- write_option!(htlc_source);
- }
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref txid, &(commitment_number, ref txouts)) in self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&txid[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(commitment_number))?;
- (txouts.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
- for script in txouts.iter() {
- script.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
-
- if for_local_storage {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_hash.0[..])?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number))?;
- }
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0))?;
- }
-
- macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
- ($local_tx: expr) => {
- $local_tx.tx.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize())?;
- writer.write_all(&$local_tx.per_commitment_point.serialize())?;
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64))?;
- for &(ref htlc_output, ref sig, ref htlc_source) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
- serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
- if let &Some(ref their_sig) = sig {
- 1u8.write(writer)?;
- writer.write_all(&their_sig.serialize_compact())?;
- } else {
- 0u8.write(writer)?;
- }
- write_option!(htlc_source);
- }
- }
- }
-
- if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- if for_local_storage {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.current_remote_commitment_number))?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0))?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64))?;
- for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
- writer.write_all(&payment_preimage.0[..])?;
- }
-
- self.last_block_hash.write(writer)?;
- self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
- if let Some((ref to_remote_script, ref local_key)) = self.to_remote_rescue {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- to_remote_script.write(writer)?;
- local_key.write(writer)?;
- } else {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.pending_claim_requests.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref ancestor_claim_txid, claim_tx_data) in self.pending_claim_requests.iter() {
- ancestor_claim_txid.write(writer)?;
- claim_tx_data.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.claimable_outpoints.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref outp, ref claim_and_height) in self.claimable_outpoints.iter() {
- outp.write(writer)?;
- claim_and_height.0.write(writer)?;
- claim_and_height.1.write(writer)?;
- }
-
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.len() as u64))?;
- for (ref target, ref events) in self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.iter() {
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(**target))?;
- writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(events.len() as u64))?;
- for ev in events.iter() {
- match *ev {
- OnchainEvent::Claim { ref claim_request } => {
- writer.write_all(&[0; 1])?;
- claim_request.write(writer)?;
- },
- OnchainEvent::HTLCUpdate { ref htlc_update } => {
- writer.write_all(&[1; 1])?;
- htlc_update.0.write(writer)?;
- htlc_update.1.write(writer)?;
- },
- OnchainEvent::ContentiousOutpoint { ref outpoint, ref input_material } => {
- writer.write_all(&[2; 1])?;
- outpoint.write(writer)?;
- input_material.write(writer)?;
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- Ok(())
- }
-
- /// Writes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for writing to disk.
- ///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
- /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
- /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_disk<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.write(writer, true)
- }
-
- /// Encodes this monitor into the given writer, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
- ///
- /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor), which
- /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
- /// the "reorg path" (ie not just starting at the same height but starting at the highest
- /// common block that appears on your best chain as well as on the chain which contains the
- /// last block hash returned) upon deserializing the object!
