Stop including dust values in feerate affordability checks

When we or our counterparty are updating the fees on the channel,
we currently check that the resulting balance is sufficient not
only to meet the reserve threshold, but also not push it below
dust. This isn't required in the BOLTs and may lead to spurious
force-closures (which would be a bit safer, but reserve should
always exceed the dust threshold).

Worse, the current logic is broken - it compares the output value
in *billionths of satoshis* to the dust limit in satoshis. Thus,
the code is borderline dead anyway, but can overflow for channels
with several million Bitcoin, causing the fuzzer to get mad (and
lead to spurious force-closures for few-billion-dollar channels).

diff --git a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
index 588995656ec4790cedd6bcb5ac7edc6bc190ae23..6e283f08660de36e381fd11bbf870d125d5ed945 100644 (file)
--- a/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
+++ b/lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
@@ -732,8 +732,8 @@ struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
        total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
        num_nondust_htlcs: usize,  // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
        htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
-       local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
-       remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
+       local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
+       remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
        outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
        inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
 }
@@ -1728,13 +1728,13 @@ impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider  {
                        }
                }
 
-               let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
+               let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
                assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
                // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
                // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
                // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
                // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
-               let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
+               let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
                assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
 
                #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
@@ -1800,10 +1800,6 @@ impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider  {
                htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
                htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
 
-               // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
-               value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
-               value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
-
                CommitmentStats {
                        tx,
                        feerate_per_kw,