msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => panic!("We picked the length..."),
msgs::DecodeError::Io(e) => panic!("{:?}", e),
msgs::DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => return,
+ msgs::DecodeError::DangerousValue => return,
}
}
}}
use crate::test_utils::{Blockchain, MockChainListener};
use super::*;
- use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
-
#[tokio::test]
async fn sync_from_same_chain() {
let chain = Blockchain::default().with_height(4);
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
use std::error;
+#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::fmt;
use core::fmt::{Display, Formatter};
use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::time::Duration;
+#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
use core::iter::Iterator;
/// Utility to create an invoice that can be paid to one of multiple nodes, or a "phantom invoice."
use bitcoin::{PubkeyHash, ScriptHash};
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::hashes::{sha256, Hash};
-use lightning::ln::PaymentSecret;
-use lightning::routing::gossip::RoutingFees;
-use lightning::routing::router::{RouteHint, RouteHintHop};
use lightning_invoice::*;
use secp256k1::PublicKey;
use secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, RecoveryId};
break Disconnect::CloseConnection;
}
},
- SelectorOutput::B(_) => {},
+ SelectorOutput::B(some) => {
+ // The mpsc Receiver should only return `None` if the write side has been
+ // dropped, but that shouldn't be possible since its referenced by the Self in
+ // `us`.
+ debug_assert!(some.is_some());
+ },
SelectorOutput::C(res) => {
if res.is_err() { break Disconnect::PeerDisconnected; }
match reader.try_read(&mut buf) {
use lightning::ln::features::*;
use lightning::ln::msgs::*;
use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler, PeerManager};
- use lightning::ln::features::NodeFeatures;
use lightning::routing::gossip::NodeId;
use lightning::events::*;
use lightning::util::test_utils::TestNodeSigner;
use lightning::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use lightning::util::test_utils;
use lightning::util::persist::read_channel_monitors;
- use std::fs;
use std::str::FromStr;
impl Drop for FilesystemStore {
#[cfg(all(feature = "std", not(test)))]
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
-#[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
+#[cfg(all(not(feature = "std"), not(test)))]
use alloc::{vec::Vec, borrow::ToOwned};
/// The purpose of this prefix is to identify the serialization format, should other rapid gossip
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{self, PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedHop, BlindedPath};
use crate::blinded_path::utils;
use crate::io;
use crate::io::Cursor;
use crate::ln::onion_utils;
use crate::onion_message::packet::ControlTlvs;
-use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::crypto::streams::ChaChaPolyReadAdapter;
use crate::util::ser::{FixedLengthReader, LengthReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
-use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::util::ser::{HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Readable, Writeable, Writer};
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
/// An intermediate node, its outbound channel, and relay parameters.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
use crate::io;
+
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
// TODO: DRY with onion_utils::construct_onion_keys_callback
//! disconnections, transaction broadcasting, and feerate information requests.
use core::{cmp, ops::Deref};
-use core::convert::TryInto;
+
+use crate::prelude::*;
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
use crate::events::{ClosureReason, Event, EventHandler};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{AnchorDescriptor, BumpTransactionEvent};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
use core::{cmp, mem};
use crate::io::{self, Error};
-use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::sync::{Mutex, LockTestExt};
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use crate::io;
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
use std::str::FromStr;
use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
pub mod chaininterface;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writer, Writeable, RequiredWrapper};
use crate::io;
-use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
-use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::mem;
use core::ops::Deref;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
use super::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
mod real_chacha {
use core::cmp;
- use core::convert::TryInto;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
- use alloc::vec;
- use alloc::vec::{Vec};
- use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::iter::repeat;
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+
use super::ChaCha20;
#[test]
// https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
use core::cmp::min;
-use core::convert::TryInto;
+
+use crate::prelude::*;
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
pub struct Poly1305 {
#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
use core::iter::repeat;
- use alloc::vec::Vec;
use super::Poly1305;
let writeable_len = $obj.serialized_length() as u64 + 16;
let write_adapter = ChaChaPolyWriteAdapter::new(rho, &$obj);
let encrypted_writeable_bytes = write_adapter.encode();
- let encrypted_writeable = &encrypted_writeable_bytes[..];
+ let encrypted_writeable = &mut &encrypted_writeable_bytes[..];
// Now deserialize the object back and make sure it matches the original.
let mut rd = FixedLengthReader::new(encrypted_writeable, writeable_len);
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use crate::io;
-use crate::prelude::*;
use core::time::Duration;
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::sync::Arc;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
/// Some information provided on receipt of payment depends on whether the payment received is a
/// spontaneous payment or a "conventional" lightning payment that's paying an invoice.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
/// Short channel id we are requesting to forward an HTLC to.
requested_forward_scid: u64
},
+ /// We couldn't decode the incoming onion to obtain the forwarding details.
+ InvalidOnion,
/// Failure scenario where an HTLC may have been forwarded to be intended for us,
/// but is invalid for some reason, so we reject it.
///
(2, UnknownNextHop) => {
(0, requested_forward_scid, required),
},
+ (3, InvalidOnion) => {},
(4, FailedPayment) => {
(0, payment_hash, required),
},
// Note that we do not write a length-prefixed TLV for FundingGenerationReady events.
0u8 => Ok(None),
1u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
let mut payment_preimage = None;
let mut payment_secret = None;
f()
},
2u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
let mut payment_hash = None;
let mut payment_id = None;
f()
},
3u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
#[cfg(test)]
let error_code = Readable::read(reader)?;
#[cfg(test)]
},
4u8 => Ok(None),
5u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut outputs = WithoutLength(Vec::new());
let mut channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
}))
},
7u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut prev_channel_id = None;
let mut next_channel_id = None;
let mut prev_user_channel_id = None;
f()
},
9u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut reason = UpgradableRequired(None);
let mut user_channel_id_low_opt: Option<u64> = None;
f()
},
11u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut transaction = Transaction{ version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
f()
},
13u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, payment_id, required),
(2, payment_hash, option),
f()
},
15u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
let mut payment_id = PaymentId([0; 32]);
let mut reason = None;
Ok(None)
},
19u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
let mut purpose = UpgradableRequired(None);
let mut amount_msat = 0;
f()
},
21u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, payment_id, required),
(2, payment_hash, required),
f()
},
23u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, payment_id, required),
(2, payment_hash, required),
f()
},
25u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut prev_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut failed_next_destination_opt = UpgradableRequired(None);
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
},
27u8 => Ok(None),
29u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut user_channel_id: u128 = 0;
let mut counterparty_node_id = RequiredWrapper(None);
f()
},
31u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
let mut channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
let mut user_channel_id: u128 = 0;
let mut former_temporary_channel_id = None;
f()
},
33u8 => {
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, payment_id, required),
});
}
mod prelude {
+ #![allow(unused_imports)]
+
pub use alloc::{vec, vec::Vec, string::String, collections::VecDeque, boxed::Box};
pub use alloc::borrow::ToOwned;
pub use alloc::string::ToString;
+ pub use core::convert::{AsMut, AsRef, TryFrom, TryInto};
+ pub use core::default::Default;
+ pub use core::marker::Sized;
+
pub(crate) use crate::util::hash_tables::*;
}
Some(payment_secret), ev.clone(), true, Some(keysend_preimage));
claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_route, false, keysend_preimage);
}
+
+#[test]
+fn custom_tlvs_to_blinded_path() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ let chan_upd = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 0).0.contents;
+
+ let amt_msat = 5000;
+ let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(amt_msat), None);
+ let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
+ payment_secret,
+ payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
+ max_cltv_expiry: u32::max_value(),
+ htlc_minimum_msat: chan_upd.htlc_minimum_msat,
+ },
+ };
+ let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
+ let blinded_path = BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
+ nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payee_tlvs, TEST_FINAL_CLTV as u16,
+ &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager, &secp_ctx
+ ).unwrap();
+
+ let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
+ PaymentParameters::blinded(vec![blinded_path]),
+ amt_msat,
+ );
+
+ let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty()
+ .with_custom_tlvs(vec![((1 << 16) + 1, vec![42, 42])])
+ .unwrap();
+ nodes[0].node.send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion_fields.clone(),
+ PaymentId(payment_hash.0), route_params, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
+
+ let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
+ let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
+
+ let path = &[&nodes[1]];
+ let args = PassAlongPathArgs::new(&nodes[0], path, amt_msat, payment_hash, ev)
+ .with_payment_secret(payment_secret)
+ .with_custom_tlvs(recipient_onion_fields.custom_tlvs.clone());
+ do_pass_along_path(args);
+ claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
+}
use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
use crate::io;
-use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cmp;
use crate::ln::chan_utils;
use crate::util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
use crate::crypto::utils::{sign, sign_with_aux_rand};
use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, DelayedPaymentKey, HtlcKey, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
/// Maximum number of one-way in-flight HTLC (protocol-level value).
pub const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
/// The weight of a BIP141 witnessScript for a BOLT3's "offered HTLC output" on a commitment transaction, non-anchor variant.