- pub fn write_for_watchtower<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
- self.write(writer, false)
- }
-
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
- return Some(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
+ return Some(ChannelMonitor::<ChanSigner>::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
}
}
assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key, local_payment_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, ref payment_base_key, .. } => {
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))),
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)),
Some(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &payment_base_key))))
},
Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
} else { None };
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
+ (ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint)),
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &keys.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint)))
},
Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
let mut inputs_info = Vec::new();
macro_rules! sign_input {
- ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
+ ($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr, $idx: expr) => {
{
let (sig, redeemscript, htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
Storage::Local { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
- let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize].0;
+ let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$idx as usize].0;
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]);
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
}
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
if htlc.offered {
- let input = TxIn {
+ let mut input = TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
txid: commitment_txid,
vout: transaction_output_index,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
+ sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
witness: Vec::new(),
};
if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
inputs.push(input);
inputs_desc.push(if htlc.offered { InputDescriptors::OfferedHTLC } else { InputDescriptors::ReceivedHTLC });
- inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry));
+ inputs_info.push((payment_preimage, tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value, htlc.cltv_expiry, idx));
total_value += tx.output[transaction_output_index as usize].value;
} else {
let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
let mut used_feerate;
if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, single_htlc_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec());
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.0.to_vec(), idx);
assert!(predicted_weight >= single_htlc_tx.get_weight());
spendable_outputs.push(SpendableOutputDescriptor::StaticOutput {
outpoint: BitcoinOutPoint { txid: single_htlc_tx.txid(), vout: 0 },
vout: transaction_output_index,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
- sequence: idx as u32,
+ sequence: 0xff_ff_ff_fd,
witness: Vec::new(),
};
let mut timeout_tx = Transaction {
let mut used_feerate;
if subtract_high_prio_fee!(self, fee_estimator, timeout_tx.output[0].value, predicted_weight, used_feerate) {
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&timeout_tx);
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0]);
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, timeout_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, vec![0], idx);
assert!(predicted_weight >= timeout_tx.get_weight());
//TODO: track SpendableOutputDescriptor
log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout, height_timer);
let height_timer = Self::get_height_timer(height, soonest_timelock);
let spend_txid = spend_tx.txid();
for (input, info) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_info.iter()) {
- let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec());
+ let (redeemscript, htlc_key) = sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, info.1, (info.0).0.to_vec(), info.3);
log_trace!(self, "Outpoint {}:{} is being being claimed, if it doesn't succeed, a bumped claiming txn is going to be broadcast at height {}", input.previous_output.txid, input.previous_output.vout, height_timer);
per_input_material.insert(input.previous_output, InputMaterial::RemoteHTLC { script: redeemscript, key: htlc_key, preimage: Some(*(info.0)), amount: info.1, locktime: 0});
match self.claimable_outpoints.entry(input.previous_output) {
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secret));
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
- Storage::Local { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
- ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
+ Storage::Local { ref keys, .. } => {
+ ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint))
},
Storage::Watchtower { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
}
fn block_connected(&mut self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, block_hash: &Sha256dHash, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator)-> (Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)>, Vec<SpendableOutputDescriptor>, Vec<(HTLCSource, Option<PaymentPreimage>, PaymentHash)>) {
+ for tx in txn_matched {
+ let mut output_val = 0;
+ for out in tx.output.iter() {
+ if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
+ output_val += out.value;
+ if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { panic!("Value-overflowing transaction provided to block connected"); }
+ }
+ }
+
log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", block_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
let mut spendable_outputs = Vec::new();
for per_outp_material in cached_claim_datas.per_input_material.values() {
match per_outp_material {
&InputMaterial::Revoked { ref script, ref is_htlc, ref amount, .. } => {
- log_trace!(self, "Is HLTC ? {}", is_htlc);
inputs_witnesses_weight += Self::get_witnesses_weight(if !is_htlc { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOutput] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedOfferedHTLC] } else if HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(script.len()) == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) { &[InputDescriptors::RevokedReceivedHTLC] } else { unreachable!() });
amt += *amount;
},
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
-impl<R: ::std::io::Read> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor) {
+impl<R: ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>) {
fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
let key_storage = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
0 => {
+ let keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
let funding_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let revocation_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let htlc_base_key = Readable::read(reader)?;
let current_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
let prev_remote_commitment_txid = Readable::read(reader)?;
Storage::Local {
+ keys,
funding_key,
revocation_base_key,
htlc_base_key,
use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
use std::sync::Arc;
+ use chain::keysinterface::InMemoryChannelKeys;
+
#[test]
fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
// Test vectors from BOLT 3:
let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
- let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
+ let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor<InMemoryChannelKeys>;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let logger = Arc::new(TestLogger::new());
};
}
+ let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ &secp_ctx,
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ [41; 32],
+ 0,
+ );
+
{
// insert_secret correct sequence
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #1 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #3 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #5 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #7 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
{
// insert_secret #8 incorrect
- monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys.clone(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
secrets.clear();
secrets.push([0; 32]);
}
}
+ let keys = InMemoryChannelKeys::new(
+ &secp_ctx,
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(),
+ [41; 32],
+ 0,
+ );
+
// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
// old state.
- let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
+ let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(keys, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[43; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[44; 32]).unwrap(), &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[45; 32]).unwrap()), 0, Script::new(), logger.clone());
monitor.their_to_self_delay = Some(10);
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(LocalCommitmentTransaction::dummy(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
// Claim tx with 1 offered HTLCs, 3 received HTLCs
claim_tx.input.clear();
for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_sig */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
// Justice tx with 1 revoked HTLC-Success tx output
claim_tx.input.clear();
for (idx, inp) in claim_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(inputs_des.iter()).enumerate() {
sign_input!(sighash_parts, inp.0, idx as u32, 0, inp.1, sum_actual_sigs);
}
- assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
+ assert_eq!(base_weight + ChannelMonitor::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::get_witnesses_weight(&inputs_des[..]), claim_tx.get_weight() + /* max_length_isg */ (73 * inputs_des.len() - sum_actual_sigs));
}
// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
//! claim outputs on-chain.
use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
-use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
+use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, SpendableOutputDescriptor};
use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterfaceUtil, BlockNotifier};
use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager,ChannelManagerReadArgs,HTLCForwardInfo,RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ManyChannelMonitor, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
-use ln::onion_utils;
+use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use ln::msgs;
use util::test_utils;
use util::events::{Event, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use util::errors::APIError;
-use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
+use util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, ReadableArgs};
use util::config::UserConfig;
use util::logger::Logger;
use std::default::Default;
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
-use std::mem;
+use std::{mem, io};
use rand::{thread_rng, Rng};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
+#[test]
+fn test_1_conf_open() {
+ // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
+ // tests that we properly send one in that case.
+ let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
+ alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
+ alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
+ bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
+ bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
+ bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::supported(), InitFeatures::supported());
+ assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.does_match_tx(&tx));
+ assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.does_match_tx(&tx));
+
+ let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
+ nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[tx.version; 1]);
+ nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
+
+ nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected_checked(&header, 1, &[&tx; 1], &[tx.version; 1]);
+ let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
+ let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
+
+ for node in nodes {
+ assert!(node.router.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
+ node.router.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
+ }
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2);
// Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
let htlc_pair = if claim_txn[0].output[0].value == 800_000 / 1000 { (claim_txn[0].clone(), claim_txn[1].clone()) } else { (claim_txn[1].clone(), claim_txn[0].clone()) };
- assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 7);
+ assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
check_spends!(claim_txn[2], chan_1.3);
check_spends!(claim_txn[3], claim_txn[2]);
- assert_eq!(claim_txn[0], claim_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[6]);
assert_eq!(htlc_pair.0.input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(htlc_pair.0.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
check_spends!(htlc_pair.0, remote_txn[0].clone());
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]); // An outpoint registration will result in a 2nd block_connected
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // nodes[1] will broadcast justice tx twice, and its own local state once
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
}
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment + HTLC-timeout
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]); // justice tx is duplicated due to block re-scanning
-
let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
}
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 29); // ChannelManager : 2, ChannelMontitor: 8 (1 standard revoked output, 2 revocation htlc tx, 1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan) + 5 * (1 local commitment tx + 1 htlc timeout tx)
-
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[7]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[8]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[9]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[10]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[11]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]); //local commitment tx + htlc timeout tx broadcasted by ChannelManger
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 26);
+ // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
+ // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
+ // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx * 7 (7), after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore
+ // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (14)
+
+
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[7]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[9]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[14]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[17]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[20]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[3], node_txn[23]);
+
assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[8]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[10]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[15]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[18]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[21]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4], node_txn[24]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
};
macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
- // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if $htlc_offered { 7 } else { 5 });
+ // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
+ // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout * 2 (block-rescan)
check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx.clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx.clone());
+ if $htlc_offered {
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ }
assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
if $htlc_offered {
check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3.clone());
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + 2*HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success) * 2 (block-rescan)
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[4]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success)