mod tests {
use super::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, ChannelPublicKeys};
use crate::chain;
- use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use bitcoin::PublicKey as BitcoinPublicKey;
use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+
struct TestCommitmentTxBuilder {
commitment_number: u64,
holder_funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
-use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
#[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
use crate::sync::Mutex;
Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
}
+/// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+enum InboundHTLCResolution {
+ /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
+ /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
+ //
+ // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
+ // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
+ Resolved {
+ pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
+ },
+ /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
+ /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
+ /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
+ Pending {
+ update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
+ },
+}
+
+impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
+ (0, Resolved) => {
+ (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
+ },
+ (2, Pending) => {
+ (0, update_add_htlc, required),
+ };
+);
+
enum InboundHTLCState {
/// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
/// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
- RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
/// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
/// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
/// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
///
/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
- AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
/// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
/// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
/// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
/// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
/// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
- AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
+ AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
Committed,
/// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
/// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
+ pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
+ monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
/// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
/// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
signer_pending_funding: false,
monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
+ monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
signer_pending_funding: false,
Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
}
- pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
- &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
- create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
- ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
- where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
- FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
- {
+ pub fn update_add_htlc(
+ &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
+ ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
- // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
- if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
- pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
- }
// If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
}
let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
- let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
}
}
}
- let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
- let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- (0, 0)
- } else {
- let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
- (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
- dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
- };
- let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
- if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
- let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
- if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
- log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
- on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
- pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
- }
- }
-
- let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
- if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
- let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
- if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
- log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
- on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
- pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
- }
- }
-
let pending_value_to_self_msat =
self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
let pending_remote_value_msat =
} else {
0
};
- if !self.context.is_outbound() {
- // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
- // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
- // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
- // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
- let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
- let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
- if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
- remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
- }
- if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
- // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
- // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
- log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
- pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
- }
- } else {
+ if self.context.is_outbound() {
// Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
- state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
+ state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
+ pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
+ }),
});
Ok(())
}
}
for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
- let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
- Some(forward_info.clone())
+ let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
+ Some(resolution.clone())
} else { None };
- if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
+ if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
&htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
need_commitment = true;
}
}
log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
+ let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
- if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
+ if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
require_commitment = true;
- } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
- match forward_info {
- PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
- log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
- require_commitment = true;
- match fail_msg {
- HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
- update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
- },
- HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
- htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
- update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
+ } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
+ match resolution {
+ InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
+ match pending_htlc_status {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
+ require_commitment = true;
+ match fail_msg {
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
+ update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
+ },
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
+ update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
+ },
+ }
},
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+ log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
+ to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
+ htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
+ }
}
- },
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
+ InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
- to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
+ pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
}
}
}
}
+ self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
+
if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
// We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
// cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
+ let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
+ mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
- accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
+ accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
+ funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
};
}
if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
MonitorRestoreUpdates {
- raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
+ raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
+ pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
}
}
})
}
+ pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
+ ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
+ where
+ F::Target: FeeEstimator,
+ L::Target: Logger
+ {
+ if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
+ return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
+ }
+
+ let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
+ let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
+ let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ (0, 0)
+ } else {
+ let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
+ (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
+ dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
+ };
+ let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
+ let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
+ if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
+ log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
+ on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
+ return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
+ }
+ }
+
+ let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
+ if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
+ let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
+ if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
+ log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
+ on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
+ return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
+ }
+ }
+
+ let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
+ } else {
+ 0
+ };
+
+ let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
+ for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
+ if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
+ removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
+ }
+ }
+
+ let pending_value_to_self_msat =
+ self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
+ let pending_remote_value_msat =
+ self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
+
+ if !self.context.is_outbound() {
+ // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
+ // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
+ // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
+ // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
+ let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
+ let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
+ if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
+ remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
+ }
+ if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
+ log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
+ return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
}
ret
}
-const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
+const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
// Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
// called.
- write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
+ let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
+ matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
+ },
+ _ => false,
+ }) {
+ SERIALIZATION_VERSION
+ } else {
+ MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
+ };
+ write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
// `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
// versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
match &htlc.state {
&InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
- &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
+ &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
1u8.write(writer)?;
- htlc_state.write(writer)?;
+ if version_to_write <= 3 {
+ if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
+ pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
+ } else {
+ panic!();
+ }
+ } else {
+ htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
+ }
},
- &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
+ &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
2u8.write(writer)?;
- htlc_state.write(writer)?;
+ if version_to_write <= 3 {
+ if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
+ pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
+ } else {
+ panic!();
+ }
+ } else {
+ htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
+ }
},
&InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3u8.write(writer)?;
let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
+ let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
+ if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
+ monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
+ }
+
write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
(0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
// minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
(7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
(8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
(9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
+ (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
(11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
(13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
(15, preimages, required_vec),
(39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
(41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
(43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
- (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
+ // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
+ (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
});
Ok(())
cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
- 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
- 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
+ 1 => {
+ let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
+ InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
+ } else {
+ Readable::read(reader)?
+ };
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
+ },
+ 2 => {
+ let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
+ InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
+ } else {
+ Readable::read(reader)?
+ };
+ InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
+ },
3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
+ let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(0, announcement_sigs, option),
(7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
(8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
(9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
+ (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
(11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
(13, channel_creation_height, option),
(15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
(39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
(41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
(43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
- (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
+ // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
+ (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
});
let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
monitor_pending_forwards,
monitor_pending_failures,
monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
+ monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
signer_pending_funding: false,
/// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
/// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
- is_connected: bool,
+ pub is_connected: bool,
}
impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
}
-/// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
-/// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
+/// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
+/// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
///
-/// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
-/// to individual Channels.
+/// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
+/// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
+/// channel
+/// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
+/// closing channels
+/// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
+/// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
+/// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
+/// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
+/// timely manner
+/// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
+/// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
+///
+/// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
+/// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
+/// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
+/// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
+/// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
+/// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
+///
+/// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
+/// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
+///
+/// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
+///
+/// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
+/// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
+/// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
+/// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
+/// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
+///
+/// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
+/// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
+/// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
+///
+/// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
+/// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
+/// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
+///
+/// # Initialization
+///
+/// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
+/// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
+/// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
+/// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
+/// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
+///
+/// ```
+/// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
+/// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
+/// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
+/// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
+/// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
+/// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
+/// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
+/// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
+///
+/// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
+/// # fn example<
+/// # 'a,
+/// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
+/// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
+/// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
+/// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
+/// # SP: Sized,
+/// # R: lightning::io::Read,
+/// # >(
+/// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
+/// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
+/// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
+/// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
+/// # logger: &L,
+/// # entropy_source: &ES,
+/// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
+/// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
+/// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
+/// # current_timestamp: u32,
+/// # mut reader: R,
+/// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
+/// // Fresh start with no channels
+/// let params = ChainParameters {
+/// network: Network::Bitcoin,
+/// best_block,
+/// };
+/// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
+/// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
+/// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
+/// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
+/// );
+///
+/// // Restart from deserialized data
+/// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
+/// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
+/// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
+/// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
+/// );
+/// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
+/// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
+///
+/// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
+/// // ...
+///
+/// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
+/// for monitor in channel_monitors {
+/// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
+/// }
+/// # Ok(())
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// # Operation
+///
+/// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
+/// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
+/// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
+/// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
+/// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
+/// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
+/// as documented by those traits
+/// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
+/// every minute
+/// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
+/// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
+/// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
+///
+/// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
+/// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
+///
+/// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
+/// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
+/// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
+/// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
+///
+/// # Channels
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
+/// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
+/// currently open channels.
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
+/// for details in channels {
+/// println!("{:?}", details);
+/// }
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
+/// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
+/// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
+/// by [`ChannelManager`].
+///
+/// ## Opening Channels
+///
+/// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
+/// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
+/// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
+/// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
+/// #
+/// # trait Wallet {
+/// # fn create_funding_transaction(
+/// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
+/// # ) -> Transaction;
+/// # }
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
+/// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
+/// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
+/// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
+/// }
+///
+/// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
+/// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
+/// user_channel_id, ..
+/// } => {
+/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+/// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
+/// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
+/// );
+/// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
+/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
+/// ) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
+/// }
+/// },
+/// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+/// println!(
+/// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
+/// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
+/// );
+/// },
+/// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+/// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// ## Accepting Channels
+///
+/// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
+/// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
+/// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
+/// #
+/// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
+/// # // ...
+/// # unimplemented!()
+/// # }
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
+/// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
+/// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
+/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
+/// ) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
+/// }
+/// return;
+/// }
+///
+/// let user_channel_id = 43;
+/// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
+/// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
+/// ) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
+/// }
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// ## Closing Channels
+///
+/// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
+/// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
+/// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
+/// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
+/// once the channel has been closed successfully.
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
+/// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
+/// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
+/// # ) {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
+/// }
+///
+/// // On the event processing thread
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
+/// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// # Payments
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
+/// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
+/// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
+/// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
+/// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
+/// HTLCs.
+///
+/// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
+/// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
+/// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
+/// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
+///
+/// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
+///
+/// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
+/// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
+/// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
+/// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
+/// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
+/// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
+///
+/// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
+/// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
+/// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
+/// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
+/// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
+/// ) {
+/// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
+/// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// payment_hash
+/// },
+/// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
+/// };
+///
+/// // On the event processing thread
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
+/// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
+/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// },
+/// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
+/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
+/// },
+/// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
+/// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
+/// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// },
+/// },
+/// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
+/// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
+/// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
+/// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
+/// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
+/// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
+/// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
+/// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
+/// # ) {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
+/// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
+/// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
+/// match channel_manager.send_payment(
+/// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
+/// ) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
+/// }
+///
+/// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
+/// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
+/// assert!(
+/// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
+/// details,
+/// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
+/// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
+/// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
+/// ..
+/// }
+/// )).is_some()
+/// );
+///
+/// // On the event processing thread
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
+/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// ## BOLT 12 Offers
+///
+/// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
+/// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
+/// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
+/// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
+/// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
+/// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
+/// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// let offer = channel_manager
+/// .create_offer_builder("coffee".to_string())?
+/// # ;
+/// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
+/// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
+/// # let offer = builder
+/// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
+/// .build()?;
+/// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
+///
+/// // On the event processing thread
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
+/// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
+/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// },
+/// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
+/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// },
+/// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
+/// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # Ok(())
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
+/// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
+/// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
+/// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
+/// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
+/// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
+/// # ) {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
+/// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
+/// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
+/// ) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
+/// }
+///
+/// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
+/// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
+/// assert!(
+/// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
+/// details,
+/// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
+/// )).is_some()
+/// );
+///
+/// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
+/// assert!(
+/// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
+/// details,
+/// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
+/// )).is_some()
+/// );
+///
+/// // On the event processing thread
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
+/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
+/// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
+///
+/// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
+/// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
+/// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
+/// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use core::time::Duration;
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
+/// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
+/// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
+/// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
+/// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
+/// let refund = channel_manager
+/// .create_refund_builder(
+/// "coffee".to_string(), amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry,
+/// max_total_routing_fee_msat
+/// )?
+/// # ;
+/// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
+/// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
+/// # let refund = builder
+/// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
+/// .build()?;
+/// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
+///
+/// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
+/// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
+/// assert!(
+/// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
+/// details,
+/// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
+/// )).is_some()
+/// );
+///
+/// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
+/// assert!(
+/// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
+/// details,
+/// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
+/// )).is_some()
+/// );
+///
+/// // On the event processing thread
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
+/// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # Ok(())
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
+/// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
+///
+/// ```
+/// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
+/// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
+/// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
+/// #
+/// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
+/// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
+/// match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
+/// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting payment for refund"),
+/// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
+/// }
+///
+/// // On the event processing thread
+/// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
+/// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
+/// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
+/// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
+/// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
+/// },
+/// PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
+/// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// },
+/// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
+/// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
+/// },
+/// // ...
+/// # _ => {},
+/// });
+/// # }
+/// ```
+///
+/// # Persistence
///
/// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
/// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
/// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
/// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
///
+/// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
+///
/// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
/// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
/// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
/// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
/// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
///
+/// # DoS Mitigation
+///
/// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
/// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
/// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
/// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
/// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
///
+/// # Type Aliases
+///
/// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
/// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
/// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
/// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
/// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
///
+/// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
+/// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
+/// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
+/// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
+/// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
+/// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
+/// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
+/// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
+/// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
+/// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
+/// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
+/// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
+/// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
+/// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
+/// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
+/// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
+/// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
+/// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
+/// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
+/// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
+/// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
+/// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
+/// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
+/// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
+/// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
+/// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
+/// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
+/// [`offers`]: crate::offers
+/// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
+/// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
+/// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
+/// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
+/// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
/// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
/// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
/// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
/// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
/// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
/// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
-/// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
/// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
//
// Lock order:
// | |
// | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
// |
+// |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
+// |
// |__`per_peer_state`
// |
// |__`pending_inbound_payments`
/// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
+ /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
+ ///
+ /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
+ /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
+ /// and via the classic SCID.
+ ///
+ /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
+ /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
+ ///
+ /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
+ decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
+
/// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
/// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
///
pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
+ /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
+ pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
+
entropy_source: ES,
node_signer: NS,
signer_provider: SP,
match $internal {
Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
- let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
+ let mut msg_event = None;
if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
$self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
if let Some(update) = update_option {
- msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
} else {
- msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
+ msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
action: err.action.clone()
});
}
- if !msg_events.is_empty() {
+ if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
+ peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
}
}
let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
.remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
- let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
+ let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
&mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
- updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
+ updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
updates.announcement_sigs);
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
$self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
}
+ if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
+ $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
+ }
$self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
+ decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
entropy_source,
node_signer,
}
};
if let Some(update) = update_opt {
- // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
- // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
- .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
- if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
- let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
- msg: update
- });
- }
+ // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ msg: update
+ });
}
Ok(counterparty_node_id)
}
}
+ fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
+ &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
+ ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
+ if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
+ // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
+ // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
+ // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
+ return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
+ // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
+ // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
+ // we don't have the channel here.
+ return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+
+ // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
+ // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
+ // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
+ // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
+ // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
+ if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
+ // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
+ // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
+ // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
+ let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
+ if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
+ return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
+ } else {
+ return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ }
+ if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
+ let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
+ return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+ if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
+ let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
+ return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
+ /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
+ fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
+ &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
+ ) -> Option<X> {
+ let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
+ None => return None,
+ Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
+ };
+ let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
+ if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
+ return None;
+ }
+ let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
+ let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+ match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
+ |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
+ ) {
+ None => None,
+ Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn can_forward_htlc(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
+ ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
+ match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
+ self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
+ }) {
+ Some(Ok(())) => {},
+ Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
+ None => {
+ // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
+ // intercept forward.
+ if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
+ fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
+ fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
+ {} else {
+ return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
+ if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
+ cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
+ ) {
+ let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
+ self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
+ }).flatten();
+ return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
+ }
+
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
+ &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
+ mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
+ shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
+ ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
+ let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
+ if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
+ let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
+ if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
+ msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
+ msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
+ // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
+ 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ }
+ (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
+ } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
+ // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
+ // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
+ // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
+ // instead.
+ err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
+ }
+
+ log_info!(
+ WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
+ "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
+ );
+ // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
+ if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
+ return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ });
+ }
+
+ let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
+ (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
+ } else {
+ (err_code, &res.0[..])
+ };
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
+ .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
+ })
+ }
+
fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
) -> Result<
msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
)?;
- let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
- onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
- next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
- intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
- }, ..
- } => true,
- _ => false,
- };
-
- macro_rules! return_err {
- ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
- {
- log_info!(
- WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
- "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
- );
- // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
- if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
- return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
- failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
- }));
- }
-
- let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
- (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
- } else { ($err_code, $data) };
- return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
- .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
- }));
- }
- }
- }
-
- let NextPacketDetails {
- next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
- } = match next_packet_details_opt {
+ let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
// it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
// Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
// can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
- if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
- let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
- let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
- None => { // unknown_next_peer
- // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
- // phantom or an intercept.
- if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
- fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
- fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
- {
- None
- } else {
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- },
- Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
- };
- let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
- let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
- let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
- if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
- |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
- ).flatten() {
- None => {
- // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
- // have no consistency guarantees.
- break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- },
- Some(chan) => chan
- };
- if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
- // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
- // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
- // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
- break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
- // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
- // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
- // we don't have the channel here.
- break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
- }
- let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
-
- // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
- // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
- // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
- // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
- // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
- if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
- // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
- // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
- // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
- if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
- break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
- } else {
- break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
- }
- }
- if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
- break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
- }
- if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
- break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
- }
- chan_update_opt
- } else {
- None
- };
-
- let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
-
- if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
- cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
- ) {
- if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
- // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
- // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
- // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
- break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
- }
- let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
- break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
- }
+ self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
+ let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
+ self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
+ msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
+ next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
+ )
+ })?;
- break None;
- }
- {
- let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
- if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
- if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
- msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
- msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
- // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
- 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- }
- (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
- } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
- // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
- // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
- // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
- // instead.
- code = 0x2000 | 2;
- }
- return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
- }
- Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
+ Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
}
fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
.ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
+
for channel_id in channel_ids {
if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
}
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
} else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
Ok(())
}
+ fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
+ let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
+ mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
+
+ let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
+ if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
+ match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
+ Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
+ HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
+ node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
+ channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
+ },
+ None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
+ requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
+ },
+ }
+ } else {
+ HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
+ }
+ };
+
+ 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
+ let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
+ let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
+ let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
+ let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
+ let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
+ (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
+ });
+ let (
+ incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
+ incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
+ ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
+ incoming_channel_details
+ } else {
+ // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
+ continue;
+ };
+
+ let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
+ let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
+ for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
+ let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
+ &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
+ ) {
+ Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
+ Err(htlc_fail) => {
+ htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
+ continue;
+ },
+ };
+
+ let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
+ let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
+
+ // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
+ match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
+ update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
+ )
+ }) {
+ Some(Ok(_)) => {},
+ Some(Err((err, code))) => {
+ let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
+ self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
+ self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
+ }).flatten()
+ } else {
+ None
+ };
+ let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
+ &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
+ outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
+ );
+ let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
+ htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
+ continue;
+ },
+ // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
+ None => continue 'outer_loop,
+ }
+
+ // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
+ if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
+ if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
+ &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
+ ) {
+ let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
+ &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
+ chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
+ );
+ let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
+ htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
+ &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
+ incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
+ ) {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
+ htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
+ },
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
+ let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
+ htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
+ },
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
+ // proposed to as a batch.
+ let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
+ incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
+ self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
+ for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
+ let failure = match htlc_fail {
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
+ htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
+ err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
+ },
+ HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
+ htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
+ sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
+ failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
+ },
+ };
+ self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
+ self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
+ prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
+ failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
+ }, None));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
///
/// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
+ self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
+
let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
}
}
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
+ let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
+ if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
+ }
+
/// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
/// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
- fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
+ fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
// Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
// This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
// `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
// Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
// from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
// being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
+ let mut push_forward_event;
match source {
HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
- if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
+ push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
- &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
- { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
+ &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
},
HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
}
};
- let mut push_forward_ev = false;
+ push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
- if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
- push_forward_ev = true;
- }
+ push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
entry.get_mut().push(failure);
}
}
mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
- if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
}, None));
},
}
+ push_forward_event
}
/// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
- pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
+ pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
+ funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
- -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
+ -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
- log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
+ log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
&channel.context.channel_id(),
if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
- if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
+ if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
+ pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
- let mut htlc_forwards = None;
-
let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
+ let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
+
+ let mut htlc_forwards = None;
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
- htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
- channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
+ htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
+ channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
+ }
+ let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
+ if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
+ decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
}
if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
}
- htlc_forwards
+ (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
}
fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
}
if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
- let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
- peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
- let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
+ let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
),
Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
};
- let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
+ let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
+ // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
+ // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
+ // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
+ if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
- return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
- msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
- channel_id: msg.channel_id,
- htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
- failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
- }
- ))
- }
- // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
- // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
- // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
- match pending_forward_info {
- PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
- ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
- }) => {
- let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
- HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
- } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
- let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
- HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
- } else {
- HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
- }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
- let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
+ msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
channel_id: msg.channel_id,
htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
- reason
- };
- PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
- },
- _ => pending_forward_info
+ sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
+ failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
+ }
+ ))
+ } else {
+ match pending_forward_info {
+ PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
+ ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
+ }) => {
+ let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
+ } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
+ let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
+ HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
+ } else {
+ HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
+ }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
+ let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
+ channel_id: msg.channel_id,
+ htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
+ reason
+ };
+ pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
+ },
+ _ => {},
+ }
}
- };
- let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
- try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
+ }
+ try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
} else {
return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
"Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
}
}
+ fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
+ let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
+ let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
+ let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
+ match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
+ hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
+ hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
+ }
+ if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
+ }
+
#[inline]
fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
+ let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
+ if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
+ }
+
+ #[inline]
+ fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
+ let mut push_forward_event = false;
for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
- let mut push_forward_event = false;
let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
// Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
+ let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
} else {
// We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
// payments are being processed.
- if forward_htlcs_empty {
- push_forward_event = true;
- }
+ push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
}
}
for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
- self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
+ push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
}
if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
}
- if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
}
+ push_forward_event
}
fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
}
fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
- let htlc_forwards;
let need_lnd_workaround = {
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
}
}
let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
- htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
+ let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
- Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
+ Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
+ debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
+ debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
}
}
};
- let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
- if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
- self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
- persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
- }
-
if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
}
- Ok(persist)
+ Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
}
/// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
};
failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
// We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
// a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
/// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
///
/// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
- /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
+ /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
/// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
}
+ let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
}
+ if peer_state.is_connected {
+ is_any_peer_connected = true
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
+ if is_any_peer_connected {
+ let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
}
if !pending_events.is_empty() {
let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
+
peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
match phase {
// Retain unfunded channels.
let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
- pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
+ let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
msg: update
});
}
}
/// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
+ ///
+ /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
+ /// indicates this should be checked.
pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
}
// Gossip
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
- &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
+ // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
+ // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
+ &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
+ debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
+ false
+ },
&events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
&events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
}
}
+ let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
+ let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
+ if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
+ decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
+ }
+
let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
(10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
(13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
+ (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
});
Ok(())
let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
let mut events_override = None;
let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
+ let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
(1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
(2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
(10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
(11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
(13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
+ (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
});
+ let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
}
}
}
if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
- // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
+ // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
- return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
+ return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
}
} else {
// We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
// still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
// `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
// the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
+ decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
+ update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
+ let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
+ update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
+ if matches {
+ log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
+ &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
+ }
+ !matches
+ });
+ !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
+ });
forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
forwards.retain(|forward| {
if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
}
}
- if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
+ if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
// If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
// `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
// shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
+ decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+ pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
+
entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
node_signer: args.node_signer,
signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
}
}
+ #[test]
+ fn test_channel_update_cached() {
+ let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
+ let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
+ let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
+ let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+
+ let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
+
+ nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
+ check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
+ check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
+
+ // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
+ let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
+
+ {
+ // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
+ let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
+ }
+
+ // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
+ nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
+
+ let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
+
+ // Now we reconnect to a peer
+ nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, true).unwrap();
+ nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
+ features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
+ }, false).unwrap();
+
+ // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
+ let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
+ assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
+ match &node_0_events[0] {
+ MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ }
+ {
+ // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
+ let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
+ assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
+ }
+ }
+
#[test]
fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
//! [BOLT #9]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
//! [messages]: crate::ln::msgs
-use crate::{io, io_extras};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
+use crate::{io, io_extras};
use core::{cmp, fmt};
use core::borrow::Borrow;
use core::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, WithoutLength, Writeable, Writer};
mod sealed {
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::ln::features::Features;
}}
}
+/// Checks if at least one peer is connected.
+fn is_any_peer_connected(node: &Node) -> bool {
+ let peer_state = node.node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
+ for (_, peer_mutex) in peer_state.iter() {
+ let peer = peer_mutex.lock().unwrap();
+ if peer.is_connected { return true; }
+ }
+ false
+}
+
/// Check that a channel's closing channel update has been broadcasted, and optionally
/// check whether an error message event has occurred.
pub fn check_closed_broadcast(node: &Node, num_channels: usize, with_error_msg: bool) -> Vec<msgs::ErrorMessage> {
+ let mut dummy_connected = false;
+ if !is_any_peer_connected(node) {
+ connect_dummy_node(&node);
+ dummy_connected = true;
+ }
let msg_events = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), if with_error_msg { num_channels * 2 } else { num_channels });
+ if dummy_connected {
+ disconnect_dummy_node(&node);
+ }
msg_events.into_iter().filter_map(|msg_event| {
match msg_event {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
/// there are any [`Event::HTLCHandlingFailed`] events their [`HTLCDestination`] is included in the
/// `expected_failures` set.
pub fn expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events: Vec<Event>, expected_failures: &[HTLCDestination]) {
- match events[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events),
- };
-
let count = expected_failures.len() + 1;
assert_eq!(events.len(), count);
-
+ assert!(events.iter().find(|event| matches!(event, Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. })).is_some());
if expected_failures.len() > 0 {
expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(events, expected_failures)
}
pub clear_recipient_events: bool,
pub expected_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
pub is_probe: bool,
+ pub custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
}
impl<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd> PassAlongPathArgs<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd> {
Self {
origin_node, expected_path, recv_value, payment_hash, payment_secret: None, event,
payment_claimable_expected: true, clear_recipient_events: true, expected_preimage: None,
- is_probe: false,
+ is_probe: false, custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
}
}
pub fn without_clearing_recipient_events(mut self) -> Self {
self.expected_preimage = Some(payment_preimage);
self
}
+ pub fn with_custom_tlvs(mut self, custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>) -> Self {
+ self.custom_tlvs = custom_tlvs;
+ self
+ }
}
pub fn do_pass_along_path<'a, 'b, 'c>(args: PassAlongPathArgs) -> Option<Event> {
let PassAlongPathArgs {
origin_node, expected_path, recv_value, payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
payment_secret: our_payment_secret, event: ev, payment_claimable_expected,
- clear_recipient_events, expected_preimage, is_probe
+ clear_recipient_events, expected_preimage, is_probe, custom_tlvs
} = args;
let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash);
assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
assert!(onion_fields.is_some());
+ assert_eq!(onion_fields.as_ref().unwrap().custom_tlvs, custom_tlvs);
match &purpose {
PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
assert_eq!(expected_preimage, *payment_preimage);
nodes
}
+pub fn connect_dummy_node<'a, 'b: 'a, 'c: 'b>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>) {
+ let node_id_dummy = PublicKey::from_slice(&[2; 33]).unwrap();
+
+ let mut dummy_init_features = InitFeatures::empty();
+ dummy_init_features.set_static_remote_key_required();
+
+ let init_dummy = msgs::Init {
+ features: dummy_init_features,
+ networks: None,
+ remote_network_address: None
+ };
+
+ node.node.peer_connected(&node_id_dummy, &init_dummy, true).unwrap();
+ node.onion_messenger.peer_connected(&node_id_dummy, &init_dummy, true).unwrap();
+}
+
+pub fn disconnect_dummy_node<'a, 'b: 'a, 'c: 'b>(node: &Node<'a, 'b, 'c>) {
+ let node_id_dummy = PublicKey::from_slice(&[2; 33]).unwrap();
+ node.node.peer_disconnected(&node_id_dummy);
+ node.onion_messenger.peer_disconnected(&node_id_dummy);
+}
+
// Note that the following only works for CLTV values up to 128
pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT: usize = 137; // Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
pub const ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT_ANCHORS: usize = 140; // Here we have a diff due to HTLC CLTV expiry being < 2^15 in test
}
pub fn handle_announce_close_broadcast_events<'a, 'b, 'c>(nodes: &Vec<Node<'a, 'b, 'c>>, a: usize, b: usize, needs_err_handle: bool, expected_error: &str) {
+ let mut dummy_connected = false;
+ if !is_any_peer_connected(&nodes[a]) {
+ connect_dummy_node(&nodes[a]);
+ dummy_connected = true
+ }
+
let events_1 = nodes[a].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
- let as_update = match events_1[0] {
+ let as_update = match events_1[1] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- match events_1[1] {
+ match events_1[0] {
MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[b].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_error);
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
-
+ if dummy_connected {
+ disconnect_dummy_node(&nodes[a]);
+ dummy_connected = false;
+ }
+ if !is_any_peer_connected(&nodes[b]) {
+ connect_dummy_node(&nodes[b]);
+ dummy_connected = true;
+ }
let events_2 = nodes[b].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_2.len(), if needs_err_handle { 1 } else { 2 });
- let bs_update = match events_2[0] {
+ let bs_update = match events_2.last().unwrap() {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
if !needs_err_handle {
- match events_2[1] {
+ match events_2[0] {
MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[a].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_error);
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
}
-
+ if dummy_connected {
+ disconnect_dummy_node(&nodes[b]);
+ }
for node in nodes {
node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
-use regex;
-
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
-use core::default::Default;
use core::iter::repeat;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
+ let close_chan_update_1 = match events[1] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- match events[1] {
+ match events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
},
connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
- let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
+ let close_chan_update_2 = match events[1] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
msg.clone()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
- match events[1] {
+ match events[0] {
MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
},
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
match events.last().unwrap() {
Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
match events[0] {
- Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
- match events[1] {
Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
+ match events[1] {
+ Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
+ _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
+ };
// Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
// block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
}
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[1] {
+ match events[2] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
}
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
- match events[0] {
+ match events[1] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[1] {
+ match events[2] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
}
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
- match events[1] {
+ match events[2] {
MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
}
connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
if deliver_last_raa {
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[1..2], true);
let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
// nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
- match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
+ match &process_htlc_forwards_event[1] {
&Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
+ // Connect a dummy node for proper future events broadcasting
+ connect_dummy_node(&nodes[0]);
+
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
- send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
+ let failed_payment_hash = send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000).1;
let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
- expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
+ expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
match events.last().unwrap() {
Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
//! Utilities to generate inbound payment information in service of invoice creation.
-use alloc::string::ToString;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
-use core::convert::{TryFrom, TryInto};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
use core::ops::Deref;
pub(crate) const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
#[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug, Ord, PartialOrd)]
pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8; 32]);
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
use bitcoin::bech32;
use bitcoin::bech32::{Base32Len, FromBase32, ToBase32, WriteBase32, u5};
use crate::onion_message;
use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
-#[cfg(feature = "std")]
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
+
use core::fmt;
use core::fmt::Debug;
use core::ops::Deref;
Io(io::ErrorKind),
/// The message included zlib-compressed values, which we don't support.
UnsupportedCompression,
+ /// Value is validly encoded but is dangerous to use.
+ ///
+ /// This is used for things like [`ChannelManager`] deserialization where we want to ensure
+ /// that we don't use a [`ChannelManager`] which is in out of sync with the [`ChannelMonitor`].
+ /// This indicates that there is a critical implementation flaw in the storage implementation
+ /// and it's unsafe to continue.
+ ///
+ /// [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
+ /// [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
+ DangerousValue,
}
/// An [`init`] message to be sent to or received from a peer.
mod fuzzy_internal_msgs {
use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, PaymentRelay};
- use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
use crate::ln::features::BlindedHopFeatures;
use super::{FinalOnionHopData, TrampolineOnionPacket};
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+
// These types aren't intended to be pub, but are exposed for direct fuzzing (as we deserialize
// them from untrusted input):
payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints,
intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
}
}
encrypted_tlvs: Vec<u8>,
intro_node_blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, // Set if the introduction node of the blinded path is the final node
keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
+ custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) enum OutboundTrampolinePayload {
+ #[allow(unused)]
+ Forward {
+ /// The value, in msat, of the payment after this hop's fee is deducted.
+ amt_to_forward: u64,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
+ /// The node id to which the trampoline node must find a route
+ outgoing_node_id: PublicKey,
}
}
// Unlike the onion packets used for payments, Trampoline onion packets have to be shorter than
// 1300 bytes. The expected default is 650 bytes.
// TODO: if 650 ends up being the most common size, optimize this to be:
- // enum { ThirteenHundred([u8; 650]), VarLen(Vec<u8>) }
+ // enum { SixFifty([u8; 650]), VarLen(Vec<u8>) }
pub hop_data: Vec<u8>,
/// HMAC to verify the integrity of hop_data
pub hmac: [u8; 32],
DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor => f.write_str("A length descriptor in the packet didn't describe the later data correctly"),
DecodeError::Io(ref e) => fmt::Debug::fmt(e, f),
DecodeError::UnsupportedCompression => f.write_str("We don't support receiving messages with zlib-compressed fields"),
+ DecodeError::DangerousValue => f.write_str("Value would be dangerous to continue execution with"),
}
}
}
},
Self::BlindedReceive {
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, total_msat, cltv_expiry_height, encrypted_tlvs,
- intro_node_blinding_point, keysend_preimage,
+ intro_node_blinding_point, keysend_preimage, ref custom_tlvs,
} => {
+ // We need to update [`ln::outbound_payment::RecipientOnionFields::with_custom_tlvs`]
+ // to reject any reserved types in the experimental range if new ones are ever
+ // standardized.
+ let keysend_tlv = keysend_preimage.map(|preimage| (5482373484, preimage.encode()));
+ let mut custom_tlvs: Vec<&(u64, Vec<u8>)> = custom_tlvs.iter().chain(keysend_tlv.iter()).collect();
+ custom_tlvs.sort_unstable_by_key(|(typ, _)| *typ);
_encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
(2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat), required),
(4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*cltv_expiry_height), required),
(10, *encrypted_tlvs, required_vec),
(12, intro_node_blinding_point, option),
- (18, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*total_msat), required),
- (5482373484, keysend_preimage, option)
- });
+ (18, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*total_msat), required)
+ }, custom_tlvs.iter());
},
}
Ok(())
}
}
+impl Writeable for OutboundTrampolinePayload {
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ match self {
+ Self::Forward { amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, outgoing_node_id } => {
+ _encode_varint_length_prefixed_tlv!(w, {
+ (2, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*amt_to_forward), required),
+ (4, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize(*outgoing_cltv_value), required),
+ (14, outgoing_node_id, required)
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+
impl<NS: Deref> ReadableArgs<(Option<PublicKey>, &NS)> for InboundOnionPayload where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R, args: (Option<PublicKey>, &NS)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
let (update_add_blinding_point, node_signer) = args;
payment_constraints,
intro_node_blinding_point,
keysend_preimage,
+ custom_tlvs,
})
},
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use std::convert::TryFrom;
use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxIn, ScriptBuf, Sequence, Witness, TxOut};
use hex::DisplayHex;
use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
use crate::sign::{NodeSigner, Recipient};
use crate::util::logger::Logger;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
use core::ops::Deref;
/// Invalid inbound onion payment.
cltv_expiry_height, payment_metadata, false),
msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, total_msat, cltv_expiry_height, payment_secret,
- intro_node_blinding_point, payment_constraints, keysend_preimage, ..
+ intro_node_blinding_point, payment_constraints, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs
} => {
check_blinded_payment_constraints(
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, cltv_expiry, &payment_constraints
}
})?;
let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
- (Some(payment_data), keysend_preimage, Vec::new(),
+ (Some(payment_data), keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs,
sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, cltv_expiry_height, None,
intro_node_blinding_point.is_none())
}
use crate::routing::router::{get_route, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, RouteHint, RouteHintHop};
use crate::ln::features::{InitFeatures, Bolt11InvoiceFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
-use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ChannelUpdate};
+use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, ChannelUpdate, OutboundTrampolinePayload};
use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, BigSize};
use crate::util::test_utils;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
-use core::default::Default;
+use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
}
}
+#[test]
+fn test_trampoline_onion_payload_serialization() {
+ // As per https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/c01d2e6267d4a8d1095f0f1188970055a9a22d29/bolt04/trampoline-payment-onion-test.json#L3
+ let trampoline_payload = OutboundTrampolinePayload::Forward {
+ amt_to_forward: 100000000,
+ outgoing_cltv_value: 800000,
+ outgoing_node_id: PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145").unwrap()).unwrap(),
+ };
+
+ let slice_to_hex = |slice: &[u8]| {
+ slice.iter()
+ .map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b).to_string())
+ .collect::<String>()
+ };
+
+ let carol_payload_hex = slice_to_hex(&trampoline_payload.encode());
+ assert_eq!(carol_payload_hex, "2e020405f5e10004030c35000e2102edabbd16b41c8371b92ef2f04c1185b4f03b6dcd52ba9b78d9d7c89c8f221145");
+}
+
fn do_test_fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(failure_code: FailureCode) {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Scalar, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
use crate::io::{Cursor, Read};
-use crate::prelude::*;
-use core::convert::{AsMut, TryInto};
use core::ops::Deref;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
pub(crate) struct OnionKeys {
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) shared_secret: SharedSecret,
encrypted_tlvs: blinded_hop.encrypted_payload.clone(),
intro_node_blinding_point: blinding_point.take(),
keysend_preimage: *keysend_preimage,
+ custom_tlvs: recipient_onion.custom_tlvs.clone(),
});
} else {
res.push(msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
)
}
+#[allow(unused)]
+pub(super) fn construct_trampoline_onion_packet(
+ payloads: Vec<msgs::OutboundTrampolinePayload>, onion_keys: Vec<OnionKeys>,
+ prng_seed: [u8; 32], associated_data: &PaymentHash, length: u16,
+) -> Result<msgs::TrampolineOnionPacket, ()> {
+ let mut packet_data = vec![0u8; length as usize];
+
+ let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&prng_seed, &[0; 8]);
+ chacha.process(&vec![0u8; length as usize], &mut packet_data);
+
+ construct_onion_packet_with_init_noise::<_, _>(
+ payloads,
+ onion_keys,
+ packet_data,
+ Some(associated_data),
+ )
+}
+
#[cfg(test)]
/// Used in testing to write bogus `BogusOnionHopData` as well as `RawOnionHopData`, which is
/// otherwise not representable in `msgs::OnionHopData`.
},
}
+impl Hop {
+ pub(crate) fn is_intro_node_blinded_forward(&self) -> bool {
+ match self {
+ Self::Forward {
+ next_hop_data:
+ msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
+ intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
+ },
+ ..
+ } => true,
+ _ => false,
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/// Error returned when we fail to decode the onion packet.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) enum OnionDecodeErr {
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
- use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::routing::router::{Path, Route, RouteHop};
use crate::util::ser::{VecWriter, Writeable, Writer};
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
- let payment_claimable = pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000,
- payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None).unwrap();
- match payment_claimable {
- Event::PaymentClaimable { onion_fields, .. } => {
- assert_eq!(&onion_fields.unwrap().custom_tlvs()[..], &custom_tlvs[..]);
- },
- _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
- };
+ let path = &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]];
+ let args = PassAlongPathArgs::new(&nodes[0], path, 1_000_000, payment_hash, events.pop().unwrap())
+ .with_payment_secret(payment_secret)
+ .with_custom_tlvs(custom_tlvs);
+ do_pass_along_path(args);
claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], false, payment_preimage);
}
use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
use crate::io;
-use alloc::collections::VecDeque;
use crate::sync::{Mutex, MutexGuard, FairRwLock};
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU32, AtomicI32, Ordering};
use core::{cmp, hash, fmt, mem};
fn handle_query_short_channel_ids(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey, _msg: msgs::QueryShortChannelIds) -> Result<(), LightningError> { Ok(()) }
fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures { NodeFeatures::empty() }
fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_node_id: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
- InitFeatures::empty()
+ let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
+ features.set_gossip_queries_optional();
+ features
}
fn processing_queue_high(&self) -> bool { false }
}
}
(msgs::DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor, _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { }),
(msgs::DecodeError::Io(_), _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { }),
+ (msgs::DecodeError::DangerousValue, _) => return Err(PeerHandleError { }),
}
}
};
}
/// Process an incoming message and return a decision (ok, lightning error, peer handling error) regarding the next action with the peer
+ ///
/// Returns the message back if it needs to be broadcasted to all other peers.
fn handle_message(
&self,
peer_mutex: &Mutex<Peer>,
-
mut peer_lock: MutexGuard<Peer>,
- message: wire::Message<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>
- ) -> Result<Option<wire::Message<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>>, MessageHandlingError> {
+ peer_lock: MutexGuard<Peer>,
+ message: wire::Message<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>
+ ) -> Result<Option<wire::Message<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>>, MessageHandlingError> {
let their_node_id = peer_lock.their_node_id.clone().expect("We know the peer's public key by the time we receive messages").0;
let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(their_node_id), None);
+
+ let message = match self.do_handle_message_holding_peer_lock(peer_lock, message, &their_node_id, &logger)? {
+ Some(processed_message) => processed_message,
+ None => return Ok(None),
+ };
+
+ self.do_handle_message_without_peer_lock(peer_mutex, message, &their_node_id, &logger)
+ }
+
+ // Conducts all message processing that requires us to hold the `peer_lock`.
+ //
+ // Returns `None` if the message was fully processed and otherwise returns the message back to
+ // allow it to be subsequently processed by `do_handle_message_without_peer_lock`.
+ fn do_handle_message_holding_peer_lock<'a>(
+ &self,
+ mut peer_lock: MutexGuard<Peer>,
+ message: wire::Message<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>,
+ their_node_id: &PublicKey,
+ logger: &WithContext<'a, L>
+ ) -> Result<Option<wire::Message<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>>, MessageHandlingError>
+ {
peer_lock.received_message_since_timer_tick = true;
// Need an Init as first message
peer_lock.received_channel_announce_since_backlogged = true;
}
- mem::drop(peer_lock);
+ Ok(Some(message))
+ }
+ // Conducts all message processing that doesn't require us to hold the `peer_lock`.
+ //
+ // Returns the message back if it needs to be broadcasted to all other peers.
+ fn do_handle_message_without_peer_lock<'a>(
+ &self,
+ peer_mutex: &Mutex<Peer>,
+ message: wire::Message<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>,
+ their_node_id: &PublicKey,
+ logger: &WithContext<'a, L>
+ ) -> Result<Option<wire::Message<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>>, MessageHandlingError>
+ {
if is_gossip_msg(message.type_id()) {
log_gossip!(logger, "Received message {:?} from {}", message, log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
} else {
Ok(should_forward)
}
- fn forward_broadcast_msg(&self, peers: &HashMap<Descriptor, Mutex<Peer>>, msg: &wire::Message<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>, except_node: Option<&PublicKey>) {
+ fn forward_broadcast_msg(&self, peers: &HashMap<Descriptor, Mutex<Peer>>, msg: &wire::Message<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>, except_node: Option<&PublicKey>) {
match msg {
wire::Message::ChannelAnnouncement(ref msg) => {
log_gossip!(self.logger, "Sending message to all peers except {:?} or the announced channel's counterparties: {:?}", except_node, msg);
// We do not have the peers write lock, so we just store that we're
// about to disconnect the peer and do it after we finish
// processing most messages.
- let msg = msg.map(|msg| wire::Message::<<<CMH as core::ops::Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>::Error(msg));
+ let msg = msg.map(|msg| wire::Message::<<<CMH as Deref>::Target as wire::CustomMessageReader>::CustomMessage>::Error(msg));
peers_to_disconnect.insert(node_id, msg);
},
msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { msg } => {
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
- use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
use core::convert::Infallible;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
+ use crate::prelude::*;
+
#[derive(Clone)]
struct FileDescriptor {
fd: u16,
use crate::util::test_utils;
use crate::prelude::*;
-use core::default::Default;
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use crate::prelude::*;
-use core::default::Default;
use crate::sync::Mutex;
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
}
let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
- if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
+ if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::DangerousValue) =
<(BlockHash, ChannelManager<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestRouter, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
default_config: UserConfig::default(),
entropy_source: keys_manager,
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
use crate::io;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
/// A script pubkey for shutting down a channel as defined by [BOLT #2].
///
/// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
#[cfg(test)]
mod shutdown_script_tests {
use super::ShutdownScript;
+
+ use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
+
use crate::ln::features::InitFeatures;
- use core::convert::TryFrom;
- use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
+ use crate::prelude::*;
fn pubkey() -> bitcoin::key::PublicKey {
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
+use crate::prelude::*;
use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
-use regex;
-
-use core::default::Default;
-use std::convert::TryFrom;
-
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
#[test]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::prelude::*;
- use core::convert::TryInto;
use crate::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
// Big-endian wire encoding of Pong message (type = 19, byteslen = 2).
-// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
+ // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr::Signature;
use bitcoin::address::{Address, Payload, WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
use bitcoin::key::TweakedPublicKey;
-use core::convert::{AsRef, TryFrom};
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::io;
use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
use crate::util::ser::{HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Iterable, SeekReadable, WithoutLength, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, Secp256k1, XOnlyPublicKey, self};
use bitcoin::address::{Address, Payload, WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
use bitcoin::key::TweakedPublicKey;
- use core::convert::TryFrom;
+
use core::time::Duration;
+
use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedHop, BlindedPath};
use crate::sign::KeyMaterial;
use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, InvoiceRequestFeatures, OfferFeatures};
use crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestTlvStreamRef;
use crate::offers::merkle::{SignError, SignatureTlvStreamRef, TaggedHash, self};
use crate::offers::offer::{Amount, OfferTlvStreamRef, Quantity};
+ use crate::prelude::*;
#[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
use {
crate::offers::offer::OfferBuilder,
use crate::util::ser::{HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, Readable, WithoutLength, Writeable, Writer};
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
/// An error in response to an [`InvoiceRequest`] or an [`Bolt12Invoice`].
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, PublicKey, Secp256k1, self};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr::Signature;
-use core::convert::{AsRef, TryFrom};
use core::ops::Deref;
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
use crate::io;
crate::offers::invoice::{InvoiceWithDerivedSigningPubkeyBuilder, InvoiceWithExplicitSigningPubkeyBuilder},
};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
/// Tag for the hash function used when signing an [`InvoiceRequest`]'s merkle root.
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, Secp256k1, SecretKey, self};
- use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::num::NonZeroU64;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
use core::time::Duration;
use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine, sha256};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, Secp256k1, self};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr::Signature;
-use core::convert::AsRef;
use crate::io;
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, Readable, Writeable, Writer};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
/// Valid type range for signature TLV records.
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, PublicKey, Secp256k1, self};
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
use core::num::NonZeroU64;
use core::ops::Deref;
crate::offers::invoice_request::{InvoiceRequestWithDerivedPayerIdBuilder, InvoiceRequestWithExplicitPayerIdBuilder},
};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
}
}
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<'a> From<OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder<'a>>
+for OfferBuilder<'a, DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
+ fn from(builder: OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder<'a>) -> Self {
+ let OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder { offer, metadata_strategy, secp_ctx } = builder;
+
+ Self { offer, metadata_strategy, secp_ctx }
+ }
+}
+
/// An `Offer` is a potentially long-lived proposal for payment of a good or service.
///
/// An offer is a precursor to an [`InvoiceRequest`]. A merchant publishes an offer from which a
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
- use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::num::NonZeroU64;
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedHop, BlindedPath};
use bitcoin::bech32;
use bitcoin::secp256k1;
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
use crate::io;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::util::ser::SeekReadable;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
mod sealed {
use bitcoin::bech32;
use bitcoin::bech32::{FromBase32, ToBase32};
- use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::fmt;
use super::Bolt12ParseError;
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
/// Indicates a message can be encoded using bech32.
use crate::offers::signer::Metadata;
use crate::util::ser::WithoutLength;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
/// An unpredictable sequence of bytes typically containing information needed to derive
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, self};
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::hash::{Hash, Hasher};
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::str::FromStr;
crate::offers::invoice::{InvoiceWithDerivedSigningPubkeyBuilder, InvoiceWithExplicitSigningPubkeyBuilder},
};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
}
}
+#[cfg(c_bindings)]
+impl<'a> From<RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder<'a>>
+for RefundBuilder<'a, secp256k1::All> {
+ fn from(builder: RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder<'a>) -> Self {
+ let RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder { refund, secp_ctx } = builder;
+
+ Self { refund, secp_ctx }
+ }
+}
+
/// A `Refund` is a request to send an [`Bolt12Invoice`] without a preceding [`Offer`].
///
/// Typically, after an invoice is paid, the recipient may publish a refund allowing the sender to
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
- use core::convert::TryFrom;
+
use core::time::Duration;
+
use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedHop, BlindedPath};
use crate::sign::KeyMaterial;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::PaymentId;
use crate::offers::test_utils::*;
use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, Writeable};
use crate::util::string::PrintableString;
+ use crate::prelude::*;
trait ToBytes {
fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8>;
use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey, self};
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::fmt;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::PaymentId;
use crate::ln::inbound_payment::{ExpandedKey, IV_LEN, Nonce};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{KeyPair, PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr::Signature;
-use core::convert::AsRef;
+
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedHop, BlindedPath};
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
use crate::offers::invoice::BlindedPayInfo;
use crate::offers::merkle::TaggedHash;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
pub(crate) fn fail_sign<T: AsRef<TaggedHash>>(_message: &T) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
Err(())
}
//! Message handling for BOLT 12 Offers.
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::fmt;
use crate::io::{self, Read};
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::io_extras::{copy, sink};
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, fmt};
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
use crate::sync::{RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, LockTestExt};
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::Arc;
- use core::convert::TryInto;
-
fn get_channel_details(short_channel_id: Option<u64>, node_id: PublicKey,
features: InitFeatures, outbound_capacity_msat: u64) -> channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
channelmanager::ChannelDetails {
use std::time::Duration;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
- use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
+ use bitcoin::secp256k1::SecretKey;
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::routing::scoring::ScoreUpdate;
- use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager};
+ use crate::sign::KeysManager;
use crate::ln::ChannelId;
- use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelCounterparty, ChannelDetails};
- use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
- use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
+ use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelCounterparty};
use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
- use crate::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
use crate::util::test_utils::TestLogger;
/// Tries to open a network graph file, or panics with a URL to fetch it.
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::{cmp, fmt};
-use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::{Deref, DerefMut};
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::io::{self, Read};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, All};
+#[allow(unused)]
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::sync::{self, Arc};
use super::*;
use crate::routing::gossip::tests::*;
use crate::util::test_utils::{TestChainSource, TestLogger};
- use crate::ln::msgs;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, SecretKey};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, ClosingTransaction};
use crate::ln::msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, HTLCDescriptor};
/// A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
use crate::offers::invoice_request::UnsignedInvoiceRequest;
use crate::prelude::*;
-use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
#[cfg(taproot)]
fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
}
+// Primarily needed in doctests because of https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/67295
+/// A dynamic [`SignerProvider`] temporarily needed for doc tests.
+#[cfg(taproot)]
+#[doc(hidden)]
+#[deprecated(note = "Remove once taproot cfg is removed")]
+pub type DynSignerProvider = dyn SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner, TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner>;
+
+/// A dynamic [`SignerProvider`] temporarily needed for doc tests.
+#[cfg(not(taproot))]
+#[doc(hidden)]
+#[deprecated(note = "Remove once taproot cfg is removed")]
+pub type DynSignerProvider = dyn SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner>;
+
/// A trait that can return signer instances for individual channels.
pub trait SignerProvider {
/// A type which implements [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`] which will be returned by [`Self::derive_channel_signer`].
}
}
}
- let symbol = symbol_after_latest_debug_sync.expect("Couldn't find lock call symbol");
+ let symbol = symbol_after_latest_debug_sync.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+ panic!("Couldn't find lock call symbol in trace {:?}", backtrace);
+ });
(format!("{}:{}", symbol.filename().unwrap().display(), symbol.lineno().unwrap()), symbol.colno())
}
// Apache License, Version 2.0, (LICENSE-APACHE or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0) or
// MIT license (LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT) at your option.
-
+#[allow(unused)]
use crate::prelude::*;
/// RFC4648 encoding table
use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
-use alloc::string::String;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
use core::fmt;
/// Indicates an error on the client's part (usually some variant of attempting to use too-low or
//! This module has a map which can be iterated in a deterministic order. See the [`IndexedMap`].
use crate::prelude::*;
-use alloc::vec::Vec;
use alloc::slice::Iter;
use core::hash::Hash;
-use core::cmp::Ord;
use core::ops::{Bound, RangeBounds};
/// A map which can be iterated in a deterministic order.
//! Low level invoice utilities.
use bitcoin::bech32::{u5, FromBase32};
+
+#[allow(unused)]
use crate::prelude::*;
/// Construct the invoice's HRP and signatureless data into a preimage to be hashed.
//! <https://lightning.readthedocs.io/lightning-signmessage.7.html>
//! <https://api.lightning.community/#signmessage>
+#[allow(unused)]
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::util::base32;
use bitcoin::hashes::{sha256d, Hash};
//! [`ChannelManager`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager
use core::cmp;
-use core::convert::{TryFrom, TryInto};
use core::ops::Deref;
use core::str::FromStr;
use bitcoin::{BlockHash, Txid};
use crate::{io, log_error};
-use crate::alloc::string::ToString;
use crate::prelude::*;
use crate::chain;
}
-impl<'a, A: KVStore, CM: Deref, L: Deref, S: WriteableScore<'a>> Persister<'a, CM, L, S> for A
+impl<'a, A: KVStore + ?Sized, CM: Deref, L: Deref, S: WriteableScore<'a>> Persister<'a, CM, L, S> for A
where
CM::Target: 'static + AChannelManager,
L::Target: 'static + Logger,
}
}
-impl<'a, CM: Deref, L: Deref, S: WriteableScore<'a>> Persister<'a, CM, L, S> for dyn KVStore + Send + Sync
-where
- CM::Target: 'static + AChannelManager,
- L::Target: 'static + Logger,
-{
- fn persist_manager(&self, channel_manager: &CM) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- self.write(CHANNEL_MANAGER_PERSISTENCE_PRIMARY_NAMESPACE,
- CHANNEL_MANAGER_PERSISTENCE_SECONDARY_NAMESPACE,
- CHANNEL_MANAGER_PERSISTENCE_KEY,
- &channel_manager.get_cm().encode())
- }
-
- fn persist_graph(&self, network_graph: &NetworkGraph<L>) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- self.write(NETWORK_GRAPH_PERSISTENCE_PRIMARY_NAMESPACE,
- NETWORK_GRAPH_PERSISTENCE_SECONDARY_NAMESPACE,
- NETWORK_GRAPH_PERSISTENCE_KEY,
- &network_graph.encode())
- }
-
- fn persist_scorer(&self, scorer: &S) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
- self.write(SCORER_PERSISTENCE_PRIMARY_NAMESPACE,
- SCORER_PERSISTENCE_SECONDARY_NAMESPACE,
- SCORER_PERSISTENCE_KEY,
- &scorer.encode())
- }
-}
-
-impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, K: KVStore> Persist<ChannelSigner> for K {
- // TODO: We really need a way for the persister to inform the user that its time to crash/shut
- // down once these start returning failure.
- // Then we should return InProgress rather than UnrecoverableError, implying we should probably
- // just shut down the node since we're not retrying persistence!
-
- fn persist_new_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>, _update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
- let key = format!("{}_{}", funding_txo.txid.to_string(), funding_txo.index);
- match self.write(
- CHANNEL_MONITOR_PERSISTENCE_PRIMARY_NAMESPACE,
- CHANNEL_MONITOR_PERSISTENCE_SECONDARY_NAMESPACE,
- &key, &monitor.encode())
- {
- Ok(()) => chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
- Err(_) => chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError
- }
- }
-
- fn update_persisted_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, _update: Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, monitor: &ChannelMonitor<ChannelSigner>, _update_id: MonitorUpdateId) -> chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus {
- let key = format!("{}_{}", funding_txo.txid.to_string(), funding_txo.index);
- match self.write(
- CHANNEL_MONITOR_PERSISTENCE_PRIMARY_NAMESPACE,
- CHANNEL_MONITOR_PERSISTENCE_SECONDARY_NAMESPACE,
- &key, &monitor.encode())
- {
- Ok(()) => chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed,
- Err(_) => chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError
- }
- }
-}
-
-impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Persist<ChannelSigner> for dyn KVStore + Send + Sync {
+impl<ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, K: KVStore + ?Sized> Persist<ChannelSigner> for K {
// TODO: We really need a way for the persister to inform the user that its time to crash/shut
// down once these start returning failure.
// Then we should return InProgress rather than UnrecoverableError, implying we should probably
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
- use crate::chain::chainmonitor::Persist;
use crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus;
use crate::events::{ClosureReason, MessageSendEventsProvider};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::util::test_utils::{self, TestLogger, TestStore};
use crate::{check_added_monitors, check_closed_broadcast};
+ use crate::sync::Arc;
+ use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
const EXPECTED_UPDATES_PER_PAYMENT: u64 = 5;
.read(CHANNEL_MONITOR_UPDATE_PERSISTENCE_PRIMARY_NAMESPACE, monitor_name.as_str(), UpdateName::from(u64::MAX - 1).as_str())
.is_err());
}
+
+ fn persist_fn<P: Deref, ChannelSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(_persist: P) -> bool where P::Target: Persist<ChannelSigner> {
+ true
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn kvstore_trait_object_usage() {
+ let store: Arc<dyn KVStore + Send + Sync> = Arc::new(TestStore::new(false));
+ assert!(persist_fn::<_, TestChannelSigner>(store.clone()));
+ }
}
use crate::sign::EntropySource;
use crate::crypto::chacha20::ChaCha20;
use crate::util::scid_utils;
+ use crate::prelude::*;
- use core::convert::TryInto;
use core::ops::Deref;
const TEST_SEGWIT_ACTIVATION_HEIGHT: u32 = 1;
use core::hash::Hash;
use crate::sync::{Mutex, RwLock};
use core::cmp;
-use core::convert::TryFrom;
use core::ops::Deref;
use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
use bitcoin::consensus::Encodable;
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
-use core::marker::Sized;
use core::time::Duration;
use crate::chain::ClaimId;
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
/// forward to ensure we always consume exactly the fixed length specified.
///
/// This is not exported to bindings users as manual TLV building is not currently supported in bindings
-pub struct FixedLengthReader<R: Read> {
- read: R,
+pub struct FixedLengthReader<'a, R: Read> {
+ read: &'a mut R,
bytes_read: u64,
total_bytes: u64,
}
-impl<R: Read> FixedLengthReader<R> {
+impl<'a, R: Read> FixedLengthReader<'a, R> {
/// Returns a new [`FixedLengthReader`].
- pub fn new(read: R, total_bytes: u64) -> Self {
+ pub fn new(read: &'a mut R, total_bytes: u64) -> Self {
Self { read, bytes_read: 0, total_bytes }
}
}
}
}
-impl<R: Read> Read for FixedLengthReader<R> {
+impl<'a, R: Read> Read for FixedLengthReader<'a, R> {
#[inline]
fn read(&mut self, dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize, io::Error> {
if self.total_bytes == self.bytes_read {
}
}
-impl<R: Read> LengthRead for FixedLengthReader<R> {
+impl<'a, R: Read> LengthRead for FixedLengthReader<'a, R> {
#[inline]
fn total_bytes(&self) -> u64 {
self.total_bytes
}
}
+// Alternatives to impl_writeable_for_vec/impl_readable_for_vec that add a length prefix to each
+// element in the Vec. Intended to be used when elements have variable lengths.
+macro_rules! impl_writeable_for_vec_with_element_length_prefix {
+ ($ty: ty $(, $name: ident)*) => {
+ impl<$($name : Writeable),*> Writeable for Vec<$ty> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
+ CollectionLength(self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
+ for elem in self.iter() {
+ CollectionLength(elem.serialized_length() as u64).write(w)?;
+ elem.write(w)?;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+macro_rules! impl_readable_for_vec_with_element_length_prefix {
+ ($ty: ty $(, $name: ident)*) => {
+ impl<$($name : Readable),*> Readable for Vec<$ty> {
+ #[inline]
+ fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
+ let len: CollectionLength = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(len.0 as usize, MAX_BUF_SIZE / core::mem::size_of::<$ty>()));
+ for _ in 0..len.0 {
+ let elem_len: CollectionLength = Readable::read(r)?;
+ let mut elem_reader = FixedLengthReader::new(r, elem_len.0);
+ if let Some(val) = MaybeReadable::read(&mut elem_reader)? {
+ ret.push(val);
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(ret)
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+macro_rules! impl_for_vec_with_element_length_prefix {
+ ($ty: ty $(, $name: ident)*) => {
+ impl_writeable_for_vec_with_element_length_prefix!($ty $(, $name)*);
+ impl_readable_for_vec_with_element_length_prefix!($ty $(, $name)*);
+ }
+}
+
impl Writeable for Vec<u8> {
#[inline]
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
impl_for_vec!((A, B), A, B);
impl_writeable_for_vec!(&crate::routing::router::BlindedTail);
impl_readable_for_vec!(crate::routing::router::BlindedTail);
+impl_for_vec_with_element_length_prefix!(crate::ln::msgs::UpdateAddHTLC);
+impl_writeable_for_vec_with_element_length_prefix!(&crate::ln::msgs::UpdateAddHTLC);
impl Writeable for Vec<Witness> {
#[inline]
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use core::convert::TryFrom;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa;
use crate::util::ser::{Readable, Hostname, Writeable};
+ use crate::prelude::*;
#[test]
fn hostname_conversion() {
$($variant_id => {
// Because read_tlv_fields creates a labeled loop, we cannot call it twice
// in the same function body. Instead, we define a closure and call it.
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
$crate::_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
$(($type, $field, $fieldty)),*
});
$($variant_id => {
// Because read_tlv_fields creates a labeled loop, we cannot call it twice
// in the same function body. Instead, we define a closure and call it.
- let f = || {
+ let mut f = || {
$crate::_init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
$(($type, $field, $fieldty)),*
});
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
- use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
+ #[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
+ use crate::io::{self, Cursor};
use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, HighZeroBytesDroppedBigSize, VecWriter};
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
//! Utilities for strings.
-use alloc::string::String;
use core::fmt;
use crate::io::{self, Read};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, Writer, Readable};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+use crate::prelude::*;
+
/// Struct to `Display` fields in a safe way using `PrintableString`
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, PartialOrd, Ord, Default)]
pub struct UntrustedString(pub String);
use crate::sign::{InMemorySigner, ChannelSigner};
use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
use core::cmp;
use crate::sync::{Mutex, Arc};
#[cfg(test)] use crate::sync::MutexGuard;
use crate::chain::WatchedOutput;
use crate::chain::chaininterface;
use crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget;
+#[cfg(test)]
use crate::chain::chaininterface::FEERATE_FLOOR_SATS_PER_KW;
use crate::chain::chainmonitor;
use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{MonitorUpdateId, UpdateOrigin};
use crate::events::bump_transaction::{WalletSource, Utxo};
use crate::ln::ChannelId;
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{ChannelDetails, self};
+#[cfg(test)]
use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::{msgs, wire};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
use bitcoin::secp256k1::schnorr;
-#[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
-use regex;
-
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use core::cell::RefCell;
}
}
+#[cfg(test)]
struct JusticeTxData {
justice_tx: Transaction,
value: u64,
commitment_number: u64,
}
+#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) struct WatchtowerPersister {
persister: TestPersister,
/// Upon a new commitment_signed, we'll get a
destination_script: ScriptBuf,
}
+#[cfg(test)]
impl WatchtowerPersister {
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn new(destination_script: ScriptBuf) -> Self {
}
}
+#[cfg(test)]
impl<Signer: sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> chainmonitor::Persist<Signer> for WatchtowerPersister {
fn persist_new_channel(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint,
data: &channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<Signer>, id: MonitorUpdateId
/// Returns an instance corresponding to the current moment.
fn now() -> Self;
- /// Returns the amount of time elapsed since `self` was created.
- fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration;
-
/// Returns the amount of time passed between `earlier` and `self`.
fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration;
-
- /// Returns the amount of time passed since the beginning of [`Time`].
- ///
- /// Used during (de-)serialization.
- fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration;
}
/// A state in which time has no meaning.
fn duration_since(&self, _earlier: Self) -> Duration {
Duration::from_secs(0)
}
-
- fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
- Duration::from_secs(0)
- }
-
- fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
- Duration::from_secs(0)
- }
}
impl Sub<Duration> for Eternity {
let now = Self::now();
if now.0 > earlier.0 { now.0 - earlier.0 } else { Duration::from_secs(0) }
}
-
- fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
- use std::time::SystemTime;
- SystemTime::now().duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap()
- }
-
- fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
- Self::now().0 - self.0
- }
}
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
impl Time for SinceEpoch {
fn now() -> Self {
- Self(Self::duration_since_epoch())
+ Self(Self::ELAPSED.with(|elapsed| elapsed.get()))
}
fn duration_since(&self, earlier: Self) -> Duration {
self.0 - earlier.0
}
-
- fn duration_since_epoch() -> Duration {
- Self::ELAPSED.with(|elapsed| elapsed.get())
- }
-
- fn elapsed(&self) -> Duration {
- Self::duration_since_epoch() - self.0
- }
}
impl Sub<Duration> for SinceEpoch {
#[test]
fn time_passes_when_advanced() {
let now = SinceEpoch::now();
- assert_eq!(now.elapsed(), Duration::from_secs(0));
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
SinceEpoch::advance(Duration::from_secs(1));
- let elapsed = now.elapsed();
let later = SinceEpoch::now();
- assert_eq!(elapsed, Duration::from_secs(2));
- assert_eq!(later - elapsed, now);
+ assert_eq!(now.0 + Duration::from_secs(2), later.0);
}
#[test]
fn time_never_passes_in_an_eternity() {
let now = Eternity::now();
- let elapsed = now.elapsed();
let later = Eternity::now();
- assert_eq!(now.elapsed(), Duration::from_secs(0));
- assert_eq!(later - elapsed, now);
- }
-
- #[test]
- #[cfg(feature = "std")]
- fn monotonic_time_subtracts() {
- let now = super::MonotonicTime::now();
- assert!(now.elapsed() < Duration::from_secs(10));
-
- let ten_years = Duration::from_secs(10 * 365 * 24 * 60 * 60);
- let past = now - ten_years;
- assert!(past.elapsed() >= ten_years);
+ assert_eq!(later, now);
}
}
use crate::ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
+
use crate::io_extras::sink;
use core::cmp::Ordering;
use super::*;
use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
- use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, TxIn, OutPoint};
- use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, OutPoint};
+ use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::hash_types::{PubkeyHash, Txid};
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
use core::mem;
use crate::sync::Mutex;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
use crate::prelude::*;
#[cfg(feature = "std")]
use super::*;
use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use core::future::Future as FutureTrait;
- use core::task::{Context, Poll, RawWaker, RawWakerVTable, Waker};
+ use core::task::{RawWaker, RawWakerVTable};
#[test]
fn notifier_pre_notified_future() {
projects / rust-lightning / commitdiff