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
let timeout_tx;
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 6 (HTLC-Timeout tx, commitment tx, timeout tx) * 2 (block-rescan)
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[7]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout) * 2 (block-rescan), timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[5]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[6]);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_2.3.clone());
nodes[0].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 200);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
- let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (timeout tx) * 2 block-rescan
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
nodes[0].router.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { short_channel_id : as_chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), is_permanent: false } );
- let as_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
+ let as_bitcoin_key = as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.local_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
+ let bs_bitcoin_key = bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.local_channel_pubkeys.funding_pubkey;
let as_network_key = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
let bs_network_key = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
macro_rules! sign_msg {
($unsigned_msg: expr) => {
let msghash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&$unsigned_msg.encode()[..])[..]).unwrap();
- let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
- let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key);
+ let as_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &as_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key());
+ let bs_bitcoin_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &bs_chan.get_local_keys().inner.funding_key());
let as_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[0].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
let bs_node_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &nodes[1].keys_manager.get_node_secret());
chan_announcement = msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
new_chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }));
nodes[0].chan_monitor = &new_chan_monitor;
let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
- let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
new_chan_monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(nodes[0].chain_monitor.clone(), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new()), Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 }));
nodes[0].chan_monitor = &new_chan_monitor;
let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
- let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut chan_0_monitor_read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
let mut read = &serialized[..];
- let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
+ let (_, monitor) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut read, Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new())).unwrap();
assert!(read.is_empty());
node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
}
}
// Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
- let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: 2 (1 preimage tx)
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
eprintln!("{:?}", node_txn[1]);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3.clone());
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] }, 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
- let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
- assert_eq!(node_txn.pop().unwrap(), node_txn[0]);
+ let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4 ); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-timeout, adjusted justice tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
// Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], 1);
assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[1]);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0].clone());
- check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[3].clone());
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[2].clone());
}
#[test]
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
// Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], 1);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[0], spend_txn[2]);
assert_eq!(spend_txn[1], spend_txn[3]);
check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone()); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
- check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
- check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[3].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0].clone()); // spending justice tx output from revoked local tx htlc received output
+ check_spends!(spend_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone()); // spending justice tx output on htlc success tx
}
#[test]
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]}, 1);
{
let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]);
+ // ChannelMonitor: claim tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout tx
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone()); // HTLC-Timeout on B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
assert_eq!(b_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
let commitment_tx = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2).unwrap().channel_monitor().get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
nodes[1].block_notifier.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone()]}, 1);
let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 4);
- check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
- check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]); // HTLC-Success tx, as a part of the local txn rebroadcast by ChannelManager in the force close
- assert_eq!(b_txn[0], b_txn[3]); // HTLC-Success tx, issued by ChannelMonitor, * 2 due to block rescan
+ // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
+ assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
+ check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1].clone());
check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
- assert_eq!(b_txn[2].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
+ assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
}
let htlc_timeout_tx;
{ // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout * 2
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0].clone());
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0].clone());
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0], node_txn[1].input[0]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_2.3.clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[3], node_txn[2].clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[2].clone());
}
}
+struct BogusOnionHopData {
+ data: Vec<u8>
+}
+impl BogusOnionHopData {
+ fn new(orig: msgs::OnionHopData) -> Self {
+ Self { data: orig.encode() }
+ }
+}
+impl Writeable for BogusOnionHopData {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ writer.write_all(&self.data[..])
+ }
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_onion_failure() {
use ln::msgs::ChannelUpdate;
let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- onion_payloads[0].realm = 3;
- msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
- }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
+ let mut new_payloads = Vec::new();
+ for payload in onion_payloads.drain(..) {
+ new_payloads.push(BogusOnionHopData::new(payload));
+ }
+ // break the first (non-final) hop payload by swapping the realm (0) byte for a byte
+ // describing a length-1 TLV payload, which is obviously bogus.
+ new_payloads[0].data[0] = 1;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet_bogus_hopdata(new_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, true, Some(PERM|22), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));//XXX incremented channels idx here
// final node failure
run_onion_failure_test("invalid_realm", 3, &nodes, &route, &payment_hash, |msg| {
let cur_height = nodes[0].node.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route, &session_priv).unwrap();
let (mut onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, _htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height).unwrap();
- onion_payloads[1].realm = 3;
- msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
- }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|1), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
+ let mut new_payloads = Vec::new();
+ for payload in onion_payloads.drain(..) {
+ new_payloads.push(BogusOnionHopData::new(payload));
+ }
+ // break the last-hop payload by swapping the realm (0) byte for a byte describing a
+ // length-1 TLV payload, which is obviously bogus.
+ new_payloads[1].data[0] = 1;
+ msg.onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet_bogus_hopdata(new_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
+ }, ||{}, false, Some(PERM|22), Some(msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed{short_channel_id: channels[1].0.contents.short_channel_id, is_permanent: true}));
// the following three with run_onion_failure_test_with_fail_intercept() test only the origin node
// receiving simulated fail messages
// Restore node A from previous state
let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0)));
- let mut chan_monitor = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chan_monitor_state.0), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap().1;
+ let mut chan_monitor = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingChannelKeys>)>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(previous_chan_monitor_state.0), Arc::clone(&logger)).unwrap().1;
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet, Arc::clone(&logger)));
- let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new())});
+ let tx_broadcaster = Arc::new(test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), broadcasted_txn: Mutex::new(HashSet::new())});
let feeest = Arc::new(test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: 253 });
monitor = test_utils::TestChannelMonitor::new(chain_monitor.clone(), tx_broadcaster.clone(), logger.clone(), feeest.clone());
node_state_0 = {
let feerate_1;
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) * 2 (block-reparsing) + local commitment tx + local HTLC-timeout (broadcasted from ChannelManager)
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx + local HTLC-timeout (broadcasted from ChannelManager)
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0].clone());
let feerate_2;
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx * 2 (block-rescan) + A commitment tx + 2 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 2 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
// Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
- assert_eq!(node_txn[7].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[7].output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[7], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
- first = node_txn[7].txid();
- assert_eq!(node_txn[8].input.len(), 1);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[8].output.len(), 1);
- check_spends!(node_txn[8], revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone());
- second = node_txn[8].txid();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone());
+ first = node_txn[4].txid();
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[5].input.len(), 1);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn[5].output.len(), 1);
+ check_spends!(node_txn[5], revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone());
+ second = node_txn[5].txid();
// Store both feerates for later comparison
- let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value - node_txn[7].output[0].value;
- feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[7].get_weight() as u64;
- let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[8].output[0].value;
- feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[8].get_weight() as u64;
+ let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
+ feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
+ let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[5].output[0].value;
+ feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[5].get_weight() as u64;
node_txn.clear();
}
let feerate_preimage;
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7); // 2 * claim tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) * 2 (block-reparsing) + local commitment tx + local HTLC-timeout + HTLC-success (broadcasted from ChannelManager)
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[5]);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[6]);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 2 * claim tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx + local HTLC-timeout + local HTLC-success (broadcasted from ChannelManager)
assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0].clone());
// Verify node A broadcast tx claiming both HTLCs
{
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
- assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[4]);
+ // ChannelMonitor: claim tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success*2
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0].clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3.clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
}
}
+#[test]
+fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
+ // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
+ // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
+ // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
+ // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
+ // EnforcingChannelKeys would have paniced as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
+ // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
+ // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
+ // implement that).
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::supported(), InitFeatures::supported()).2;
+
+ let commitment_seed = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().local_keys.commitment_seed().clone();
+ const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
+ let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
+ &SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
+ let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
+
+ nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
+ &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
+ assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
+}
+
#[test]
fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
// Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
let penalty_txn = {
let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
- assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
+ assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff